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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRIALISATION 
- THE ROLE OF THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX
ABSTRACT
This thesis provides an original interpretation of 
the trajectory of South Africa's post-war 
industrialisation by emphasising the role played by the 
economy's Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC).
The MEC is viewed as a system of accumulation, 
encompassing a number of core economic sectors and 
imparting a determining influence on the pattern of 
industrialisation and economic performance. The 
development of the MEC has been mediated by relationships 
between English and Afrikaner fractions of capital 
through the state, giving rise to a conglomerate form of 
private and public corporate structure, straddling the 
mining, manufacturing and financial sectors.
By examining the MEC empirically, through primary 
and secondary material from the inter-war period to the 
present day, it is shown that past debates over the 
rhythm of industrialisation have been based, both on a 
false perception of the pattern of (import-substituting) 
industrialisation’and on a partial and even false 
recognition of how industrial policy has been adopted and 
implemented. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there was 
capability in capital goods and other industries in and 
around the MEC but their potential scope has not been 
exploited through coherent industrial policy.
In the 1950s, efforts at diversification were hampered by 
the objective of creating large-scale Afrikaner capital. 
Foreign disinvestment after 1961 opened new opportunities 
for domestic investment, while the disjuncture between
2
large-scale English and Afrikaner capital narrowed as the 
former assisted the latter to enter gold mining and as 
further interpenetration between the two occurred. 
Policies of strengthening the MEC followed the gold and 
energy price rise in the 1970s, while the crisis of the 
1980s precluded policies of industrial diversification 
from being implemented. Consequently, the industrial 
structure and institutional impetus that represent the 
MEC continue to guide South Africa's industrial 
trajectory into the 1990s.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis provides an original interpretation of 
the trajectory of South Africa's post-war 
industrialisation by emphasising the role played by the 
economy's Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC). The MEC is 
viewed as a system of accumulation, encompassing a number 
of core economic sectors, which has imparted a 
determining influence on the pattern of industrialisation 
and on economic performance.
A number of broad assumptions have been made in this 
thesis. The most important concern the theoretical 
stances adopted (respectively) towards the state and 
towards industrialisation. While no theory of the state 
is explicitly adopted, it is generally viewed as being 
responsive to class forces and influenced by the balance 
of political and economic power at any given point in 
time. The theoretical stance adopted toward the process 
of industrialisation is also not made explicit. However, 
it is generally located within a political economy 
framework which is informed by a number of analytical and 
theoretical concepts, lying within the terrain of 
political economy.
While some of these concepts are "tested" against 
the process of South African industrialisation, the 
objective of the thesis is less concerned to confirm or 
to reject specific theories than to unravell the specific 
processes through which industrialisation has 
materialised in South Africa. For both the state and the 
process of industrialisation, the theoretical stance has 
drawn implicitly (in exposition) from recent analyses of 
the role of the South Korean state and its relationship 
with capital in South Korean industrialisation.
Much of the material contained here was compiled 
during a two-year, ESRC-funded research project entitled
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"The South African Minerals-Energy Complex and the 
Capital Goods Industry". There are several common themes 
that are traced throughout the thesis, which is written 
in six self-contained chapters and, therefore, some 
repetition has been unavoidable.1
The more general contribution of the MEC to the 
economy through its core sectors and its shifting 
sectoral boundaries are outlined in Chapter 1 . Through an 
analysis of input-output linkages, conventional economic 
categories of industrial sectors are found to be 
misleading in interpreting the pattern of 
industrialisation in South Africa, It is shown that 
mining, energy and a number of associated sub-sectors of 
manufacturing have constituted, and continue to 
constitute, the core site of accumulation in the South 
African economy. Contrary to the apparent declining role 
of "mining", the economy's dependence on this MEC core 
has, in fact, increased.
The development of the MEC has been mediated by 
relationships between English and Afrikaner fractions of 
capital through the state. These have contributed to the 
emergence of a specific conglomerate form of corporate 
structure both private and public, which straddles the 
mining, manufacturing and financial sectors. Chapter 2 
outlines this peculiar form of corporate ownership for 
the private sector, demonstrating how conglomerate 
ownership and control are distributed sectorally and 
reproduced at the level of the financial sector.
While acknowledgement of concentrated ownership of 
capital in South Africa is not novel, the approach 
adopted here is to view the process of increasing 
conglomeration and centralisation as both a product of 
the economy's historical evolution around the MEC as well
1  Chapter 1 was published as Rustomjee (1992). Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were based on joint work carried 
out with Ben Fine at SOAS, as Fine and Rustomjee (1992), (1993a), (1993b) and (1993c) respectively.
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as having itself contributed to shaping that evolution. 
Chapters 1 and 2 are essentially descriptive in nature 
and should be interpreted as introductory to Chapter 3. 
For the MEC should be viewed, less as a set of economic 
and institutional linkages and more as a system of 
accumulation. Chapters 3 and 4 trace this process during 
the inter-war period and across the post-war period, 
respectively.
In Chapter 3, economic policy in South Africa in the 
inter-war period is discussed in the context of 
differences between the economic power and political 
influence of "Afrikaner" as opposed to mining or 
"English" capital. Previous analyses are shown to have 
been limited by over-generalisation, narrowness of scope, 
and analytical methodologies which have overemphasised 
class agencies at the expense of actual and potential 
economic linkages.
While interventions by the state varied across 
sectors, including protection, other forms of subsidy and 
the creation of a state sector around heavy industry, 
policies were not cohesive enough to diversify 
extensively out of the economy's mineral base. Despite 
this, constrained industrial diversification did occur in 
isolated cases, including chemicals and industrial 
diamond products, suggesting that other development 
trajectories could have been possible. This is taken up 
in Chapter 6, where the relationship between the MEC and 
the South African engineering industry is explored.
Chapter 4 advances this analysis into the post-war 
period. It is shown that, despite the development of some 
significant individual industries, and despite the 
conventional wisdom that South Africa has achieved 
substantial import-substituting industrialisation through 
protection, the trajectory of industrialisation was 
effectively centred on the core MEC sectors. In the
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1950s, efforts at diversification were constrained by the 
creation of large-scale Afrikaner capital which was 
subsequently deployed within the MEC core. In the 19 60s, 
foreign disinvestment opened new opportunities for 
domestic investment and diversification. But as growing 
interpenetration between large-scale English and 
Afrikaner capital increased, the potential for 
diversification diminished, for example, as the former 
assisted the latter to enter gold mining. In the 1970s, 
following the gold and energy price rise, extensive and 
coherent policies to strengthen the MEC core were 
adopted, while the crisis of the 1980s precluded policies 
of industrial diversification from being implemented. 
Consequently, the industrial structure and institutional 
impetus that is based on the MEC has continued to guide 
South Africa's industrial trajectory into the 1990s.
In Chapter 5 , the process of industrial policy 
formulation is reviewed through an examination of the 
conduct and role of two key institutions, the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and the Board of Trade and 
Industry (BTI). Here, it is demonstrated that the 
industrial policies that were actually pursued followed a 
separate path from the recommendations emanating from the 
many official Commissions of Inquiry into industrial 
development. It is argued that the reasons for this are 
bound up with the over-riding role of the MEC as a system 
of accumulation which, for a variety of reasons that 
differed over time, precluded the adoption of industrial 
policies of diversification away from economic dependence 
on South Africa's MEC base.
Such policy conduct was accompanied by a 
historiography which interpreted post-war industrial 
performance and the pattern and determinants of 
industrial diversification as a movement away from the 
mineral base of the economy. These debates are reviewed 
and counterposed, firstly, with the practice of policy
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implementation as outlined and, secondly, with the 
evolution of the MEC. The debates are shown to have 
changed in parallel with more general developments in the 
theory of industrialisation and development. But, it is 
argued that past debates over the rhythm of 
industrialisation have been based, both on a false 
perception of the pattern of industrialisation and on a 
partial and even false recognition of how industrial 
policy has been adopted and implemented.
Firstly, a false dichotomy has been drawn by both 
policymakers and in the literature between "mining" and 
"manufacturing" activities, masking the evolution of the 
MEC that straddles both. Secondly, the commonly accepted 
past and prospective trajectory for import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) is shown to be contrary to the 
actual pattern of post-war industrialisation in South 
Africa whereby, in reality, heavy (producer goods) 
industries grew in parallel with the supposedly "easy" 
light (consumer goods) industries.
Thus, contrary to ISI logic, South African industry 
is shown to have demonstrated a considerable capital 
goods capability, and this is drawn out in more detail in 
Chapter 6 . Yet, despite this capability, engineering 
industries are shown to have remained dependent on MEC 
core sectors. The reasons for this are attributed to 
complex relations of conflict and collusion between 
Afrikaner and English capital leading to industrial 
policies which were insufficiently coherent to diversify 
engineering away from the MEC core. Seen in this light, 
the success of those individual engineering firms 
achieving such diversification represents the latent 
potential of industrial development in South Africa, 
which has been impeded by the system of accumulation 
around the MEC.
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Chapter 7 concludes with some implications of this 
thesis for the future trajectory of industrialisation. As 
a system of accumulation, the MEC has been shown both 
institutionally and sectorally to have confined the 
industrial trajectory of the South African economy to a 
narrow core of industries. The accompanying growth of 
large-scale capital, and its dominance of most economic 
activity in South Africa through a particular 
conglomerate form, has contributed to impeding the 
industrial diversification. Potentially, it also forms 
the basis for considerable diversification, growing out 
of the strengths already identified. Policymakers will 
thus have a difficult task in challenging the power of 
the conglomerates to carry through this process such that 
it begins to address the needs of those most affected by 
the legacy of apartheid.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINERALS-ENERGY 
COMPLEX - THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MANUFACTURING LED GROWTH 
STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
Foremost in the minds of politicians, economic 
planners, the corporate sector and the labour movement is 
the dualism of the South African economy. On the one 
hand, there is a relatively well-developed industrial 
core with supporting infrastructure and, on the other, an 
underdeveloped periphery. Even before the completion of 
negotiations over the abolition of apartheid, the 
problems of development have occupied centre stage.
At present, several concurrent debates are 
continuing. First, there is the overarching and rather 
sterile debate oyer state intervention versus market 
forces. A second area is around export orientation of the 
economy versus an orientation that addresses basic needs. 
A third is whether emphasis should be on urban or on 
rural development.
However, many of these debates are conducted in the 
absence of rigorous concrete analysis. Many studies of 
industry and industrial development fail to look behind 
the aggregate statistics and, therefore, result in rather 
superficial analyses which are somewhat misleading. The 
perception of a declining mining sector and a largely 
protected and inefficient manufacturing sector is the 
conventional starting point. Here the problem is 
perceived to be the difficulty of shifting the basis of 
accumulation and economic activity away from mining to 
dynamic, competitive and employment creating segments of
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the manufacturing sector, while retaining macroeconomic 
and fiscal balances.1
This chapter shows that the South African economy's 
current strength lies in what is termed a Minerals-Energy 
Complex (MEC), which includes the mining, energy and a 
number of associated sub-sectors of manufacturing. These 
sectors have constituted and continue to constitute the 
core site of accumulation in the South African economy.2 
By taking account of the systemic linkages between these 
different economic activities, the direct and indirect 
dependence of the entire economy on the MEC is exposed. 
Contrary to the apparent declining role of mining, the 
economy's dependence on this MEC core has, in fact, 
increased, posing a rather different challenge, namely, 
to shift the basis of accumulation towards non-MEC 
manufacturing sectors.
Section one uses a conventional input-output 
approach to examine the more visible backward and forward 
linkages between mining and manufacturing sub-sectors, 
their respective contributions to GDP, exports, 
employment and their import propensities. Section two 
identifies the specific sub-sectors of manufacturing that 
constitute the MEC and justifies the MEC concept largely 
in terms of the material flows between the various sub­
sectors. In the process, traditional categories of 
"Mining and Quarrying" and "Manufacturing" are redefined. 
The role of the MEC in the economy is analysed through
1  See, for example, BTI Annual Report, (1990, p.4), IDO Annual Report, (1990, pp.5-6), IDC (1990), 
Sacob (1991, pp.11-13, 61-63) and ANC (1992). In January 1992, COSATU embarked on an 18 month 
Industrial Strategy Project which examines 15 manufacturing sub-sectors precisely in order to 
provide policy guidelines for Industrial restructuring.
2 As a starting point, this chapter focuses on relatively static structural linkages that 
characterise the MEC. It does not examine the agencies which influenced the manner in which such 
linkages emerged, such as corporate structure, patterns of ownership, labour supply and control, 
management interlocks, technology, trade, manufacturing and mining associations (of which the 
Chamber of Mines Is the most prominent) relationships with state agencies, state policies, social 
and class struggles, and external and other factors which have influenced the patterns of 
development. Some of these more dynamic and historical aspects including the linkages and 
Institutions which govern financial flows of capital, profits, taxes and wages, will be covered in 
other chapters.
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macroeconomic indicators, sketching the institutional 
fabric that supports the MEC, linking it to other 
economic agencies, such as labour, the state and capital. 
Past policies are shown to have strengthened the MEC. 
Section three shows that the current debate on post­
apartheid industrial policy does not take account of the 
centrality of the MEC. The reasons for the central 
position of the MEC in the economy cannot be explained 
through input-output analysis but the MEC can be regarded 
as the result of deliberate state intervention to support 
the centralisation and concentration of specific 
fractions of capital.
There are two important ways that the MEC's future 
trajectory can be interpreted. First, the MEC as a whole 
constitutes a site of existing comparative advantage, 
which may not require intervention to attract investment 
for further beneficiation of mineral products, for 
example. Secondly, in relation to non-MEC manufacturing 
activities, the MEC represents a distortion. The MEC has 
become so integrated and entrenched, in terms of both 
economic and other linkages and institutional power, that 
it will naturally crowd-out the development of any other 
industrial sector unless there is an intervention to 
prevent this through creating dynamic comparative 
advantages in non-MEC sectors. Thus, future industrial 
policy requires at least three components, one directed 
towards the MEC, a second towards the non-MEC 
manufacturing industries and a third thrust towards 
strengthening and coordinating the linkages between the 
two.
1. MINING AND MANUFACTURING IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
South African statistics normally divide mining into 
four sub-sectors; gold, coal, diamonds and other mining.
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Manufacturing covers a range of value adding activities 
which are listed in Appendix 1. The traditional view 
considers mining activities as separate from 
manufacturing, some outputs of mining feeding into 
manufacturing, with manufacturing supplying some of 
mining's requirements for consumable items such as 
explosives, drill steels, chemicals, timber roof 
supports, as well as certain capital goods like 
earthmoving equipment, mine winders and continuous mining 
equipment.
The mining industry is widely perceived by 
policymakers, by the business sector and by the labour 
movement to be an industry in decline relative to the 
manufacturing sector. Mining's role is, nevertheless, 
recognised as being important, particularly as a major 
generator of foreign exchange and as an employer of 
labour. As will be shown, particular analyses and policy 
options flow from the way in which statistics are 
compiled on the division between "mining'1 and 
"manufacturing". Such analyses will be shown in section 
three to be different from analyses based on recognition 
of the MEC.
1.1 THE DECLINE OF MINING
Mining's relative decline is evident in its sectoral 
contribution to GDP, currently 12%. This has fluctuated 
between a low of 8% in 1971 and its peak of 22% in 19 80, 
(figure l.l). This is equivalent to about half the 
contribution of manufacturing and is roughly equal to 
that of the financial sector and the trade and catering 
sector, (table 1.1). Since 1950, manufacturing's 
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Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years (1960), South 
African Statistics (1990), IDC (1992).
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TABLE 1.1 - 1989 GDP STATISTICS
Rand %
(million)(1)GDP
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, FISHING 11,629 5.6
MINING AND QUARRYING 24,936 12.0
MANUFACTURING 50,896 24 . 6
ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER 8,923 4.3
CONSTRUCTION 6,503 3.1
TRADE, CATERING, ACCOMM.SERVICES 27,436 13.3
TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATION 17,145 8 . 3
FINANCE, REAL ESTATE, BUSINESS SERV. 28,615 13 . 8
COMMUNITY, SOCIAL, PERSONAL SERV. 3,539 1.7
less IMPUTED FINANCIAL SERVICES (5,883) (2.8)
GENERAL GOVERNMENT 28,285 13 . 7
OTHER PRODUCERS 4,924 2.4
TOTAL 206 ,948 100 ,0
Source: South African Statistics (1990).
(l) GDP at factor incomes at current price.
The heavy dependence on the export of gold and other 
minerals, mostly in raw form, is seen as a weakness at 
the macroeconomic level which must be overcome by 
exporting more beneficiated products and by developing 
the manufacturing sector further along an export-oriented 
trajectory. Statistics abound to support such policy 
choices.
Although its price has recently declined, gold has 
consistently contributed more than 30% of all exports 
since the early 1950s. Between 1979 and 1982 when its 
price soared, gold exports were in the region of 45%~50% 
of total exports, (figure 1.2). The major corporations 
involved in minerals extraction and marketing are 
vigorously expounding the view that gold has become just 
another commodity, driven by supply and demand, thus 
contributing to the decline of the mining sector3.
3 Clem Sunter, Chairman of Anglo American Corporation's Gold and Uranium Division quoted in the 
Financial Mail Mining Supplement (1991)
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The mining and quarrying sectors have, since 1970, 
consistently employed about half the number of workers in 
manufacturing, (table 1.4). Mining employment has 
fluctuated in a narrow band between 650,000 and 7 30,000, 
largely in rhythm with major gold price movements. The 
crisis in the mining industry in the late 1970s is 
reflected by a fall in gold's contribution to exports as 
well as a significant decline in numbers employed.4 Since 
19 86, there has been a steady fall in mining employment, 
from 763,000 to 707,000 in 1989. About 42,000, or 75%, of 
these jobs were shed in the gold mining industry. Further 
falls have taken place since 1989.
4 However both sectors have been eclipsed by a steady rise in employment In the "Social and Personal 












FIGURE 1.2 - GOLD EXPORTS AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS
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FIGURE 1.3 - MINING AND MANUFACTURING SECTOR EXPORTS
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1.2 THE RISE OF MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing, on the other hand, is regarded as the 
sector on which to focus future prospects. Compared to 
mining, manufacturing's share of GDP has risen more 
consistently in the post-war period, (figure l.l). 
Manufacturing sector employment has grown in the 1970s to 
more than double that of mining, (figure 1.1), and 
manufacturing exports have risen faster than mining 
exports in the 1980s, dovetailing with other historical 
experiences of growth and development, (figure 1.3)
The arguments for policies supporting export- 
oriented manufacturing are rooted in such statistics. 
Sacob (1990, pp.45-6), for example, compare South African 
manufactured exports as a percentage of GDP with similar 
statistics for developed and developing countries, 
concluding that South Africa's ratio is among the lowest:
South Africa is becoming a consistently smaller 
player in international trade. This is a combination.- 
of the effect of sanctions and the lack of an 
industrial environment which encourages investment 
and growth in those industries where the world's 
markets are growing the most, namely manufactured 
products.
Such policy thrusts, which regard manufacturing as 
relatively independent from other sectors, are supported 
by official input-output statistics, (figure 1.5). These 
indicate that 7.5% of manufacturing inputs (or R8.1b) are 
sourced from the mining sector. The mining sector, on the 
other hand seems more dependent on manufacturing which 
contributed 50% (or R5.5b) of mining inputs. A high 
proportion of manufacturing outputs are intermediate ones 
(of Rl53.0b produced, R62.5b was intermediate), being fed 
into other manufacturing sub-sectors. This partly 
justifies the focusing of policy on manufacturing. The 
need to orient manufacture to exports is underlined by
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the small proportion of manufacturing exports, 10.8% of 
total manufacturing output (R16.6b), (figure 1.5), 
compared to mining exports of 7 3.6% of total output.5
Manufacturing's importance is illustrated by its 
scale of activities, dwarfing those of the mining 
industry. In 1988, the mining industry produced ore to 
the value of R37.1b, using inputs of Rll.Ob, (figure 
1.5). Manufacturing produced goods to the value of 
R153.Ob, using material inputs worth R107.8b. An 
indication of sectoral contribution to GDP is the value 
added (ie the difference between output value and input 
value). The value added in mining, some 237% of inputs, 
was far larger than manufacturing's 41.9% of inputs. 
Nevertheless, the total GDP contribution of manufacturing 
was about twice that of mining.
South Africa's development trajectory appears then 
to be one where mining output provides foreign exchange 
to pay for imported manufacturing inputs, with the 
manufacturing sector constituting the engine of growth.
In absolute terms, imported mining inputs are one tenth 
of the value of manufacturing's imported inputs, (table
1.2). At the aggregate level, economic expansions have 
required increased imports for manufacturing which, in 
turn, have affected the balance of payments, influenced 
monetary and fiscal policy and, finally, have acted to 
choke off expansion.
5
Economic activity in both the mining and manufacturing sectors are categorised according to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification ( IS 1C) standards and these statistics are used to 
determine sectoral contributions to GDP as well as to categorise trade statistics. South African 
statistics are rather difficult to decypher because much of the production and export of strategic 
commodities are hidden in catch-all categories like 'classified' or 'mineral products not elsewhere 
classified'. Approximately half of total reported trade is listed under the 'classified' category. 
The method used to cull statistics In this study is discussed In Appendix 2.
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The high import propensity of manufacturing is 
interpreted as arising from past inward-looking policies 
of Import-Substituting Industrialisation (ISI). The shift 
to export-oriented policies in the late 1980s appears to 
have succeeded in raising manufacturing exports, (figure
1.3), and is used to justify the continuance of policies 
which reduce state intervention, are export-oriented and 
enhance the capability of the manufacturing sector, IDC 
(1990 ) .
However, import propensities differ in terms of 
inputs as a proportion of outputs. Table 1.2 shows 
mining's propensity in terms of inputs is only slightly 
less than that of manufacturing; 15.1% compared to 17.8%. 
However, imports contribute more to output in mining. The 
latter's import propensity as a percentage of output is 
4.7% compared to 12.3% for manufacturing. This is a 
reflection of the greater proportion of value added in 
mining. Import propensities also differ according to the 
diverse activities carried out in each mining and 
manufacturing sub-sector which involve different levels 
of technology, different processes and linkages and, in 
particular, activities which use specific inputs that are 
or are not available locally. This highlights the need 
for disaggregation of industrial sectors, particularly 
when conducting policy studies. Within mining, the coal 
sub-sector has the largest propensity to import, 20.5% of 
inputs compared to the mining sector's average of 15.1%. 
Coal mining, both underground and open cast, is highly 
mechanised, requiring a large quantity of imported 
equipment, (see table 6.6, page 351).
In section three, the conventional view of South 
Africa's economic development as one of declining mining 
and increasing manufacturing activities will be shown to 
be misleading, since it is based on a highly aggregated 
and static view of manufacturing. Apart from their
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aggregate impact on economic development, ISI policies 
will be shown to be focused on very specific sectors and 
directed at strengthening and concentrating specific 
fractions of capital.
TABLE 1.2 - MINING, MANUFACTURING 
IMPORT INTENSITY (Rm)
AND MEC INDUSTRIES -
IMPORTED TOTAL IMP. TOTAL \HP.
MEC MINING
INPUTS INPUTS % OUTPUT %
COAL 260 1271 20.5 3188 8.1
GOLD 398 2924 13.6 11712 3.4
DIAMONDS 27 295 9.2 707 3.8
OTHER MINING 269 1831 14.7 4888 5.5
AVERAGE MINING 954 6321 15.1 20495 4.7
TOTAL MANUFACT.{INC.MEC) 10054 56507 17.8 81772 12.3
MEC MANUFACTURING
FERTILISERS AND PESTIC. 193 690 27.9 1074 17.9
SYNTH. RES INS,PLAST ICS 235 1162 20.2 1423 16.5
OTHER CHEMICAL PRODS. 116 639 18.1 944 12.3
OTHER BASIC CHEMICALS 2061 6699 30.8 10380 19.8
OTHER PLASTIC PRODS. 140 1029 13.6 1602 8.7
BRICKS,TILES.REFRACT. 68 370 18.3 699 9.7
CEMENT 41 238 17.2 523 7.8
OTHER N0N-METALLIC MINS. 129 654 19.7 1090 11.8
IRON AND STEEL 539 3774 14.3 6110 8.8
NON-FERROUS METALS 336 1581 21.2 2387 14.1
ELECTRICITY 123 2929 4.2 6654 1.8
3981 19765 20.1 32886 12.1
OTHER MANUFACT.(EXC.MEC) 6073 36742 16.5 48886 12.4
TOTAL MEC SECTORS 4935 26086 18.9 53381 9.2
Source: Input-Output Tables, (1984)
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2. THE MEC AND MANUFACTURING IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
2.1 DEFINING THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX
Although section one shows that, in aggregate terms, 
mining only provides 7.5% of manufacturing inputs, these 
inputs are essential to several key sectors of 
manufacturing which, in turn, support many other 
productive activities. At the beginning of 1990, 1100 
mines and quarries were in operation, producing 80 
different minerals. South African Statistics (1990, 
p. 11.16) define the "mining" sectors as;
,.. any activities in connection with underground 
and surface mining, including stone quarries, clay 
and sand pits, wells (except for water) and salt 
pans and all supplemental activities for the 
dressing and beneficiation of ores and other crude 
materials, such as crushing, screening, grading, 
milling, flotation, melting, pelleting, topping and 
other preparations needed to render the material 
marketable.
Many productive "mining" activities are integrally 
linked, often physically integrated, with productive 
activities within the "manufacturing" sector. The 
separation of value added in each usually takes place at 
the level of national and corporate accounting 
procedures.
Few mineral-producing countries today export 
unbeneficiated primary mineral commodities. Many 
developing countries in recent years have tended to 
process their minerals partially, mainly through 
smelting, to produce a concentrate of higher value which 
is then either refined or, more often, shipped to 
refineries in more developed economies. Jourdan's (1990) 
study of minerals production in the Southern African 
region shows that this tendency is fairly advanced. About
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98% of Zambia's copper production (6% of world supply in 
1988) is exported in the form of pure refined copper 
cathodes; Cobalt (14% of world supply in 1988) is 
produced as a by-product of copper smelting; 50% of the 
region's nickel output is exported as a beneficiated 
sulphide matte; almost all chromite ore mined in Zimbabwe 
is smelted and exported as ferrochrome (7% of world 
supply in 1988). There are exceptions to this tendency, 
for example Zaire which exports copper blister - a less 
refined form of copper - to Belgium for refining even 
though excess capacity exists in neighbouring Zambian 
smelters.
Although the smelting and refining of mineral ore is 
usually integrated with mining operations, with smelters 
and refineries sited on or close to the mine, the value 
added is often abitrarily divided between mining and 
manufacturing statistics. Consider chrome. The mining of 
chrome ore underpins the manufacturing activity of 
smelting the ore, yet the mining activity contributes 
about one third less value than the processing of ore. In 
1987, the mining of chrome ore contributed about 0.16% to 
South African GDP, with sales of R242.4m. Smelting the 
ore produced ferrochrome worth R7 30.6m and this 
contributed about 0.48% to GDP.6 Smelting is 
statistically located in the "Non ferrous metal basic 
industry" sub-sector of the "manufacturing" sector even 
though there is an almost continuous process involved 
from mining to ferrochrome production.
The concentrated levels of ownership that 
characterise the South African economy also have an 
impact on the allocation of value added. Genmin, for 
example, owns a number of mines through their Cromore 
(Pty) Ltd holding company. Ore is transported to the 
nearby smelters of Genmin-owned Tubatse Ferrochrome (Pty)
C
Source: Census on Mining (1987, pp.33, 82-83). GDP data from South African Statistics, (1990, 
pp.21.9).
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Ltd. The smelting process is operated by a different 
company within the same conglomerate group for a number 
of reasons, including the objective of minimising tax and 
maximising use of specific state policies (such as 
manufacturing incentives promoting beneficiation and 
exports. A critical factor in this division is the price 
at which the raw material is transferred from the 
"mining" activity to the "manufacturing" activity. Often 
this price is simply an accounting variable which is 
optimised in the process of maximising group profits. 
However, the effect of this often exacerbates the 
artificial difference between "mining" and 
"manufacturing" activities. If the transfer price were 
minimised, due to attractive tax incentives and write­
offs in beneficiation, the effect would be to reduce the 
GDP contribution of mining and correspondingly raise, 
artificially, the GDP contribution of the manufacturing 
activity (even if it were accepted that they were 
separate).
The construction and casual interpretation of 
economic statistics categorised by "mining" or 
"manufacturing" and the abitrary allocation of value 
added to each, does not adequately and accurately 
represent the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa's 
resource based economy and can, therefore, be misleading. 
It is, correspondingly, more useful to recognise inherent 
and logical productive linkages and to conceptualise them 
integrally. In this vein, a Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) 
which includes, at least, the following economic sectors 
can be identified.7




These are largely related to productive activities downstream of mining. The capital goods and 
mining supply industries that produce inputs for mining are not dealt with empirically In this 
chapter. However, it Is clear that their inclusion will serve to extend the scope of the MEC.
8 Includes mica, phosphate concentrate, bricks, tiles, refractories, cement.
36
Iron and steel basic industries.
Non-ferrous metals basic industries.9 
Fertilisers, pesticides, synthetic resins, plastics, 
other chemicals, basic chemicals and petroleum.
The rationale for including these primary and secondary 
mineral processing activities, together with electricity, 
within the boundaries of the MEC is developed further 
below.
While existing statistics categorise "electricity" 
as an economic activity separate from "mining and 
quarrying" and "manufacturing", there are extensive 
linkages between these.10 More than 90% of electricity is 
generated from coal, a "mining" activity, the balance 
sourced from hydro-electric and nuclear stations (the 
latter also ultimately sources its feed from uranium 
mining and electricity-intensive, coal-powered 
enrichment). Some 21.6% of electricity output is consumed 
in the coal, gold, diamond and other mining sectors. An 
additional 21.3% of electricity output is consumed in the 
energy-intensive smelting and refining processes in just 
three sub-sectors of manufacturing - namely, Other Non- 
metallic Mineral Products, Iron and Steel Basic 
Industries and Non-ferrous Metal Basic Industries.il
While chemicals and petroleum production activities 
may seem remote from mining, they are linked largely 
through the coal mining industry, on which the South 
African economy is heavily reliant. Firstly, the 
production of fertilisers, plastics, chemicals and 
petroleum depend on energy-intensive processes which 
consume large quantities of electricity, in turn, 
generated from coal. The Sasol II and III plants at 
Secunda in the eastern Transvaal utilise a large
9 Includes platinum group metals, silver and ferrochrome.
10 Strictly speaking, this category Is defined as "Electricity, Gas and Steam" although the value of 
gas and steam generated Is low. See South African Statistics, (1990).
^  Based on Input-Output Tables (1988) after excluding losses in generation and transmission.
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proportion of the output of the nearby 3600MW Kriel power 
station (built specifically for that purpose).12 Of the 
175.6 million tons of coal mined in South Africa in 1989, 
46.8mt was exported. From remaining local sales of 
128.8mt, 70.0mt was used by Escom to produce electricity, 
35.0mt was consumed by the three Sasol plants to produce 
synthetic fuels and chemicals, and 1.lmt was used by AECI 
to produce ammonia, explosives and methanol at 
Modderfontein. AECI also produces some chemicals at 
Umbogintwini from coal feedstock. The AECI/Sentrachem 
Coalplex plant at Sasolburg produces PVC from coal and, 
until it was mothballed recently, Sentrachem was 
producing synthetic rubber from coal at its Karbochem 
plant at Newcastle. A coal-based industrial gas grid 
supplies industries in the PWV area from the Sasol plant 
in Sasolburg.
Non-metallic mineral products such as cement and 
bricks, the inputs to building and construction 
industries, are immediate downstream activities from 
mining. In both cases, mined or quarried products, such 
as limestone and gypsum, are crushed mixed and heated, 
often using coal as the fuel. These plants are usually 
located close to the quarries which supply their raw 
materials.
Iron and Steel industries are not as numerous as 
cement and brick-making plants. They are, firstly, more 
capital-intensive and, secondly, have been regarded by 
almost every government in the world as a strategic 
economic sector. Even today, when state intervention is 
no longer fashionable and under ideological attack, many 
of the steel industries in Europe are protected either 
directly or indirectly. Of the three steel producers in 
South Africa, the recently privatised Iscor dominates the 
industry. Iron ore, coal and electricity constitute the
_
50GMW is generated internally and 400MW is bought in. The greatest demand is from the air 
separation plants.
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major inputs to steel manufacture which is produced in 
the form of shapes, sections, tubes, wire or castings. 
Other mineral products, such as chrome and vanadium, are 
also used to produce alloys and various grades of 
stainless steels, although at present only one plant, 
Middleburg Steel and Alloys, currently produces stainless 
steel. Some 62.8% of direct inputs to the Iron and Steel 
Basic Industries is sourced from within the MEC while 22% 
of the Iron and Steel sector's output is fed back into 
the MEC.
Chrome, copper, silver, aluminium, platinum and 
platinum group metals are the major components of the 
non-ferrous metals category. As with steel, the 
respective ores are smelted and refined to produce the 
basic sections, castings or refined mattes that are then 
either sold on commodity markets or used in subsequent 
manufacturing activities.
The cohesion of the MEC is illustrated by table 1.3, 
which shows that 58.3% of MEC inputs are from the MEC and 
that 27.7% of MEC output is returned to MEC sectors. In 
summary, it is more useful to distinguish between a non- 
MEC manufacturing sector and the MEC, made up of mining 
and quarrying, the electricity sector and a number of 
related sub-sectors of manufacturing.
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TABLE 1.3 - THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE MEC - INPUT/OUTPUT 
LINKAGES
MEC VALUE ADDED as a % of OUTPUT
MEC INPUTS as a % of TOTAL INPUTS








FERTILISERS AND PESTICIDES 755
SYNTHETIC RESINS, PLASTICS 1964
OTHER CHEMICALS 692
OTHER BASIC CHEMICALS, PETROLEUM 6477
OTHER PLASTIC PRODUCTS 1437
BRICKS, TILES, REFRACTORIES 397
CEMENT 212
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 691
IRON & STEEL BASIC INDUSTRIES 4899









FROM ADDED TO TO





3228 16706 0 21776
734 1081 0 2012
1920 5319 6709 1492
315 267 181 1155
417 697 1726 1352
470 525 1016 672
2918 6674 4831 11237
602 916 300 2654
264 511 94 1079
162 497 202 669
441 699 284 1547
2897 4096 1725 10167
1166 1879 1123 3980
1939 7279 6364 6122
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FIGURE 1.7 - % GDP MINERAL PROCESSING, CHEMICALS, 
ELECTRICITY
GDP CONTRIBUTION
MINERAL PROCESSNG, CHEMICALS, ELECTRICITY
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ESS ELECTRICITY □  CHEMICALS ggg MINERAL PROCESSING
Source: South African Statistics (1990).
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2.2 MODIFYING NATIONAL STATISTICS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 
MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX
The change in the distribution of GDP resulting from 
focusing upon the central role of the MEC is illustrated 
in figure 1.6. Non-MEC manufacturing has, since 19 60, 
stagnated within a narrow band of 15-17% of GDP. The 
MEC's relative contribution to GDP fell in the 1960s from 
22% to about 17% but rose to a high of 32% in 1980 and 
then settled within a band of 25-27%. The impact of the 
most recent decline in the gold price is partly shown by 
the dip in the MEC's contribution to GDP, from 27.5% in 
1989 to 25% in 1990, (figure 1.6). But, unlike mining 
alone, the MEC is not only affected by the gold price. 
Escom power generation, Sasol's petroleum-chemicals 
complex and the rise in minerals processing have 
underpinned its integrated dominance of the economy. The 
largest growth in the MEC’s GDP contribution seems to 
have taken place in the capital-intensive minerals 
processing and chemical (largely Sasol) industries in the 
19 80s, whereas it was the electricity industry that grew 
in the 1970s, (figure 1.7).
What particularly stands out is that the growth of 
the MEC has been accompanied by stagnation of the non-MEC 
manufacturing sector since 1960. The latter(s 
contribution to GDP has not risen above 18% (1981) and 
has declined to 15% in 1989. Non-MEC manufacturing also 
exhibits weak forward and backward linkages with the MEC, 
(figure 1.8). Forward linkages between the MEC and non- 
MEC manufacturing are, however, stronger than between 
mining and manufacturing. Some 22.1% of non-MEC 
manufacturing inputs are drawn from the MEC, mainly from 
the iron and steel, basic chemicals and petroleum, 
synthetic resin and plastic and non-ferrous metal sub­
sectors. However, MEC backward linkages are relatively 
weak, almost de-linked from manufacturing. Only 13.4% of 
MEC inputs were drawn from manufacturing. This contrasts 
with the standard analysis of mining vs. manufacturing 
where 50% of mining inputs are drawn from the 
manufacturing sector.
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Source: Input-Output Tables, (1988).
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2.3 EXPORTS FROM THE MEC
The impression drawn from figure 1.3, that 
"manufacturing" exports are rapidly surpassing those of 
"mining" is rather misleading. While "mining" exports as 
a percentage of total exports have gradually declined 
during the 1980s, the economy has remained dependent on 
exports from the MEC. Dependence on foreign exchange from 
gold exports has shifted to dependence on exports of 
other raw minerals, processed minerals, steel and 
chemicals, (figure 1.9). Thus, in the same period that 
gold's share fell from 51% to 31% of exports, total MEC 
exports as a percentage of all other exports fell from 
7 5% to only 6 3%, emphasising the centrality and 
resilience of the MEC within the South African economy. 
The apparent relative rise in exports of non-MEC 
manufactures is partly due to declining commodity prices, 
including that of gold.l One third of manufacturing 
exports consist of processed minerals, steel and 
chemicals, (figure 1.9).
What is also apparent is the classic developing 
economy's vulnerability to fluctuating mineral commodity 
prices, both raw and beneficiated. Figure 1.2 illustrates 
cyclical movement in the value of gold exports. Non-gold 
raw mineral exports as a percentage of total exports have 
fluctuated during the 1980s, between 17% and 21%, with 
the exception of 1987 and 1988 when they fell to 14%, 
(figure 1.10). Processed minerals (mainly ferro-alloys 
and vanadium) have swung between 3% and 8% of total 
exports between 1979 and 1990, falling back to 5% in 1990 
due to plummeting commodity prices, (figure l.ll).
Exports of beneficiated minerals, such as steel and 
chemicals, both part of the MEC, rose from 5% of total 
exports to 9% between 1980 and 1990. This highlights the 
need for further research on the nature and dynamics of 
world minerals markets and the manner in which South
^  Commodity Export Price Indices (CEPI) have declined in real rand terms since 1983. Refer to 
Minerals Bureau (1988) and (1991).
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African exports locate themselves within them, for major 
policy implications flow from this.
2.4 IMPORT-INTENSITY
Rather than viewing the economy as one resting on a 
narrow export-oriented mining base, the picture here is 
of a more diversified core, the MEC, with greater 
linkages, than from mining alone to the rest of the 
economy. Such analysis, of course, requires deepening for 
it takes no account of ownership, treating mining and 
manufacturing sub-sectors as operating in unison with no 
conflict or tension. Furthermore, there is no distinction 
between the import of capital and consumption goods and 
the degree of dependence on technology through, for 
example, licensing. Such factors are likely to be sector- 
specific and require further research.
The import propensity of the MEC is higher than that 
of non-MEC manufacturing in terms of inputs; 18.9% versus 
17.8%, and slightly lower in relation to output; 9.2% 
compared to 12.3%. Despite the highly capital-intensive 
nature of MEC sectors, and their acknowledged reliance on 
imported capital goods, imports of intermediate 
consumables are also included in aggregated statistics of 
import propensity. A major reason for the high import 
propensity of the MEC is the continuing dependence of the 
sub-sector "other basic chemicals" on imported crude oil. 
Roughly 20% of all 19 84 manufacturing sector imports were 
related to crude oil imports. Of course, this might have 













FIGURE 1.9 - SECTORAL EXPORTS AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS
SECTORAL EXPORTS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
I | GOLD ^  RAW MINERALS ■  PROCESSED MINS.
I | STEEL+CHEMICALS ^  MANUFACTURES
Source: South African Statistics (various years), South 


















FIGURE 1.10 - NON-GOLD RAW MINERAL EXPORTS, % TOTAL
EXPORTS
NON-GOLD RAW MINERALS EXPORTS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
25-rT
LJfelLJ
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
Source: South African Statistics (various years) , South 
Africa's Mineral Industry Yearbook (various 
years)
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FIGURE 1.11 - PROCESSED MINERAL EXPORTS AS % TOTAL 
EXPORTS
EXPORTS OF PROCESSED MINERALS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
Source: South African Statistics (various years), South 











FIGURE 1.12 - EMPLOYMENT IN THE MEC














Source: South African Labour Statistics (various years)
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2.5 LABOUR
Shifting MEC activities out of manufacturing 
(statistically) reveals a more even pattern of employment 
between the MEC and manufacturing, (figure 1.12). 
Employment in manufacturing (excluding MEC) grew from 
0.81 million in 1970 to a peak of 1.12 million in 1982, 
falling to about 1.06m in 1986 but subsequently rising 
again. MEC employment has been falling since 1986, 
largely due to the declining gold mining industry. Sub­
sectors of manufacturing that fall within the MEC have 
employed a fairly static number of workers in the 1980s, 
about 350,000. This partly reflects the capital-intensity 
of MEC manufacturing sectors. The downturn in the gold 
mining industry has had a severe impact on many other 
sectors of the economy. Frost (1990) shows that it also 
led to attempts to increase the mechanisation of gold 
mining, although with limited success. The mechanisation 
of mining has been a continuous process, driven by 
material factors such as ore grades and depths, as well 
as by the exploitative relationships between labour and 
capital. Mechanisation has been increasingly energy- 
intensive, particularly on electricity.
The liberal-modernist view of capitalism's 
progressive impact on apartheid is particularly 
undermined by the existence of the MEC.2 Apartheid, and 
in particular the system of supplying of cheap labour, is 
said to have favoured mining but not some of the more 
sophisticated capital-intensive continuous manufacturing 
processes. This suggests a tension between these 
manufacturing interests and those of mining. However, the 
evidence of increasing mechanisation in mining sectors 
such as coal, platinum and diamonds imply that the above 
dichotomy between mining and manufacturing is not so 
stark. It would appear that mechanisation possibilities 
are lower in the case of gold mining largely due to 
technical factors. Nevertheless, huge quantities of
2 See, for example, Lipton (1986)
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capital have been expended by gold mining houses through 
the Chamber of Mines Research Organisation (COMRO) in 
searching for ways to raise productivity in gold mining.3 
Contrary to assertions that the manufacturing sector is 
the greatest creator of wealth, value added is actually 
higher in the mining sector, (table 1.4); on average 
R35,282/employee compared to manufacturing's 
R31,236/employee in 1988.4 This is likely to rise with 
increasing mining mechanisation. Low wages are not 
relevant here since value added is defined as wages, 
taxes and profits. Mining is clearly as important a site 
of national accumulation as manufacturing. Moreover, as 
has been demonstrated above, mining is the starting point 
for much downstream MEC and other economic activity.











COAL 1209 1709 69 93767 31855
GOLD 7005 9554 146 531640 31422
DIAMONDS 356 689 36 14497 74567
OTHER MINING 1679 3421 219 99619 53393
TOTAL MINING 10249 15373 470 739523 35282
MANUFACTURING 23771 20476 998 1448500 31236
Source: Input-Output Tables, (1988).
(1) 1987 figures, South African Statistics (1990).
Interestingly, Edwards (1991) has shown that Research and Deveiopment(RSD) spending In the mining 
and mineral processing Industries Is highest when commodity prices are high, falling with the fall 
In prices. Thus, there has recently been a drastic curtailment in Research and Development spending 
by the Chamber of Mines.



































While it is useful to conceptualise mining 
activities as separate from manufacturing, this practice 
has masked a more fundamental and structural interlinkage 
between mining, energy generation and the manufacturing 
sector. At the core of the South African economy lies a 
Minerals-Energy Complex, exhibiting the following 
characteristics:
A contribution to GDP that is significantly larger 
than that of non-MEC manufacturing and one that is 
consistently growing.
A stagnating non-MEC manufacturing sector.
The falling export contribution of gold, has been 
partly offset, firstly, by growing exports of other raw 
and beneficiated minerals, particularly exports of coal- 
based chemicals. These, together with a large but 
unquantified saving in imports of crude oil and certain 
chemicals, have contributed to making the foreign 
exchange balance of the MEC increasingly positive since 
the early 1980s.
Exports of raw and beneficiated MEC commodities are 
subject to cyclical international markets and declining 
terms of trade.
An increasing capital-intensity, particularly in the 
MEC sectors.
Forward linkages between the MEC and the rest of 
industry are stronger than between mining and 
manufacturing. The non-MEC manufacturing sector already 
relies heavily on inputs from the MEC. Beneficiation is 
unlikely to change this and will only strengthen the role 
of the MEC.
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Weaker backward linkages are not uniform across the 
entire MEC. In particular, there is a heavy reliance of 
mining on inputs from the non-MEC manufacturing sectors, 
particularly the engineering industries, chapter 6.
The traditional narrow export-oriented mining base 
of a developing economy has thus been transformed into a 
more diversified Minerals-Energy Complex although there 
has not been a corresponding strengthening of linkages 
between the MEC and the rest of manufacturing.
3. THE MEC AND MANUFACTURING-LED INDUSTRIALISATION
The MEC is not simply a descriptive or analytical 
category as described in Section two. It has also been 
the target of post-war development policies and a core 
site of capital accumulation. The characterisation of 
these policies as Import-Substituting-Industrialisation 
conceals more than it reveals. State policies have 
facilitated the concentration and centralisation of 
scarce capital resources in projects which have mainly 
fallen within the MEC. The MEC is, therefore, a testament 
to the success of this process which has reaped the 
benefits of economies of scale and scope, even if the 
benefits were unevenly distributed towards specific 
fractions of capital. The relatively stunted non-MEC 
manufacturing sector is the negative counterpart to this 
process.
Interventions by the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) have contributed significantly to the 
growth of the MEC. The IDC historically chose to finance 
the establishment of infant industries which largely fell 
within the non-mining sectors of the MEC, including 
phosphates (1952), Palaborwa copper (1963), coal based 
chemicals; Sasol I (1951), synthetic rubber (1962),
Soekor oil exploration (1965), Alusaf aluminium smelter
55
(1967), industrial chemicals (1967), Sasol II (1976), 
Sasol III (1979) and Mossgas (1986).
While the IDC promoted other industries, including 
military industries such as Atlas Aircraft Corporation 
(1964), most resources have been deployed to promote the 
MEC, (table 1.5); 68.3% in 1960, falling gradually to 
37.4% in 1980 and rising to 48.0% in 1985.5 The upward 
trend since 19 80 is set to continue. The IDC has 
indicated that its next targets include steel and 
stainless steel beneficiation, wood pulp, chemicals and 
petrochemical products.6 Simultaneously, the IDC (1990) 
is justifying the non-targeting of other industrial 
sectors on the basis that they already receive excessive 
protection. Past industrial policy which mainly involved 
erecting tariff barriers is simply being put in reverse, 
without the addition of other policy tools.
TABLE 1.5 - IDC FINANCING OF THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
68.3% 64.6% 52.3% 53.5% 37.4% 48.0%
Represents the cumulative proportion of outstanding 
capital advanced to industrial undertakings in the 
following sub-sectors; Chemicals, Rubber, Plastics, Non- 
metallic Mineral products, Basic Iron and Steel 
Industries, Non-ferrous Metals.
Source: IDC Annual Reports (various years).
The reality of the MEC has partly been obscured by 
the way in which statistics are traditionally constructed 
and interpreted in terms of a divide between mining and 
manufacturing and by the limitations of models of 
economic development. This is often compounded by a 
particularly Eurocentric "stages" interpretation of
5
This is not apparent from statistics presented in this chapter but has been clearly illustrated by 
Zarenda (1992, p.33, Table 5).
6  Financial Mail 17-5-91.
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development, which views primary production as a 
transitory and essentially backward component of an 
economy.7
The statistical divisions between agriculture, 
mining and manufacturing are reflected in the models that 
are the creations of various economic and development 
theories. Whether one uses a neo-liberal, Keynesian or 
post-Keynesian framework, country models are designed 
either for developed or underdeveloped economies. The 
latter are largely primary commodity exporters, either 
dependent on minerals or agriculture. The key issue of 
the development path is interpreted in terms of the 
relative growth of different sectors, with targeting of 
the manufacturing sector for growth.
A good example of this was the Kleu Report's (1982) 
analysis of post-war industrial policy. Sectoral 
contributions were measured in terms of output, 
employment, capital-intensity and impact on the balance 
of payments. The subsequent comparison between mining and 
manufacturing was one of "either/or"; either use scarce 
resources to support primary production or support 
manufacturing. It is unclear why the study acknowledged 
the growing forward and backward linkages between 
agriculture and manufacturing, yet failed to apply a 
similar analysis to mining, Kleu (1982):
Apart from its direct contribution to economic 
growth, agriculture's supporting contribution is 
also significant. Agriculture continues to be an 
important earner of foreign exchange, while the 
linkage effects between agriculture and 
manufacturing industry are significant and becoming 
stronger. Forward linkage effects of agriculture are 
taking place mainly because of the supply of raw
—
The traditional construction of statistics has other serious policy implications for it a) usually 
disregards the informal sector, or regards it as a separate sector de-linked from mining and 
manufacturing; and b) ignores the contribution of unpaid and undervalued labour, usually female.
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materials, particularly for food processing, the 
production of liquor, tobacco and textiles and 
leather and timber processing. Together these 
industries are responsible for 25% of the total 
manufacturing output. Backward linkage is also 
important and has a bearing on purchases by 
agriculture and on production inputs.
This is even more surprising given that the report's only 
reference to mining's backward linkages was to 
acknowledge that major developments had taken place in 
the mining equipment industry, attributing this to 
favourable aspects of technology policy and research and 
development expenditure.8
Kleu argued that, while manufacturing was the 
fastest growing and most important sector of the economy, 
growth had been confined largely to the metal product, 
machinery and transport equipment sub-sectors but that 
manufacturing wa.s the largest net consumer of foreign 
exchange and was more capital-intensive than primary 
production sectors. Since Kleu's analysis only partly 
recognised the MEC and was based on the 
mining/manufacturing division, his recommendations were 
piecemeal and diffuse; namely that primary production 
should be encouraged to its maximum potential, while 
selective targeting of particular manufacturing sub­
sectors was required (with the state playing an 
indicative role).
Levy (1992) has also partly recognised the 
centrality of the chemicals component of the MEC, noting 
its relative ease in appropriating resources for 
expansion. In a preliminary analysis of the South African 
petrochemical feedstock industry (Sasol, in particular), 
Levy adopts an integrated approach by not viewing the 
"chemicals" and "plastics" sectors as individual
8  Kleu (1982, Para. 6.33, p.121).
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entities, except to measure static capital productivity 
for comparative purposes. Although he goes much further, 
drawing out the linkages and the integrated nature of the 
fuels/energy/chemicals complex, Levy does not extend his 
analysis across the manufacturing/mining or 
manufacturing/energy divides where there are major 
interlinkages.9 Nevertheless, Levy's approach results in 
a far more useful analysis and assessment of the 
potential for profitable and market-oriented investment 
in further downstream chemicals processing. Such an 
analysis is however less useful in evaluating the choice 
that an economy with scarce capital resources might face 
in the future, namely, whether R2 billion should be spent 
on an export-oriented naphtha cracker or whether it might 
better be utilised in creating employment in, say, rural 
infrastructure or in the garments industry, (see below).
The growth of the MEC has also been obscured by the 
fact that economic development and planning in South 
Africa have been conducted through the collaboration of 
state policy makers and the corporate sectors (public and 
private) within a strategic framework of military 
intervention and apartheid exploitation. Analysis and 
policy evaluation have been further clouded by the 
cumbersome and unsystematic protection policies that 
typify the economy. Protection has not been a major 
policy instrument that the apartheid state has used to 
nurture industrial development. There has been a parallel 
strategy of direct intervention through the creation of 
specific industries in decentralised "growth points" 
chosen for their proximity to Bantustans which, by most 
accounts, have failed. Notable exceptions are in areas 
where MEC linkages took root; Newcastle, Witbank/ 
Middelburg, Richards Bay and Bophuthatswana/Rustenburg.
The substantial technical achievements of the MEC 
have been accompanied and even facilitated by the
q
For example, Sasol mines and converts about 20% of all coal mined in South Africa.
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centralisation and concentration of capital, the entire 
process being underpinned by state intervention.
Ownership of large sections of the economy have reached 
an advanced stage of concentration, whereby six "axes" of 
capital dominate almost every sub-sector of mining, 
manufacturing and the financial sector, (see chapter 2), 
yet current analyses of industrial development in South 
Africa tend to overlook these factors. Industrial policy 
proposals based on the mining/manufacturing divide, 
recently put forward by an important representative of 
the corporate sector, Sacob (1991), regards mining as a 
more or less, isolated sector, contributing only 7.5% of 
manufacturing inputs. These inputs are viewed in terms of 
providing a competitive advantage to manufacturing. A 
misleading impression of the basis of South African 
exports is given by dividing South African exports into 
gold and merchandise exports. No account is taken of the 
differences between resource-based economies and those 
without natural/mineral resources, (figure 1.13). South 
Africa's manufacturing sector (25% of GDP in 1988) is 
compared to Taiwan's (41%) rather than to resource-based 
economies like Canada (23%), Mexico (26%) or Turkey 
(26%). The only attempt made to disaggregate the 
manufacturing sector is in order to demonstrate state 
intervention though levels of effective protection.
The Sacob document was devoted to highlighting the 
competitive disadvantages inhibiting manufacturing sector 
growth, namely cost and productivity of capital and 
labour and costs of intermediate inputs. The high costs 
of capital are attributed to prevailing policies which 
keep tax, interest and inflation rates high. Import 
tariffs and protection raise the costs of intermediate 
inputs and capital goods and result in reduced 
productivity. Exorbitant labour demands, they also argue, 
have raised production costs without corresponding 
productivity gains. Although Sacob acknowledges growth in 
beneficiation, they argue that the above inhibiting
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factors have prevented greater levels of beneficiation. 
The policy recommendations that flow from this centre on 
the elimination of the causes of competitive 
disadvantages; in particular, that the state should act 
to reduce the cost of capital, to reduce the power of 
organised labour and to reduce the cost of intermediate 
inputs and capital goods. The overall emphasis is on 
reducing the role of the state in the economy and to 
encourage emulation of selected policies pursued by 
successful newly industrialised economies (NICs) like 
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, namely an outward 
orientation, with an emphasis on subordinating the 
economy towards increasing manufactured exports.
What is overlooked in these arguments are the 
extremely high degrees of NIC state intervention in 
support of specific fractions of capital. This was 
accompanied by an initial autarchy and inward- 
orientation, a brutal political repression that 
accompanied rapid accumulation and favourable geo­
political factors that virtually guaranteed political 
"stability", currency convertibility, access to capital 
and access to the huge markets of developed market 
economies. The evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that current popular comparisons between the 
South African economy and the economies of successful 
late developers like Taiwan, South Korea and even Japan 
must proceed cautiously. While much attention has been 
given to state policies, institutions, production 
methods, marketing strategies, geo-political, social and 
other factors that contributed to their measured success 
as "manufacturing" economies, insufficient attention is 
given to the starting point of the productive bases of 
their respective economies. The economies of the NICs 
were never based on a Minerals-Energy Complex and, 
therefore, their development trajectory, quite 
appropriately, focused on manufacturing exports. The 
danger, therefore, is that the policy emphasis on the
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"manufacturing" sector that is emerging might lead to 
serious misallocation of the scarce resources that will 
be available in post-apartheid South Africa.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The process by which the MEC has occupied a central 
position within the economy cannot be explained by input- 
output analysis. Explanations lie in the realm of 
political economy. Past interventions by the South 
African state have succeeded in creating a highly 
capital-intensive MEC with ownership concentrated in the 
hands of what were previously distinguished as "English" 
and "Afrikaner" capital. While these distinctions are 
less relevant today, they constituted a disjuncture 
between economic and political power which was eroded 
through the development of the MEC, chapters 3 and 4.
The main policy implication here is that the MEC as 
a whole, today, contributes more to GDP than non-MEC 
manufacturing and also constitutes a site of comparative 
advantage, either requiring little state assistance, or 
being able to call upon it, in order to be competitive. 
Due to its size, integration and institutional 
relationships, the MEC acts as a magnet to capital for 
further expansion. With the exception of major housing 
programmes that are being mooted or implemented, driven 
largely by present political considerations, the bulk of 
national capital expenditure is being allocated to 
minerals- and energy- related projects. For example, the 
R3 billion Columbus stainless steel project is a joint 
venture between the Anglo American Corporation's Highveld 
Steel and Sanlam's Genmin, Other recently announced major 
capital expenditure projects relate to the upgrading of 
oil and coal-based fuel refineries and coal-based 
petrochemical projects. Most of these MEC projects are 
commercial ventures which require little state support. 
The only support given is a one-off capital subsidy to
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counter the high cost of capital. This is in the form of 
an accelerated tax write-off in the year of expenditure. 
The only other manufacturing sector projects of note are
a) the expansion of the beer monopoly, South African 
Breweries, a sector which is financially outside the MEC 
today but held within the conglomerate structure that 
dominates the economy.10 b) Several motor component 
industry investments directed at exports. For example, 
two platinum based autocatalyst exhaust plants have been 
opened in 1991, geared solely to the export market. 
However, the latter's existence is based on the 
continuation of export incentives to encourage higher 
local content in the motor industry. It is unclear how 
many of the projects associated with the motor industry 
would be economically viable without the current export 
incentive schemes and what their position is likely to be 
when the Phase VI incentives expire in 1996. Furthermore, 
recent revelations of foreign exchange fraud around the 
export incentive scheme are of particular concern.
The integrated nature of the MEC is also illustrated 
by the contraction of certain parts of the MEC, due to 
the knock-on impact on other MEC components. The most 
recent example lies in the rationalisation of the gold 
mining industry. Recent comparisons of individual South 
African mine working costs have implied that, at about 
$300/oz, 40% of South African gold mines would be 
uneconomic producers. Subsequent rationalisation has been 
borne directly by black mineworkers as mines scale-back 
operations, even sub-contracting the mining of some mine 
shafts. Contracting demand has directly affected 
manufacturing and other sectors supplying mining inputs, 
such as the electricity industry.
Corresponding closures of Escom power stations have 
had an adverse impact on tied coal suppliers. The net
Although this was not the case at the turn of the century when alcohol played a major role, both 
as a site of accumulation and as a means of social control, until It began to affect mine output. 
See Van Onselen (1982).
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pressure of Escom's 35%-40% excess power has prompted it 
to forge new relations within the MEC. This involves a 
possible 25% equity participation by Escom in the R3 
billion Alusaf aluminium smelter expansion, partly in 
return for a 20 year contract to supply electricity to 
the smelters at a price linked to the international price 
of aluminium. This is consistent with the historical 
orientation of the electricity parastatal's supply 
pattern, which has been to support mining and large- 
scale, energy-intensive industry. The role of such an 
agency has differed in other countries where electric 
utilities have often supported more socially motivated 
development patterns, rather than involving themselves 
solely in industrial projects.
To off-set the overall national impact of dependence 
on the MEC, monetary authorities have managed a 
controlled devaluation of the rand, which has compensated 
MEC core industries. This, in turn, has set in motion a 
comparative shift in the positions of sectors both within 
and without the MEC, widening the divide between the MEC 
core and non-MEC industries,
A second policy implication focuses on non-MEC 
manufacturing in relation to the MEC. Here the MEC can be 
regarded as a core, resulting from past interventions, 
that is so integrated and entrenched, in both linkage and 
institutional power terms, that it will naturally crowd 
out the development of any other industrial sector unless 
there is further intervention to prevent this. The 
traditional mining/manufacturing interpretation of the 
economy leads to a piecemeal policy focus on 
beneficiation of mineral products, justifying 
intervention to support some of the MEC's individual 
parts which, by themselves, appear to have no existing 
static comparative advantage. The policy challenge that 
flows from recognising the existence of the MEC and its 
inherent comparative advantage is, firstly, to focus on
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non-MEC industries and, secondly, to strengthen 
systematically the weak linkages between the MEC and non- 
MEC industries. This does not preclude selective 
targeting of sectors within the MEC but any further 
intervention to strengthen the role of the MEC in the 
economy needs to be balanced against the potential lost 
opportunity costs in favouring other sectors of the 
economy. This has recently been the site of debate.11
Since the IDC's planned future interventions will 
further the centrality of the MEC within the South 
African economy, then the magnitudes of capital required 
will, firstly, most definitely crowd out other 
investments and, secondly, will place major demands on 
the financial system. Foreign borrowings are likely to be 
needed and this will have other, potentially adverse 
knock-on effects on overall development of non-MEC 
sectors, if it is accepted that trade is not always 
mutually beneficial once relations of power figure in 
determining prices. This is important in policy 
formulation, particularly for the South African economy, 
whose export base is firmly rooted in cyclical 
commodities (both raw and beneficiated). If present 
policies of strengthening the MEC continue, corresponding 
cyclical patterns should be expected in future balance of 
payment projections and specific policies need to be 
developed to counter declining terms of trade associated 
with primary and secondary commodity producers.
Failure to appreciate fully the dynamics of the 
economy through the MEC is also reflected within the 
democratic movement (Cosatu/ANC) although their 
policymaking is probably far more advanced than within 
official structures. Sustainable policy formulation and 
implementation is a process and not simply the drawing up 
and ratification of a multitude of documents and plans by 
corporate Boards and state bureaucracies. While there are
1 'L See Rustomjee and Seidman-Makgetla (1992) and Van der Merwe (1992).
65
important differences between the approaches of business 
and the democratic movement, both tend to take the mining 
sector as given with little future potential but with one 
major drawback.12 This sector is increasingly being 
viewed as a political and economic millstone around the 
neck of a future state, particularly in terms of the 
potentially redundant but organised and militant labour 
it employs. For business, policy implications that flow 
from this include state intervention to limit labour's 
wage demands while policy debates within the democratic 
movement range between direct intervention and 
institutionalised enskilling and retraining.13 In both 
cases, there is reference to the need for "beneficiation" 
of mineral products but very little substance on how this 
might be achieved through a process which, firstly, 
prevents the MEC from appropriating a disproportionate 
share of national resources and, secondly, which ensures 
that other sectors of the economy do not become 
progressively more de-linked and underdeveloped in 
relation to the MEC
This chapter has argued that an understanding of the 
linkages between sectors and the relationships between 
agencies that constitute the Minerals-Energy Complex are 
essential prerequisites to any current restructuring of 
industry and any alternative post-apartheid 
restructuring. A negotiated national political settlement 
means that the agents involved will adopt positions that 
best defend their interests. Given that the confluence of 
these interests have been played out in the context of an 
increasing dependence on the MEC, a careful assessment of 
their dynamics and interplay will be required if the 
objective is either to build upon or to move away from 
the MEC. Whatever the outcome, there is a clear and
12 There are differences. The Sacob position subordinates the economy to manufacturing export-led 
growth, whi le the democratic movement tends to support the restructuring of the industry to meet 
domestic basic needs.
13 Sacob (1991) argues for "A national wage and productivity policy which will give due regard to the 
necessity to maintain a relation between wages, productivity and the rate of Inflation."
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urgent need for broader debate before action is taken by 
any agency or party to strengthen the MEC, action which 
might, through its sheer magnitude, result in further 
unsustainable development of the South African economy.
THE MEC AS AN ANALYTICAL CONCEPT
In this chapter, the MEC has been referred to as a 
core set of industrial sectors which exhibit very strong 
linkages between each other and relatively weaker 
linkages with other sectors listed in input-output 
tables. However, subsequent chapters also refer to the 
MEC as a system of accumulation. This addendum serves to 
explain the difference in the uses of the term Minerals- 
Energy Complex for two reasons; firstly to avoid 
confusion and, secondly, to outline the methodological 
position occupied by a concept which can be applied to 
interpret and explain the process of industrialisation in 
the specific context of South Africa. There is no 
presumption that the MEC is applicable to other countries 
since it has been analytically developed in the specific 
context of the South African economy. The MEC, as a 
system of accumulation, addresses the process by which 
the core set of industries outlined above have developed 
historically and, correspondingly, have influenced how 
other sectors have developed.
The methodology adopted in the thesis builds on
strong input-output linkages exhibited within the MEC
core sectors. Chapter 2 outlines important political and 
economic counterparts to the strength and cohesiveness of
the core, namely the form of ownership and control of the
core sectors. Here it is shown that, while conglomerate 
ownership dominates both the MEC core industries, control 
also extends to other non-MEC sectors. In the specific 
South African context, conglomerate power over the 
economy, reinforced through simultaneous control of the 
financial sector, is shown to extend to all activities
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and sub-sectors within mining, manufacturing and 
financial activities. This is specific to South Africa.
The MEC, as a system of accumulation, refers to the 
process by which accumulation is carried out within the 
broader economy, not just within the MEC core. One reason 
for this is that, in the specific South African case, 
conglomerate control across all productive sectors means 
that, even though strong linkages have been demonstrated 
within MEC core sectors, the process of accumulation has 
encompassed all other sectors continuously, with varying 
intensities, at different points in time and with 
different outcomes. Some of this complexity is outlined 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 which trace the political economy 
of industrialisation from the inter-war period to the 
present day, covering developments in both core MEC 
sectors as well as other industrial sectors and, where 
relevant, showing how relationships between various arms 
of the state and private capital as well as the role of 
the financial sector have led to the particular structure 
and location of the sectors defined as lying within and 
without the MEC core. The way these relationships have 
manifested themselves in the process and outcome of 
industrialisation is referred to in this thesis as the 
MEC as a system of accumulation. Sectorally, this system 
includes those sectors outside the MEC core industries, 
but this does not contradict the simultaneous 
understanding of the MEC as comprising a core set of 
industrial sectors. Instead, the analysis of the system 
of accumulation is tailored to unravelling the specific 
process of South African industrial development through 
an analysis of the internal dynamics and empirical 
outcomes of industrialisation in the context of a 
particular evolution of economic and political power.
As a system of accumulation then, the MEC 
potentially encompasses all economic sectors, since these 
have necessarily been associated with each other, through
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ownership and control, through relationships between 
state and capital or through the imperatives of 
apartheid. Some ambiguity necessarily arises over the 
boundaries between MEC (core) and non-MEC sectors since 
multiple criteria of (non)-membership arise - by core 
sector or not, by political and economic and functioning 
forms of control, by the linkages in input and output 
tables. Thus, the arbitrary boundary around the MEC core, 
drawn in Chapter 1 , does not extend to the engineering 
industry, the subject of Chapter 6 , although the latter 
has long been associated with MEC core sectors. There are 
a number of reasons for this. Firstly, in the South 
African instance, engineering sector activity, although 
closely linked to, is shown to have been subordinate to 
MEC core sectors in the sense of limited diversification 
from serving the core sectors. Secondly, then, the 
purpose of singling out engineering is to demonstrate
how, as a system of accumulation, the MEC has followed a
limited and narrow pattern of industrial development and 
that the reasons for this lie outside the fact that close
linkages existed between the MEC core and engineering.
Precisely because much engineering has been closely 
linked to the MEC core, it is limited in scope as a 
reflection of the evolution of the MEC as a system of 
accumulation. Ownership may have been incorporated across 
from the core to the engineering subsectors but many of 
the input-output linkages (a separate criteria) have 
remained weak.
Similarly, the concept of the Military-Industrial 
Complex (MIC) is very different to that of the MEC. In a 
review of the literature Fine (1992) has shown that there 
are generally two views of the MIC. The first, views the 
MIC as a "critical mass of agencies and linkages that 
gives it a uniquely significant presence and momentum". 
The second view sees the MIC more as a systemic mechanism 
within an economy to counteract stagnation derived from 
underconsumption. Both of these perspectives loosely and
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respectively resemble the concepts of the MEC as both a 
core set of sectors as well as a system of accumulation. 
However there the similarity ends for, in both cases, the 
MIC concept has been shown to be unsustainable in 
providing an adequate explanation of the pattern of 
industrialisation. The MIC theory, ’’which provides a 
framework within which to organise empirical 
material...leaves it vulnerable to criticism that it is 
no more significant than other ’complexes' such as the 
welfare or education lobbies", Fine (1992, p.l). In 
short, and in contrast, the MEC has constituted a core 
set of activities whose weight has been heavily 
influential over the direction of the economy as a whole. 
For the concept, or some other version of it, to be 
operative for other countries, it would be necessary to 
demonstrate empirically that the economic and political 
factors involved were equally powerful and influential.
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APPENDIX 1 - ISIC MANUFACTURING CATEGORIES
FOOD
BEVERAGES
TOBACCO & TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
TEXTILES
WEARING APPAREL (EXCL. FOOTWEAR)
LEATHER St PRODUCTS OF LEATHER St LEATHER SUBSTITUTES
FOOTWEAR
WOOD
WOOD St CORK PRODUCTS (EXCL. FURNITURE)
FURNITURE St FIXTURES 
PAPER St PAPER PRODUCTS
PRINTING, PUBLISHING St ALLIED INDUSTRIES 
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 
OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 
RUBBER PRODUCTS
PLASTIC PRODUCTS (NOT ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED)
POTTERY, CHINA St OTHER EARTHENWARE 
GLASS St GLASS PRODUCTS 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 
IRON St STEEL BASIC INDUSTRIES 
NON-FERROUS METAL BASIC INDUSTRIES
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS (EXCL. MACHINERY St EQUIPMENT) 
MACHINERY (EXCL.ELECTRICAL)
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, APPARATUS, APPLIANCES St SUPPLIES 
MOTOR VEHICLES, PARTS St ACCESSORIES
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT (EXCL.MOTOR VEHICLES PARTS St ACC.) 
PROFESSIONAL St SCIENTIFIC, MEASURING St CONTROLLING EQUIP 
PHOTOGRAPHIC St OPTICAL GOODS 
OTHER INDUSTRIES
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APPENDIX 2 - NOTES ON STATISTICAL SOURCES
Two major sources of mineral production statistics have 
been;
a)Minerals Bureau. These have been used to determine the 
extent of raw and processed minerals production and 
exports.
b)National Accounting/Foreign Trade Statistics. These 
have been the basis of input-output tables and have been 
used to determine forward and backward linkages between 
mining activities and the rest of the economy. They have 
also been used to determine contributions of the various 
economic sectors to gross domestic product.
MINERALS BUREAU - RAW MINERALS
Total annual raw minerals production and exports (tonnage 
and value) are published in South Africa's Mineral 
Industry Yearbook's (SAMI), Minerals Bureau. These 
statistics are reproduced by the Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs (DMEA) in their Annual Report. 
Categories of minerals are divided as follows:
PRECIOUS
Diamonds, gold, platinum group metals and silver.
METALLIC MINERALS
Antimony, beryllium, chrome ore, cobalt, copper, iron 
ore, lead, manganese ore, monazite, nickel, 
tantallite/colombite, tin, titanium minerals, uranium 
oxide, zinc, zirconium minerals.
NON-METALLIC MINERALS
Andalusite, asbestos, barytes, coal, corundum, feldspar, 
fluorspar, gypsum, kieselguhr, limestone and dolomite,
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magnesite, mica, mineral pigments, nephaline syemite, 
perlite, phosphate concentrate, pyrophyllite, salt, 
semiprecious stones, silcrete, silica, sillimanite, 
sodium sulphate, sulphur, talc, vermiculite.
DIMENSION AND BUILDING STONE
Granite, marble, quartzite, schist, shale, siltstone, 
slate.
CLAY




The Miscellaneous category includes several of the above 
minerals for which individual production statistics are 
classified secrets;
Precious Diamonds, platinum group metals,
Metallic Antimony, cobalt, monazite, tin, titanium
minerals, uranium oxide, zirconium 
minerals.
Non-Metallic Mica, phosphate concentrate.
MINERALS BUREAU - PROCESSED MINERALS





d)Other : Titanium slag, manganese dioxide, low





Foreign trade statistics are published by the 
Commissioner for Customs and Excise under two 
classification systems.
a)Harmonised System - statistics published at the 8 digit 
level.
b)ISIC - statistics published at the 4 digit level. 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
The national accounts classify industrial activity 
according to the Standard Industrial Classification. This 
divides mining and MEC manufacturing activities as 
follows;
Mining and Quarrying
coal (SIC 2100) 
gold(SIC 2400) 
diamonds (SIC 2700)
other mining (SIC 2200, 2300, 2800, 2900)
Manufacturing
a)Iron and steel basic industries (SIC 371): 
basic iron and steel,
steel pipe and tube mills
b)Non-ferrous metal basic industries (SIC 372): 
primary non-ferrous metal products (incl platinum)
c)Other non-metallic mineral products (SIC 361, 369): 
bricks, tiles, refractories, cement, etc.
d)Fertilisers, pesticides, synthetic resins, plastics, 




OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY - THE 
ROLE OF THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX
INTRODUCTION
The South African economy is dominated by six 
conglomerates which, because of their simultaneous 
control of the mining, manufacturing and financial 
sectors, are more usefully viewed as "axes" of capital. 
The historical process by which this particular corporate 
form has evolved in South Africa is discussed in other 
chapters and represents the operation of the MEC as a 
system of accumulation.
Section one analyses the extent of concentrated 
ownership by economic sector. Starting with the mining 
industry, the economy's dependence on gold is shown to 
have shifted to a broader range of minerals, in which the 
production of each is controlled by one or more of the 
six "axes". Conglomerate control extends into the 
manufacturing sector. In the first instance, it covers 
the activities immediately downstream of mining, 
including mineral processing and chemical production. 
Secondly, the industries that produce the key inputs for 
these sectors, particularly the enginering industries, 
are also characterised by conglomerate domination. 
Thirdly, all other sub-sectors of manufacturing exhibit 
considerable ownership concentration. The financial 
sector is also shown to lie within the sphere of control 
of the six "axes" of capital, and this has served to 
reproduce further and extend conglomerate control of 
other productive sectors.
Acknowledgement of conglomerate control of the South 
African economy is not novel. The corporate structure
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that is outlined here is typical of modern capitalism, 
though the degree of concentration in South Africa may be 
more acute than exhibited in other developing and 
industrialised economies. In recent debates, 
concentration is acknowledged and interpreted in terms of 
the way it has (usually adversely) affected industrial 
performance.1 However, from the perspective of the MEC, 
this stance forcibly separates the processes which led to 
concentration from the phenomenon of poor industrial 
performance.
The approach adopted in this thesis is that the 
process of concentration and conglomeration is seen, as 
will be shown in the chapters below, to be both a product 
of the economy's evolution around the MEC, as well as 
having had an impact on that evolution itself. 
Concentration of markets and conglomerate control of an 
economy does not by itself determine success or failure 
of industry, and the rest of the thesis demonstrates that 
the process by which the economy has evolved is better 
explained by reference to the MEC, rather than by a 
simplistic association with the increasing degree of 
economic concentration.
The South African economy is a "mixed" economy, in 
that there is both state and private ownership of 
productive sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing) 
and the financial sector. The extent of state ownership 
is outlined in Section two, where it is shown that, while 
state ownership of the productive sector is not large in 
comparison with private ownership, it is concentrated in 
sectors associated with the MEC. The historical 
relationship between state and private capital in the 
industrialisation process is dealt with in other 
chapters, but what is demonstrated here is that the 
state-owned sectors have fulfilled a particularly 
important function in lubricating the growth of MEC core
1 See for example, Lewis (1993).
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sectors and, simultaneously, the ascendance of large- 
scale private capital.
While the changing relationship between state and 
private capital is discussed in other chapters, the 
ownership of sectors around the MEC have involved a 
considerable degree of interpenetration between what was 
formerly referred to as English and Afrikaner capital as 
well as between them and the various state-owned 
corporations. The recent trend of privatisation should 
thus be seen as a continuation of this shifting 
relationship between the state and fractions of private 
capital.
In addition to its creation of industries in and 
around the MEC, the state, in its regulating role, is 
shown to have supported the emergence of large-scale 
capital which, as is demonstrated in chapter one, has 
concentrated its activity within the MEC core. This is 
discussed in Section three.
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1. CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND THE MEC
Corporate structure has evolved and extended around 
the MEC core. The origins of the MEC lie in mining where 
the enormous economies of scale required by deep mining 
conditions, after exhaustion of surface gold deposits, 
led to early concentration of ownership.
Out of the 57 6 gold mining companies floated on the
Rand during the period 1887-1932... only 57 remained
in existence in 1932...The 57 goldmining companies
in existence in 1932 were, with some minor
exceptions, controlled by six finance houses or 
2groups.*
The conglomerate forms that have developed since 
then are extensions of this oligopoly, whose power, as 
will be shown, is rooted in the control of the financial 
sector. The economy has gravitated away from a dependence 
on gold and diamond mining to a range of other raw and 
processed minerals, {table 2.1). This has largely 
occurred during and after the 1960s, particularly in the 
growth of coal, ferro-chrome, platinum, vanadium and 
copper mining. The smelting and refining activities of 
many of these are measured, and discussed below, under 
the manufacturing sector.
2 Davies, R.H. (1979) quoting Frankel, S.H. (1938).
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TABLE 2.1 - SOUTH AFRICAN MINERAL PRODUCTION, 19 88




GOLD 612 19687 5 4
COAL 180182000 5761 16
DIAMONDS n/a n/a n/a
FERRO-CHROME{1) 1190000 3551 10
PLATINUM(1) 2580 3092 9
VANADIUM(1) 29545 1249 3
COPPER 168000 932 3
IRON ORE 25029000 560 1
MANGANESE ORE 3447000 354 1
LIME/LIMESTONE 15721000 320 1
CHROMITE ORE 3401000 316 1
NICKEL n/a n/a n/a
URANIUM 4590 n/a n/a
ZIRCON SAND 135000 176 <1
TITANIUM n/a n/a n/a
ASBESTOS 109 n/a
FLUORSPAR 358000 84 <1
SILVER 182 81 <1
SALT 794000 59 <1
ANTIMONY 8838 46 <1
36268 100
Source: Central Statistical Service, Bulletin of 
Statistics.
(1) Item statistically recorded under the manufacturing 
sector. We have included it here since secondary 
processing is often carried out by subsidiaries of the 
major holding companies.
(2) This only represents the totals listed and should be 
regarded as indicative.
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TABLE 2.2 - SOUTH AFRICAN MINERAL PRODUCTION, 19 88 MARKET 
CONCENTRATION OF THE SIX MAJOR MINING HOUSES(%)









G OLDO) 39 8 14 6 6 18 91
COAL(2) 23 20 21 3 - 4 71
DIAMONDS 100 - - - - - 100
FERRO-CHROME - 27 42 13 8 - 90
PLATINUM 49 1 39 2 - - 91
VANADIUM 77 - - - - - 77
COPPER 69 - - - 29 2 100
IRON ORE ? - _ - ? - 30
CHROMITE ORE 3 30 42 - 9 - 84
ANTIMONY - - - 100 - - 100
Source: Rustomj ee (1990 ) .
(1)1989 statistics used for market share.
(2)1984 statistics used for market share.
(3)Ultimate controlling shareholder in brackets. Source: 
McGregor (1990 ) .
(4)Information is not available, iscor is the largest 
consumer of iron ore, owning most of its mines. Since 
privatisation, no clear ownership control of Iscor has 
emerged, but AAC, SA Mutual and the IDC hold significant 
stakes.




CONCENTRATED 50 TO 75
MILDLY CONCENTRATED 25 TO 50
NOT CONCENTRATED <25
Source: Alcorto (1990).
(1) C4 represents the cumulative market share of the four 
largest firms.
Table 2.2 illustrates the extent of oligopoly in the 
production of the most valuable minerals. The 
subsidiaries of six large mining houses namely Anglo 
American (AAC), Anglovaal, Rand Mines (SA Mutual), Genmin 
(Sanlam), Gold Fields of South Africa (GFSA) and
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Johannesburg Consolidated Investment (AAC) dominate the 
production and marketing of all individual mineral 
markets. With the exception of iron ore, a combination of 
the six conglomerates mine more than 7 0% of all major 
minerals in South Africa. Bain (1951) has suggested that 
significant monopoly or oligopoly power is indicated if 
the eight largest firms (C8 ratio) control more than 70% 
of the market. Alcorto (1990) argues that such ratios are 
largely a matter of degree but that a C4 ratio of 75% can 
be regarded as significant, (table 2.3). Even if 
Alcorto's more conservative indicators are used, the 
production of most minerals fall into the "highly 
concentrated" category. In any case, the purpose here is 
less to highlight individual market dominance and more to 
illustrate the pattern of evolving economic dominance of 
large-scale capital.
For the MEC core has expanded out of mining, through 
downstream mineral processing activities carried out by 
subsidiary companies of the conglomerates. Such 
statistics are measured within the manufacturing sector, 
which exhibits an oligopolistic pattern of market control 
and a concentration of ownership among the same 
conglomerates that control the mining sector.3 About 37% 
of the manufacturing sector's output is from MEC sectors 
including the steel, chemical and mineral processing 
industries, each of which is dominated by one or other 
conglomerate. Each of these sectors is highly 
concentrated, with the C5% index (ie.the cumulative 
market share of the dominant 5% of firms) above 75%, 
(table 2.4).4 Engineering sectors exhibit slightly lower 
C5% concentration ratios. The engineering industries are 
shown in chapter six to have been historically linked to 
the development of the MEC core both in ownership terms
3 See Fourle and SmIt (1989), Tregenna-Plggott (1976), (1979) and (1980), Dollery (1983) and Du 
P less Is (1978).
4 Fourie and SmIt (1989) have also demonstrated this tendency using the Gini Coefficient (or 
quantitative indicator of the Lorenz curve) and provide a discussion of the pros and cons of these 
widely accepted indicators.
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and in providing a large proportion of MEC inputs. Non- 
MEC industries exhibit similar, highly concentrated 
ownership structures and demonstrate that oligopoly in 
South Africa is not only confined to industries requiring 
large economies of scale, (table 2.4). This is confirmed, 
for example, in table 2.7 by the dominance of SA Mutual's 
subsidiaries in the food industries.
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TABLE 2.4 - MANUFACTURING SECTOR CONCENTRATION INDEX, 
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51. 5 
59 . 0 
79.0 



















































50 . 0 
64 . 0 
61 . 9
44. 3
TOTAL (ALL SECTORS) 120.7
(1) Source: Central Statistical Service, Bulletin of 
Statistics.
(2) Source: Fourie and Smit (1989).
Du Plessis (1977), (1978) and (1979) demonstrates 
that the manufacturing sector exhibits higher levels of 
concentration than France, West Germany, U.K. and Italy. 
Although one would expect South Africa, a relatively
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smaller economy, to have greater levels of concentration, 
the trend in concentration has actually been increasing. 
As early as 1972, 63.5% of manufacturing industries 
classified under the Standard Industrial Classification 
were regarded as highly oligopolistic, (table 2.5). Data 
to update these are not available but, since mergers and 
acquisitions accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, it is 
reasonable to assume that this trend has increased.^
TABLE 2.5 - SOUTH AFRICAN 
OF OLIGOPOLY, 197 2
MANUFACTURING SECTOR MEASURES
N o .Firms Cumulative





DUOPOLISTIC 2 15 . 4
HIGH-OLIGOPOLISTIC 3-10 63.5
MODERATE-OLIGOPOLISTIC 11-15 74 . 6
LOW-OLIGOPOLISTIC 16-20 77 . 9
UNCONCENTRATED 21-40 90 . 6
COMPETITIVE 41 + 100.0
Source: Du Plessis (1978).
Ownership of manufacturing firms can be traced to 
the six large conglomerates that dominate mining in two 
ways. First, it is reasonable to consider ownership on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as indicative of 
the ownership structure of manufacturing since the 
magnitude of ownership by the state, by domestic or by 
transnational corporations outside of the JSE is small in 
comparison. In 1988, 82.5% of the entire JSE was 
controlled by the six conglomerates, (table 2.6), three 
of which were dominant. The changes between 1985 and 
1988, in table 2.6, are due to changing corporate 
structures through mergers and acquisitions as well as 
changing stock valuations. The predominance of gold 
shares in Anglo American's portfolio in particular, has
5 Du Plessis (1977) and (1978) had access to unpublished official data.
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contributed to the relative decline in its share since 
October 1987.
Secondly, the conglomerates exercise control over 
these industries through pyramid, or holding companies 
which provide control without a significant outlay of 
capital. An examination of the distribution of the 
largest 100 listed companies by asset size, reveals 
extensive use of the holding company as a vehicle of 
conglomeration and a corresponding concentration of 
ownership of these companies, (table 2.7).
TABLE 2.6 - OWNERSHIP OF SHARES ON THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK 
EXCHANGE, (%)
1985 1988
ANGLO AMERICAN 53.60 49 . 5
SANLAM 12 . 20 10 . 8
S.A MUTUAL 10.60 9.8
REMBRANDT 3.80 7 . 6
ANGLOVAAL 2.10 2.2
LIBERTY LIFE 2.00 2.6
84. 30 82.5
Source: Rustomjee (1990) using McGregor (1990).
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686 3 SA MUTUAL
4395 SA MUTUAL
3204 AAC










3 35 SA MUTUAL
181 DIRECTORS
Source: Rustomjee (1990) using Financial Mail, Top
Companies Supplement, 19 May 1989 and McGregor 
(1990) .
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More recently, conglomerate ownership has extended 
to the financial sector. An important role of the 
financial sector in any economy is to collect, store and 
distribute national savings. Major institutions within 
the South African financial sector include commercial 
banks, merchant banks, pension funds, mining finance 
houses and (until recently) building societies. Banks 
have traditionally made loans and bonds to both state and 
private sectors and have specialised in financing trade 
through merchant banking interests. Building societies 
have traditionally operated in the long term financing of 
property, although with deregulation in the early 1980s, 
their position has changed (see below). Insurance and 
pension funds have traditionally made loans to the state 
and public sector and have channelled the balance of 
their large cash inflows onto the JSE, which itself is an 
important institution within South Africa's capital 
market.
The distribution of financial sector assets is 
illustrated in table 2.8. The actual occurence of 
concentrated ownership of the financial sector is less 
important than the sector's organic, facilitating and 
lubricating role in financing and linking the various 
mining, manufacturing and other productive sectors in a 
dynamic manner along a particular growth path. 
Oligopolistic control of the financial sector has not 
only contributed to the process of concentration and 
centralisation, but has also shaped the pattern of 
industrialisation itself around the MEC core. In 1988, 
commercial banks and long-term insurers deployed 59% of 
the financial sector's assets, the balance being spread 
between general and merchant banks and building 
societies. Table 2.9 shows that conglomerates dominate 
each of these specialised financial activities.
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COMMERCIAL BANKS 82.7 30 . 7
GENERAL BANKS 28.1 10 . 4
MERCHANT BANKS 6.5 2.4
BUILDING SOCIETIES 36.0 13 . 3
LONG TERM INSURERS 77 . 6 28.8
PENSION/PROVIDENT FUNDS 38.9 14 . 4
269 . 8 100 .0
STATE SECTOR
OFFICIAL FUNDS(1) 31. 3 45 .8
PUBLIC INVESTMENT COMMISSION(2) 27.8 40 . 7
LAND BANK 9.2 13.5
68. 3 100 .0
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, 
March 1990.
(1) Administered by SATS and Dept, of National Health and 
Population Development
(2) The PIC administer public sector pension funds.
Direct control over financial sector assets in 1988 
were as follows; SA Mutual R52.9b; Anglo American R41.0b, 
Sanlam R38b and Liberty Life R21b, (table 2.9). Indirect 
or joint control increases this significantly, 
reinforcing the contention that the financial sector is 
under oligopolistic control. This does not mean that no 
competition exists between finance houses, but the basis 
of competition is a narrow one characterised by capital- 
intensity (South Africa has one of the highest ratios of 
automated telling machines in the world, higher than the 
UK and FRG), speculative activity like the channelling 
of funds onto the stock market causing it to boom during 
recessions, and in activities that attempt to circumvent 
capital controls (see below).
6 For further details on automated banking see, Weekly Mai 1, 1 June 1990.
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Liberalisation policies pursued by the state between 
1980 and 1983 lifted controls over interest rates, 
exchange rates and on activities of various sectors 
within the financial system. Traditionally, building 
societies competed ineffectively with banks for 
individual savings accounts and their capacity to compete 
was enhanced in the short term by deregulation through a 
new Building Societies Act which allowed them to convert 
themselves from mutual organisations owned by their 
depositors to companies which could raise funds through, 
for example, share issues. However, in the longer term, 
this has paradoxically encouraged the tendency to 
concentration by allowing existing monopolies to buy up 
the building society competitors. Those societies that 
converted, namely UBS, Allied, NBS and Saambou have all 
fallen within the orbit of the major conglomerates while 
the Perm, which is the only society to remain a mutual, 
is now a division of Nedbank and thereby controlled by 
Sanlam. One result of this is the recent emergence of the 
Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA) as the largest 
banking group, representing the merging of Volkskas, 
United, Allied, Bankorp and Trustbank, largely Afrikaner- 
oriented institutions.
In conclusion, the structure of private corporate 
capital in South Africa is represented by six broad- 
based, organically linked "axes" of capital each with 
varying interests in mining, manufacturing and the 
financial sector. Three of these (SA Mutual, Sanlam and 
Anglo American) control a long term insurance group, a 
commercial, general or merchant bank, and/or a building 
society, an industrial holding company and a mining 
holding company. The Liberty/Standard and 
Rembrandt/Volkskas axes are more active the financial 
sector level while Anglovaal is more concerned with 
direct investments in manufacturing and mining 
industries.
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The SA Mutual axis involves SA Mutual - Nedbank - 
UAL/Finance Bank - Perm Building Society - Barlow Rand - 
Rand Mines.
The Sanlam axis involves Sanlam - Trust/SANTAM Bank - 
Senbank - (no building society) - Gencor - Malbak.
The Anglo American axis involves Southern Life - Firn+: 
National Bank - First Corporate Bank - (no building 
society) - AMIC - AMGOLD/AMCOAL/DE Beers/JCI.
The Liberty/Standard axis involves Liberty Life - 
Standard Bank - Standard Merchant Bank - (no building 
society) - (no direct mining/industrial arms).
The Rembrandt/Volkskas axis involves Lifegro/Federated 
Life - Volkskas/Boland - Rand Merchant Bank - United 
Building Society - Remgro - GFSA.
Anglovaal operates relatively independently of financing 
with some Sanlam and SA Mutual influence in their mining 
and industrial holding companies.
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TABLE 2.9a - OWNERSHIP OF FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSETS, 1988 - 





















Stannic 5.2 As per STANDARD above
First Western 4.4 ANGLO AMERICAN




A 1fled Bank 2.1 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
REMBRANDT
REMBRANDT
First Industrial 1.9 ANGLO AMERICAN
Nedf In 1.7 SA MUTUAL
French Bank 0.8 N/A
Volkskas Industrial 0.7 REMBRANDT/D IRECTORS




Source: Rustomjee (1990) using Financial Mail, Top
Companies Supplement, 19 May 1989 and McGregor 
(1990 ) .
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TABLE 2.9b - OWNERSHIP OF FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSETS, 1988 - 




Standard Merchant Bank 1.1
First Corporate 0.8
UAL Merchant Bank 1.1
Volkskas Merchant Bank 1.1




















































14.8 STANDARD BANK/DONALD GORDON 








Total Financial Sector 264.7
Source: Rustomjee (1990) using Financial Mail, Top
Companies Supplement, 19 May 19 89 and McGregor
(1990) .
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2. STATE AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND THE MEC
TABLE 2.10 - OWNERSHIP OF FIXED CAPITAL STOCK (%)
PRIVATE
PUBLIC PUBLIC PUBLIC BUSINESS




1949 44 _ 3 53
1950 41 - 4 55
1955 39 - 5 5 6
1960 20 22 5 53
1965 22 22 5 51
1970 24 21 7 49
1975 24 20 9 46
1980 24 20 14 42
1985 23 19 15 43
1990 25 18 10 47
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletins.
(1) Public Authorities = Central Authorities, Provincial 
Administration and Local Authorities.
(2) Public Authority Business Enterprises = South African 
Transport Services (now Transnet and Portnet), Posts and 
Telecommunications, South African Mint, National Supplies 
Procurement Fund, Community Development Fund. Public 
Authority statistics were only disaggregated after 1960.
(3) Public Corporations = Escom, Iscor, IDC, Rand Water 
Board, Sasol, Uranium Enrichment Corporation (Ucor), 
Armscor, Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), Corporation for 
Economic Development.
South Africa's "mixed" economy has evolved through 
close inter-relationships between the state, English and 
Afrikaner fractions of capital, particularly around the 
MEC. The extent of state involvement is reflected in its 
share of national fixed assets, (table 2.10). In the 
post-war period, the bulk of national fixed capital stock 
in industrial sectors has been privately, mainly 
conglomerate, owned. Private ownership of national fixed 
capital stock fluctuated between 50% and 55% between 1946 
and 1960 before falling to 42% in 1980, (table 2.10). 
State sector investment has been of two sorts. Firstly it 
has been concentrated in specific large-scale MEC core
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industries such as steel, chemicals, processed minerals 
and energy (liquid fuels and electricity). The Public 
Corporations' share of fixed capital stock grew from 5% 
in 1955 to 7% by 1970. Thereafter it accelerated to 15% 
in 1985, reflecting state-led direct investment in 
synthetic fuel, chemicals, steel, energy and armaments. 
This has declined in the 1980s, falling to 10% by 1990,
n
as state-led investment fell, and as state corporations 
like Iscor and Sasol were privatised. Private capital's 
share correspondingly rose with the privatisation from 
43% to 47% between 1985 and 1990, reflecting the 
continuing process of its growth by acquisition rather 
than by new investment. The state has also provided 
indirect support to the MEC core through its provision of 
railway, harbour, fuel pipeline and telecommunication 
facilities and the share of such infrastructure has 
remained fairly steady between 22% and 18% in the post­
war period.
Table 2.11 reveals a concentration of state assets 
in a handful of large corporations or organisations, 
several of which have either been or are in the process 
of being privatised. In 1986, of the R80b worth of 
assets, R63.5b was either directly or indirectly 
associated with the MEC.
The historical process of state involvement with 
private capital around the MEC is outlined in subsequent 
chapters. However, state-created industries have tended 
to provide the means by which the MEC core could be 
expanded. This began with the creation of the primary 
steel industry in the 1920s and continued through the 
nationalisation and subsequent investment in the under­
capitalised electricity industry in 1948. Electricity has 
continued to provide a key impetus to the trajectory of
7 South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bui let Ins show total gross domestic fixed Investment (GDFI) 
(at 1975 prices) rise from R5.6 billion In 1970 to R7.2 billion In 1979, reach a peak of R9.6 
billion In 1981 before falling to R7.1 billion in 1988. Private sector share of expenditure was as 
follows: 1970 - 57%, 1979 - 47%, 1981 - 51%, 1988 - 67%.
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industrialisation.8 The Sasol I plant was the first 
large-scale support given by the state to the chemicals 
sector, extending the links between coal mining and the 
manufacturing sector, as will be shown below. One of the 
characteristics of state-ownership has been that it has 
often been accompanied by joint-ventures with domestic 
and international private capital.
TABLE 2.11 - FIXED ASSETS OF MAJOR 
1986
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,














Source: McGregor, R. (ed.) (1987).
To summarise, the extent of state ownership of fixed 
assets in the productive sectors of the economy is 
relatively small compared to the private sector. But 
state investment is focused in, and supportive of, MEC 
core sectors. Furthermore, the control of investible 
surpluses is firmly in the hands of private capital.
Prior to the privatisations after 1988, the state had 
direct control of only R68b of financial sector assets, 
whereas the private sector controlled some R270b, (table 
2 .8 ) .
® The I DC Managing Director, van der Merwe (1992) argued that the decision to spend some R12b on an 
aluminium smelter and a stainless steel plant In 1992 was partly Justified on the grounds of 
utilising the estimated 40% excess electricity generating capacity.
96
2.1 THE INTERPENETRATION OF CAPITAL AND THE MEC
Mergers and acquisitions have characterised the 
growth of the conglomerates since the early 1960s, when 
the Sharpeville massacre prompted a flight of foreign 
capital. Acquisitions increased dramatically in the 1970s 
and, in the 1980s, was accompanied by increasing 
interpentration of ownership particularly between English 
and Afrikaner capital. In subsequent chapters, the 
empowerment of large-scale Afrikaner capital is shown to 
have been a major political and economic objective of the 
apartheid state, which contributed to the emergence and 
interpenetration of large-scale capital, as embodied by 
the "axes'1. This took place at different times across the 
various sectors. Table 2.12 illustrates the ultimate 
controlling interest in each of the mining houses and the 
cross-holdings between them. Anglo American's interest in
GFSA and JCI 
Anglovaal.
is significant as is Sanlam's interest in
TABLE 2.12 - 
1988
SOUTH AFRICAN MINING HOUSE CROSS HOLDINGS,
% OWNED BY PARENT/CONTROLLING INTEREST
ANGLO RAND GENCOR X I ANGLO GFSA
ULTIMATE AMERICAN MINES -VAAL
CONTROLLING
INTEREST PARENT
AAC ANGLO AMERICAN __ 5.5 50.0 21.8
SA MUTUAL BARLOW RAND -- 10.3 10.3 <10.0
SANLAM GENCOR -- 26.7
AAC JCI --
HERSOV/MENEL FAMILY ANGLOVAAL 2.3 --
REMBRANDT GFSA --
Source: McGregor (1990).
(---- ) denotes a controlling interest.
Extensive cross holdings are evident in the 
financial sector. Within the Anglo stable, First National
97
Bank (FNB) owns a large percentage of Southern Life 
which, in turn, has a large stake in FNB. Standard Bank, 
owned largely by Liberty Life, SA Mutual and Rembrandt, 
in turn owns 50% of Liberty's controlling company. UBS 
Holdings (listed) controls UBS and together with Volkskas 
control United Bank.
3. LARGE-SCALE CAPITAL AND ANTI-MONOPOLY REGULATION
One of the ways by which large-scale capital was 
empowered was through the support of the state in 
regulating capital in general. Direct regulatory policy 
on monopoly and competition has existed in South Africa 
since 1955 in the form of the Regulation of Monopolistic 
Conditions Act No.24 of 1955, which was governed by the 
Board of Trade and Industries (BTI) under discretionary 
control of the (then) Minister of Economic Affairs, who 
had powers to initiate and terminate investigations and 
negotiations. This was superseded by the Maintenance and 
Promotion of Competition Act No.96 of 1979 and modified 
by Act No.5 of 1986 which effectively increased the scope 
and power of the Competition Board (CB). Legislation in 
July 1990 appears to have further strengthened the powers 
of the Board.^
However, such legislation has never challenged 
large-scale capital. In the 1950s, the consolidation of 
Afrikaner capital and its deployment into large-scale 
mining and industrial activites was promoted. In the 
1960s, both Afrikaner and English large-scale capital 
acquired footholds in a wide range of industries as 
foreign capital disinvested following the Sharpeville 
massacre. In the 1970s, the state promoted a wide range 
of industrial activity in expanding MEC core sectors 
which further enhanced joint-venture activity between 
English and Afrikaner capital under state coordination. 
With the fall in commodity prices and the growing crisis
9 "Sharper bite for board", Sunday Times, Business section, July 29, 1990, Page 3, Johannesburg.
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of apartheid in the 1980s, coordinated policies, 
including those concerning ownership and control, 
diffused as policymakers increasingly embraced policies 
of deregulation and privatisation.
The National Party (NP) used its control of the 
state apparatus after 1948 not only to provide jobs for 
Afrikaners who, among whites, had been economically and 
politically marginalised by the preceding imperial epoch, 
but also to consolidate and build an Afrikaner economic 
base. Manufacturing at this time was controlled by a 
mixture of domestic and foreign capital while mining 
capital was more monopolised, dominated by mainly 
domestic or foreign (mainly) "English" capital. Commerce 
and finance was controlled by foreign capital although 
there was a significant and growing domestic presence.
The passing of the 1955 Act should be viewed in the 
context of the N P 's diverse constituency, for subsequent 
NP policy was not to break-up existing monopolies but 
rather to force them to admit large-scale Afrikaner 
capital. Lipton (1986, p.286) quotes Verwoerd in 1957:
the encouragement of local capital formation was one 
of the guiding principles of our financial policies 
during this past decade*
The entry of Afrikaner capital was effected by 
favourable treatment by the state through its 
institutional position and in its role as a major 
consumer in the market through, for example, shifting 
state bank accounts to Afrikaner financial institutions 
and awarding lucrative coal supply contracts for power 
stations to Afrikaner-owned mines, chapter 4. The rise of 
Afrikaner capital was a slow process, the breakthrough 
into gold mining only occurring with the takeover of the 
General Mining Corporation by Fedvolks in 1964 with the 
assistance of the Anglo American Corporation. The
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objective of empowering large-scale Afrikaner capital 
contradicted any commitment to the promotion of 
competition under the Regulation of Monopolistic 
Conditions Act No.24 of 1955. Evidence of investigations 
under the 1955 act indicates that monopoly was justified 
if it contributed to overall national productive 
efficiency. However, what constituted the "public" 
interest was never clearly defined.1^
The rapid concentration of ownership that took place 
in the 1960s and early 1970s and the uneven effects that 
both gold and oil price rises had on the economy, 
particularly the manner in which cash rich fractions of 
capital like Anglo American and GFSA threatened the 
takeover of assets of other fractions of capital that had 
little interest in gold mining, led to the appointment of 
a Commission of Inquiry into the 1955 Act. The Commission 
gathered considerable evidence of concentration in sector 
after sector showing extensive oligopolistic conditions. 
Oligopoly was found to have been exacerbated by 
protectionist barriers, small market size, distance 
between centres and historical factors which have 
influenced the pattern of industrialisation. The 
Commission recommended that changes were required to 
speed up the process of investigation which conflicted 
with other Board of Trade and Industry (BTI) activities 
and priorities. Apparently, proper investigation under 
the Act in order to determine whether, for example, a 
merger was in the "public" interest, was hampered by the 
lack of qualified staff and resources.11 A major 
criticism was the fact the Act applied only after abuse 
had occurred, that since it was not pre-emptive,it was 
unable to deal effectively with the rising spate of 
mergers.
10 See Tregenna-Plggott (1980, p.29).
11 Competition Board Annual Report, 1980.
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This report led to the 1955 Act being superceded by
the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act No.9 6 of
1979, under which, the Competition Board (CB) was set up
and empowered to investigate and advise the Minister of
Industry, Commerce and Tourism on the existence of
restrictive practices, on proposed or completed
acquisitions and to interpret whether such practices were
1 ^
or were not in the "public" interest.
If monopolistic conditions were found to be against 
the public interest, the Board had the power to negotiate 
with the infringing parties to resolve the specific 
problem. If the latter did not comply, legislation could 
be enacted to prohibit the practice. In addition the CB 
had specific responsibilities to monitor ownership 
concentration continuously which served to guide 
investigations into acquisitions or mergers and to 
publish guidelines on policy on acquisitions. These 
guidelines encouraged consultation with the Board prior 
to making acquisitions through the granting of immunity 
against any subsequent dissolution through legislation. 
Maximum penalties for contravention of clauses issued 
under the Act were R100,000 and/or 5 years imprisonment. 
To date, no such penalties have ever been imposed.
The most important aspect of the 1979 legislation 
(like its predecessor) is that it was an enabling 
measure. It did not contain any prohibitions, could not 
be contravened and merely established guidelines for 
viewing monopoly issues. The objectives of the 1979 Act 
were clearly stated;
This is not anti-monopolistic legislation. It is 
just a bill to regulate monopolistic conditions and 
it appears very clearly from this, that even though 
a monopoly exists and even though combines exist,
12 See Competition Board (1981, p.3) for a detailed definition of restrictive practices. See 
Competition Board (1981, pp.7-26) regarding acquisitions.
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they can still be justified in South Africa if they 
do not have a deleterious effect on the public. J
The Act did not address the extent of concentration 
of ownership nor market share as an issue. Monopoly was 
not regarded as a problem in itself, only when it 
affected the "public's interest" as interpreted by the CB 
and finally judged by the Minister. Furthermore, where 
mergers were concerned, the focus was to inhibit future 
mergers to prevent concentration, while dismemberment of 
existing concentrations was regarded as retarding growth 
and as too drastic or difficult a task.14
In practice, however, the Board's investigations 
have focused on relatively minor sectors as table 2.13 
shows below and, furthermore, no concept of linkage 
between economic sectors appears to have been considered 
until after 1986. In the case of alcoholic beverages, the 
Board appeared to avoid confronting South African 
Breweries (SAB) who had consolidated 100% control over 
the beer market by taking over its rival Intercontinental 
Breweries under an industry restructuring directive by 
the BTI in 1979.
SAB's acquisition...constituted a restriction on 
competition in the beer industry, but...little could 
be done to restore the slight degree of competition 
that had existed...1^
A minority report criticised the Board's neglect of this 
and its decision instead to condemn the wine industry,
85% of which was controlled by a company jointly-owned by 
Rembrandt and the KWV vine growers co-operative.
13 Minister of Economic Affairs, when Introducing the Draft Bill of the 1977 Act, Hansard, 28 
February 1977, Page 1824. Quoted In Tregenna-Plggott (1980),
14 See Four Ie (1987).
15 Competition Board Annual Report, 1982.
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TABLE 2.13 - COMPETITION BOARD ACTIVITIES, 19 80-19 90
INDUSTRY INVESTIGATED REPORT NO. DATE TYPE
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS BTI 1884(M), 1980
MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS BTI 1929(M), 1980
B U 1L D 1NG 1NDUSTRY(SAN1TORY/HARDWARE) 1, 1980 RP
POULTRY INDUSTRY 2, 1981 RP
FERTILISER 3, 1981 SD
DISCRIMINATION IN PRICING & CONDITIONS OF SALE 4, 1981 D
ASSOCIATION OF S.A. TRAVEL AGENTS 5, 1982 ACT
ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION 6, 1981 ACT
INTERFLORA 7, 1982 RP
SOFT DRINKS INDUSTRY 8, 1982 RP
SUPPLY & DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOSIVES 9, 1982 RP
SUPPLY & DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 10, 1982 RP
SUPPLY & DISTRIBUTION OF FERROUS SCRAP METAL 11, 1983 RP
SUPPLY & DISTRIBUTION OF COAL 12, 1983 RP
SUPPLY & DISTRIBUTION OF ANTHRACITE 13, 1983 RP
ACQUISITIONS BY SCAW METALS 14, 1983 ACQ
COLLUSION ON PRICES & CONDITIONS 15, 1985
ACQUISITION BY ARGUS 16, 1986 ACQ
REAL ESTATE MULTI LISTING SERVICES (PTY)LTD 17, 1987 RP
ACQUISITION BY NEBANK GROUP 18, 1987 ACQ
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION IN SAWMILLING INDUSTRY 19, 1987 ACT
POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF GFSA BY ANGLO AMERICAN 20, 1989 ACQ
ACQUISITIONS IN THE BAKING INDUSTRY 21, 1989 ACQ
ACQUISITIONS IN THE ANIMAL FEED INDUSTRY 23, 1989 ACQ
ACQUISITIONS IN THE STATIONARY INDUSTRY 24, 1989 ACQ
POST 1986 DEREGULATION ACTIVITIES
TRADE REGULATION : LICENCING & TRADING HOURS 
TAXI LICENCING
LEGISLATION AFFECTING BLACK TRADERS 
FOOD HANDLING REGULATION 
DEREGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL PARKS 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
REGULATION AT LOCAL GOVT.LEVEL
Source: Competition Board Annual Reports, 1980-1990,
Competition Board, Published Investigations No. 
1-24, 1980-1990, Government Printer, Pretoria.
(1)Investigation Type:




SD = Supply & Distribution
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In the case of explosives, restrictive practices 
were found and the CB was instructed by the minister to 
negotiate rectification. This decision assisted Sasol1s 
entry into the explosives market. In the case of coal, 
the Board regarded the excessive regulations governing 
the industry to be contrary to the public interest. 
However, coal production, distribution and export 
continued to be monopolised by conglomerate subsidiaries.
Between 1980 and 1986, political and economic crises 
deepened. Large capital outflows and a collapsing 
currency forced the South African state to declare a 
moratorium on debt repayments in 1985. The embracing of 
deregulation and privatisation policies prompteD the 
Competition Board to shift its attention to such 
investigations after 1986, (table 2.13).16
In 1986, an amendment to the 1979 Act was passed 
(Act No.5 of 1986) which had the following implications;
a)It extended Competition Board powers to take action 
against an "existing concentration of economic power". 
Previously, it could only act against new concentrations.
b)Powers were extended to cover financial institutions, 
previously limited by Section 16 of the Act.
c)It removed exemptions covering agricultural co­
operatives and control boards (Section 2(i)(c)). Up to 
1990, no action had been taken against these sectors, 
although an investigation into the Eastern Transvaal 
Cooperative (OTK) was instituted in July 1989.
d)It formally introduced issues of deregulation and 
privatisation into the activities of the Board, which 
subsequently played an increased advisory role in 
formulating state policy in this regard.
16 Deregulation also had the effect of empowering capital. Under the Temporary Removal of Restriction 
on Economic Activity Act, 87 f 1986, the State President could exempt entrepreneurs from a host of 
national and local ordinances Including safety requirements "if It unduly Impedes economic 
development or competition or the creation of job opportunities". Competition Board Annual Report, 
1987, p.11.
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e)The Boards composition was increased through Reserve 
Bank and Agricultural Ministry appointees to include 
expertise on agricultural and financial matters.
A changing relationship between capital and the 
state is reflected in the extension of the scope of the 
Competition Board to cover existing concentrations of 
private power. The financial crisis at this time was 
over-riding and perhaps for this reason, the CB were 
instructed by the Minister in 1986 to abandon their 
investigation into structural linkages between businesses 
through interlocking directorates and cross-holdings and 
focus instead on the concentration in the financial 
sector. The Board justified this investigation as 
follows;
..because of the close links which financial 
institutions in particular had with the major 
conglomerates in the country the issue of economic 
concentration had to be addressed on a broader 
basis. In this respect the investigation proved to 
be very fruitful and has provided the Board with a 
sound overall picture of the considerable diversity 
and extent of conglomerate activity in South 
Africa.17
Here the result of previous complacency is clearly 
apparent, perhaps arising from the consensual approach 
that the Board had taken since 1979. It is a reflection 
on the activities and role of the Competition Board, its 
predecessors and other state agencies that between 1955 
and 1988, such an important study was never carried out. 
Ovendon and Cole (1989) have pointed out that at the time 
of the declaration of a moratorium, the extent of debt 
exposure was not known. Capital flight played an 
important part in the decision to focus on the financial 
sector. Ovendon and Cole (1989, pp.123-124) report that;
17 Competition Board Annual Report, 1988, p.9.
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... in...December 1988 a working group was set up at 
the request of the Minister of Finance to examine 
various completed foreign exchange transactions in 
response to information that had come to light 
suggesting new methods of avoidance.... the South 
African Reserve Bank..was taking a number of 
measures to improve exchange control methods of 
enforcement (by) a Senior Deputy Governor of the 
bank ...(assuming)... specific responsibility of co­
ordinating the exchange control and banking 
supervision departments of the bank....The exchange 
control department was to take outside advice from 
accountants and other government departments in the 
search for methods for detecting and preventing 
over-invoicing of imports, and other fraudulent 
methods of avoiding exchange control of capital 
exports.
Since 1986, there appears to be a new thrust in the 
approach of the CB. Firstly, the focus on agricultural 
co-operatives also serves a political purpose in the 
increasing threat that the Conservative Party and other 
splinter groups pose to the National Party. Secondly, the 
support for privatisation falls more within concepts of 
perfect competition and neo-liberalism with associated 
minimum state involvement, echoing the perspectives of 
the conglomerates who are likely to be beneficiaries of 
privatisation and deregulation policies.
In summary, although anti-monopoly legislation has 
been in existence since 1955, it has never been exercised 
to the detriment of large-scale capital. Rather, it was 
initially used as a lever to force the then dominant 
English capital fractions to accommodate Afrikaner 
enterprises. By the mid-1970s, growing interpenetration 
between English and Afrikaner capital led to a review of 
competition policy, but the emergence of the Competition
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Board did not have any effect on the process of ownership 
concentration around the MEC core. Since 1986, the crisis 
of the NP appears to have shifted the position of the 
Board towards more of a perfect competition perspective, 
providing it with greater powers and scope. However, the 
Board has yet to act against the high levels of 
concentration across and between all the sectors of the 
economy that this chapter has described.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, six "axes" of private capital 
dominate the South African economy. Control has initially 
extended as an articulation of mining activities into MEC 
core sectors. This, in turn, has broadened to cover all 
other productive sectors as well as the financial sector, 
the control of which serves to reinforce conglomerate 
power.
The growth of the MEC core sectors and the 
increasing interpenetration between fractions of large- 
scale capital, which were formerly characterised as 
"English" or "Afrikaner" capital, has been associated 
with the state's direct role in ownership of sections of 
the productive sector. State investments have largely 
contributed directly and indirectly to enlarging the MEC 
core. In regulating the process of oligopolisation of the 
economy, the MEC, as a system of accumulation has been 
lubricated through, for example, the effect that such 
regulation had on the empowering of Afrikaner capital.
The overall impact that this has had on broader 
industrial development will be explored below.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIALISATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA DURING THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
INTRODUCTION
Both the political economy and the historiography of 
apartheid have gone through a number of stages.1 The 
major divide is undoubtedly between the liberal and 
revisionist traditions. As has been pointed out all too 
frequently, the distance between these two positions is 
enormous both in methodology and in conclusion, but they 
also have a common thread in counterposing the relative 
priority of race and class against the performance of the 
economy. In this respect, they are like two sides of a 
well-worn coin which drives the better out of circulation 
- at least until it is no longer acceptable currency. As 
Posel (1983, p.56) observes:
When defined in antithesis to this liberal stance, 
revisionism amounts to a simple reversal of the 
purportedly liberal priorities: class now has 
primacy over race, and segregation and apartheid are 
seen as functional, rather than dysfunctional, to 
the development of South African capitalism.
The most apt testimony, possibly testament, to this 
observation is Lipton's (1986) culminating contribution 
to the liberal tradition which falls more accurately into 
the role of synthesis between the two schools in 
combining an examination of class/strata interests with 
the (ultimate) efficacy and triumph of market forces.
Whatever its limitations, the class-race debate was 
inevitably dependent for its origins on the specificity 
of South African society. This has not, however, been the
1  Exploring South Africa's own historiography has proved an extremely popular pastime. See for 
example, Murray (1982 and 1988), Morris (1987), Saunders (1988a and b), Bozzoll and Delius (1990), 
Cell (1982), Smith (1988), Wright (1977), Mabin (1986), Marks and Rathbone (1982) and Marks (1986).
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only influence on intellectual developments. New 
approaches and objects of analysis have followed both in 
response to the unfolding of internal events and 
according to the intellectual fashions of the outside 
world. Thus, revisionism in different ways appropriated 
the insights of the various strands of the structural 
Marxism of the 1960s onwards. It has given way to a 
social history, which has drawn its inspiration from the 
work of E.P. Thompson. In this literature rural struggles 
figure prominently and there is considerable antipathy to 
reductionism, functionalism, structuralism and many other 
-isms. In its place is offered rich empirical detail, and 
an emphasis on the many-sided making of history both in 
terms of the different aspects of, and participants in, 
struggle. But there is precious little explicit theory.
More recently, in response to the gathering crisis 
of the apartheid regime, much attention has been shifted 
to explaining this turn of events - ironically, possibly 
a greater problem for the triumphant revisionists than 
for the predominantly vanquished liberals given their 
respective positions on the functionality of apartheid 
for South African capitalism. Neatly illustrating the 
point of the dual dependence of South African 
intellectual development on internal events and external 
theory, Gelb's (1991) collection marries regulation 
theory, and its notions of modes, social structures and 
regimes of accumulation, with an explanation of the 
crisis of the South African economy - as the collapse of 
"racist Fordism".2
An analytical stance organised around explaining the 
crisis has, however, already been rendered redundant to 
some extent by the pace of internal events. It is too 
backward-looking. Now there is less emphasis upon the 
causes of the current crisis and more upon the shape of
2
Regulation theory originated In the Marxist work of Aglietta (1979). It has since become 
increasingly eclectic and removed from Marxism. For a critique, see Mavroudeas (1990) and Brenner 
and Glick (1991).
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future economic policy and developments in a post­
apartheid society. It is no longer enough to look back 
and see how what was favourable to accumulation came to 
be unfavourable, it is also necessary to see how 
conditions can be made conducive to economic growth once 
again, albeit in serving very different needs and 
constituencies. As it were, policy considerations, rather 
than class struggle or laws of development, have become 
the leading edge on the analytical cutting tools.
These opening remarks are not intended as a cynical 
dismissal of past practices in which the rigour and 
validity of academic endeavour is perceived to be 
injuriously influenced by current events and intellectual 
fashions. Indeed, the substance of this chapter does 
itself consciously fall into this pattern. Its concern is 
predominantly with the debate over inter-war economic 
policy and development and, in particular, the 
relationship between economic and political power. It is 
influenced by concern over the same issues for the coming 
period but this will not be made explicit except by way 
of concluding remarks.
Nevertheless it is worthwhile making explicit the 
intellectual origins of this contribution. Previously, 
debate over the inter-war years has been based on an 
analytical and policy milieu of dependency theory and 
import-substituting-industrialisation. Accordingly, for a 
developing and potentially industrialising economy, the 
main focus has tended to fall on the issues of markets 
and protection at the policy level and on the issue of 
class interests over these at the analytical level.
Today, certainly in the light of the success of the Asian 
NICs, it has been found that the range of policies 
involved in industrialisation (and hence the role of the 
state) is much broader, with trade policy as such not
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necessarily foremost;3 and, nor is this simply a matter 
of discovering the right policies and adopting them. The 
capacity of, and pressures upon, the state to do so 
depends upon its relations to class interests and 
economic structures.4
In this light, the analytical position adopted in 
this paper is quite straightforward and far from 
original, although its implications are possibly 
stretched further than before. It accepts that mining and 
other closely-related capital held, and continue to hold, 
economic power in South Africa. However, the assertion of 
this economic power politically was eroded in the inter­
war period as the attempt was made by the state to 
support an indigenous, predominantly Afrikaner, capital 
(with its advantage of political support from the white 
working class). This success of the goal of creating a 
national capital was dependent upon collaboration as well 
conflict with mining capital, given the surplus generated 
by the latter. As a contemporary put it, Pearsall (19 37, 
p .422) : 5
It therefore seems likely that secondary industry 
will be in a better position to meet the 
fluctuations of trade, provided always that no 
sudden set-back to gold-mining, on which so much of 
our prosperity depends, should occur.
3
An astonishing Indication of the continuing Identification of industrial with trade policy In 
South Africa Is to be found In the IDC's recent report on protection policy, IDC (1990, p.1): "In 
this report the terms "trade policy" and "industrial policy" are used synonymously and 
interchangeably."
These issues are discussed in the context of South Korea In Fine (1992b).
See also Busschau (1945, pp.220-1):
The fact that the output of "Manufacturing" is more valuable and has probably Increased more 
rapidly In volume than the outputs for "Mining" and "Agriculture" also does not prove that 
"Manufacturing" is the prime generator of Income, since, as already explained, much of the 
output of both manufacturing and agriculture depends on the needs of the chief consumer, the 
mining Industry ... one cannot escape the conclusion that the primary Impulse towards a 
greater national Income in the immediate past has come, and in the future will have to come, 
from Increased mining activity, particularly that of gold mining.
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The more the surplus that could be generated by mining, 
the more was potentially available for subsidising 
national capital. Consequently, the inter-war development 
of South African capital is best seen as one in which the 
strength of mining capital dictated the boundaries within 
which national capital could be economically, and hence 
politically, supported. There were then limits on the 
economic policies of the state, whatever its derived 
political objectives, because of its economic dependence 
on mining capital. By the same token, the possible 
accumulation strategies of mining capital were 
circumscribed by its relation to the exercise of state 
power.
In the next section, these issues are explored 
further by reference to the debate over hegemony in the 
inter-war period. It is suggested that this debate is 
limited by its being too much oriented around zero-sum 
pay-offs, seeking to read off the exercise of political 
power by reference to the redistributional adv_antages 
bestowed by the state's economic policies. Instead, it is 
necessary to look more closely at the complex relation 
between economic and political power at a greater level 
of detail and according to the particular issues 
concerned.
Section 2 attempts to do this by reference to the 
development of the inter-war economy, examining broad 
economic aggregates as well as specific industrial sub­
sectors. A focus is placed on trade policy and the role 
of state enterprises. It is less concerned with exploring 
the motives, consequences and beneficiaries of such 
interventions than in revealing the limited extent to 
which coherent industrial policy progressed beyond them. 
This reflected the uneasy relation between mining capital 
and the state, which essentially foreclosed the option of 
an industrialisation strategy based on diversification 
out of the economic base provided by mining.
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1. HEGEMONY OR CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE
Central to debate over the inter-war South African 
economy is the contribution of Davies et al (1976).^ 
Methodologically, they adopted the approach of Poulantzas 
for which there is a structured tier in the exercise of 
power and in which the various fractions of the 
exploiting classes (identified at the economic level) 
jockey for advantage politically through the formation of 
a power bloc to control the state. Thus, there can be 
shifts in the relative economic positions of different 
sections of capital as well as in their political 
influence. Necessarily, these structures and their 
associated dynamics are dialectically related to one 
another and to intra- and inter-class conflict.7
For Davies et al the primary division is between 
national and imperial capital, with a secondary division 
within national capital between agriculture and 
manufacturing, both of which are closely identified with 
Afrikaners. Imperial, foreign or English capital is 
primarily identified with mining. The election of the 
Pact Government in 1924, an alliance of the white Labour 
Party and the Nationalist Party, signals for them the 
loss of hegemony by imperial capital to national capital. 
Consequently, economic policy in the inter-war years, 
despite the formation of the Fusion Government in 193 3, 
is seen as representative of the interests of national 
capital - particularly in support for agriculture by a 
variety of measures, protection of domestic industry (and 
agriculture), the creation of state corporations, 
especially in steel (ISCOR) and electricity (ESCOM), and 
the heavy taxation of (gold) mining to fund these 
policies. As a corollary, political support depended upon 
incorporation of the white working class, partly by more
g
This article constitutes a synthesis of the four authors' PhD theses, Morris (1979) on the 
development of capitalist agriculture, Davies (1979) on the white working class, O'Meara (1983) on 
the Afrikaner bourgeoisie, and Kaplan (1977) on class fractions and the economic policies of the 
state.
For a sympathetic account of Poulantzas, see Jessop (1985).
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or less temporary schemes of employment relief for poor 
whites and job reservation more generally. This is seen, 
however, as secondary and contingent upon the level of 
white working class economic and political pressure.
This approach, and the specific stance within it, 
has been the subject of much criticism. Methodologically, 
however well it is an application of Poulantzas' theory,8 
the net result is simply to couch interest group analysis 
at the economic and political levels in the more obscure 
language of hegemony, power bloc, etc, in which changes 
of government and/or policy are read off in accordance 
with a corresponding judgement of who wins and who loses. 
There is a notable absence of the analysis of dynamics 
and contradiction in practice. In particular, there is a 
peculiar inversion of Marx's method, in which the economy 
is read off through the policies of the state (although 
this is always a danger within the Poulantzas method of 
relative autonomy, displaced contradictions and the 
formation and hegemony of power blocs). As Freund (1989, 
p.94-5) succinctly puts it, the problem lies "in trying 
to understand material change by an unwandering gaze on 
the state rather than the actual economy".
There are also criticisms to be made at the level of 
detail. First, support for agriculture was by no means 
initiated in the inter-war period; it reflected, then, 
more a continuity of policy even if increasingly 
favourable to white farmers. As Horwitz (1967, p.129) 
reports:
Between 1910 and 1935, eighty-seven bills relating 
to the land were executed by Parliament in a 
Parliament in which farmer-members were a high 
proportion in all political parties.
BozzoIi (1978), Clarke (1978) and Innes and Plaut (1978) all point to the treatment of hegemony in 
Davies et al primarily as a relationship within the capitalist class, rather than as one of 
dominance over the exploited classes. For a response, see Kaplan (1979).
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Second, there are complex issues concerning the 
boundaries of the various fractions of capital, with 
foreign capital involved in many non-mining activities,
Q
including agriculture and manufacturing. Freund (1989, 
p.81) refers to diversification from mining into repair 
and maintenance and other engineering. This contrasts 
with the Cape garment industry, thereby signifying a lack 
of integration and homogeneity in secondary industry 
whether sectorally, politically or regionally.
Third, some, most notably Yudelman (1983), would 
take 193 3 and not 1924 as a turning point in policy, 
either rejecting the view that the Pact Government 
represented a victory for white miners or because the 
later date witnessed a stimulus to manufacturing out of 
the revenue and demand generated by the gold industry as 
the gold price rose in the thirties. The point, however, 
is less to deny or to exaggerate the significance of 
political change as to situate it in a fuller and more 
complex analysis of economic interests and relations (of 
dependence as much as of conflict).
Fourth, and relatedly, the approach of Davies et al 
may be considered too historically delimited. It has 
primarily been motivated by a wish to anticipate and 
explain the subsequent period of classic apartheid. 
Consequently, continuities with the past concerning the 
conflict and compromise between fractions of capital are 
implicitly reduced to the presumption that the Boer War 
implied an unambiguous hegemony for foreign capital prior 
to its overthrow in the inter-war period. Yet, as sharply 
demonstrated by Marks and Trapido (1979), even the 
reconstruction period after the War involved continuing 
compromise between the interests of different capitals, 
even if the primary objective of the state was to 
guarantee conditions favourable to the pursuance of
_
See Bozzoli (1978) and (1981), Fransman and Davies (1977), Bienefeld and Innes (1976) and Kubicek
(1991).
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mining (which it never subsequently threatened).1  ^
Finally, the taxation of goldmining, whether directly or 
indirectly through differentially disadvantageous railway 
charges and protection, is indicative of dependence on, 
not dominance over, mining especially after the rise in 
gold prices when heavy profits were to be made and in 
which the state would surely be expected to share.11 As 
Kaplan's (1977, p.157) own account of the excess profits 
tax on the gold mines in the 1930s reveals, there was 
give-and-take in the amount appropriated by the state. In 
response to Chamber of Mines and other protests:
Duncan, as Acting Minister of Finance, granted a 
number of concessions. The most important of these 
were to place definite limits on the tax yields for 
the next five years - £6 million in the first year, 
£7.4 million in the second year, and for the three 
subsequent years a maximum of 50% of the excess 
profits.
With limited exceptions, it is not the intention here to 
pass judgement on these issues. To a large degree, they 
suffer from being situated in too simple an approach in 
which the various interests involved, capitalists and 
white labourers, gain or lose at one another's expense. 
The analysis is primarily redistributional with a greater 
or lesser weight being given to the motives of, pressures 
upon, and power of government. Given its political
To For somewhat later, Gelb's (1989) analysis of the creation of the South African Reserve Bank In 
1921 is obscured rather than Illuminated by the idea that it simply forms part of the shift In 
power from foreign to indigenous capital. He Is, however, sufficiently sensitive to the empirical 
details of what occurred to qualify, possibly to mdermlne, the historiography Involved, p.65, 
emphasis added:
This contradiction (over the control of monetary policy), it would seem, Is Indicative of 
the complexity and the duration of the transition In South Africa during the Inter-war 
period from Imperialist domination to peripheral national capitalism.
For analysis of the preceding period, where emphasis Is placed on the shifting realItles of the 
world financial system (within which mining capital and the City do not represent a homogeneous 
foreign capital), see Ally (1990) and (1991).
See Fransman and Davies (1977).
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complexion, this essentially reduces to the extent to 
which the exercise of political power on behalf of 
national capital (and possibly white labour) is both 
genuine and able to overcome the economic power of 
foreign, mining capital.
Such a general framework for assessing policy is 
necessarily insensitive to the differences in the 
material organisation and development of particular 
economic sectors, and these differences will determine 
the scope for policy interventions by government. To give 
an extreme example, the policy of remaining on the gold 
standard, as an act of independence from Britain after it 
had abandoned gold in 1931, proved so disastrous that it 
had to be dropped even though this boosted gold mining 
profitability in particular. Indeed, with the pay limit 
system to ensure the full working of poorer ores when the 
gold price was higher, it can be argued that policy was 
directed to prolonging mining capital, rather than 
allowing the maximisation of immediate returns, because 
of its continuing importance in sustaining other 
government objectives.
This all takes us to the point of recognising that 
the various fractions of capital were highly 
interdependent and not just in conflict, not least 
because the surplus to be obtained from mining was 
essential to the support of other indigenous economic 
activity. One of the results of focusing on the politics 
of power blocs is that differences between fractions of 
capital tend to be exaggerated at the expense of 
recognising a common interest in relation to the 
exploited classes which, of necessity, sets the
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structural limits within which capitalists can compete.12 
To move beyond this analytical observation, however, and 
uncover the relationship between economic and political 
factors, requires specific studies. These have been 
notably absent in the literature, especially for 
manufacturing. For all the discussion of hegemony of 
manufacturing (and agriculture) over mining in the inter­
war period, industry has hardly been investigated and, 
when it has, this has usually been as background for some 
other purpose such as the history of a trade union.
Perhaps the one area of "economic" policy in which 
most analytical and empirical advance has been made, and 
for which many of the above criticisms are less 
applicable is for labour control - not least because it 
has been explored both in terms of the practical needs of 
different sections of capital as well as politically and - 
ideologically. Consequently, a much more complex and 
complete picture has emerged, in which the conflicts of 
interest between capitals over access to black labour has 
been set against a common interest. Thus, Lacey (1981, 
pp.3-4) puts it as:1^
How the Hertzog regime handled the issues between 
1924 and 1932, and how finally the dominant classes 
in the rival capitalist sectors determined to sink 
their differences and hammer out a policy which 
enabled them to tackle the one overriding issue: how 
best to super-exploit all African workers in the
12 Clarke (1978, p.55) makes a similar point, whilst both oversimplifying and constructing too sharp 
a dichotomy between state and capital: "Normally the relations between capitals, and so between 
departments, are regulated by competition and the ability of the state to Intervene in these 
relations without disrupting accumulation is limited. There are normally severe limits on the 
abi lity of the state to intervene to redirect surplus value. These limits are not given, as the 
fractionalists (Davies et al) would have us believe, by the total available surplus value and the 
relative political strength of the various parties Involved In political conflict. They are rather 
given by the role of surplus value In the expanded reproduction of the capitalist mode of 
.production."
Following the work of Wolpe (1972), the issue of labour control has been treated with increasing 
sophistication, recognising differentiation within the black workforce, as in Hlndson (1987). See 
also Dubow (1989) and Pose I's (1991) discussion of the Inter-war period.
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interest of capitalist profitability and the
national economy as a whole.
From the gold-maize alliance of the turn of the 
century, a compromise was reached in the inter-war period 
which privileged agriculture's access to domestic 
supplies of black labour by simultaneously promoting the 
mines' access to foreign migrant labour.14
What follows does not remedy, for other areas of 
application, our collective analytical deficiencies - 
which are, in part, a reflection of the very weakness of 
manufacturing and the even greater weakness of industrial 
policy. Rather it seeks less to identify the conflicts 
between various fractions of capital as to explore how 
their mutual interactions determined the policy options 
that were, or were not, available. More specifically, our 
narratives below are intended to illustrate a number of 
overlapping themes; the preference for indigenous over 
imperial capital, but dependence upon the latter 
especially because of the weight of mining in the economy 
(as a source of revenue and as a structural determinant 
for industrialisation); the need to disaggregate economic 
activity to unravel the interplay of economic and 
political forces; but the underlying failure to develop 
coherent and comprehensive industrial policies because of 
the disjuncture between economic and political power, 
leading to a corresponding fragmentation of policymaking.
14 On the go Id-ma1ze alliance, see Trapldo (1971), and Morrell (1988) for Its dissolution In the 




The inter-war years are acknowledged as the period 
when industrial policy was first overtly and extensively 
implemented. It appears to have met with some success in 
bringing about industrialisation. However, it is 
important to clarify what "industrialisation" is 
perceived to be. At an aggregate level, commentators have 
interpreted industrialisation in terms of the relative 
shifts between manufacturing, agriculture and mining 
activities.
From contributing 9.8% to national income in 1918, 
private manufacturing grew to 17.7% in 1939. Mining 
fluctuated between a low of 15.2% in 1922 and a high of 
23.8% in 1933 (after the gold standard was abandoned). 
Agriculture clearly declined in relative importance; its 
contribution to national income fell from 20.2% in 1918 
to 12.2% by 1939.
However, it is important not to read off the rhythm 
of economic and political power and the impact of policy 
choices from such aggregate data. It is also necessary to 
recognise what policy options were not adopted. The 
purpose of this section is to highlight the absence of 
coherent state policy both for broad aggregate sectors of 
the economy and for certain sub-sectors of manufacturing. 
It supports the conclusion that the disjuncture between 
economic and political power in the inter-war period gave 
rise to different outcomes according to the incidence of 
compromise and conflict sector by sector.
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% Total Manufacturing Net Output
Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years (1960,s-2).
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2.1 POLICIES TOWARDS AGRICULTURE
In the case of agriculture, the central authority of 
the state was unable to provide a clear lead through its 
own policy - it resorted to devolving responsibility and 
decision making powers to the various agricultural 
control boards that were set up at this time. This 
reveals another deficiency in the literature on the 
economy of the inter-war period, namely that regional 
differences and class differentiation within the ruling 
party in government have not been adequately addressed - 
the state is often interpreted as a relatively monolithic 
central authority, more plausible for its relations to 
mining, less so for Afrikaner capital.
For, although agriculture was protected, state 
support was neither fully centrally controlled nor 
implemented on behalf of a readily identifiable and 
uniform agricultural interest. The process of 
agricultural policy formulation is described by Richards 
(1935, p.397) as:
1. The passing of an enabling act which permits the 
Minister to make regulations for the control of a 
particular agricultural industry or product;
2. In pursuance of this policy, the Minister sets up 
boards of Control composed largely of 
representatives of the particular agricultural 
industry whose interests it is desired to protect, 
with wide and arbitrary powers affecting all phases 
of the industry, and incidentally the interests of 
the consumer.
3. There is a third method whereby the Minister 
delegates his powers to existing organisations but 
with increased jurisdiction, e.g. in the case of the 
central Co-operative for Maize in 1933, and the 
K.W.V. for the Wine Industry.
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Protection after 1925 has often been seen as 
favourable to agriculture anNd manufacturing at the 
expense of mining capital that had to foot the bill in 
terms of higher input prices. The impact of protection, 
however, is not quite so simple; along with other factors 
in play, effective rates of protection and their ultimate 
incidence do not appear to have been assessed, either in 
policymaking or in retrospective assessment. Not least is 
the issue of whether conditions were conducive to 
promoting infant industries or to feather-bedding 
inefficiencies, or whether policy was more likely to lead 
to one or the other.
Specifically, manufacturing sectors dependent upon 
agricultural inputs faced higher costs, reflecting the 
absence of a strategy favouring the development of 
linkages between agriculture and manufacturing.1^ The 
opposite appears to have been the case, as the Board of 
Trade acknowledged:1^
Confectionery manufacturers must buy highly 
protected sugar, glucose made from maize and milk 
powder at relatively high prices and that 
agricultural protection must be followed by 
industrial protection, if local factories are to use 
South African raw materials.
Horwitz points to a further factor undermining the 
development of food processing industries:
What the Board of Trade and Industries did not 
elaborate was that the dumping of many of these 
agricultural raw materials under forced-export 
policies enabled foreign manufacturers to obtain 
their raw materials at below cost to the even
15 For details from a political perspective, see O'Meara (1983).
1 6  Horwitz (1967, pp.248-9), citing BTI Report No. 282.
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further disadvantage of their South African 
competitors.
Another example of the lack of coherent policy 
towards agriculture and industry is presented by 
Alexander (1935). He refutes arguments of the day 
excusing the failure to penetrate dairy export markets. 
Citing the cases of New Zealand and Denmark, which had 
successfully overcome similar debilities such as soil 
infertility, uncertain rainfall, vast travelling 
distances, odours in cream and lack of monetary 
incentives to dairy-farms, Alexander observes that, 
p.359:
The reasons for the comparative failure of 
agriculture in the Union ... is not the natural 
conditions of the country which are so largely to 
blame as the incompetence of past Governments, ever 
since Union, and, largely arising from this, the 
inefficient methods of the majority of farmers.
While most observers have recognised that the thrust
of inter-war state policy was to favour domestic industry
and the agricultural sector, the resources allocated to
the latter appear to outweigh the commitment to
developing the former. For example, the cost of
agricultural subsidies in 1933 alone are estimated at 
17£7.5m, more than twice the £3.5m that was spent on 
Iscor between 1929 and 1933. If the establishment of a 
domestic iron and steel industry proved possible with 
such support, surely much more could have been done for 
food processing? That it was not, as Richards observes, 
reflects the devolution of responsibility to fragmented 
interests. The state’s representation of small-scale 
Afrikaner capital, whether agricultural or industrial, 
did not preclude a concerted policy for the development
T7
Richards (1935, p.365). It Is evident that other forms of subsidy, such as transport rates, also 
favoured agriculture relatively.
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of food processing and marketing, but it could not be 
pushed through by the state centrally. Consequently, the 
relative absence of political representation of mining 
capital weakened industrial policy through its inability 
to diversify from mining. And, even where mining capital 
had no direct role to play (other than in paying taxes to 
support subsidies, etc.), the state's room for manoeuvre 
in the policies that it could adopt were contingent upon 
the economic and political structures of indigenous 
Afrikaner capital - the more so because of the political 
weakness of the economically dominant form of capital.1®
Despite this disjuncture between economic and 
political power, the history of the wine industry 
illustrates how, through the devolving of price fixing 
power to regionally (Cape) based interests in 1924, it 
was possible for small-scale Afrikaner capital to be 
accumulated through the concentration and centralisation 
of the resources of a relatively small sector of the 
economy. The strength of its political lobby is evident 
in the numerous Commissions of Inquiry and BTI Reports 
from as early as 1934, whose consistent recommendations 
for the economic disempowerment of the vintners 
represented by the KWV, were never implemented, Fridjon 
et al (1986). It was precisely from these and other 
similar roots that the Rembrandt, Sanlam and Old Mutual 
conglomerates grew into economic rivals to the offshoots 
of imperial capital. As Fridjon et al (1986, p.62) 
observe:
All groupings of farmers in South Africa are 
politically powerful, but the most powerful of all 
are the 6,000 grape farmers. There are many reasons 
for their power. They ... have always supported the 
Nationalist Party with votes, money and ... are 
heavily represented in Parliament as Cape
18 Consequently, the economic and socla! histories of the food and other consumer goods industries 
are different from one another, each depending upon regional specificities and their associated 
political and economic factors, Cape wine as opposed to Natal sugar, the maize triangle, etc.
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Nationalists ... are extremely well and cohesively 
organised, and, not least, they enjoy a statutory 
framework that is extraordinarily helpful to their 
interests.
From a critical, free market perspective, they argue 
that the industry was held back from greater efficiency 
and dynamism. By the criterion of creating relatively 
large-scale Afrikaner capital, however, the KWV can be 
considered a success in forging a linkage between 
agriculture and food processing. Experience across the 
food and beverage industry more generally is much more 
mixed. As a sector, it stands out during the inter-war 
period, accounting for 37.6% of manufacturing's gross 
output in 1924. By 19 39, this had declined to 26.6%. 
Nattrass (1988) attempts to explain this decline in part 
as an outcome of the operation of Engels Law, that a 
diminishing proportion of (mainly) white incomes would be 
expected to be spent on food. But such demand-side 
explanations, essentially tautologous in nature, are 
insensitive to differences across sub-sectors and to the 
potential availability of export markets.
Smith (1945) has addressed the supply-side, pointing 
to a significant degree of concentration within the food 
and beverage sector of manufacturing. Between 1940-42, 
3.5% of all firms within this sector produced more than 
50% of total output. This figure, however, conceals more 
than it reveals. Consider the crushing and processing of 
sugar cane, for example. By 1933, sugar processing 
accounted for about 20% of the food sector's output. Its 
growth during the inter-war period was dramatic, from 
82,000 tons in 1919 to 500,000 tons in 1939, and it also 
had a disproportionate impact on the spatial pattern of 
development in South Africa. Most of its associated 
activities were concentrated in Natal, a province 
dominated by a mixture of imperial and domestic (English) 
capital. Sugar was not cultivated in the Eastern
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Transvaal until much later, and that development was 
associated more with the growth of the Rembrandt 
Afrikaner conglomerate.




50% of total output
Food Sc Drink 3.5
Vehicles 0.4
Metal & Engineering 5.0
Clothing Sc Textiles 3.9
Building 6.4
Stone Sc Clay 3.1




Chemicals 4 . 8
Heat, Light Sc Power 3.5
Surgical Instruments Sc Jewellery 4.8
Raw Materials (1) 6.5
Other 3.3
Source: Smith (1945).
(1) Raw Materials include Tallow Rendering, Bone Milling, 
Fellmongering, Wool Scouring, Chaff-cutting, Corn 
Crushing, Cotton Ginning, Wattle Bark Grinding.
Sugar processing is just one of several activities 
within food processing. A further 30% of food output in 
19 3 3 consisted of the production of Tobacco, Bread, 
Biscuits, Cake, Wheat and Maize Milling activities, 
Pearsall (1937). With the exception of Maize and 
Breadmaking (Transvaal), the other activities were mainly 
Cape-based. Tobacco and cigarette manufacture has long 
been the preserve of a single company, Rembrandt, whose 
origins lie in the Voorbrand Tobacco Corporation. Its 
products were distributed in Broederbond meetings in the 
early 1930s, and the company subsequently grew to control
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the international cigarette company, Rothmans, among 
other diverse activities.1  ^ Maize milling, on the other 
hand, was geographically located in the Transvaal near 
its main markets provided by the mines. Ownership was 
less concentrated, though some early ownership linkages 
existed between mining houses and millers. Premier 
Milling was, in 1896, linked to the Corner House Group 
(the forerunner to Rand Mines). Kaplan (1986) observes 
that this activity, like most of manufacturing in South 
Africa, was gradually concentrated through a series of 
mergers.
TABLE 3 . 2 -  FOOD AND BEVERAGE INDUSTRY - DISTRIBUTION OF 
ESTABLISHMENTS, 19 3 7-38
Flour & Grain Mills




Aerated Water Works 7.8




Ice Works 2 . 2
Distilleries 1.8
Coffee Works 1.4
Malt Works 1 . 3
Sugar Mills 1.1
Tea & Fruit Packers 1.1
Fish Canneries 1.0
Other Establishments 5 . 9
Total 100 .0
Source: Smith (1945).
Such a cursory overview provides some limited 
evidence of disparate development in the food industries, 
in part as a consequence of the absence of coherent 
industrial policy. Further concerted study is urgently
19 "We were asked to smoke and cough for Volk and Vaderland", recounted an old Bond member, cited in 
Wilkins and Strydom (1978, p.425).
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needed. But the apparently separate experiences of the 
wine and dairy industries, for example, follows from 
differences in their economic and political leverage, but 
this is in part mutually derived from autonomy from 
central direction.
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2.2 POLICIES TOWARDS INDUSTRY
There were two major industrial policy instruments 
utilised in the inter-war period; first, tariff 
protection and, second, the creation of a state sector 
around heavy industry whose initially stated objectives, 
among others, were to cheapen industrial inputs and 
strengthen linkages between mining and manufacturing.
A major focus of debate has been over the reasons 
for protecting manufacturing. Kaplan (1974, p.90), in 
particular, insists that protection was primarily 
designed to serve the interests of manufacturing as 
opposed to those who see it as part of civilised labour 
policy, meeting the needs of poor white workers
Where the two objectives of "civilised labour" and 
industrial development conflicted ... the government 
came down firmly on the side of local industrial 
development.
Some, such as Innes and Plaut (1978, p.57) combine 
the two motives. Martin (1990a and b) takes a broader 
view of the goals of indigenous industrialisation through 
protection, incorporating the construction of South 
African manufacturing hegemony in the Southern African 
region as a whole. He views this as representing a break 
in policy from 1925, in part to reduce dependence on gold 
mining, although this was tempered in the 19 30s following
20 In a retrospective and official account of the development of Industry in the context of the role 
of the Industrial Development Corporation, Rosenthal (I960, p.8) sees providing employment for the 
"poor white" class as Important. For Horwltz (1967, p .251):
The empirical examination has shown however that the polity accepted and applied a 
protectionist policy only because it promised increased, Improved employment of Whites, 
otherwise described as "civilized labour". That this was the raison d'etre of 
industrialization, if needs be under the encouragement of protection, is brought out 
unequivocally by the Customs Tariff Commission of 1934 as welI as by the launching of a 
state-controI led Iron and steel Industry by the Pact Government.
On the issue of white labour, see Goo I (1983), Yudelman (1983), Johnstone (1976) and Davies (1979). 
On poor whites, see especially Abed I an and Stand Ish (1985).
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increases in the gold price. For Norval (1962, Chapter 
V), tariff policy combined a mix of motives - providing 
for poor white employment, raising government revenue, 
protection for existing or (to be) newly established 
industries, safeguards against dumping, and not to harm 
unduly the interests of agriculture, mining and the 
availability of capital goods and raw materials.^1
These different perceptions of the role of 
protection derive more or less directly from the 
correspondingly identified economic interests, these 
varying as between authors (and their analytical 
prejudices) and over time. If the belief is that the Pact 
Government represented a swing towards the interests of 
national capital and/or white labour, so it is argued 
that protection was introduced on their behalf, etc.
More recently a sharp interchange between Christie 
(1991a and b) and Martin (1990b and 1991) has centred on 
the relative efficacy of the dual policy instruments of 
protection through tariffs and the creation of state- 
owned heavy industry. Christie emphasises the importance 
of underlying infrastructure provided by state agencies 
such as the railways, Escom and Iscor and, consequently, 
the role of individuals such as Smuts, Hoy and van der 
Bijl. Although much is made today of providing the 
economy, particularly manufacturing, with a "kick-start", 
for Christie, the thirties primarily enjoyed the benefits 
of an "electric start". As such, the benefits were 
available to all capitals and not necessarily favouring 
domestic capital. Indeed, mining inevitably enjoyed 
disproportionate benefits, raising doubts over the 
potential role of such state ventures to promote 
indigenous capital at its expense.
21 For broad discussion of the policy and empirical Issues Involved In Inter-war protection, see 
Archer (1981).
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Martin (1991, p.610), on the other hand, attributes 
the degree of inter-war industrialisation to, "the 
emergence for the first time in South Africa of a 
definite policy of industrial development and, as an 
essential and integral part of this, protective tariffs". 
However, he reads this off as part of a global structure 
in which South Africa's position as a semi-peripheral 
country was bound to condemn attempts at 
industrialisation to failure, p.616:
For primary producers and especially mining capital, 
profits and continued expansion seemed best assured 
by the reproduction of a peripheral position in the 
global division of labour. To break these globally 
and regionally constructed relationships threatened 
not simply tariff-induced higher costs, lower 
profits, and the loss of easy access to overseas and 
regional markets, but the very structure of dominant 
class alliances across Southern Africa and core 
areas of the world-economy. As the relatively 
autonomous Pact government moved in this direction - 
by reshaping tariffs, state intervention, and 
regional and international foreign relations, and so 
on - it accordingly came into conflict with mining 
and commercial capital, much of agricultural 
capital, and the dense web of academics, policy­
makers, and ideologues who maintained that South 
Africa's proper destiny was to form a primary planet 
circulating the bright if declining sun of Britain.
The heavy emphasis on tariffs is contested by Christie 
who points out that they were low in contrast to other 
colonial countries. Martin replies by arguing that
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aggregate tariff levels are irrelevant since they were
7 7designed to target particular industrial sectors.
However the dispute over the advantages, 
disadvantages, strengths and impact of protection is 
resolved, it is much more important to recognise the 
implicit assumption that tariffs, together with the 
promotion of state-owned industries such as Escom and 
Iscor, are considered to be the core of industrial 
policy. But what stands out is not the greater or lesser 
role of protection as much as the failure to adopt an 
additional range of industrial policies, promoting 
manufacturing through provision of skills, technology, 
finance, intersectoral linkages and marketing. Even the 
taxation system seems to have discriminated against such 
diversification. According to Kaplan (1977, p.270):
Companies whose principal business was gold mining 
were taxed at 4/- in the pound on all profits earned 
on non-mining activities. This compared with 2/6d in 
the pound taxation rate on all other companies.
Although he reports this as not being too significant an 
impediment to diversification into industry, it did prove 
so for Anglo-American and attracted the opposition of the 
Chamber of Mines.
22 Martin's approach is based on the Idea that protection is doomed to fall as a policy to develop 
Indigenous capital In the periphery. Ironically, this view of the inevitable subordination to the 
needs of metropolitan capital might be better supported by Christie's analysis than by his own, 
since the former suggests that state corporations were more wedded to the Interests of mining 
(metropolItan) capital.
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Such a broader range of industrial policies, 
however, could only have been effectively and 
significantly based upon support for diversification out 
of mining. The extent to which this had already taken 
place prior to the inter-war period has not always been 
acknowledged, not least partly because the concept of 
industrialisation has been primarily dealt with in 
aggregate quantitative terms. The empirical analyses 
found in most of the literature on the inter-war period 
tend not to differentiate economic activity across the 
diverse sub-sectors within manufacturing and are, 
consequently, insensitive to both detail and timing.
A useful starting point is to consider the 
development of the steel industry, which falls within the 
Metal and Engineering sub-sector of manufacturing. As 
Christie (1991a, p.604) observes of plans for Iscor:
(They) were personally initiated by Smuts as a state 
sponsored project, in 1922. Smuts went to great 
lengths in 1922 to persuade Lionel Phillips, Solly 
Joel, the Albus, Ernest Oppenheimer, and other 
goldmine owners to invest in an iron and steel 
industry that would be partly state supported ... 
Smuts passed a scheme through Parliament in 1922 
whereby the state would pay bounties to any large- 
scale iron and steel producer in South Africa ... 
This bounties scheme was taken over by the Pact as 
late as 1926. Only once the scheme was clearly a 
failure did the Pact create Iscor ... In short, the 
Pact created Iscor but it could only do so because 
of Smut's extensive previous work.
In interpreting this critical period it is crucial 
to appreciate the extent to which a privately-owned 
domestic steel industry, based on recycling scrap steel, 
already existed in the early 1920s and, more importantly,
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the extent to which there was competition over plans to 
expand by shifting to the primary smelting of ore. In 
1924, nine years before Iscor began production, the 
sector already contributed 18.8% of the manufacturing 
sector's gross output. Simply because of the capital 
requirements and economies of scale associated with 
steelmaking, the bounty system could only realistically 
be extended to one producer and the contest for this 
concession was played out between the Union Steel 
Corporation (Usko), wishing to expand its smelting works 
in Newcastle (based on scrap steel), and the Pretoria 
Iron Mines (PIM), supported by the Pretoria lobby.
It would be inaccurate to categorise the Union Steel 
Corporation at that time as imperial capital when 
compared to the Belgian, German and British companies 
that supplied most of the steel used in the Union. Even 
if Usko were to be regarded as representing imperial 
capital, close relations necessarily existed with the 
state. The viability of Usko (and other companies such as 
Stott and Company and Dunswart) were dependent on the 
close cooperation of the state (mainly through the 
railways who provided scrap for smelting and who were 
also major consumers).
PIM was very definitely aligned to Afrikaner 
interests but, while Usko's initial capital was 
subscribed in England, the company was controlled by 
Lewis and Marks, the latter having had a long association 
with Boer Republics, Mendelsohn (1991).24 Even so, Mendel 
Kaplan (1986, p.98) records that C.F. Delfos, the owner 
of PIM, had unsuccessfully attempted to raise capital in 
Britain as early as 1924 for expansion. Subsequently:
(He) approached the board of the Gotehoffnungshotte
"to prepare a report on the possibility of
Much of what follows draws upon Richards (1940).
Many economic analyses proceed as Is there were no differences amongst Afrikaner "Interests", and 
O'Meara (1983) has clearly Illustrated that there are, by sector and by location, for example.
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establishing an iron and steel industry". In 1924, 
also, the Pact government came into power, not only 
keen on promoting South African industry, but more 
in sympathy with Delfos's own political views than 
the Smuts government which preceded it.
The evidence points to a municipal/regional lobby, 
with Pretoria's strongly underpinned by Afrikaner 
nationalism. Within this melee, Delfos' lobbying for a 
state-owned enterprise is interpreted by Kaplan (1986, 
p.98) as his last resort to raise capital to compete with 
Usko (although Kaplan elsewhere suggests anti-semitism as 
a motive):
During the recess of 1925, Delfos made his first 
approaches to Pretoria Members of Parliament and 
began campaigning for a public utility company 
similar to that of Escom ... Delfos, unable to 
obtain sufficient capital to expand his own 
business, was inspired by the foundation of Escom in 
1923, and then determined to compete with Usco one 
way if he could not do it in another. He was 
obsessive about it.
To assert then, in the events leading up to its 
formation, that Iscor was created by an act of the state 
in support of national capital against imperial capital 
is superficial and quite misleading. Clark (1987a, p.122) 
observes that:
The state corporations did not so much challenge 
private capital nor work as a "tool" of private 
enterprise, but rather they provided a growing link 
between the state and the private sector.
The tensions inherent in its conception persisted, 
deepened and broadened as it grew. After Iscor began 
producing, it was forced into joint ventures with
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finished steel companies, "agents" of imperial capital, 
in order to guarantee its markets. Ultimately it had to 
come to an accommodation with European producers, joining 
their international cartel in 1935, reserving just one- 
third of the domestic market for itself and the other 
local producers, but raising prices for all.
The Pact government's decision did not simply favour 
the interests of domestic over imperial capital. Within 
the state itself, the railways had to pay higher costs
O  C
for s t e e l w h i l e ,  on the other hand, the Customs and 
Excise raised higher revenues from tariffs and the steel 
parastatal made huge profits. Imperial capital, as 
represented by the mineowners, did have to pay higher 
costs for their steel inputs but steel producers in 
Europe and the USA benefited from higher prices arranged 
for their exports. Of greater importance to the 
development, or rather the stunting of domestic industry, 
many domestic users of steel (such as the fabrication 
shops, engineering sector, etc.) suffered under the 
burden of higher costs of steel.
In fact, the impact of Iscor's output on the economy 
is not accurately reflected within the metal sector 
alone, for the company reported its activities under four 
categories; namely, Iron and Steel; Gas, Coal, Coke, and 
Tar; Electric Light and Power and Lime Works. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that at the 
aggregate level, the £3.5m capital expenditure on Iscor 
between 1929 and 1933 represented only 4% of total 
manufacturing fixed capital. This is not to dismiss the 
importance of Iscor in the economy, but to highlight how 
misleading it is to read too much from the interplay of 
interests within a single sub-sector of manufacturing 
(even if these have been correctly read in the first 
place).
25 Of the total primary and secondary iron and steel consumption In South Africa, the railways 
consumed 17.2% and the mines 41% between 1932 and 1937.
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The policy instrument of creating state industries 
cannot simply, nor even primarily, be interpreted as 
support for domestic capital. Nor was industrialisation 
necessarily guaranteed as a result of such industries. In 
the case of the creation of Escom through the 1922 
Electricity Act, it is important to note that throughout 
the inter-war period, Escom remained in a subordinate 
position to the privately-owned Victoria Falls and 
Transvaal Power Company (VFTPC) which served the 
lucrative mining contracts, partially by the delivery of 
power generated by Escom.^
Thus, state enterprises certainly reflected the 
economic and political disjunctures of the inter-war 
years, but in ways that substantially differed according 
to the resolution of compromises and conflicts.
Dependence of power and metal on markets provided by 
mining, for example, endowed that fraction of capital 
with much greater leverage than for the railways which 
served, like protection, as a preferred policy instrument 
for Afrikaner capital. In such a situation, it was both 
difficult for state enterprises to serve as the 
commanding heights for a coherent policy of 
industrialisation. Furthermore, neither Afrikaner nor 
mining capital could reasonably command such a vision.
2.2.1 CHEMICALS
Figure 3.2 for sectoral composition of manufacturing 
indicates that the chemicals industry was relatively 
well-developed by 1924, contributing 8.3% to industrial 
output, at least as much as the Heat, Light and Power 
sector. This sector highlights two important features of 
industrialisation in South Africa. First, it has
? 6 The VFTPC was ultimately bought by Escom after the second world war, with finance provided by the 
Anglo American Corporation. See Clark (1987b, p.268) and also Christie (1984).
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frequently taken place around, and in support of, mining 
activities. Second, despite the phenomenal achievements 
of such industries, they have often failed to develop and 
diversify.
The Modderfontein factory, built in 1895 by the 
Nobel explosive monopoly, was the largest dynamite 
factory in the world and the largest single industrial 
plant in South Africa at the time. Expansion of this 
industry was driven largely by its proximity to the 
mining industry, by economies of scale and by conflict 
between various fractions of imperial capital.
Imperial mining interests, in striving to reduce 
costs, built their own dynamite plant in the Cape in 1898 
to challenge the Nobel monopoly and, through the 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines, set up an explosives supply 
system that survives to the present day. A third imperial 
competitor, Kynoch, set up a plant in Natal after the 
Boer War in 190 3, and competition between these three 
producers led to the beginnings of diversification, 
initially limited to backward integration through, for 
example, the production in 1911 of a key input, 
glycerine, from whale oil.
The early development of the chemicals sector was 
governed by corruption and collusion between various 
organs of the South African state and various fractions 
of imperial capital. The collusive arrangements 
particularly centred around arms manufacture, which were 
viewed as strategic, and such considerations have 
influenced many subsequent decisions on industrialisation 
in South Africa.
It is partly due to the lack of an industrial 
strategy, both before and after the Pact, that the 
potential for diversification was not fully realised. By 
1911, long before the Pact government which supposedly
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favoured industrialisation, the chemicals industry 
(mainly explosives) was the largest sub-sector of 
manufacturing, capitalised at £2m and employing 3,000 
workers. It was the largest single importer of raw 
materials into South Africa, the largest single source of 
revenue to Natal Railways and a very large source of 
revenue for the Cape Railways, Cartwright (1964, p.119).
Some further progress was made. De Beers’ Cape 
Explosives plant at Somerset West even purchased a ship 
and began exporting explosives to Australia on the eve of 
the First World War. A detonator plant was built between 
1917 and 1920. Paint manufacture even began in 1918 by 
virtue of an accident of a British paint manufacturer.
Its agent had mistakenly ordered five years of normal 
supply and, after delivery, the parent company had to 
ship a second-hand paint mill to reprocess the paint to 
avoid deterioration. Yet these diverse forays were not 
sustained.
Mergers between explosive companies in Europe in 
1924 were followed by the same in South Africa in 1925 
and allowed the introduction of the revolutionary ammonia 
synthesis process from coal in 1930, dispensing with 
imports of Chilean nitrates. Foreign exchange outflows on 
Chilean nitrate imports were replaced by a royalty 
payment to ICI of between £2 and £4 per ton of ammonia 
produced. Furthermore, as Cartwright (1964, 
p. 191) observes:
This was an ICI project from start to finish. ICI 
engineers designed the plant, manufactured a great 
deal of the equipment and supervised the erection, 
which was carried out by the factory staff. Wade and 
Dorman of Johannesburg were responsible for the 
structural steel work, and Stuart of Germiston built 
the foundations.
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The merger also facilitated diversification into 
fertilisers. However, it was limited, not least because 
of a lack of support on the part of the state. The 
superphosphate plant at the De Beers Somerset West 
factory shut down in 1921 after only operating for a few 
months due to Dutch dumping and the refusal of the 
Government to raise local prices through tariffs. It 
feared, "losing ground in the country districts (and) was 
anxious not to antagonise the farmers by imposing a duty 
that would increase the price of fertiliser", Cartwright 
(1964, p.163).
Thus, Pact policy, in regard to explosives and 
fertiliser manufacture within the chemicals industry as a 
whole, is best interpreted through the prevailing 
disjuncture between economic and political power. While 
it was acceptable to subsidise food manufacturing 
industries whose inputs were based on subsidised 
agriculture, the government was seemingly not prepared to 
subsidise agricultural inputs, particularly since the 
industries producing them were under imperial control. 
After the merger in 1925, the domestic explosives and 
fertiliser industry was jointly owned by De Beers and 
ICI, both regarded as imperial capital.
Other sectors of the chemicals industry exhibited 
similar patterns. They were usually based around the 
mining industry. Rand Carbide, for example, began carbide 
production in 1926 using lime and coke in electric 
furnaces. By 1930 it was the VTFPC power utility's 
largest bulk industrial customer with the exception of a 
few of the gold mines. The major demand for carbide was 
from the mines but the factory apparently became a major 
exporter for a while, Christie (1984, p.93). Similarly, 
the pulp and paper industry was only set up on any scale 
in 1936 by the Union Corporation, a major mining house 
with headquarters in London, Hocking (1987).
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Liquid fuel production in the inter-war period was 
centred around the mining and retorting of torbanite. The 
first torbanite plant was set up by the Natal Mineral Oil 
Company in 1895 to extract paraffin from shale. This was 
followed by the Oil Shale Development Company in 1913 
with oil shale mines in Natal, Transvaal and Swaziland.
In 1934, the first South African oil refinery was set up 
in Boksburg by an Anglo-Transvaal (Anglovaal) subsidiary, 
South African Torbanite Mining and Refining Company 
(Satmar). It processed imported crude and shale oil, 
retorted at its Ermelo shale mine. Two factors 
underpinned the plant in the 19 30s. First, the natural 
protection of the inland market through railway freight 
rates, tariff protection for local manufacture and, 
during the war years, the irregular imports of crude oil. 
A large proportion of the inland market was supplied by 
this plant.
The history of Anglovaal itself illustrates the 
centrality of mining to industrialisation and its 
importance as a source of finance and surplus:27
The only big businesses by world standards were the 
mining companies ... To be a big mining house you 
need lots of mines and to have lots of mines you had 
to be prepared to spend tens of thousands of pounds 
on holes in the ground looking for them - and that's 
money written off the moment it's spent. So they 
decided very soon that they needed to diversify so 
that they could start businesses based upon local 
raw materials, satisfying local needs, and raising 
money for those needs on a booming stock market - 
which boom wouldn't go on for ever. So within three 
years of inception we were into petroleum refining, 
cement and bricks and tiles. (We got out of the 
bricks and tiles two years later. I think we burned
27
Interview with Clive Menell, Deputy Chair and joint-owner of Anglovaal, by Mendel Kaplan (1986,
p.110).
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our fingers.) And so from the very start, the 
premise was that we would start those industries, 
then in a period of years move them up so that they 
would throw off cash, some of which we would spend 
on holes in the ground to find mines which, in their 
turn, would throw off cash, some of which we would 
use to build more industries - and lever our way 
forward on a diversified base on the basis that 
matters don't go wrong all at once ... We were 
diversified from inception, unlike many mining 
houses who grew rich and made their fortunes on 
mines and only at a time that they had these riches 
did they look for other opportunities - and 
diversified then.
Anglovaal, a corporation with indigenous roots 
through both ownership and finance, appears to have been 
able to challenge imperial capital through a judicious 
and explicitly diverse investment strategy. This 
possibility of domestic equity financing seems to have 
been completely missed by Norval (1962, p.96) who 
justifies the establishment of the IDC by arguing that:
The industries which developed under the stimulus of 
the customs tariff protection inaugurated in 1925, 
found very little if any organised financial backing 
on which to rely. Financial institutions such as the 
industrial banks in the older countries, for 
instance the four D. banks in Germany ... the 
banques d'affaires in France, the organised 
industrial share and capital market and in 
particular the investment trusts in Great Britain 
and the United States of America were wholly absent 
in South Africa. The larger industrial concerns such 
as AECI, Stewarts and Lloyds, Lever Brothers,
Price's Candles, Cadbury-Fry, Nestle, the motor 
assembly plants, the tyre factories and many others, 
all South African branches of overseas concerns
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were, in the main, initially financed by their 
parent companies, which thereafter ... ploughed back 
their profits to finance further developments and 
expansions ... many other concerns in the industrial 
field in South Africa developed on the strength of 
financial reserves built up from within and with 
such other resources as could be obtained from 
friends or from the commercial banks by the way of 
overdrafts or other forms of trade credit.
As a generality, the example of Anglovaal shows this 
to be false. Highly capital-intensive industries were 
developed in the inter-war period by national capital, 
largely from within accumulation through mining. But, 
more importantly, this took place in the absence of any 
clear state industrial strategy save for tariff 
protection. What Anglovaal achieved as domestic capital 
might well have been dwarfed by diversification from the 
large mining companies, if they had been secure in 
economic and political support.2®
2.2.2 DIAMONDS
The uneasy relationship between state and capital is 
best illustrated by the diamond industry. It shows how 
mining capital could frustrate the state's economic goals 
in sustaining the activity of capital located within 
South Africa. One of the early acts of the Pact 
Government was to introduce the Diamond Control Bill in 
July 1925. Newbury (1989, p.258) describes it thus:
2 8 Ehrensaft (1985, p.81) uses the term "flywheel effect" to describe the potential use of gold as a 
source of state-promoted industrialisation. For the view that secondary Industrialisation depended 
upon (the foreign exchange earnings of) the gold Industry but was not Integrated with It, see Lumby 
(1976) and (1977). For the latter, p.143:
Thus, rather than assisting the secondary sector to develop as a substitute for the gold 
mines, the local printing industry remained dependent upon the foreign exchange earnings of 
the gold mines for Its continued existence.
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The government now had an instrument which it could 
use to determine quantities produced, set minimum 
prices, and call for returns of production. All 
sales agreements required ministerial approval. A 
"Diamond Control Bill" might be established to buy 
and sell, issue advances, and fund monopoly sales 
through its own officials.
But he concludes:
Very little of these Draconian powers was ever 
brought to bear on the industry; but the threat was 
there, unless the merchants and companies set their 
house in order.
What the state required as a minimum, as indeed did the 
industry itself, was a cartel to limit the output finding 
its way onto the world market in order to sustain prices 
- from which the state would benefit from its allocated 
share of revenue. From its earliest days, the industry 
had struggled to attain a collusive monopoly over 
marketing on a world scale, its arrangements always 
subject to erosion by the emergence of new sources of
2 Qsupply. Despite the weight of South Africa in world 
diamond production, cartels had always been organised by 
international capital located in London, so that the 
South African government could at most be an influence 
on, not a determinant of, marketing arrangements. Thus, 
state control of the diamond industry was at most 
negative in the sense that it could have disrupted 
attempts to cartelise by raising and marketing its own 
output, but only at the expense of the market as a whole 
and its own revenue as prices collapsed.
This is illustrated by developments over the inter­
war years. The 1920s were to witness Ernest Oppenheimer
9~Q
For the early history of the Industry, see Newbury (1989), Turrell (1987) and Worger (1987). See 
also Fine (1992c).
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gaining control over the industry on behalf of Anglo- 
American through De Beers and his cementing a cartel 
together. One issue within South Africa concerned 
alluvial diggings which had provided a source of 
employment for independent small-scale white mining. 
Gregory (1962, p.171) reports of the Precious Stones Act 
of 1927:
"The main principle underlying this measure", said 
the Minister (of Mines), "is that alluvial diggings, 
subject to the interests of the State, and a fair 
participation of the State where necessary and 
desirable, should remain the reserve and preserve of 
the small man".
He wryly observes:
The principle of reserving alluvial digging for the 
"small man", whether justifiable or not as a measure 
of social and economic justice, did not in itself 
meet the essential needs of the situation as it was 
in 1927, namely, the control of output which was, 
however, a I so provided for in section 115 of the 
Act.
By 1929 the independent diggers had all but disappeared, 
and by 19 31 De Beers had control over all major diamond 
production in South Africa.
The 1930s presented rather different problems, even 
if derived from the same imperative of limiting supply, 
only now in the context of collapsed demand on a world 
scale. Other than buying up and stockpiling excessive 
quantities of gems, how was diminished overall levels of 
demand to be allocated between the different sources of 
supply? For the South African state, this became a matter 
of sustaining both its revenue and (white) employment on 
the mines. De Beers, however, sought to keep the diamond
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cartel together by adjusting its own South African 
output. For Newbury (1989, p.364-5):®®
The clash between diamond capitalists and the Pact 
politicians centered on the crisis of overproduction 
and not on the politics of "Afrikanerisation" or job 
protection at the work place. The tensions were real 
enough, however, and lasted from 1924 till about 
193 3, beginning with a breakdown in contractual 
monopoly and ending in accommodation between 
merchants, producers, and government during 
reconstruction ... In effect, the industry climbed 
out of the crisis of the 1930s because South African 
diamond production was used as the regulator for a 
measure of control by the Diamond Corporation over 
total diamond purchases inside and outside the 
Union. Mines were closed and purchases were held 
back from resale in the late 1930s, while outside 
minimum sales contracts and the rise of bulk diamond 
sales favoured West and Central African producers.
Conflict focused on the closure of the Premier Mine in 
March 1932 for which the government did not give 
permission and De Beers did not give adequate notice as
O 1
was required by agreement. After this point, as market 
conditions improved, the government was reconciled to its 
subordinate role, Newbury (1989, p.371):
The South African government then became a partner 
in the corporation which rationalized its functions 
to deal with production at home and overseas, and 
market gem and industrial goods through the London 
channel.
In short, policy around the diamond industry cannot be 
seen as a simple conflict between imperial and domestic
z z  See also p.375 and p.369.
See also Gregory's (1962, pp.246-7) discussion.
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capital (and white labour). The exercise of the 
government's political power was severely constrained in 
particular ways by the economic structure of the industry 
on an international scale (just as for steel and its, 
rather different, arrangements for a global cartel).
Nevertheless, the extent to which industrial 
diversification is possible in the absence of a cohesive 
industrial strategy is illustrated by the emergence from 
South African diamond mining of one of the country's most 
successful industrial corporations.®2 The fall in 
international demand in the 19 30s, despite De Beers 
having a global monopoly, precipitated the development of 
uses for boart, what was then essentially a by-product of 
the mining of gem diamonds. The forerunner of Boart 
International, began in Johannesburg researching and 
developing a composite diamond impregnated drill bit in 
1936. Since then, Boart has diversified into a range of 
activities utilising diamonds including cutting, 
abrasives and contract drilling. At its peak in the early 
1980s, Boart controlled 100 companies and employed 17,000 
people in 28 countries.
3 2 What follows Is from a variety of sources
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CONCLUSIONS
In looking back at the inter-war period and in 
looking over the literature that has confronted it, a 
number of conclusions emerge. First, the correctly 
recognised disjuncture between economic and political 
power has been too simplistically examined. This is 
reflected in an overemphasis upon the class agencies 
involved without due attention being paid to actual and 
potential economic linkages and structures. The strategy 
of developing national capital was heavily circumscribed 
by the unacceptability of its being primarily based upon 
diversification out of the economy's strength in and 
around mining.
Second, this one-sided analysis is also symbolised 
both by the absence of industrial studies and by the 
continuing ambiguity over the term "industrialisation" 
itself.33 The South African economy, in the scholarly and 
popular literature, has gone through (secondary) 
industrialisation so many times - around the turn of the 
century, when stimulated by the wars, in the thirties, 
and in the fifties and sixties - that it comes as a 
surprise to find that it is now once again suffering from 
a crushingly uncompetitive and inadequate industrial 
sector.
Third, how is the story to be brought forward from 
the inter-war period? In retrospect, it is now known that 
Afrikaner capital has been built up, not perhaps to be on 
a par with English capital, but with sufficient strength,
__
For an index of the weakness of South African industry and Industrial policy, consider the 
performance of the IDC over its first twenty years for which, as Norval (1962, p.98) reports:
In 1959 the Corporation had Investments in 75 companies for a total amount of just under 
R130 million of which just under R104 million was invested in three concerns. The balance 
was invested in 72 companies In the normal course of its business.
On average, other than for state corporations, that Is less than R4Q0,000 per company. Excluding 
SASOL, in 1990, the IDC had invested just under R5 billion in almost 4,000 projects, a little over 
R1 ml 11 ion per project.
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interpenetration and cooperation with it that their 
common interests are and have been closely coordinated 
and served by the state. The historical route to this 
outcome has, however, primarily been through the growth 
of finance houses which, together with what was a 
continuing state priority to such indigenous capital, 
foreclosed an industrialisation strategy based on 
diversification out of mining and its related activities.
This history's significance for the future is found 
in the irony that, just as the various fractions of 
capital operating in South Africa are open to coordinated 
state policy in formulating industrial strategy, the 
apartheid system should itself be in crisis. Nonetheless, 
for a future government, the technical option does exist 
to benefit from the infrastructural capability and 
economies of scale and scope that have been created in 
and around mining and which has not been previously fully 




THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-WAR INDUSTRIALISATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to review post-war 
industrialisation in South Africa, tracing the historical 
evolution of the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) in order 
to address its impact upon the South African economy in 
the past as well as to assess its implications for the 
future. In chapter l, it has been argued that the South 
African economy has been and is increasingly dominated by 
the MEC. To some extent the influence of this complex has 
been overlooked, and the degree of South Africa's 
industrialisation exaggerated, by the way in which 
industrial statistics have been constructed. Much that is 
designated as manufacturing might either be reasonably 
classified as belonging to the MEC or be so closely 
linked to it for it to be included as such for analytical 
purposes. The purpose here is less to draw precise 
quantitative boundaries between what belongs to the MEC 
as opposed to what lies outside it as to point to a 
particular system of capital accumulation that contains 
the MEC at its core with a determining influence on the 
rest of the economy.
The position of the MEC during the inter-war period 
was determined by the disjuncture between Afrikaner 
political and English economic power which impeded 
industrial diversification out of the core activities of 
the MEC, chapter 3. What has been witnessed over the 
post-war period is the erosion of this disjuncture, 
predominantly unobserved or taken for granted in contrast 
to its earlier presence which has been more readily
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recognised.1 But the route by which this articulation was 
accomplished, and its content and consequences, whilst 
uneven across separate components of the economic and 
political formation, has a definite periodisation in 
which Afrikaner capital first emerges to prominence in 
the 1950s under state tutelage prior to its integration 
with the previously exclusive stronghold of English 
mining capital. But the latter did not stand idly by, and 
the evolution of the MEC up to the 1960s is traced in 
Section 1. Section 2 discusses large-scale Afrikaner 
capital's interpenetration into mining and other 
activities in the 1960s supported, in particular, by the 
component of industrial policy that was effected by 
state-owned corporations in steel, chemicals, fuels and 
energy.
The resulting commitment to public and private 
investment in energy, mining and mineral processing 
related sectors after the gold and energy price rises in 
the 1970s was the first signal that large-scale capital 
had been integrated economically and politically within 
an industrial policy. Section 3 discusses this 
strengthening of the MEC. But the costs were to be felt 
in the failure to develop and to have developed a 
coherent commitment to industrialisation much beyond the 
immediate concerns of core mining and energy activities. 
This, as much as the impediments imposed by apartheid 
policies, explains the continuing structural weakness and 
paradoxes of the South African economy, as presented in 
Section 4.
1
The debates around the disjuncture Include Davies et a I (1976), Freund (1989), Yudelman (1983), 
among others, For a review of these, see chapter 3.
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1. ERODING DISJUNCTIVES - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRIKANER
CAPITAL
The disjuncture between English and Afrikaner 
capital, which constrained industrial diversification out 
of the MEC during the inter-war period, was also apparent 
in the 1950s. Its erosion, while varying in rhythm and 
extent across sectors, was evident in the relations of 
conflict and compromise between English capital, on the 
one hand, and Afrikaner capital and state institutions on 
the other. In the 1940s and 1950s, the latter grew in 
strength, by the promotion of Afrikaner interests in 
general but, particularly, through the promotion of 
Afrikaner capital and its deployment in productive 
activities which, in the inter-war period, were largely 
the preserve of English capital.
The process of accumulation around the MEC in the 
1950s included the expansion of gold mining, electricity, 
coal and chemical sectors and the financing of these 
activities. In the financial sector, the creation of a 
long-term capital market addressed the collective demands 
of productive activities within the MEC, but conflict 
resulted from state patronage of Afrikaner financial 
interests and similar dichotomies emerged within the 
electricity, coal and chemical industries and are 
discussed below.
1.1 AFRIKANER CAPITAL IN THE 1950s
There is no doubt that the Nationalist Government 
supported Afrikaner economic and social advance upon 
assuming power. One of the best accounts of this is to be 
found in Lazar (1987) because of his concern to trace the 
evolution of Afrikaner politics and ideology in response 
to changing economic stratification. Our contribution is
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to locate Nationalist support for Afrikaner capital in 
the context of the MEC.
Apart from a purge of government jobs to make way 
for Afrikaners, p.38:
Afrikaner farmers, financial capitalists, small 
traders, and workers all received massive direct and 
indirect hand-outs from the government in the decade 
after 1948.
Following the development of secondary industry in 
the war, based on the growth of both public and private 
investment, Lazar finds that Afrikaners already owned 
3,385 factories, but only employed 14,450 white workers 
(little more than four per enterprise) out of a total of 
170,959 and controlled 6% of industrial turnover by 1948. 
Yet, of white male workers, they constituted 86% of the 
unskilled in industry in South Africa's principal cities, 
79% of mine workers, 74% of rail workers, and 63% of 
factory workers. Afrikaners made up only 5% of directors 
of companies and 15% of professional workers. Per capita 
income of English-speaking whites was twice that of 
Afrikaners.
Lazar points to three trends associated with the 
promotion of Afrikaners; the growth of white collar 
employment, the polarisation of Afrikaner agriculture, 
and the rapid expansion of major Afrikaner corporations 
for which financial enterprises were most prominent in 
the first instance. For farming, support through the 
state to the sector that was and remained dominated by 
Afrikaners, gave rise to rapid development of 
large-scale, mechanised capital alongside an often 
marginal and precarious small-scale sector, pp.108-9:
By 1960, a relatively small number of powerful 
farmers and "land capitalists" controlled a sizeable
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proportion of South African agriculture.
Undoubtedly, some smaller farmers also benefited 
from the huge government input into this sector of 
the economy. But a growing number of poor farmers 
forsook the land for the towns; the livelihood of 
those who remained behind on over-divided uneconomic 
tracts was only guaranteed by government aid. While 
the grootboers grew richer from the fruits of a 
lucrative decade (1950s), the kleinboer (small 
farmer) seems to have become poorer, or given up 
altogether.
Only 16% of all economically active Afrikaners were 
employed in agricultural occupations by 1960, compared 
with more than 30% in 1946 and 23% in 1954-55, p.97. They 
had migrated to the towns in search of the higher rewards 
to be found in waged labour. Much of this was within the 
public sector which employed 30% of whites by 1960, many 
of them white collar employees who had benefited from 
enhanced levels of educational provision. Income 
differentials remained to the advantage of the 
English-speaking but had narrowed considerably. 
Nonetheless, there was only a limited advance in the 
numbers of Afrikaner owners, managers and directors, 
their making up 26% of the total in I960.2
Afrikaner capital in the 1950s, the main beneficiary 
of this process, was represented by four important 
groups, three of which (Volkskas, Sanlam, Rembrandt) were 
large, centralised and involved themselves in a number of 
diverse and also overlapping activities. The fourth group 
consisted of a large number of small-scale commercial and 
industrial enterprises, geographically concentrated in 
the rural areas of the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State (OFS).
2 To some extent, this casts doubt on the commitment to the promotion of small-scale Afrikaner 
industrial capital by the Nationalists. Phlmister (1991, p.441) argues this, contra Kaplan (1977), 
in view of the 1948 Customs Agreement between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa which favoured 
small-scale business In the former at the expense of the latter.
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The Afrikaner economic movement initiated in 19 34 
and shaped at the first Economiese Volkskongres in 19 39 
had, by 1950, effectively consolidated Afrikaner 
capital's structure but had not significantly raised its 
share of national economic activity. In the financial 
sector, although the share of total funds controlled by 
Afrikaner institutions rose from 5% in 1939 to 6.16% in 
1950, what was important was that these funds had been 
centralised and concentrated in the hands of two or three 
institutions, O'Meara {1983, p.205). Manufacturing 
enterprises were very closely linked to the processing of 
agricultural produce through co-operatives with 80% of 
the firms located in rural areas. They were small-scale 
in nature, 85% being single-person enterprises. Afrikaner 
capital was virtually absent in mining activities but a 
significant presence had been established in commerce, 
although many of the enterprises concerned were small.
7 5% were single-person, and most progress had been made 
at the expense of Indian traders evicted in the 
Transvaal.
TABLE 4.1 - THE GROWTH OF AFRIKANER CAPITAL, 19 3 9-1949
£m Turnover %Afrikaner
1939 1949 1939 1949
Commerce 28.0 203 . 7 8 25
Manufacturing 6.0 43.6 3 6
Finance 27 .0 74 .4 5 6
Mining 1.0 1.0 1 1
Total 61.0 322 . 7 5 11
Source: O'Meara (1983, p.182).
With the exception of the financial institutions, 
most of these small-scale enterprises could not compete 
with established "English" competitors. Politically, 
however, they could not be ignored, although their 
influence on the economic discourse of Afrikaner capital
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waned during the 1950s. The Afrikaner economic movement 
had been, O'Meara (1983, p.200):
initiated as a result of a wary cooperation of the 
driving forces behind each of the two companies - on 
the one hand the young financiers around W.A.
Hofmeyr (Sanlam), led by M.S. Louw, and on the other 
hand the theoreticians and Bond activists who sat on 
the Board of Volkskas. Sanlam and Volkskas were 
without any question the prime beneficiaries of the 
centralisation of capital aimed at by the economic 
movement. The 1940s thus gave rise to two powerful 
Afrikaner financial groups, each based in one of the 
two most important centres, the Cape and the 
Transvaal, and each directly linked to a different 
faction within the nationalist movement - Sanlam to 
the Cape National Party (NP) and Volkskas to the 
Bond, which dominated northern Afrikaner 
nationalism..
Successful competition with English capital could 
only be achieved on the basis of scale and, recognising 
this, the second Economiese Volkskongres laid out the 
course of events of the 1950s, O'Meara (1983, pp.281-9):
A strategy of accumulation based on small 
undertakings was doomed. Led by the managing 
director of Sanlam and Bonuskor (Sanlam subsidiary), 
all the major theoreticians declared that now the 
volk would have to reserve its assistance 
exclusively for well-established, large 
institutions, and in particular those which 
centralised capital for investment ... no capital 
would be forthcoming to help develop existing small 
undertakings. Large-scale Afrikaner commercial 
undertakings could now only be established on the 
initiative of, and under the supervision and control 
of, the investment companies dominated by Sanlam ...
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With the growing differentiation of urban 
Afrikaners, and particularly with the emergence of 
two distinct classes out of the economic movement - 
a small group of financial capitalists and a large, 
restive, petty bourgeoisie - strong differences over 
the meaning of the economic movement and what 
constituted the interests of the 'volk' grew more 
acute. This was to find its reflection in the 
nationalist politics of the 1950s and 1960s.
This approach, focusing on large-scale investments 
was reflected in policies towards industrial development, 
particularly in the actions of the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) which resulted in a strengthening of 
the MEC as is discussed below. While less relevant to the 
MEC, there were important divisions between the three 
dominant Afrikaner institutions. Volkskas confined its 
activities almost exclusively to banking in the 1940s, 
O'Meara (1983, p.200):
During this period (1940s) Volkskas' activities 
were almost entirely limited to banking. Unlike 
Sanlam it did not yet enjoy a wide network of 
financial and industrial interests. While its 
role in centralising capital was vital, this
archly conservative bank was not itself in the
business of directly investing in industry.
Banking, up until 1960, was dominated by the 
Barclays and Standard Banks. Their dominance in 
mobilising national savings was eroded in the 1950s by:
a) the growth of the National Finance Corporation (NFC);
b) competition from Volkskas, Nedbank and Trustbank; c)
competition from building societies and life assurers.
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1948 156.1 187 .8 162 .4
1960 376 .6 (1959)531.9 (1957)365.4
Source: Jones and Muller(1992).
The phenomenal growth of Volkskas, initially founded 
in 1934 as a "people's savings bank on a co-operative 
basis", Verhoef (1992), is illustrated by the rise in 
deposits relative to other commercial bank competitors, 
from 2.8% in 1947 to 18.6% by 1967. Most of the growth in 
deposits came after the election of the National Party in 
1948 and resulted from the transfer of the banking 
accounts of central government, municipalities and state 
corporations like Iscor, Escom, South African Post 
Office, South African Railways, Sasol and others.










Source: Volkskas data from Verhoef (1992), Standard and
Barclays data from Jones and Muller (1992).
However, Volkskas did not venture significantly into 
financing industrial development until the 1960s, 
focusing on serving small-scale agricultural interests.
In 1965, 83% of its branches were in the platteland
160
(rural Transvaal and OFS), and this fell to 75% in 1981 
when its business "was divided fairly equally between its 
urban and rural customers", Verhoef (1992).
Sanlam, the life assurance company, on the other 
hand, was in a position by 1950 to increase its 
involvement in mining, manufacturing and commerce.
Through its industrial arm, Federale Volksbeleggings, it 
had interests in fishing and canning (Laaiplek Visserye 
and Marine Production Corporation), agricultural 
implements (South African Farm Implements Manufacturers), 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals (Agricultura Laboratoria 
and Klipfontein Organic Products), coal mining 
(Klipfontein and Klippoortjie mines) and publishing 
(Nationale Pers).
As a life assurer or mutual institution, Sanlam was 
legally restricted in the extent to which it could deploy 
its life assurance income in production. To overcome 
this, it separated the bonuses accrued to its policy 
holders and used newly created Bonuskor in 1946 as an 
additional industrial investment arm. Bonuskor followed a 
similar pattern to Fedvolks and by 1950 had invested the 
bulk of available funds in manufacturing (57%), mining 
(4%), commerce (21%) and finance (18%), The process of 
consolidation and concentration continued in the 1950s 
with a shift of emphasis to mining. In 1953, Fedvolks and 
Bonuskor merged their mining interests into Federale 
Mynbou, the forerunner of today's Gencor. By 1957, 23% of 
Bonuskor's investments were in mining.
The passing of the Regulation of Monopolistic 
Competition Act of 1955 reflected the tensions between 
small- and large-scale capital at the time, although it 
is widely acknowledged that the legislation was 
ineffective in practice. However, divisions within, and 
competition between, fractions of Afrikaner capital also 
mirrored the tensions between the Cape and Transvaal
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branches of the National Party, with these surfacing from 
time to time. For example, Trustbank was set up by Sanlam 
in 1955 in competition to Volkskas. After the election of 
Verwoerd, Sanlam and the Cape NP became a focus for 
opposion to the leadership of the NP. The significance of 
these divisions were not lost on the Anglo American 
Corporation (AAC), as will be discussed later.
But not all fractions of Afrikaner capital grew 
through the financial sector. Rembrandt's growth in the 
1950s was sectorally specific, in tobacco, cigarettes 
and, later, alcohol spirit. Rembrandt initially sprang 
from within the Transvaal Broederbond faction. In 1953, 
financed by both Sanlam and Volkskas, Rembrandt bought 
the Rothmans cigarette mail order company and expanded 
rapidly thereafter. Rembrandt and its founder, Anton 
Rupert, became associated with Cape financial power. Its 
position as large-scale capital was articulated more 
clearly and openly than any other fraction of Afrikaner 
capital. In the post-Sharpeville period, together with 
AAC, it set up the South African Foundation business 
lobby. In 1977, after the Soweto uprising, again with 
AAC, it created the Urban Foundation.^
The promotion of Afrikaner capital in the late 1940s 
and 1950s overlapped with the creation of a range of 
institutions around gold mining, then the central 
activity of the MEC, and challenged the dominance of 
British commercial banks in mobilising national capital 
for industrialisation. The process involved significant 
interaction between state agencies, "Afrikaner" and 
"English" capitals. It had three principal components, 
namely the accommodation of Afrikaner banking 
institutions by the dominant Standard and Barclays Banks 
(discussed above), the strengthening of Afrikaner 
institutions through state patronage and the creation of 
a long term capital market.
_
For more details see Gerber (1973).
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1.2 LONG-TERM CAPITAL MARKET
In 1949, when the National Party created the 
National Finance Corporation (NFC), short-term funds 
taken in by commercial banks in South Africa were being 
re-deposited in London. The NFC provided a local market, 
investing its deposits in Treasury bills, thus providing 
an "instrument for channelling short-term funds into the 
hands of government bodies", Jones and Muller (1992, 
p.210). Despite drawing in considerable funds, Jones 
(1992) argues that the NFC did not provide the basis for 
a successful domestic money market because the demand for 
short-term loans was rather limited. Unfortunately,
Jones' descriptive account overlooks the central role of 
the MEC. For events in the financial sphere in the 
post-war period up to 1955 were heavily conditioned by 
the development of the Orange Free State Goldfields 
(FSG). Mining and quarrying capital expenditure exceeded 
R1 billion (constant 1985 terms) for four consecutive 
years after 1950, and more than 80% of this was related 
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Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years (1960) , South 
African Statistics (1990), IDC (1992).
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The scale of this project cannot be over-emphasized. 
The recent AAC decision to develop the Moab gold mine, 
the announcement of the Columbus stainless steel project 
and the Alusaf II smelter investments, currently welcomed 
as desperately needed signs of confidence in the economy, 
all pale into insignificance compared to the FSG 
development of 12 individual gold mines in a part of the 
country where supporting infrastructure was virtually 
non-existent. De Kock (1951) imparts a striking 
impression of an interplay between state and corporate 
planning right down to the last compound for mine 
workers. The sheer scale of the project was even 
impressive to the chair of the IBRD (now part of the 
World Bank group), and its £50m loan to the Union 
government in 1953 for electrification, railways and 
infrastructure can be taken as a sign of their 
confidence. The state utilities overcame huge technical 
problems - water was pumped 40 miles from the Vaal river 
and, while electricity from the Vaal power station was 
used initially, Vierfontein station was specially built 
by state-owned Escom at a cost of £17m in addition to the 
£370m spent on the 12 mines themselves.
Among its activities, also subscribed heavily to 
mining house debentures. In many respects, the NFC was a 
financial intermediary, inter alia channelling profits 
made from (AAC-owned) De Beers diamond sales into AAC's 
FSG project. Of the NFC's deposits of £58m in 1958, £21m 
had been deposited by De Beers, Innes (1984, pp.148-9). 
Mining houses were able to reduce risks associated with 
mining investment by taking advantage of the financial 
intermediary role of the NFC. With the NFC sharing the 
risks, financing investment in mine development followed 
a well-lubricated path.
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Such funding of the development of the FSG was an 
important site for the erosion of the disjunctures 
between economic and political power despite the 
prevailing political animosities following the 1948 
election of the National Party and its re-election in 
1952. The benefits of the interplay of interests were 
overwhelming. Through the NFC, the state profited on the 
"spread" between deposits and investment. According to 
Palmer (1958), NFC turnover rose from £70m in 1949 to 
£l,045m in 1953. Secondly, direct and indirect state 
revenues from leasing, royalties, company and employee 
tax were estimated at around 40% of the gold fields' 
profits. Third, the project transformed the OFS 
economically and politically. Economically, it promoted a 
form of regional decentralisation, developing a 
relatively unpopulated NP stronghold. By 1960, there were 
9 3,000 workers in the OFS, about 20% of the 456,000 
employed in the entire gold mining industry. It also 
raised the white voting population of the OFS thirty-fold 
over 15 years from 5,500 whites in 1950 to an estimated 
146,000 in 1966, thereby increasing the number of 
parliamentary seats and strengthening the NP.
In 1955, the AAC founded Union Acceptances Ltd 
(UAL), its in-house merchant bank. It did so with the 
support of Barclays, one of two dominant commercial 
banks. Innes (1984, p.182) argues that this was the 
second stage in its strategy whereby,
...first, the state was prevailed upon to make 
the early running through the NFC (as it were, 
to test out the market) and only when that 
venture had proved successful did the Group 
itself enter the field through UAL.4
4
Innes (1984, p.135) cites Hagart (1967, p.110) who asserts that Ernest Oppenheimer was actively 
Involved in the formation of the NFC.
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By 1961, although UAL dominated the merchant banking 
market, four other merchant banks had been formed 
including the Sanlam-controlled Central Finance and 
Acceptance Corporation and the IDC-controlled Accepting 
Bank for Industry. The NFC with deposits of £69m had been 
overtaken by private sector institutions, their 
collectively holding £71m.
The growth in the financial sector's contribution to 
GDP from 9.5% to 10.7% between 1950 and 1960 is 
illustrated in figure 4.2. However, the assertion by 
Innes (1984, p.182), that the structure of capital during 
the 1950s represented "the clearest form yet of the 
merging together of bank capital and productive capital - 
that is, of the emergence of the phase of finance 
capital", proves a premature and inappropriate dating.5 
For, while Afrikaner capital had grown significantly 
through the financial sector, it had not acquired a firm 
and sustainable base within mining or manufacturing 
industries. The FSG development had been a joint venture 
between AAC and three other mining houses, none of which 
was associated with Afrikaner capital.5 And the 
significant developments in the financial sector, were 
not yet followed by any significant diversification out 
of the MEC.
5
Innes refers to King (1962, p.163) who suggests that the UAL was to be modelled along the lines of 
the UK financial system. Innes seems motivated by the wish to impose concepts, such as finance 
capital on the South African economy. These are borrowed from the analysis of advanced capitalism, 
however much valid for that purpose. Here the term finance capital will be used for descriptive 
purposes only.
Innes (1984, p.256) provides the following record of the distribution of ownership of the OFS gold 
field:
AAC Mines: Western Holdings, Free State Geduld, Welkom, President Brand, President Steyn, 
Lorraine and Jeannette.
Anglovaal Mines: Virginia and Merriesprult.
Union Corporation: St.Helena.
JCI: Freddies Cons.
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Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years (1960) , South 
African Statistics (1990), IDC (1992).
Sectorally the MEC core includes Mining, Electricity and 
the following sub-sectors of Manufacturing; ISIC 371 
(Iron and Steel Basic Industries), ISIC 372 (Non-Ferrous 
Metal Basic Industries, ISIC 361,369 (Other Non-Metallic 
Mineral Products) and ISIC 351-354 (Fertilisers, 
pesticides, synthetic resins, plastics, other chemicals, 
basic chemicals and petroleum).
168
1.3 ERODING DISJUNCTURES IN ELECTRICITY, COAL MINING, 
CHEMICAL AND FUEL INDUSTRIES
MEC growth dominated industrial development in the 
1950s, as the political and economic disjuncture in its 
component productive sectors gradually eroded. There were 
two identifiable state industrial strategies which 
emerged during this process; firstly, the nationalisation 
of the electricity industry and a corresponding power 
station construction programme and, secondly, the 
creation of a state-owned fuel-chemical industry. Both of 
these policies were implemented through a mixture of 
collusion and competition with English capital, while 
state provision of energy and transport infrastructure 
was essential for mining, the process of provision 
implicitly included state patronage for Afrikaner 
industrial concerns which, supported by burgeoning 
Afrikaner finance, were propelled into several key 
industries around the MEC.
The role of the energy component of the MEC was most 
prominent in the 1950s through its impact on other 
sectors. The electricity industry had been set up in the 
19th century by the mining industry and was taken over by 
the state in 1948, with AAC assisting with financing. At 
the time, about 59% of generated power was consumed in 
the (mainly) gold mines, Christie (1984, p.128).
Uncertain of their future prior to state takeover, the 
private power generators did not invest in new capacity, 
and the demand from the OFS gold fields together with 
increasing post-war industrialisation in the early 1950s 
led to periodic power shortages. The lack of sufficient 
railway trucks and locomotives during that period 
constrained the movement of goods, particularly bulk coal 
from mines to urban power stations and urban consumers. 
Coal exports were also constrained by the lack of 
transport.
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Coal mining at the time was dominated by the major 
"English" mining houses represented by the Transvaal Coal 
Owners Association (TCOA), a cartel that effectively 
controlled access to the domestic market. Controls on the 
pithead price of coal, in existence in the post 1948 
period, encouraged exports at the expense of the local 
market, Christie (1984, p.151):
The average cost of coal at the pit's mouth at 
7s 4d per short ton, compared with 45s in 
Britain, France and Germany, 65s in Belgium,
34s in the US, 36s in Canada and 17s per short 
ton in Australia.
An indication of the lucrative nature of exports at 
the time is that, while only 7.5% of total mined coal was 
being exported, it contributed 46% of coal mine profits. 
Frustrated by the "closed shop" of the TCOA, the coal 
mines owned by Sanlam found other means to further their 
interests by influencing the Department of Commerce and 
Industry to allocate scarce rail trucks and export 
licenses independently of the TCOA cartel. This strategy 
was fuelled by the ideological debates of the period, 
with the "English" TCOA being publicly blamed for the 
coal shortages, the (slightly misleading) argument being 
that they were making excessive profits from export coal 
which could be made available on the domestic market.
Coal rationing was introduced in 1952, with the TCOA 
giving first claim on supplies to state railways, the 
central state, municipal and mine power stations and gold 
mines. With these priorities, black consumers suffered 
the most from fuel shortages. With its re-election in 
1952, the National Party ensured continuing support to 
Afrikaner capital and, by 1954, TCOA was forced to admit 
two Afrikaner coal owners into the cartel. New power 
stations were being constructed, and the coal supply 
contracts were increasingly being awarded to
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Afrikaner-owned coal-mines. Federale Mynbou1s Coalbrook 
colliery supplied the new Taaibos and Highveld stations. 
However, overall, Afrikaner capital was still on the 
fringes of such activity. The major problem of the 1950s 
was in meeting the power demand of the gold mines, and 
this was ultimately resolved by 1960 through the building 
of three power stations on the coal fields themselves, 
thus circumventing the need to transport huge quantities 
of coal around the country.
The construction of new power stations strengthened 
the MEC, but it was constrained by a lack of capital and 
machinery. Even when power station construction was 
approved, Korean war demand mopped up supplies of 
imported power generation equipment. To some extent, this 
was countered by the strategic needs of the United States 
for South African uranium. The US Export-Import Bank 
provided a £7m loan in 1952 for US equipment, thus 
facilitating the construction of the Wilge station. 
Enormous long term loans were raised in the 1950s, mainly 
through the World Bank, for power plant (1950: $30m and 
1954: $30m) and railway infrastructure (1950: $20m and 
1954: $30m). In 1950, a further $10m was raised from 
eight US commercial banks, who also raised $20m to 
finance mining equipment for the OFS mines. By 1960, the 
Vierfontein (360MW), Taaibos (480MW) and Wilge (240MW) 
stations had been built and the Highveld (480MW) station 
was under construction. New capacity totalled 1560MW, a 
huge increase compared to 1950 capacity of 1290MW, Escom 
Statistical Review (1990). Of the £105m of long term 
liabilities raised by the Union Government in the 1950s, 
Union Statistics for Fifty Years (1960, U3), more than 
half (£58.5m or $117m) was incurred before 1955, 
specifically for energy and railway infrastructure. 
Macroeconomic balances were then significantly affected 
by the investment demands of the MEC.
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In the 1950s, a second conscious industrial strategy 
by the state was the development of an indigenous fuel- 
chemical industry. This coincided with the expansion of 
the existing chemical industry which was heavily 
dependent on demand from the mining industry and which 
had long been dominated by the AAC subsidiary AECI. Most 
of AECI1s capital expenditure in the 1950s was aimed at 
increasing ammonia production for the explosives required 
by the new OPS gold mines. While diversification did take 
place - the SAICCOR Rayon plant joint venture with the 
IDC in 1954, PVC in 1955 and expansion in fertiliser 
production, for example - most chemical production served 
the mining industry.
The construction of the Sasol I oil and 
chemicals-from-coal plant was a substantial bolster to 
the MEC. An indication of its impact on the chemicals 
sector and on the state budget was its cost - about £40m 
between 1950 and 1956 when it began producing, IDC Annual 
Report, 1956. I n ,comparison, this was almost double the 
total authorised capital (£23m in 1956) of the dominant 
producer AECI, and it dwarfed AECI1s ammonia plant 
expansions between 1958 and 1960 which cost £10m, 
Cartwright (1964).
The IDC, set up in 1940 to encourage secondary 
industrialisation, was heavily involved in developing the 
synthetic fuel and chemical industries. Table 1.5 
provides an indication of the focus of its attention in 
industrial sectors associated with the MEC. By 1956, the 
IDC had invested £40.7m in Sasol, representing 77% of its 
total investments in industry.
These and subsequent IDC interventions have 
contributed significantly to the growth of the MEC core. 
The IDC historically chose to finance the establishment 
of infant industries which largely fell within the non­
mining sectors of the MEC, including phosphates (1952),
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Palaborwa copper (1963), coal-based chemicals; Sasol I 
(1951), synthetic rubber (1962), Soekor oil exploration 
(1965), Alusaf aluminium smelter (1967), industrial 
chemicals (1967), Sasol II (1976), Sasol III (1979) and 
Mossgas (1986 ) .
While the IDC promoted other industries, including 
armaments such as Atlas Aircraft Corporation (1964), most 
resources have been deployed to promote the MEC, (table 
1.5); 68.3% in 1960, falling gradually to 37.4% in 1980 
and rising to 48.0% in 1985.
The upward trend since 1980 is set to continue. The 
IDC has indicated that its next targets include steel and 
stainless steel beneficiation, wood pulp, chemicals and 
petrochemical products.7 Simultaneously, the IDC (1990) 
is proposing to reduce tariff barriers which have 
protected large segments of non-MEC industries. Thus, 
that component of past industrial policy which involved 
tariff protection is simply being put into reverse, 
without the addition of other policy tools.
In summary, by 1960, the boundaries of the MEC had
been substantially broadened (a process that was to 
continue subsequently). In sectoral terms, it encompassed 
mining, mineral processing (mainly steel at the time),
electricity, chemicals and liquid fuels. GDP
contributions from these sectors rose from 18% in 1953 to 
21.5% by 1960, while non-MEC manufacturing continued to 
fluctuate between 14-15%, (figure 4.2).
As a system of accumulation, the MEC represented the 
means by which Afrikaner fractions of capital sought to 
involve themselves in mainstream economic activity. While 
the 1950s saw Afrikaner capital consolidate its position 
within the financial sector and gain footholds in the 
coal mining and fuels-chemical sectors as a junior
7 Financial Mai I 17-5-91.
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partner, the 1960s would witness its much wider sectoral 
penetration of the economy, mainly within the core MEC 
sectors, and with an increasing interaction between 
itself and English capital.
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2. THE INTERPENETRATION OF ENGLISH AND AFRIKANER CAPITAL
IN THE 1960s
The erosion of the disjuncture between English and 
Afrikaner capital was spurred on by foreign capital 
withdrawal after the Sharpeville massacre in 1961. It 
resulted in the interpenetration, firstly, of English and 
Afrikaner capital and, secondly, of different fractions 
of Afrikaner capital. However, the erosion was 
insufficient to support significant industrial 
diversification out of the MEC, which dominated economic 
activity and continued to determine the pattern of 
industrial development. This process was accompanied by 
increasing state-led investment in the MEC, around 
energy, chemicals, processed minerals and armaments.
Thus, as the direct contribution of mining to the economy 
fell from 13.7% of GDP in 1960 to 8.8% in 1971, the 
contribution to GDP of non-mining MEC sectors rose from 
7.9% to 8.5%, (figure 4.6).
The share of Afrikaner ownership of the mining 
sector increased significantly in the 1960s. Initially, 
these were served by coal contracts from the growing 
state electricity giant, Escom, (table 4.4). Of the five 
stations commissioned in the 1960s, four coal contracts 
were awarded to Sanlam's Federate Mynbou, whose coal 
interests were subsequently placed under the Trans-Natal 
Coal subsidiary, TNC. By 1962, Federate Mynbou was the 
second largest coal company in the country, after AAC.
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TABLE 4.4 - ESCOM COMMISSIONING SCHEDULE
COAL-FIRED LOCATION RATING MINING FIRST LAST
STATIONS MW HOUSE SET SET
KOMATI Mlddelburg 1000 TNC 1952 1966
INGAGANE Newcastle 500 TNC 1963 1969
CAMDEN Ermelo 1600 TNC 1967 1969
GROOTVLE1 Balfour 1200 AAC 1969 1977
HENDRINA HendrIna 2000 TNC 1970 1977
ARNOT Mlddelburg 2100 AAC 1971 1975
KRIEL Betha1 3000 AAC 1976 1979
MATLA Betha1 3600 TNC/GFSA 1979 1983
DUVHA Wltbank 3600 RM 1980 1984
LETHABO Vereenlging 3708 AAC 1985 1990
TUTUKA Standerton 3654 AAC 1985 1990
MAT 1MBA Ell isras 3325 ISC0R 1987 1991
KENDAL/KHUTALA Kenda1 686 RM 1988 1993
MAJUBA Volksrust 0 RM 1996 2001
Source: Escom (1990) .
With the exception of a few large and lumpy 
investments, mainly in MEC sectors, diversification out 
of mining took place through acquisition rather than 
through new investments. Federate Mynbou diversified into 
asbestos in 1962 through the acquisition of Msauli and 
Gefco. The outflow of foreign capital after the 
Sharpeville massacre in 1961 provided the opportunity for 
Afrikaner and English capital to buy into existing 
concerns. The AAC, flush with cash from the OFS gold 
fields, began a pattern of domestic and international 
acquisitions that has continued unabated. In 1958, AAC 
took control of Central Mining, subsequently placing it 
under a London-based subsidiary, Charter Consolidated. In 
1962, Charter took control of the Hudson Bay Mining and 
Smelting Company in Canada at the same time that AAC was 
blocking Federale Mynbou's bid for control of JCI, by 
taking over JCI itself. There were two reasons for this, 
Innes (1984, p.158). First, JCI had substantial holdings 
in De Beers and the Diamond Producers' Association. 
Second, JCI controlled Rustenburg, the world's largest
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platinum mine and also had substantial copper mining 
interests. Clearly, uncontrolled interpenetration of 
Afrikaner interests in AAC's sphere of influence was not 
welcome.
TABLE 4.5 - DOMINANT MINING 
AFRICA, 1960-1970






Anglo American Corporation 87. 3 AAC
JCI 15.1 AAC
Rand Mines 12.7 AAC
Central Mining 15.5 AAC
General Mining 15 . 3 Sanlam




(1) General Mining took control in 1975.
Thus, the acquisition in 1964 of General Mining by 
Federale Mynbou, with the help of AAC, signalled a 
conscious accommodation of Afrikaner by English capital, 
or compromise in the face of conflict. It is no 
coincidence that the assistance given to Federale Mynbou 
followed the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry into 
the affairs of the AAC in 1964 as a result of lobbying by 
the largely Transvaal-based, Afrikaner petty-bourgeois 
fraction of the N P . Innes (1984, p.158) argues that, 
"participation for Afrikaner interests in one of the main 
gold mining groups was a way in which these criticisms 
might be muted." However, the growing accommodation with 
English capital increased the strains on the NP alliance 
and, as O'Meara (1984, p.251) observes:
Initially this took the form of regionalism.
Attacks on the geldmag (financial power) of the
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Cape - on Sanlam and Rembrandt - gathered force 
in the 1950s. By the time of Sharpeville, these 
divisions were explicit ... Throughout the 
early 1960s ... the Cape party, its organ Die 
Burger, and the Sanlam interests were virtually 
an official opposition within the NP. With the 
assassination of Verwoerd in September 1966, 
this conflict burst into open struggles between 
so-called verligtes (the enlightened) and 
verkramptes (the reactionaries). In 1969, the 
leading verkramptes were expelled from the NP 
and ... they formed the Herstigte 
(reconstituted) National Party.
By end of the 1960s, while Afrikaner capital had 
made inroads into the mining industry, AAC still 
dominated gold mining through its own mines and through 
control of JCI, Rand Mines and Central Mining. 
Interpenetration was evident through the minority 
holdings AAC held in General Mining, Union Corporation 
and Goldfields, (table 4.5).
Clearly, given the political strains outlined above, 
and despite the erosion of the disjuncture, it was still 
not possible for the state to adopt industrial strategies 
to diversify out of the MEC. Instead, the policies 
adopted in the 1950s, through state corporations and 
joint ventures between the IDC and private capital in and 
around the MEC, continued to provide the main impetus to 
industrial development.
Although the manufacturing sector is generally 
acknowledged to have grown significantly in the 1960s, 
most of the expansion was, as it had been throughout the 
post-war period, associated with large, lumpy investments 
in the MEC. A considerable portion of manufacturing 
sector fixed investment in the 1960s was concentrated in 
MEC sectors like steel, chemicals and processed minerals,
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rising from 35.5% to 49.8% of manufacturing fixed 
investment between 1961 and 1972, {figure 4.3).
For much of the decade of the 1960s, the iron and 
steel sector absorbed more than a quarter of all annual 
fixed investment in the manufacturing sector, (figure 
4.4). Specific investments in the steel industry 
included, in 1964, the AAC-owned Highveld Steel and 
Vanadium plant costing R127m (compared to total 1964 
manufacturing sector fixed investment expenditure of 
R241m). Highveld prompted a second round of investment as 
AAC vertically integrated its steel and engineering 
activities, Innes (1984, p.195). Scaw Metals, a 
speciality steel producer was also acquired in 1964 and 
by 1969 had assets of R40m.
The ferrochrome industry was created in 1964 by RMB 
Alloys, a subsidiary of Rand Mines using local chromite 
ore. This was followed by the Southern Cross Stainless 
Steel plant, built in Middelburg with IDC assistance 
between 1964-65. However, the state-owned primary steel 
maker, Iscor, still remained the major producer and 
investor in the sector.
In the mineral processing sectors, large investments 
were made in the Alusaf aluminium smelter. Construction 
of Alusaf began in 1967 and came into production in 1971 
with 5 3,000t/a (ton per annum) capacity. The plant's 
R59.5m cost in 1970 compares with total 1970 
manufacturing sector fixed investment expenditure of 
R371.8m. Increasing interpenetration and collaboration is 
evidenced by the fact that Alusaf was a joint venture 
between the state, domestic English and transnational 
capital, involving the IDC, AAC-controlled Rand Mines and 
Alusuisse. The project included an additional aluminium 
rod plant, Alustang, a joint venture between Alusaf and 
state-owned Iscor subsidiary, USCO.®


















FIGURE 4.3 - MEC FIXED INVESTMENT AS % OF MANUFACTURING,
1961-1990
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FIGURE 4.4 - GDFI IN IRON AND STEEL BASIC INDUSTRIES,
1961-1985
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The chemical industry was also an avenue through 
which Afrikaner capital grew and interpenetrated with 
English capital. In I960, apart from Sasol and 
Klipfontein Organic Products, chemical production was 
dominated by the AAC subsidiary AECI and by transnational 
oil companies. Economies of scale prompted early 
integration at Sasolburg, with a polythene plant joint 
venture between AECI and Sasol. In 1964, the South 
African Nylon Spinners (SANS) plant was built. In 1966 
AECI spent R80m on a petrochemical complex at Sasolburg 
(compared to a total for manufacturing sector fixed 
investment expenditure of R386.5m in 1966).
Afrikaner capital furthered its investments in 
chemicals with the assistance of the IDC. In 1964, a 
synthetic rubber plant was set up by the Fedvolks 
subsidiary Karbochem and the IDC. In 1967, the Sanlam 
subsidiary, Sentrachem, absorbed Karbochem, KOP and the 
UK Distillers Corporation subsidiary, National Chemical 
Products (NCP). This newly-formed Afrikaner-owned 
chemical giant formed an association with Hoechst of 
Germany in 1969, and expanded into polyethylene. The 
Natref inland crude oil refinery was built between 19 68- 
19 71 and was a joint venture between initiators IDC, the 
National Iranian Oil Company and the Compagnie Francaise 
de Petroles. Domestic investors invited included 
Rembrandt, Volkskas and SA Mutual. The magnitude of 
chemical sector investments in the 1960s, though less 
than in the 1970s, were significant, (figure 4.5).
The imposition of an international arms embargo in 
the early 1960s provided other manufacturing 
opportunities for Afrikaner capital. Again the IDC's 
assistance in the formation of Armscor subsidiaries such 






FIGURE 4.5 - GDFI IN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, 1961-1985
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FIGURE 4.7 - GDP CONTRIBUTION OF NON-MEC SECTORS, 19 60-
1970
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The emphasis on the MEC does not detract from 
attempts made during this period, or any other period for 
that matter, to diversify out of the MEC. However, such 
efforts were not extensive. Between 1960 and 1970, the 
GDP contribution of non-MEC manufacturing sectors rose 
from 15% to 17.5% and then fell below 16% in 1972,
(figure 4.6).
This non-MEC growth can be attributed to the motor 
industry (0.6% GDP directly) and, to a lesser extent, the 
textile industry (0.4% GDP). In the case of the motor 
industry, many commentators have cited the local content 
programme, initiated in the early 1960s, as providing a 
boost to the manufacturing sector.^ The evidence, 
presented in figure 4.7, indicates that the impact has 
perhaps been exaggerated, relative to the MEC. Apart from 
the direct growth in GDP contribution of about 1.8%, the 
motor industry would have stimulated growth in the 
Fabricated Metal Product sector and in the Non-Electrical 
Machinery sector. While the latter two grew, 
respectively, to 2.2% and 1.6% of GDP, they are equally 
likely to have been stimulated by the impact of large- 
scale MEC projects during this period.1 1^
In the case of textiles, growth during the 1950s was 
partly encouraged by, now discredited, apartheid 
decentralisation policies.11 By the early 1960s, the 
lessons of this experience were abundantly clear to the 
IDC, the creator of the industry in the 1950s. ^  However, 
the linkage effects created by the new SANS nylon plant 
in 1964, provided a boost to the downstream textile 
industry, (figure 4.7).
g
The IDC provided direct support by forming Wispeco, a Joint venture with Australian Repco, to 
manufacture motor components.
See chapter 6 for a discussion of linkages between the economy and fabricated metal and machinery 
industries falling within the ISiC 3800 category.
1 1  See Clark (1987, p.335)
See van Eck cited by Gerber (1973, p.113) and also thesis Chapter 5, Section 1.3, page 229.
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Adopting a more historical perspective, non-MEC 
manufacturing's GDP contribution grew from about 4% in 
1924 to above 15% in the early 1950s and it has 
fluctuated around that figure ever since, (figure 1.6).
In contrast, a conventional, and false, perspective is 
that manufacturing's GDP contribution grew from 7.5% in 
1924 to 26% in 1990, (figure 1.1). In the 1960s, the 
financial sector grew rapidly, its GDP contribution 
rising from 10.8% in 1960 to 14.9% in 1971, (figure 4.6). 
This was partly due to the role played by this sector, 
particularly by newly formed merchant banks, in 
channelling profits from mining into acquisitions of, and 
investments in, MEC and non-MEC manufacturing sectors.
In conclusion then, and without detracting from 
their importance, non-MEC manufacturing industries as a 
whole did not in the 1960s acquire an independent 
momentum from the weight of activities within the MEC, 
nor were the institutional conditions favourable to the 
adoption of policies to achieve such an objective. With 
the rise in gold and energy prices in the early 1970s, 
the possibility of this receded even further.
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3. MEC EXPANSION IN THE 1970s
The erosion of the disjuncture between English and 
Afrikaner capital allowed the state, for the first time 
since the 1950s, to adopt coordinated industrial 
policies. These revolved primarily around the MEC, 
following the gold and energy price rises in the early 
1970s but coordination was uneven, varying across sub­
sectors. In contrast to previous periods, a significantly 
greater degree of co-operation was evident between 
private capital as a whole and the state.
A far greater degree of both competition and 
interpenetration between large-scale English and 
Afrikaner capital was evident which strengthened private 
capital as a whole. The emergence of six corporate "axes" 
of private capital by the early 1980s, signalled the 
metamorphosis of the historic disjuncture. Each "axis" 
consists of a conglomerate with extensive but varying 
interests in the mining, manufacturing and the financial 
sectors. Each sector is oligopolised by the 
conglomerates, and that dominance is reproduced through 
simultaneous control of the financial sector, see chapter 
two.
In the 1970s, MEC industries benefited from both 
booming commodity prices and stable and conducive 
relations governing the profitability of internal 
markets. Non-MEC industries, while playing a supportive 
role to MEC mega-projects, either as suppliers of inputs 
and capital goods or as consumers of intermediate goods 
produced by the MEC core, were partly boosted by military 
demand during the Angolan war in the 1970s, and partly 
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FIGURE 4.9 - GDFI IN COAL MINING, 1950-1990
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Perhaps the best example of state coordinated 
policies and the eroding disjuncture between English and 
Afrikaner capital is found around coal utilisation; 
firstly, in the expansion of Escom power generation and, 
secondly, in the development of the coal exports through 
Richards Bay. Coal output grew rapidly from the early 
1970s, driven by electricity demand, demand from the 
Sasol II and III plants and coal exports, (figure 4.8).
Through the patronage of Escom contracts, General 
Mining's Trans-Natal Coal had become the largest single 
producer of coal in South Africa by the early 1970s. 
Subsequent Escom contracts were integrated within broader 
policies for the development of the (then fragmented) 
coal industry as a whole. This led to the coal industry's 
consolidation and modernisation around three major 
groups; AAC's Amcoal, General Mining's TNC and Rand 
Mines' Randcoal.
The coal export industry could not have developed 
without such closely coordinated policies which 
facilitated the pooling of large-scale resources. At the 
time, the Transvaal Coal Owner's Association (TCOA), of 
which TNC was an important member, entered into a long 
term coal supply contract with Japanese steel producers, 
and subsequent negotiations with the state and the 
development of coal export policies resulted in enormous 
state and private sector capital investments. Capital 
expenditure in the coal industry averaged more than 13% 
of mining investment for most of the period between 1975 
and 1988, (figure 4.9). The state developed 
infrastructure to facilitate rail transport of coal from 
the developing Eastern Transvaal coal fields to Richards 
Bay, ensuring that the harbour would be developed to 
accommodate large coal carriers. The TCOA undertook to 
develop the mines and to build, maintain and operate the 
coal loading terminal. Thus, the MEC was both the most
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important site of accumulation and the platform from 
which the economy was propelled in the 19 70s (and on 
which it faltered in the 1980s).
Perhaps the most decisive industrial policy since 
the formation of Iscor was the decision by the state to 
build Sasol II and III. These plants, built with 
considerable assistance from the IDC, came on stream 
between 1979 and 1983 and further enhanced the role of 
the MEC within the economy. Sasol's output of 
approximately 50% of domestic liquid fuel consumption was 
forced upon the existing transnational oil refiners, who 
were compensated through a secret agreement that 
continues to regulate the fuels industry in 1993.
The disjuncture between English and Afrikaner 
capital in the chemicals sector did not fade to as great 
an extent as in others. The construction of the Sasol 
plants assisted the erosion in downstream chemical 
processing. It provided new and stable sources of raw 
materials which could be further processed within a 
policy framework that would protect downstream 
investment, the latter requiring enormous commitments of 
capital which could only be secured through the pooling 
of resources. In 1979, for example, Sentrachem formed a 
joint venture with AECI, to produce PVC from coal at the 
Coalplex plant in Sasolburg. On the other hand, the Sasol 
project partly undermined coordination and further 
development of the chemicals industry in the 19 80s(see 
below).
By the 1970s, Afrikaner capital was also confidently 
reorganising other important sections of the mining and 
manufacturing industry, although not without favourable 
assistance from state institutions. Clark (1987) 
incorrectly interprets this reorganisation as state-led, 
by the IDC. Acquisitions of fragmented chrome mines in 
the early 1970s were consolidated and recapitalised
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leading to the development of the ferrochrome industry on 
a large scale.
After embarking on a joint venture with Union 
Carbide, which led to the construction of the Tubatse 
Ferrochrome smelter, Genmin took control of its main 
rival Samancor in 1984 in controversial circumstances. 
Samancor, formed by a merger between South African 
Manganese and AMCOR in 1975, was controlled by 
Iscor(39.6%) with AAC as the largest private shareholder 
and Gencor as a smaller partner (7%). In 1977, both AAC 
and Genmin bid for Iscor's 40% share but each was blocked 
by the state. In 1983, Genmin instituted a R120m court 
case against Iscor on a coal supply contract at the tied 
Hlobane colliery where Iscor was demanding reductions in 
supply. To resolve this, in June 1983, Iscor exchanged 
50.25% of AMCOR (which controlled its share of Samancor) 
for Hlobane and 70% control of Dunswart Steel despite the 
fact that AAC would have paid more for the stake. In June 
1984, Samancor bought the remainder of Iscor's share.
Several other manufacturing industries within the 
MEC core grew in the 1970s including aluminium, titanium 
and platinum smelting. Alusaf's capacity was doubled in 
19 74 and a further expansion was carried out in 19 8 3 by 
importing an entire mothballed Japanese smelting plant. 
The titanium smelting operation at Richards Bay was 
initiated in 1972, as a joint venture between the IDC, 
Genmin, SA Mutual and QIT of Canada (a subsidiary of 
mining conglomerate RTZ).
While large-scale English and Afrikaner capital were 
increasingly entering into joint activities, they 
competed in the scramble for acquisitions in order to 
accrue scale advantages. In 1975, General Mining acquired 
control over the Union Corporation in circumstances which 
characterised emerging relationships between 
conglomerates. In 1974, Gold Fields of South Africa
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(GFSA) announced a takeover bid for Union Corporation, 
then one of the largest "independently-owned" mining 
houses. Previous interpenetration had resulted in AAC and 
General Mining (Genmin) having, respectively, 10% and 7% 
strategic stakes in the company, AAC holding 10% through 
London-based Charter Consolidated. To complicate matters, 
AAC also held a strategic stake in General Mining.
Threatened by GFSA's bid, AAC initially offered its 
10% holding in Union Corporation to General Mining but, 
after the latter had raised its holding to 29.9%, AAC 
switched its support to GFSA. Since its parent Sanlam was 
not prepared to bear the full risk, Genmin was only able 
to acquire control with the financial assistance of 
Rembrandt. This resulted in increased interpenetration 
between large-scale Afrikaner concerns, with Rembrandt 
subsequently taking a 25% stake in Genmin, which 
reorganised itself and Union Corporation into Gencor in 
1980. Through Union Corporation, Afrikaner capital 
acquired footholds in two important sectors, pulp and 
paper through Sappi and platinum through Impala, the 
latter later growing into the world's second largest 
producer after AAC's Rustenburg Platinum.
Interpenetration took place within Afrikaner capital 
too but was not without associated conflicts. Having 
jointly financed General Mining's takeover of Union 
Corporation in 197 5 and the subsequent formation of 
Gencor in 1980, publicly antagonistic relations developed 
between Rembrandt and Sanlam.14
The 1980s, then, witnessed the emergence of six 
interpenetrated "axes" of capital straddling the mining, 
manufacturing and financial sectors, chapter 2. Their
1 3 "Independent" in that It was not within the controlling sphere of any of the South African 
conglomerates.
Whi le less relevant to the arguments here, the reason stemmed from Sanlam's heavy-handed ousting 
of Gencor chair, Wim de Vi Iliers, apparently because he had opposed a Sanlam directive to purchase 
a company owned by the son of then Sanlam Chair, Wassenaar. By then, Rembrandt had Increased its 
stake to 30% of Gencor.
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origins differed ethnically and sectorally. AAC had moved 
from gold and diamond mining into domestic manufacturing, 
domestic finance and regional and international mining. 
Sanlam had used its pooled Afrikaner financial resources 
to break into mining and manufacturing. Rembrandt had 
grown domestically and internationally retaining a focus 
on cigarettes, tobacco and liquor production, but also 
diversifying its investment portfolio. Anglovaal, the 
smallest group had retained a historical base in 
manufacturing while Liberty/Standard bank had remained in 
the financial sphere. Thomas Barlow had developed its 
manufacturing interests, diversified into mining through 
acquisition of Rand Mines in 1971, and had retained the 
financial backing of SA Mutual, mainly to prevent itself 
from being taken over by other conglomerates.
The extent of oligopolisation at the sectoral and 
sub-sectoral levels in mining and manufacturing is 
evident. The "axes" dominate mining through their mining 
holding companies, (table 2.2), between which there is 
extensive interpenetration through cross-holdings, (table 
2.12). The manufacturing sector has increasingly been 
dominated by the six "axes". The bulk of the 
manufacturing sector's assets are listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, with more than 80% held by 
the conglomerates, (table 2.6). However, ownership 
concentration extends to the disaggregated sub-sectoral 
level, (table 2.7). Increasing concentration and control 
of the financial sector by the conglomerates became 
apparent in the 1980s, (table 2.9), reproducing the 
economic and political power of both English and 
Afrikaner fractions of capital.
Thus, by the early 1980s, the disjuncture between 
English and Afrikaner capital had eroded sufficiently to 
allow coordinated industrial policies to be effected. 
Booming commodity prices in the historically evolved 
institutional context ensured that the site of
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accumulation remained in and around MEC industries. The 
policies adopted, while facilitating MEC exports, also 
ensured stable and conducive relations governing the 
profitability of internal markets. The conglomerate form 
that emerged straddled the mining, manufacturing and 
financial sectors and, while each of the six "axes" of 
capital were historically associated with either English 
or Afrikaner fractions, their degree of interpenetration 
of ownership and coordination of activities across a 
variety of sectors reduced the influence of the 
disjuncture.
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4. POST-1980 PARADOXES OF THE MEC - THE LIMITS TO GROWTH
The six "axes" of private capital entered the 1980s 
with increasing strength and cohesion, particularly 
through extensive oligopolisation of most productive 
sectors. The disjunctures between economic and political 
power had eroded across a wide range of economic sectors. 
The benefits of scale economies through acquisition were 
also reaching their limits, and the fractions of capital 
in South Africa became more open to state coordinated 
industrial policies, both within and without the MEC. 
Paradoxically, by 1980, the crisis of apartheid began to 
foreclose possibilities for state coordinated industrial 
strategies which sought to diversify out of the MEC, as 
the latter focused more on monetary policy following the 
debt moratorium of 1985. Paradoxically also, conglomerate 
control of the financial sector led to increasing 
speculative domestic investment activity and illegal 
capital flight at the expense of productive investment. 
While large investments have been made in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, these have been solely in core MEC 
sectors, with corresponding consequences for broader 
future economic growth.
After the gold price peak in 1980, the GDP 
contribution of the MEC fluctuated around 25%, rising 
after the devaluation of the Rand to average 27% until 
the fall in the gold price after 1990, when its 
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There is little empirical evidence of 
diversification out of the MEC core. Investment in these 
sectors declined relatively in the 1980s, (figure 4.3). 
Non-MEC manufacturing's contribution actually fell from 
18% in 1980 to 15% in 1985 but rose slightly to 16% by 
1990. This was probably due to increased engineering 
sector activity during the construction of the Mossgas 
proj ect.
State industrial coordination during the 1970s, 
however, had been uneven across sectors and was short­
lived. As MEC projects such as mineral processing and 
Sasol were completed in the early 1980s, export commodity 
prices declined. Since there was no structural or 
institutional basis laid down to diversify into non-MEC 
sectors, the latter declined according to the fortunes of 
the MEC (except for some sub-sectors driven by military 
and mega-project expenditure, whose buoyancy was 
prolonged until the late 1980s)
A confluence of factors in the 1980s contributed to 
impeding any diversification out of the MEC. The 
orientation of the corporate sector and the nature and 
structure of the financial sector, together with policies 
of deregulation in the latter were not conducive to 
encouraging diversification. With most major mining and 
manufacturing assets having been acquired by 
conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s, a flurry of 
financial sector acquisitions followed deregulation in 
the 1980s, consolidating conglomerate power at the level 
of the financial sector. This is reflected in financial 
service contributions to GDP rising from 11% in 1980 to 
almost 15% in 1990, (figure 4.10).
Prominent among the efforts in the 1980s in 
centralising and concentrating financial sector interests 
was the recent emergence of the ABSA banking group. As 
the largest group in South Africa, it is a testament to
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the success of such objectives, representing the merging 
of Volkskas, United, Allied, Bankorp and Trustbank, 
largely Afrikaner-oriented institutions.
4.1 FINANCIAL SECTOR PARADOXES
One of the consequences of the way in which 
Afrikaner capital has been promoted and, ultimately, 
integrated with large-scale capital in general is to have 
generated a particular relationship between finance and 
industry. Whilst there are close ownership linkages 
between mining/industry houses and finance houses, these 
have not been conducive to long-term investment in 
industry. Rather, the South African financial system has 
been much more geared towards the buying and selling of 
financial assets than in the creation of productive 
assets. Roux et al (1991) address the role of the 
financial system. They recognise that it has been subject 
to criticism, being accused of, p.2:
allowing excessive speculation, of not financing 
productive investment, of ignoring the needs of 
important sections of the population, of channelling 
too much saving through the contractual 
institutions, of overextending its lending activity, 
and of being dominated by a few powerful operators.
Such issues tend to be addressed in a framework of 
the supply of and demand for funds. Almost inevitably, 
this leads to the conclusion that inadequate levels of 
(manufacturing) investment are primarily due to lack of 
demand for funds, not their absence of availability. The 
financial system would respond to signalled investment 
opportunities if these were profitable, even if the funds 
have to filter through a series of intermediaries which 
effectively convert short term speculative activity into 
sources of long term manufacturing investment. Indeed, it
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can even be argued that the complexity and variety of 
financial intermediaries can serve to enhance the types 
and levels of investment funds available. It is thus not 
surprising that the Financial Mail rejected the IDC's 
role as an industrial financier in the early 1980s.
Whether the IDC was necessary or successful in the 
past is now a fatuous question. There are as many 
pros as there are cons. The point is whether it will 
continue to be useful in the future now that the 
country enjoys developed capital markets and has a 
core of developed technical skills15
The logic of this view is more attractive than its 
realism. A complex and sophisticated financial system may 
operate in this way, especially if the real economy is 
booming, although it is assigned an extremely passive and 
reactive, rather than an active, role in generating 
manufacturing investment. To the contrary, finance can be 
trapped within speculative activity that is 
self-sustaining. A more satisfactory approach is to 
reject supply and demand as a starting point and to 
examine the institutional context within which investment 
takes place. For the distinction between supply and 
demand is obscured once it is recognised that there is a 
close relation between saving and investment within those 
corporate structures that control both, whether it be 
through internal financing or the relationship between 
financial and non-financial branches of the 
conglomerates. The appropriate question then becomes 
somewhat different. To what extent, does the financial 
system serve both to fund and direct the level and 
restructuring of manufacturing investment?
Interestingly, in this context, Roux et al (1991, 
p.11) draw a parallel with the UK financial system:
1 5  Financial Mall 29-1-82, p.398.
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Financial arrangements in South Africa are largely 
modelled on the British banking system. Within this 
framework banks are primarily confined to short-term 
lending and money market activity. The stock 
exchange occupies a distinct, but equally central 
position, since it is assigned the dominant role 
within the capital market.
There are similarities between the two banking 
systems both in institutional organisation and in the 
structure of finance. There are also, however, 
significant differences between the South African and UK 
systems, which makes each of them unique (and, for the 
former, a high level of concentration and intimate 
connections to other corporate structures, especially 
with mining, which might have been expected to lead to 
more direct avenues to manufacturing investment). This 
raises questions of the suitability of the South African 
system for promoting industrial investment given its 
higher level of development of banking relative to its 
more general level of economic development, even if the 
UK could be taken as an appropriate model to be emulated.
Of course, the UK cannot be taken as a model. It has 
suffered from low levels of ineffective manufacturing 
investment exactly like the South African economy. There 
has been a long tradition of argument that this is due to 
the nature and power of the financial system in its 
influence over economic policy and in its greater 
commitment to speculative global short term financing as 
opposed to long term financing of investment in domestic 
industry. Fine and Harris (1985) argue that this is both 
a cause and effect of the structure of the British 
economy in that the financial system does not itself 
serve directly as an agency for the restructuring of 
British industry (unlike, say, German and Japanese 
banking) and nor does it respond constructively, if more 
passively to the needs of industry, given its
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preoccupation with short-term, speculative, financing. A 
similar, if not identical situation has prevailed within 
South Africa. And macroeconomic policy has been geared 
around support to the financial sector under the guise of 
an otherwise neutral commitment to stabilisation of 
inflation, the exchange rate or the balance of payments. 
The result then is that, although greatly concentrated in 
the 1980s, the financial structure did not encourage 
productive investment but encouraged speculative 
activities instead.
Further, since the early 1970s, both English and
Afrikaner capital have begun to adopt an outward
orientation, investing off-shore. Illegal capital flight,
always part of the structure of South Africa's
politically charged, mixed economy, increased
dramatically, largely through the mechanism of transfer 
i fipricing. It has also been accompanied by a publicly 
vociferous campaign by corporate capital for the lifting 
of capital and exchange controls. Capital flight has been 
estimated to have run at around 25% of the value of non­
gold exports, most of which were raw and processed 
minerals from MEC sectors,17 (figure 4.11).
1 5  See Kahn (1991), Rustomjee (1991) and SmIt and Mocke (1992)
Gold exports have been more strictly monitored by the Reserve Bank.
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Increasing capital flight through transfer pricing, 
a mechanism favoured by transnational corporations, is 
directly linked to the internationalisation of domestic 
capital. This has not only been confined to English 
capital, as represented by AAC. For example, Rembrandt 
had internationalised from an early period. By 1961, it 
had operations in more than a dozen different countries. 
In 1981, it sold a share of Rothmans to the US 
cigarette-maker Phillip Morris and used the proceeds to 
finance further off-shore diversification.
While internal opposition to apartheid had always 
been important, by the mid-1980s it was strong enough to 
prompt a withdrawal of foreign capital, the latter also 
affected by the global financial crisis involving third 
world debt. Thus, instead of coordinating the privately- 
owned financial sector within cohesive industrial policy, 
the state first deregulated the sector {flush with gold 
revenues in the early 1980s) and, after the fall in the 
gold price and the debt moratorium in 1985, focused more 
on monetary policy rather than on industrial policy.
4.2 MANUFACTURING SECTOR PARADOXES
Despite the shift in the orientation of some state
agencies towards liberalisation in the 1980s, a most
cohesive industrial policy was maintained almost until
1990 for the production of armaments. Several sub-sectors
of manufacturing associated with arms production remained
buoyant, despite recessionary conditions prevalent in the
economy between 1981-83 and 1984-86 and after 1988. While
fixed asset values of the engineering sector declined in
the 1980s, the value of assets held by Armscor actually
i ftgrew over the same period.
1 8  Rustomjee (1993, p. 138)
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This partly reflects a paradox in policies of 
industrialisation in South Africa, uneven as they have 
been across sectors. Given the unsustainable political 
policies of apartheid, both domestically and regionally 
for which arms production was both supportive and 
dependent, such a strategy was always unlikely to 
diversify industrial activity significantly away from 
mining, processed minerals and chemicals.
Another paradox of state coordination around the MEC 
is evident in the chemicals industry. In the 1970s, state 
coordination fostered a synthetic fuel industry. Although 
it regulated and mediated between the interests of 
English, Afrikaner and transnational capital, the 
competition between the former two undermined the 
extension of industrial coordination around fuels to 
cover chemicals. Base (organic) chemical production is, 
of course, usually a joint activity of fuel refineries, 
(whether crude oil- or coal-based). The chemical industry 
had been the site of competition between the two largest 
entities, AECI and Sentrachem, with the latter never 
having been a serious challenger. Sasol, on the other 
hand, by its sheer size and its association with the IDC 
and Afrikanerdom, became a threat as its output increased 
after 1982. It lobbied for and achieved deregulation of 
the explosives industry and, with burgeoning production, 
made increasing in-roads into explosives and fertiliser 
markets which had long been the preserve of AAC's AECI.
Thus, on the one hand, state coordination of the 
national chemicals industry became possible in the mid- 
1980s, particularly through Sasol's production of a 
considerable proportion of national bulk chemicals such 
as ethylene, alcohols and other intermediate feedstocks. 
On the other hand, deregulation considerably undermined 
the potential for a coordinated industrial strategy 
around chemicals. It also undermined the achievement of 
economies of scale at the national level and very little
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new investment was subsequently made in the chemicals 
industry until the mid-1980s.
At the time, state policy makers were more concerned 
with ensuring liquid fuel supplies to South African 
industry as a whole and less inclined to adopting a 
strategic approach towards coordinating fuel output with 
chemicals production and coordinating bulk chemical 
output with the development of downstream industries. The 
lucrative nature of these well-regulated synthetic fuel 
projects also made them the subject of private capital's 
attention in the early 1980s. Several private sector 
consortiums, involving various combinations of English, 
Afrikaner and transnational corporations, put forward 
proposals for synthetic fuels projects that were to 
follow Sasol III into the 1980s. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the state approved the construction of the 
Mossgas synthetic fuel plant, a design which used Sasol1s 
synthetic fuel process under licence. Gencor was also 
offered the option to take a share in the project on 
completion. Private sector interpenetration in the fuels 
and chemicals sector also continued. In 1989, Gencor 
purchased the refining and fuels interests of divesting 
transnational Mobil and has subsequently developed this 
into Engen, a diversified fuels exploration, production 
and refining division with significant off-shore 
interests.
In 1993, the commitment to coordination has receded 
through the partial privatisation of Sasol and policy 
proposals for the deregulation of the fuel industry. A 
large proportion of Sasol stock is now held by various 
financial arms of the six private sector "axes". Cost 
overruns on the Mossgas project have also been a focal 
point of an ideologically-based attack by private capital 
on the coordinating role of state institutions.
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4.3 INSTITUTIONAL PARADOXES
State institutions previously coordinating 
industrial policy were not unaffected by these historical 
developments. The Board of Trade and Industries (BTI), 
administrator of tariff policies, was emasculated in 1992 
by the BTI Amendment Act, and the IDC assumed the role of 
industrial policy formulator and implementor.
This is not surprising since it had been the IDC's 
role to foster and further the interests of large-scale 
capital, and it seems only natural that the latter, 
having acquired a cohesion as never before, should find a 
corresponding institution within the state apparatus to 
pursue its appetite for big foreign exchange generating 
projects, requiring state support and guarantees (but not 
coordination).
The apartheid state, prior to transitional 
government in the 1990s, appears to have withdrawn from 
any active coordination of industrial policy to diversify 
out of the MEC. The weight of past investment and the 
present institutional orientation have acted to keep the 
trajectory of industrialisation firmly in and around the 
MEC core. The stagnation of the economy and political 
paralysis in adopting coherent, long-run industrial 
policies are leading to investments which can be regarded 
as strategic and subsidised staging posts for future 
private sector operations lying, as far as is technically 
possible, outside the reach of a future post-apartheid 
state and its political constituencies. This is the 
domestic counterpart to capital flight and disinvestment 
and, together with mergers and acquisitions, is part of 




To conclude then, the political economy of post-war 
industrialisation in South Africa has been traced largely 
by examining the process of change within the capitalist 
class.^ This appears to have exhibited three overlapping 
phases in what is essentially a history of the creation 
of large-scale Afrikaner capital, its interpenetration 
with English capital and, ultimately, their combined 
collaboration with the state. The first phase, centred in 
the 1950s, witnessed the state's successful encouragement 
of the development of large-scale Afrikaner capital. The 
second phase around the 1960s witnessed the 
interpenetration of large-scale Afrikaner capital into 
mining, with the active collaboration of both the state 
and mining capital itself. As a result, by the 1970s, 
there was no longer a political obstacle within the 
capitalist class to the adoption of a concerted economic 
strategy on the part of the state.
Indeed, one was adopted. But economic conditions had
changed, both through the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system, and the associated rise in the price of gold, and
through the oil shock which similarly enhanced all energy
prices. Consequently, the state and private capital drew
upon policies to strengthen the MEC in its core
activities. Thus, the third phase, emerging in the 1970s,
consolidated the collaboration between MEC capital and
the state with extensive, if not comprehensive,
coordinated polices for the economy emerging for the
first time in South Africa's history. They were directed
at the MEC, through the expansion of public and private
investment to promote mineral, heavy chemical and energy
production, both for domestic and foreign markets. In
addition, a highly coordinated strategy to produce
armaments was also implemented. By the 1980s, even as the 
__
There has been considerable research and study Into the historical role played by other classes 
In the development of South African Industry, and while our approach does not detract from their 
Importance, we have chosen to cover a less researched but equally Important subject.
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boost to core MEC activities was eroded, the apartheid 
system as a whole was in crisis. With increasing 
sanctions, disinvestment and labour and social unrest, it 
is hardly surprising that a coherent industrial strategy 
to diversify industry out of and away from the MEC core 
sectors continued to remain far off the agenda. These 
adverse conditions might be considered sufficient reason 
for faltering industrialisation but they were reinforced 
by the mode of operation of the economy, particularly of 
its previously developed financial system, this being 
more geared to speculation than to long term provision of 
investment finance to industry. And the policy priority 
of the financial system has been oriented around 
macroeconomic objectives rather than those of industrial 
development as in the disastrous liberalisation of the 
financial system in the early 1980s.
In conclusion, two views of post-apartheid economic 
prospects arise. One is positive and concerns the scope 
for economic development and growth, and the provision 
directly and indirectly of basic needs, arising out of 
the potential already established by the MEC from which 
economies of scale and scope have yet to have been fully 
realised. The other is less certain and requires that 
policy debate be firmly rooted in the economic and 
political realities associated with the continuing 
presence of the MEC. It will be no mean task to formulate 
and implement policies that conflict with, and yet depend 
upon, the interests of a peculiarly powerful and uniquely 
institutionalised class of corporate capitalists.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE INFLUENCE OF THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX ON POST-WAR 
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, focus was placed upon the 
evolving relations between different fractions of 
capital. This chapter is concerned with the issue of 
industrial policy - how it developed and how it has been 
debated.
Post-war industrial policy has been conducted mainly 
through the use of three instruments: firstly, the 
creation of state corporations and joint ventures with 
private capital; secondly, the extensive use of tariffs; 
thirdly, industrial decentralisation. In Section one, the 
conduct of these industrial policies is traced and shown 
to have been mediated by the role of the MEC as a system 
of accumulation, in particular, by eroding the 
disjuncture between English and Afrikaner capital. 
Although the MEC's impact has differed over time and 
across sectors, it effectively led to policies which, 
both supported its core sectors, and precluded the 
adoption of other industrial policies of diversification 
away from economic dependence on South Africa's resource 
base. This was despite numerous recommendations to the 
contrary, by official Commissions of Inquiry into 
industrial performance. Further it is demonstrated that 
the industrial policies that were actually pursued, 
particularly by two key institutions, the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and the Board of Trade and 
Industries (BTI), followed a separate path from that 
promoting industrial diversification.
In reviewing past debates in Section two, it is 
shown that, on the one hand, these have changed in
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parallel with more general developments in the theory of 
industrialisation and development. On the other hand, it 
is remarkable how the themes of the debate and their 
interpretations of industrialisation have remained 
unchanged, these often being resurrected from time to 
time. The rhythm and themes of debate are discussed in 
Section three and it is found that past debates over 
industrialisation have been based, both on a false 
perception of the pattern of industrialisation and on a 
partial and even false recognition of how industrial 
policy has been adopted and implemented in practice.
Two specific examples are used to illustrate this. 
First, the commonly accepted past and prospective 
trajectory of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) 
(backward from consumption goods to intermediate and then 
capital goods) is shown to be contrary to the actual form 
of post-war industrialisation in South Africa, which has 
run in the opposite direction even if to a stunted 
extent. Second, as already shown in Chapter 1, a false 
dichotomy has been drawn between mining and manufacturing 
activities, masking the evolution of a MEC that straddles 
both. The presence of the MEC core and its role as a 
system of accumulation has thus been overlooked in past 
and present debates on industrial performance and the 
consequences of this are drawn out in the final Section.
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1 . THE CONDUCT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
As a system of accumulation, the underlying thrust 
of the MEC was the empowerment of Afrikaner capital, 
ultimately fostering the latter's successful 
interpenetration with English capital. This has had a 
profound impact on industrial policy, reducing it to 
three relatively uncoordinated, and even incoherent, 
components, namely, the creation of state corporations, 
mainly around the MEC, the application of trade policy 
through tariff protection and, thirdly, policies of 
industrial decentralisation. While these policies have 
varied over time and across sectors, they have never 
actively sought to diversify out of the MEC on a long 
term basis.
1.1 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND STATE CORPORATIONS IN THE 
1950s
The creation of state corporations as instruments of 
industrial policy began in the early 19 30s with the 
creation of Iscor. This had an enormous propulsive impact 
on the economy, both directly and indirectly. Most 
subsequent state corporation investment was made in this 
and other MEC sub-sectors, with considerable downstream 
interpenetration through joint ventures with private 
capital. Despite this, the broader role of state 
corporations in industrialisation has usually been 
overlooked - or viewed separately from privately-owned 
industries upstream and downstream of the parastatal.
Clark (1987) provides the most comprehensive 
discussion of the role of state corporations in South 
Africa, focusing especially on Escom and Iscor. Her work 
has been discussed elsewhere, in Chapter 3. There is 
little evidence that these corporations were set up to 
act or could operate as stepping stones predominantly for
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the promotion of national capital at the expense of 
foreign or mining capital. The latter were essential to 
their operation, especially as customers, p.345:
Indeed, it was difficult even for the 
state-sponsored industries to diversify economic 
development away from the mining industry.
Thus the inter-war period witnessed varying degrees 
of cooperation and conflict between Iscor and private 
capital. Coming out of the second world war, the state 
corporations saw private capital as potential 
competitors, undermining their own commercial viability. 
This seems to have been more important than establishing 
a more or less favourable relation to one or other 
fraction of capital. For the Board of Trade and Industry 
{1946, p.64), the curtailment of Iscor's activity was 
motivated by the wish to minimise its competition with 
the private sector, indeed to serve it through providing 
its basic input:1
In view of the fact that the primary object in 
establishing the Corporation was to provide the 
country with cheap steel, the Board feels that under 
no circumstances should the Corporation undertake 
the processing and manufacture of secondary products 
which can be economically provided by independent 
undertakings.
Nonetheless, the symbiosis between the corporations 
and private capital was subject to some scrutiny after 
1948, since there was suspicion of subsidy to private 
capital through joint ventures. This was not without 
foundation since the Victoria Falls Power Company, for 
example, was only purchased by Escom in 19 48, having been 
owned previously by mining capital that had benefited
1 Soe also p.66. For an account of how the state-owned steel corporation In Britain was used to 
promote private steel companies prior to Its privatisation, see Fine and Polettl (1992).
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from wartime profiteering. Paradoxically, the purchase 
was made with finance underwritten by Anglo-American 
which also entered into a joint venture with Iscor to 
form Vecor, a heavy engineering company utilising steel 
output from Iscor.
It is against such a background that the development 
of both state and private industry must be assessed.
There is no doubting the widening scope of state 
corporations such as Iscor and Sasol, both in their 
exclusive activities and in their collaboration with the 
private sector. Phillips (1974, p.242) refers to Iscor's 
"far flung activities and the depth to which it had 
penetrated the economy even before 1939", and for Norval 
(1962, p.17), the Chair of the Board of Trade and 
Industries during the 1950s:
It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of 
the role played by Iscor, with all its 
ramifications, in the economy of South Africa. There 
is hardly a sector in the country's economy which
its activities do not permeate and influence to a
greater or lesser extent.
Webster (1985, p.130) illustrates how by the 1970s, 
"the ownership of the seven largest foundries was 
concentrated in the South African state through Iscor and 
IDC, international capital and local mining and
industrial finance". Joint ventures, and the all too
familiar feature of interlocking ownership, involved 
companies such as British Steel, GEC International,
Barlow Rand, Anglo-American and General Mining.
Similarly, Sasol has proved the basis for diversification 
into (heavy) chemicals, again through involvement with 
the private sector.
2 For an early Illustration, see Houghton and Dagut (1972, p.195).
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In this light, large-scale state investments and 
corporations must be assessed in relation to the broader 
context within which industrial development has been 
taking place. To what extent have they served to foster 
dynamic economies and new industries and linkages, both 
sectorally and in support of private capital? Nor are 
these questions that can only be asked in retrospect. 
Norval (1962), for example, anticipated a bright prospect 
for South Africa in iron, steel, engineering and metal 
industries, including exports, as long as appropriate 
policies for training and research and development were 
adopted. A similar stance is adopted in relation to 
chemicals, in each case on the basis of the availability 
of indigenous natural resources and the initial 
development of state and private corporations. In the 
event, his hopes proved futile (although such goals are 
even now re-emerging, with significant privatisation of 
the state corporations). Thus, whilst there was a 
necessary integration between state and private capital, 
it was one which has largely been confined to the MEC 
core.
The IDC has played a major role in conducting those 
aspects of industrial policy concerned with the creation 
of state-owned industries around the MEC. It also 
conducted the now abandoned industrial decentralisation 
programmes and administers policy in support of small 
business.
Its promotion of large-scale investments in Sasol 
and Foskor in the 19 50s are seen by Clark to have 
accepted the limits of the form to be adopted by South 
African industrialisation - namely the use of minerals to 
produce industrial goods and provide support for skilled 
white as opposed to unskilled, black employment. She 
cites the example of the promotion of the manufacture and 
export of rayon pulp but not of the development of rayon 
manufacture, Clark (1987, pp.337-8). Influential policy
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makers also seemed wedded to an industrial trajectory 
explicitly based on increasing both capital and energy 
intensity and, hence, mechanisation. Sectors were 
targeted according to perceived comparative advantage and 
lay largely within the MEC. Addressing a delegation from 
the California Institute of Technology in 1962, H.J. van 
Eck {the then Chairman of Escom and IDC) stated;^
In South Africa, far from relying on so-called 
cheap labour we believe in the application of 
power. The generation of electricity per head 
is just about 1500 kWh per annum. It is equal 
to the per capita generation of a very highly 
industrialized country like Great Britain only 
six years ago. In other words in the 
development of power and the use of power, we 
compare favourably with the countries of 
western Europe. Van Eck in Gerber (197 3, p.105)
The fields in which we have comparative 
advantage are iron and steel, foundry products, 
ferro-silicon, ferro-chrome, ferro-manganese, 
timber as a cheap raw material because of the 
high rate of growth of trees in certain areas.
Van Eck in Gerber (1973, p.112)
Writing in 1962, Norval (1962) noted that;
It would be extremely unwise for South Africa 
to enter into long-term contracts for the sale 
of its base minerals, even in a semi-processed 
state, p.25 ... In the chemical field South 
Africa possesses a vast potential for the 
manufacture of a large range of chemicals, 
which are presently being imported by a 
considerable number of industrialists as raw or
3 The seminar was hosted by the South Africa Foundation and Included the president of the CSIR in 
South Africa, Me I ring Naude.
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semi-manufactured materials for use in their 
respective manufacturing processes. It is a 
field too which, next to iron and steel, will, 
in course of time, lend itself to the 
development of large-scale exports, not only to 
adjoining territories, but to other parts of 
the world, as has already been demonstrated by 
some of the concerns operating in the chemical 
field, p.39
The heady optimism and determinism of the time is 
clearly reflected in a startling statement by Van Eck on 
the need to curb growth, and it also records the early 
recognition of problems of skill shortages and high 
import propensity.
...our growth rate should not be very much 
faster than an average over the years of 5 per 
cent per annum because a high growth rate sets 
up difficult strains in the economy. A high 
growth rate increases our imports because of 
our high marginal propensity to import...I 
don't think we should grow much faster than 5 
per cent because of the problems of social 
adjustments, housing conditions town and 
regional planning and all the other factors 
that enter into development in a highly 
complicated multiracial society with vastly 
different stages of cultural and economic 
development. Van Eck in Gerber (1973, p.106)
I regard it (5%) as a pretty good rate...we 
cannot move faster unless we train our people 
better, unless we have more managers skilled in 
various directions, scientists, technologists, 
engineers and people with high managerial 
ability. Van Eck in Gerber (1973, p.106)
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In summary then, by 1960, the creation of state 
corporations and their support for related industries had 
played a pivotal role both for the MEC and 
industrialisation but its potential was subsequently 
never fully exploited in extending the scope of 
manufacturing.1 Thirty years later in 1991, the IDC's 
priorities have remained with the MEC. Mineral 
beneficiation targets included financing the Columbus 
stainless steel plant, the Alusaf aluminium smelter 
project and Foskor1s potash/alumina project. Chemicals 
and paper projects include Sappi's Saiccor expansion and 
Sasol's acrylic fibre plant.2
1.2 TARIFFS AS INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Tariff protection was neither all pervading, nor was 
it ever central to determining the pattern of 
industrialisation. It was the disjuncture between English 
and Afrikaner capital, the formation of state 
corporations and the latter's interplay with private 
capital that was central in influencing post-war 
industrialisation. The erosion of the disjuncture between 
the two fractions of capital - as the former grew in 
strength and interpenetrated with the latter - has partly 
undermined the rationale for tariffs, as is evident in 
the demise of the BTI and the IDC's present overtures in 
negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).
The Board of Trade and Industry, the state agency, 
wielding the tariff instrument of industrial policy, 
interfaced (mainly) most directly and continuously with 
the private manufacturing sectors. Norval (1962, pp.121- 
2) is emphatic on the role played by protection to ensure 
the viability of local production, and he observes that
1  In regard to Industrial policy and performance, many recognise the existence of state-owned 
Industries but view them as being Inappropriately targeted, Moll (1991), or Inherently inefficient 
compared to privately-owned Industries, Fallon et al (1993) and Levy (1992).
2 IDC senior General Manager, Maicom MacDonald quoted in Business Day 1-11-91.
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such support was strengthened following the second world 
war once duties could be offered by the Board in advance 
of the setting up of productive facilities. 
Institutionally:
It is doubtful whether in any country in the 
world there is a closer contact between the 
body dealing with tariff matters and industry 
than exists between the Board of Trade and 
Industries and the manufacturing industries in 
South Africa.
Opposition to tariffs in the 19 30s had been rooted 
in the disjuncture between English and Afrikaner capital. 
Iscor, created in the face of intense opposition by 
mining interests who would rather have built their own 
plant under protection, was undermined by dumping in the 
mid-19 30s. Dumping was common for a wide range of goods 
in the 1930s and lowered input costs for mining capital. 
The influence of the latter after the political defeat of 
the Nationalist and Labour Pact in 19 33 is evident in the 
report of the Holloway Commission (1936). Holloway argued 
that protected industries were not internationally 
competitive because their white labour costs were much 
higher than in Europe.3 Clark (1987), however, has 
demonstrated that Iscor, which would have been the most 
likely industry to retain the "civilised labour" policy, 
was busy substituting cheaper black labour at this time 
to reduce costs.4
Even if tariffs were meant to provide a propulsive 
effect to industrialisation, they were ineffective due to 
poor management and a failure to appreciate the 
importance of linkages between protected sectors. After 
WWII, the Board of Trade and Industries (1945), while 
recognising the extent of protection, viewed this as a
3 See Zarenda (1977).
4 Iron ore mining and steel making processes Involved an extensive division of labour, and such 
policies did not apply to all categories. Moreover, Iscor's policy was fluid, contingent on
polIt lea I lobbying and sensitive to the lessons drawn from strikes by black power station workers 
In 1943.
220
temporary necessity to protect infant industries during 
post-war reconstruction. Thirteen years later the Viljoen 
Commission (1958) reported. Unlike Holloway, Viljoen did 
not evaluate the effects of past tariffs on the 
manufacturing sector. Its brief was to report a) whether 
existing tariffs were adequate to ensure growth and 
employment creation; b) whether growth could be sustained 
without imposing a burden on mining and agriculture; c) 
the constraints to accelerated growth and d) the adequacy 
of policy machinery to combat dumping by importers.
Viljoen's starting point was that, since 
possibilities were limited in the mining and agricultural 
sectors, the burden of employment creation would have to 
fall on the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing's high 
import propensity was viewed as a constraint on high 
rates of growth and, therefore, Viljoen's recommendations 
were to restrict imports, raise exports and increase 
capital inflows. Viljoen's recognition of the need to 
raise exports is not overlooked by Brand (1976), who has 
argued that the debate at the time on industrial policy 
was not between either import substitution (ISI) or 
export orientation (EOI), but is more usefully seen as 
being over the balance of emphasis between each, with 
Viljoen falling into the group favouring emphasis on the 
former. The policy instruments to achieve this included 
retaining import tariffs, but Viljoen went further, 
recommending targeting of sectors to be protected and 
singling out two industries for special protection,^ 
including the motor industry which would forge economic 
linkages downstream of the steel and chemical industries.
The challenge posed then, by what otherwise appears 
to be a most sensible reconciliation between inward and 
export orientation, is that it leaves the entire onus of 
policymaking on the ill-defined practice of selectivity. 
This raises the issue of the selection of industries to 
receive state support, whether through tariff protection 
or by being created from scratch as state-owned
5 Vi Ijoen Commission (1958, PI, SI, sch28, III).
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enterprises. The evidence is that this process was not 
based on an adequate assessment of the targeted sector's 
potential to fulfil the objectives of economic policy.
The latter might have been a combination of balance of 
payments constraints, employment generation, 
industrialisation to diversify out of dependence on gold, 
protection of infant industries, or more short term 
measures in response to the unfair competition associated 
with various forms of "dumping".
Early on, Laight (1955) had argued against 
protection as a general policy and warned that its 
selectivity for infant industry, to broaden the 
industrial base, in response to "unfair" competition, or 
as a temporary measure in response to cyclical 
unemployment had to "be very carefully defined and 
constantly reviewed", p.222.
The intention was that selectivity should be 
determined by economic goals and potential, but how well 
could these be both identified and put into practice? The 
evidence on the first is far from satisfactory. Samuels 
(1959, p.181), criticised Viljoen along these lines for 
understating the linkages between primary and secondary 
sectors and failing to disaggregate the manufacturing 
sector adequately to determine sectoral sources of 
growth. He argued that a considerable portion of demand 
for manufacturing output came from mining and agriculture 
and, furthermore, that increased international demand for 
mineral and agricultural output could not be excluded as 
a source of economic growth. He pointed out that, since 
much of 1950s industrialisation involved capital- 
intensive investment in sectors such as chemicals and 
steel, the scope for employment creation was limited if 
this trajectory continued.
Tariff policy was poorly managed, bringing into 
question the basis of discretionary decisions, even over 
targeted sectors such as the motor industry. This was 
noted by Norval (1962, p .8):(emphasis added)
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...the then Minister of Commerce and Industries 
made provision in the Enabling Act of the Board 
of Trade and Industries in 1947 for the 
establishment of costing systems, in a manner 
approved by the Board, in any particular 
industry or branch of industry enjoying customs 
tariff protection or receiving any form of 
State aid. Unfortunately not much has been done 
in this respect, but it is a matter which, in 
the interest of industry and in order to 
provide the Board with more reliable costing 
material to determine the measure of tariff 
protection needed, should receive earnest 
consideration.
This is a particularly damning indictment of the 
lack of scientific criteria for conducting industrial 
policy. Given Norval's acknowledgement of the centrality 
of tariff protection to industrialisation, a range of 
unnamed and presumably unquantifiable criteria, other 
than cost, were used to evaluate applications for tariff 
protection.
However, to divorce this choice of policy instrument 
from political and economic issues of the day is to miss 
important causal factors. Departmental discretion in 
licence and scarce resource allocation was exercised in 
favour of Afrikaner-owned concerns as early as 1949, and 
continued after the National Party secured electoral 
victory again in 1953. In a complaint to Ernest 
Oppenheimer MP in 1949, the African and European Company 
(a subsidiary of Anglo American, chaired by Oppenheimer) 
stated that advisers of the Department of Commerce and 
Industry;
mostly young men of the Stellenbosch University 
type (were) very sympathetic towards the new 
low-grade (coal) producers.^
6 Cited In Christie (1984, p.153).
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Import and export permits, scarce railway freight space 
and power during periods of shortage were favourably 
allocated to these Afrikaner concerns.
Despite the warnings of the former chair of the BTI, 
poor management continued into the 1980s. Twenty six 
years later, the BTI (1988, p. 4) revealed how poorly 
tariff policy had been administered, that tariff 
applications were dealt with in a reactive manner with no 
continuity (emphasis added).
It was realised by the BTI that the approach 
adopted by the Government in the (1985) White 
Paper for continuous (sectoral) studies to be 
undertaken was a major policy deviation from 
the policies applied in the past. Previously 
the BTI reported from time to time on 
industrial sectors after having completed 
investigations into those sectors. There was, 
however, not a continuous involvement. In 
respect of tariff protection the BTI responded 
to applications by the private sector and 
initiated revisions of previously recommended 
duties. Even in such cases there was no attempt 
at continuous monitoring actions. It was a 
reactive rather than a pro-active procedure.
Although at the aggregate level, tariff discretion 
may have favoured large-scale Afrikaner capital, 
particularly after 1948, its application was rather 
uneven. During the 1950s, sectors that benefited most 
were mining, agriculture and the motor industries, which 
were treated as special cases, each with separate 
arrangements around the method of licence issue.
Any impact that trade policy might have had on 
industrialisation was mediated by its frequent use as a 
mechanism to protect the balance of payments, through 
increasing quantitative restrictions, Viljoen (1958).
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This increased during the capital outflow crisis of the 
1960s. Petrol, oil, coffee and yarn imports were not 
restricted under the import control regulations of 1958. 
However, 75% of imports were subject to licensing (with a 
few quotas from time to time) on the basis of meeting 
national market needs rather than for processing for 
export. In the 1960s, the policy instrument used to 
stimulate the targeted motor assembly industry was simply 
an extension of the scope of the permit system. For 
manufacturers with an acceptable local content programme, 
full requirement permits were issued. For others, CKD 
(completely knocked down kits for assembly) permits were 
only issued for 9 months stock at a time.
While, for Viljoen, tariff protection and import 
licensing were intended to be a temporary state of 
affairs, Lachman (1974) has outlined how these specific 
instruments became a permanent feature of industrial 
policy. South Africa's Gatt membership in 1947 imposed 
limits on tariff levels and, to by-pass this, import 
licensing was extensively used. Between 1949 and 197 3 it 
grew to cover 80-90% of imports, with raw materials and 
capital goods being given priority licence allocation 
over consumer goods.
Lachman, citing Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), 
argued that the usual disadvantages of bureaucracy, rent 
seeking and misallocation made licensing an inefficient 
mechanism for the allocation of scarce foreign exchange. 
His alternative, reflecting the concern of the time, was 
to use the price mechanism as a policy instrument and to 
allow the exchange rate to float.
Thus, as a policy to shape industrialisation, tariff 
policy was neither coherent nor decisive. Instead it was 
reactive to interests of various fractions of capital. An 
empirical indication of the extent to which, and the ease 
with which, the Board has granted trade protection is 
revealed by the numbers of applications for support and
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the proportion of these that were successful, (table 
5.1) .



























A v . % 1958-67 47.8 52. 2
Source: BTI Annual Report, various years.
In terms of its criteria of operation, the Board 
offered eight considerations to be taken into account 
when granting assistance.7 Even though these were 
counterbalanced by a list of grounds, running from (a) to 
(m), on which an application could be refused, this only 
served to increase the discretion exercised by the Board. 
However, as early as 1945, the Board was hopeful that 
protection would decrease as manufacturing 
competitiveness was attained, BTI (1945):
7 See Appendix II to the Viljoen Commission (1958). See also the discussion of the levels at which 
protection could be granted, pp.7-8. The Board's policy and practice remained essentially unaltered 
until the mId-eighties. Contrast the statement In the BTI Annual Report for 1985, pp.5-6, with 
those for 1989, p.12, and for 1990, pp.5-6, there being a shift in emphasis from protection to meet 
normal competition from abroad to one of export-orlentatlon.
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The Board wishes to reiterate that the 
future of the Union's manufacturing industry 
does not lie primarily in the granting of 
protection in the form of assistance through 
customs duties or otherwise. Protection has, 
the Board fears, in some cases, enhanced 
immediate profits, without sufficient 
stimulation being given to the industry to 
improve its methods of production and marketing 
with an eye to its future stability. The future 
lies much more in the rationalisation of 
industry ... and the consequent reduction of 
the high cost structure.
Such hopes have not been realised. In its Annual 
Report for 1989, the Board divides export composition, 
excluding gold, into the following proportions; raw 
materials (42%), processed raw materials (45%), 
intermediate goods (8%), and finished products (5%). On 
the other hand, imports remain dominated by capital and 
intermediate goods, especially chemicals for the latter. 
Excluding arms, oils and miscellaneous goods, the share 
of machinery and equipment in imports has risen from 
20.7% in 1946 to 49.3% in 1985, having peaked at 54.4% in 
1980.8
In implementing the tariff component of industrial 
policy, there appears to have been little cohesion with 
industrial policies around state corporations and their 
joint ventures with the private sector. Table 5.1b, which 
should be viewed as indicative only, reveals a multitude 
of more than 200 tariff categories with low nominal 
tariffs on mining and manufactured intermediate and 
capital goods compared to India and Brazil. In addition, 
policy was usually implemented reactively and was poorly 
managed. Little or no continuous monitoring existed to 
provide a concrete basis for policy and to measure the 
effectiveness of such policy over time. In what was
8 Figures calculated from Lewis (1990, p.59). See also Kahn (1987).
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essentially a discretionary process, there is evidence 
that Afrikaner capital was preferentially favoured.
TABLE 5. lb - COMPARATIVE TARIFF LEVELS
NUMBER MINING MANUFACTURING MANUFACTURING MANUFACTURING
OF CONSUMER INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL
CATEGORIES GOODS GOODS GOODS
SOUTH AFRICA 200+ 3.0 48.0 18.0 17.0
INDIA 13 84.2 101.8 111.0 83.2
BRAZIL 34 21.8 66.0 39.4 47.9
Source: Belli et al (1993).
Thus, industrial policy has proved resistant to 
interventions over and above those that operate at the 
level of revenue, whether subsidising profits through 
protection against imports or compensating for the higher 
costs that these imply for manufacturing inputs. Nor have 
these interventions been sustained by a careful economic 
calculus, it long being recognised how no account has 
been taken of effective levels of protection. For 
example, protection for the textile industry has led to 
higher costs to the clothing industry which, accordingly, 
itself requires corresponding support to sustain its 
profitability. Balancing the relative costs and benefits 
to the two sectors has taken priority over transforming 
and advancing the connections between them.^
In short, the use of tariffs to target industrial 
sub-sectors selectively, was not accompanied with a range 
of additional supportive policies to overcome the 
numerous problems of industry identified by official 
investigations. Thus, contrary to the commonly held view, 
the overall pro-active thrust of industrial policy at the 
institutional level came, not from the BTI1s tariff
9 See the 1983 government report on textiles and clothing, for example.
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protection, but from the support given to the MEC through 
the offices of the IDC.
1.3 DECENTRALISATION AND INDUSTRIAL TRAJECTORY
The academic discussion around decentralisation has 
been remarkably unanimous in its conclusions (and in its 
divergence from official pronouncements) over an extended 
period. It is perceived to have been an expensive failure 
and is not dealt with in any great detail here. The 
reader is referred to the relevant literature below.1
However, one early foray in the early 1950s involved 
creating a decentralised textile industry and proved 
disastrous. The IDC was then, and is still, concerned 
with decentralisation as well as with small business 
support, although its role has been devolved to, or been 
supplemented by, other organisations such as the Small 
Business Development Corporation (SBDC), formed in 1983, 
and the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry, 
formed in 1960.
In textiles, the IDC was unable to control its 
costs, was insufficiently funded and unable to guarantee 
a stable, low-waged, docile work force. The industry 
could not compete effectively with private capital, whose 
costs were lower since they had located in developed 
urban areas and also enjoyed tariff protection.
Subsequent industries promoted by the IDC tended to be 
the more capital-intensive process industries, such as 
Sasol and Foskor, whose costs were more easily 
controlled. Here, mining operations were based on well- 
known coercive labour management techniques and 
supportive legislation, requiring little commitment to
1 There is an extensive literature on the decentralisation of Industry. For a selection with Its own 
further references, see the June, 1990 issue of the South African Journal of Economics, Addleson 
(1990), Dewar et al (1986), Dickman (1991), Geyer (1989a and b), Holden (1990), Maasdorp (1990), 
Rogerson (1982), Rogerson (1987), Rogerson (1988), Tomlinson (1990), Tomlinson and Addleson (eds) 
(1987) and We 111ngs and Black (1986).
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training as had been the case with textiles, while the 
processing operations required higher skilled white 
labour.
Political and ideological, rather than economic and 
industrial imperatives have driven decentralisation 
policy. In regard to its role in South Africa's 
industrial trajectory, three points emerge. First, the 
scope for such policy, even outside the context of 
apartheid, is heavily contingent upon the success of 
national performance and policy; the faster is economic 
growth, the greater can be the influence on the number 
and location of jobs away from traditional centres of 
industry. As growth in the sorts of employment that could 
be decentralised has been minimal within South Africa, in 
part as a consequence of its (lack of) industrial policy 
more generally, so the potential for decentralisation has 
been negligible even if it had been appropriately pushed 
with greater commitment.
Second, in practice, policy has never been 
sufficiently nor coherently funded. It has always been 
based upon, or dominated by, other objectives than a 
genuine commitment to homeland development.
Third, as a consequence, it is hardly surprising 
that the rationale for, and efficacy of, decentralisation 
policy should have become entirely subverted by lack of 
economic effectiveness and open to bribery and 
corruption. In the absence of any internal coherence and 
external direction, detailed decisions in implementation 
have become more or less arbitrary. As such, they are not 
so much random or misguided as a remarkable synthesis of 
South Africa's political economy, reflecting an overall 
lack of industrial policy as well as the increasingly 
byzantine compromises between the economics, politics and 
ideologies of the apartheid system. In short, 
decentralisation policy has both reflected and
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consolidated the weaknesses of industrial development 
more generally.
1.4 SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY
In practice then, and compared to its support of MEC 
core sectors, the IDC committed few resources in support 
of decentralisation or for small-scale industry. Norval 
(1962, p.98) observes that:
In 1959 the Corporation had investments in 75 
companies for a total amount of just under R130m of 
which just under R104m was invested in three major 
concerns. The balance ... was invested in 7 2 
companies in the normal course of its business.
In other words, at a rate of R26m for 72 companies, the 
average support to companies was less than R300,000 
compared to the average of over R30m to Iscor, Sasol and 
Foskor. State corporations in and around the MEC had been 
hugely supported by the IDC; its role otherwise has been, 
and continues to be, little short of token, (table 1.5).
This is also evidenced by examination of the 
beneficiaries of present tax incentives (under Section 
37E of the Income Tax Act) and export subsidies. Ben 
Vosloo, Managing Director of the Small Business 
Development Corporation argued;^
In the Budget for the 1991/92 fiscal year,
R1.411bn was allocated to export trade 
promotion. This amount is distributed to about 
2500 beneficiaries, most of which are large 
companies, under the General Export Incentive 
Scheme (GEIS). In the same Budget, only R75m 
was earmarked for small and medium size 
enterprise (SME) development through the Small
2 Business Day 10-6-92.
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Business Development Corporation (SBDC)....In 
this year's Budget. ..R2bn has been allocated to 
the GEIS, but only R3.8m has been set aside for 
small business development.
Thus the agency entrusted with supporting small- 
scale business, the IDC, has never accorded it any 
significant priority. That has principally gone to the 
MEC.
In summary, by the early 1960s, the two prongs of 
industrial policy, namely state corporations and tariff 
protection, were operated in favour of large-scale, 
capital and energy-intensive industries within the MEC. 
Afrikaner capital was also favoured, resulting in greater 
penetration of several industries which were formerly the 
preserve of English capital. The latter's distinctiveness 
was further eroded in the 1960s as it bought up shares in 
industrial companies as foreign capital withdrew and as 
interpenetration with English capital increased. 
Industrial policy conduct did not alter this trajectory 
significantly during the 1960s.
1.5 PROMOTING THE MEC - THE REYNDERS COMMISSION
Fourteen years after Viljoen (1958), the Reynders 
Commission (1972) reported. Highlighting the need to 
shift to an outward orientation (a reflection of the 
economic debate of the time), Reynders (1975, p.131) 
identified a wide range of structural impediments to 
further industrialisation.
...if South Africa is to maintain its export 
momentum and to stop balance of payments 
constraints from becoming an obstacle in the 
national development process, continuous 
attention will need to be directed to import 
replacement on the one hand, particularly in
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the intermediary and capital goods sectors, and 
on the other hand, to the promotion of exports.
The latter may perhaps best be secured by the 
process of export targeting through which the 
national export earnings are assessed and 
evaluated against the export potential of each 
economic sub-sector. And this in sum was the 
basic proposition of the export Commission.
Recommendations included improved productivity 
monitoring by the National Productivity Institute, 
government support in raising skill levels, export 
marketing assistance, improving the transport and port 
systems and removing labour market rigidities including 
apartheid restrictions. The concept of export processing 
zones was supported by Reynders together with 
recommendations for freight concessions for export 
inputs. Reynders also argued that industrial 
decentralisation policies should not undermine the 
economies of agglomeration and that policies should not 
hurt export industries in metropolitan areas. Ten years 
earlier in 1961, Van Eck had identified the same problem.
As far as the Bantu border areas are concerned, 
the pace of development is still tragically 
slow, particularly with our high rate of 
population growth. The industrialist has to 
decide to go to a border area...where there are 
no cinemas, cafes, schools, or other amenities 
for his supervisory staff, no water, no roads, 
no communications, no power, no housing, no 
sewerage, inadequate health services and police 
protection. Why should anybody want to go there 
where he is far from his market? Of course he 
comes to Johannesburg instead. Van Eck in 
Gerber (1973, p.113)
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Ratcliffe (197 5, p.80), however, warned that 
Reynders had underestimated the extent of internal 
structural change that would be required to shift to an 
export orientation.
...the essentially one-sided approach of the 
Commission to the expansion of exports causes 
it to underestimate the extent of the internal 
transformation of the South African economy 
which is required for exports to lead growth.
Again and again the Commission tentatively 
considers various aspects of the matter, 
notably in the chapters dealing with production 
costs, fiscal measures, finance, and transport. 
Nevertheless it does not fully accept the 
proposition that domestic economic changes are 
the essential precondition for increased 
exports and for sustained growth.
In response, Reynders (1975, p.123) argued that it 
would be the implementation of export incentives that 
would lead to the structural changes, not the reverse.
...my fundamental hypothesis is that the newly 
introduced export incentives have in fact 
introduced a structural change in the whole of 
South Africa's export environment. However, 
since this is a very recent change; since the 
package of incentives is not yet complete; and 
since the understanding and acceptance of the 
new package has not yet worked its way through 
to all exporters and potential exporters, it is 
rather premature to look for a statistical 
quantification of the extent of the change 
which I am hypothesizing.
To date there has never been an adequate analysis of 
the impact of these policies. More than a decade later,
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the same debate was played out between policy makers in 
the BTI (1988), who proposed industrial restructuring, 
and IDC (1990), who supported export incentives to induce 
structural change (see below). It is thus unlikely that 
the effect of 37E and GEIS export incentives will ever be 
separated from other policy initiatives.
In any case, Government rejected Reynders' call for 
a cabinet committee on exports and for a White Paper 
which outlined official positions and strategies on 
export oriented industrialisation. Instead, it appointed 
an interdepartmental committee on exports consisting of 
heads of relevant departments. The private sector at the 
time was represented on the state's Private Sector Export 
Advisory Committee.
Despite Reynders' wide ranging recommendations on 
raising manufacturing exports, no diversification away 
from the MEC took place in the 1970s. Instead, the very 
reverse occurred after the gold/energy price boom after 
1973 increased industrialisation around the MEC, (figure 
1.6). These industrial policy decisions were partly IDC- 
led, including Sasol II and III, Escom expansion and 
Armscor. They were increasingly propelled by the growing 
interpenetration between English and Afrikaner capital in 
specific sub-sectors. For example interpenetration in the 
coal industry facilitated the development of large-scale 
coal exports.
The increasing dependence of the economy on the MEC 
became apparent by 1975. Main (1975) and Zarenda (1975) 
attributed this to the fact that Reynders had not focused 
adequate attention on the internal structure of the 
economy. Zarenda (1975, p.117), while agreeing on the 
need to bring down tariffs gradually, pointed out that
3 The Section 37E amendment to the Income Tax Act allows an investor to accelerate the depreciation 
on new Investments, subject to certain conditions. The General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) 
provides varying rebates on the exports of commodities. Rebates Increase In accordance with 
increasing complexity.
235
protection was more complex and that it would be more 
useful to use effective rather than nominal measures of 
protection, mainly because past policies had favoured 
intermediate input and capital goods imports. This had 
the impact of masking very high levels of effective 
protection, emphasising the lack of cohesiveness of 
tariff policies.
Main pointed out the linkages between mining, 
mineral processing and other manufacturing, and was 
concerned with the failure to accord equal state 
incentives to each, particularly around mining taxation. 
He described how mineral processing was hampered by a 
small local market, low capital returns, high freight 
charges, inadequate port loading facilities, difficulty 
in competing with developed market producers and 
penetrating their markets and a shortage of skilled 
labour.
Despite Main's criticisms, many segments of the MEC 
benefited from Reynders' recommendations. A 20% power 
subsidy was allowed to the ferro-alloy industry in mid- 
1974, retrospective to October 1973, and contributed to 
the growth in ferrochrome exports. Government implemented 
a number of recommendations including finance charge aid 
to exporters of some minerals, but rejected private 
sector proposals to lower export finance charges below 
domestic interest rates in a scheme which involved the 
Reserve Bank raising off-shore loans. Instead, the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) allocated R95m per annum for 
foreign exchange forward cover losses during 1973-4, and 
the IDC allocated R40m per annum to subsidise export 
production capacity creation. Some of Reynders' 
recommendations on transport were also implemented. 
Rebates were granted on the transport of unprocessed or 
semi-processed raw materials destined for export either 
directly to ports or via processing plants. Government 
also increased tax allowances on market development
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expenditure, capital investment, initial allowances and 
beneficiation allowances.
Thus, when viewed in the context of social, 
political and economic forces of the day, it is not 
surprising that a selective implementation of Reynders1 
recommendations occurred, one that benefited and enhanced 
the MEC over and above non-MEC manufacturing.
1.6 INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE 1980s - THE KLEU REPORT
By the 1980s the disjuncture between English and 
Afrikaner capital had largely been eroded, manifesting 
itself in increasingly influential economic roles played 
by Sanlam and Rembrandt. By the late 1980s, increasing 
conglomeration and interpenetration were being 
accompanied by the privatisation of state corporations, 
such as Iscor and Sasol.
The policies of the 1970s that supported the MEC had 
led to a cul-de-sac once the benefits from the gold and 
energy boom of the 1970s were exhausted. The economic 
crises of falling global demand for MEC exports and the 
structural impediments to diversification out of the MEC 
core overlapped with the political crises of apartheid. 
Ironically, just when conditions were most conducive for 
the adoption of coherent economic policies for 
diversifying out of the MEC, the state was unable to 
effect them, subordinating policy to counter the post- 
1985 debt crisis. For example, Kahn (1991) has shown that 
resulting exchange rate movements had differential 
impacts upon the profitability of one sector as opposed 
to another depending upon their relative dependence upon 
imports for their inputs and exports for their outputs.
It was perhaps because MEC growth adequately 
sustained the economy for much of the 1970s, that the 
next official inquiry into the state of South African
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industry reported only ten years after Reynders, in 1982. 
The time that it took for the Kleu Report to be produced, 
indicates both the limited inherited expertise and 
research on which the Study Group was able to draw as 
well as the limited urgency with which industrial policy 
was being treated. The Study Group was set up in 1977, 
its deliberations emerging in 1982,4 and a White Paper on 
industrial policy only in 1985!
Kleu1s lack of realism and the Report's ideology is 
apparent from its opening page, p.l:
It must be said at the outset therefore that an 
industrial strategy for South Africa must be 
determined within the framework of a system in 
which free enterprise, consumers' freedom of 
choice and private ownership play a fundamental 
role.
In effect, the Report did point to a broad framework 
for the formulation of industrial policy although this 
was ambiguously, if not inconsistently, combined with a 
commitment to "the private entrepreneur to decide what he 
will produce, how much he will produce and how and where 
he will produce", pp.317-8 - even if subject to 
indicative planning. As such, the Report suffers from two 
drawbacks. First, it is so general as to be meaningless 
except as a statement of good intent; we are given little 
indication of what, how much, how and where he is liable 
to be producing either within any one sector or across 
them. Second, by the same token, the recommendations have 
been studiously ignored in practice, having themselves 
been based on an analysis that has placed little 
attention on the political and other forces that had in 
the past shaped the path of both industry and industrial 
policy.
4 Even so, the Report Is Itself poorly produced, with many publishing errors.
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Joffe (1987, p.l) detected a shift away from state 
intervention in industry in the rhetoric of the Kleu 
report, interpreting this as a reflection of a global 
trend towards liberalisation. This process, in fact, 
began in the early 1980s when the state liberalised the 
financial sector, an act which, by itself, failed to give 
impetus to the industrial trajectory. Instead it heavily 
benefited the cash-rich mining conglomerates, rather 
heralding speculative booms, capital flight and 
accelerating imports. More damaging policies to confront 
a subsequent fall in the gold price would have been 
difficult to design even in retrospect! Yet Moll (1992) 
suggests that macroeconomic policy was successful, given 
the "exogenous" constraints under which the economy 
operated.
Even before that, Kleu (197 3) had argued for policy 
to enhance competition by reducing government 
interference in the economy and shifting towards a more 
even balance of support between import-substitution and 
export promotion. Greater productivity increases were to 
be encouraged through the startling measure of initiating 
studies by the NPI in collaboration with industry.
The Kleu Report, whatever its other deficiencies, 
examined industrial policy from a wide perspective, just 
as its predecessors had. The Report called for a balanced 
promotion of exports and import replacement, a more 
vigorous effort towards decentralisation, enhanced labour 
skills and a concerted technological policy.
Kleu's "multidimensional" view of industrial policy, 
recognised the proliferation of responsible government 
agencies and called for a coordination both between these 
various agencies and with the private sector, implicitly 
recognising how this had been absent in the past, p.318:
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At present a number of bodies naturally share 
the task of dealing with numerous policy 
aspects that influence industrial development.
These bodies include the Department of 
Industries, Commerce and Tourism, the Board of 
Trade and Industries, the Decentralisation 
Board, the Competition Board, the Economic and 
Physical Planning Branches of the Prime 
Minister, the Department of Manpower and 
Finance, the South African Reserve Bank, the 
Industrial Development Corporation, and others.
However, with the exhaustion of MEC revenues in the 
early 1980s, coupled with the crisis of apartheid, 
industrial policy coordination, never cohesive in the 
first instance, evaporated further. Firstly, Kleu's 
narrow vision of "industry" excluded mining and energy 
sectors which had long been coordinated through the 
Chamber of Mines and, more recently, in conjunction with 
the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA). An 
attempt had even been made to extend coordination to 
mineral processing. Reynders' proposal in 1972, to reduce 
imports of intermediary and capital goods while raising 
sectorally targeted exports, necessitated continuous 
monitoring of the latter and the Minerals Bureau was set 
up in 1972 to monitor mineral resource management and 
mineral processing, Main (1975, p.109).
Secondly, the responsibility for coordinating energy 
policy concerning liquid fuels rested with the DMEA, 
although Sasol and its creator, the IDC, also played 
decisive roles. Thirdly, and most importantly, 
responsibility for industrial policy for most "other" 
industries (non-MEC) fell to the DTI and, in particular, 
to the BTI whose tariff policies were both diffused 
across MEC and non-MEC sectors and were also 
uncoordinated with MEC policies.
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1.7 INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE 1990S - THE DEMISE OF THE 
BTI
Industrial policy in the 1980s cannot simply be 
described as a shift from an inward to an outward focus. 
In fact, industrial policy thrusts around the MEC, 
through creating and supporting large-scale MEC 
industries, continued. While some Escom projects were 
postponed because stagnation reduced electricity demand, 
the coordinated strategy around liquid fuel energy 
continued. Shortly after the release of the 1985 White 
Paper on industrial policy, the Cabinet evaluated several 
private and public corporation proposals for developing 
the nation's offshore gas reserves and the Mossgas 
proposal was selected. This IDC-led mega-project involved 
the transfer of Sasol's technology and provided a major 
short-term boost to the economy between 1988 and 1992.
On the other hand, the economic crisis of apartheid, 
particularly after the 1985 debt crisis, began to have an 
impact on the uncoordinated trade policies of tariff 
protection. Lacking an overall economic rationale and 
coherence as well as being disconnected from other 
aspects of policy, tariff policy through the BTI had been 
reactive to the individual levels of profitability of 
domestic industry even if apparently more stringently 
applied over the most recent years. Levy (1992) takes the 
fate of applications to the Board as an index of "its 
responsiveness to entreaties from the private sector".
65% proved successful in 1987, compared to 40% in 1988 
and 20% in 1989.
In the late 1980s, the Board of Trade and Industries 
attempted to reduce tariff protection substantially by 
linking this to interventionist (and inappropriately 
named) structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
sector-by-sector. This was in part to ease the path of 
adjustment but, more significantly, to secure
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productivity increase without relying exclusively upon 
the competitive coercion of the market.
In the BTI (1988) view, the decline in the economy’s 
performance, as measured in terms of GDP growth, was due 
to several factors. First, despite Reynders' (1972) 
emphasis on export promotion, South Africa did not adjust 
its exports away from primary commodities ("stage 1" 
goods) in response to falling real prices and increasing 
world imports of advanced technology products ("stage 4" 
goods). Second, low productivity, high capital intensity, 
low personal savings and high tariffs were contributing 
factors as were currency overvaluation which occurred 
between 1979-1983, p.37. Using the negative trade balance 
of "stage 4" complex manufactured goods as an indicator 
of poor industrial performance and orientation, the BTI 
crystalised the debate over policy orientation at the 
time into three alternative options, p.42:
a) liberalisation through removing tariff protection
b) simulating a free trade regime in the belief that 
this, by itself, would shake industries into 
competitiveness. The envisaged instruments were tax 
rebates on industrial inputs or the adoption of export 
processing zones.
c) adopting a sectorally targeted strategy which supports 
industries while tariffs are gradually lowered, p.47.
The last option, or SAPs, were favoured by the BTI. In 
essence, these;
would fundamentally be founded on principles 
similar to those underlying tariff protection 
and would, therefore, essentially also exhibit 
similar characteristics (except for .... various 
forms of assistance pertaining to the different 
functional areas of business and different 
competitive factors). In short, it embraces an
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infant industry approach to export development 
assistance, p.48.
However, with the continued stagnation in South 
African manufacturing throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s, two important influences have altered ways of 
thinking about future industrial policy. First, the 
prospect of a post-apartheid government has opened up a 
Pandora's box as far as analysis, policy and strategy are 
concerned. Theory and experience from many different 
sources have greatly enriched the terms within which 
South Africa's past, present and future manufacturing 
performance is being assessed. Second, as a specific and 
central example of this, the success of the NICs has 
exposed the limited terrain upon which South African 
industrial policy has been both conducted and discussed.
The pressure for action in the face of economic 
stagnation was most acutely felt by non-MEC sectors and 
by their coordinating institution, the BTI. Here, the 
sectoral SAPs proved less acceptable, especially to the 
Department of Trade and Industry even if it was more 
amenable to tariff reform (i.e. reduction). As Levy
(1992) quotes from the Department's Annual Report for 
1989, pp.17-8:
The Department experienced problems with the 
acceptance of the BTI's first recommended 
"structural adjustment programmes" ... government 
policy implies the reduction of state involvement 
with the activities of the business sector - not an 
evergrowing involvement.
It was followed in 1990 by the DTI withdrawing 
ninety personnel seconded to the BTI, crippling the 
latter's SAP work. Simultaneously, new SAPs were 
forbidden by the Trade and Industry Minister.5
5 Business Day 14-6-91.
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The IDC appears to have stepped into this policy 
vacuum, publicly challenging the BTI1s interventionist 
approach. The IDC (1990) attributed the problems of poor 
industrial performance to tariff policies, which were 
administered by the BTI, p.l:
For almost 70 years, the industrial development 
policy of successive governments was based on import 
replacement.
In its recommendations which were more in keeping 
with the liberalising elements of the Kleu Report,5 the 
IDC conveniently ignored its own interventionist role in 
creating and nurturing a range of MEC industries which, 
it is argued here, played a greater role in shaping South 
African industry than tariffs. There is also an 
astonishingly frank, but possibly unconscious, 
recognition of the limited scope of what it perceived as 
constituting industrial policy; it is effectively 
identified with trade or, more exactly, BTI-administered 
protection policy. As if as a matter of terminological 
convenience, p.l:
In this report the terms "trade policy" and 
"industrial policy" are used synonymously and 
interchangeably.
The logic lying behind the IDC's push for greater 
export orientation is that protection policy is mere
6 For a review of the IDC report along the lines presented here, see also Black (1991). He sees "a 
key Instrument of Industrial policy is the availability of long term capital and that this has to 
be made available on a concessionary basis to targeted sectors", p.17. This raises a number of 
Issues. By what criteria are those sectors to be selected, how are they to be Identified given 
those criteria and, if this can be done, why should Intervention not be more extensive (and not 
necessari ly centred on cheap finance which serves more as a mechanism of Implementation of policy) 
to guarantee the realisation of goals within the firms and sectors selected for the economy more 
generally. In short, Black appears to substitute selective finance for trade policy as the Midas 
touch in the formulation of industrial policy. This Is all the more remarkable given his correct 
emphasis on the need, drawing upon South Korean experience, to create comparative advantage. See 
Black (1990) where he draws similar, if more general, conclusions to our own concerning the scope 
of Industrial policy and the lessons to be learnt from the Asian NICs as a consequence.
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featherbedding of inefficient industries which need to 
feel the coercion of competition to shake them out of a 
low level of performance; industries are not expected to 
be infants for 70 years. Such logic fails to recognise 
that, irrespective of the presence of such competitive 
pressures, there is also the incentive to reduce costs in 
order to enhance profitability and, more pragmatically, 
removal of protection may have the effect of eliminating 
the fittest enterprises without necessarily inducing the 
entry of alternative producers in the same or other 
sectors (except from abroad). But bend the IDC must to 
international pressures, and it recommends a progressive 
reduction of import duties and surcharges to bring about 
a more uniform and lower level of protection in line with 
the fashion for export orientation. Equally significant, 
the stiffening attitude to protection almost certainly 
reflects a shift in the balance of internal economic 
interests and political balance. Favour has swung away 
from small-scale (never highly supported), Afrikaner 
manufacturing towards large-scale corporate, MEC 
activity, It is also apparent that the large-scale mega­
projects currently being put in place - under the 
imperative of generating foreign exchange - incorporate a 
logic arising out of their capital-intensity, that places 
them more readily outside the reach of organised labour 
and the state other than in the form of an incorporated 
and elite-based dependence. This is all the more 
remarkable given the desperate need for labour-intensive 
job creation through state expenditure.
The exact incidence of support across sectors, and 
its determinants, requires further study. The shifts in 
balance are themselves masked by limited coherence in 
policy and the more general withdrawal of support to all 
as a response to economic stagnation. While the BTI 
(1988) proposed sectorally based adjustment programmes, 
the IDC (1990) favoured a three-pronged approach. First, 
reduce tariffs, the basis of BTI's discretionary power.
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Second, support export oriented capital investment 
through tax incentives. Third, target industrial sectors 
which offer static comparative advantage, in particular, 
mineral beneficiation industries. The policy disjuncture, 
not entirely dissimilar to the debate between Reynders 
and Ratcliffe in the mid-1970s over the sequencing of 
restructuring measures, was publicly highlighted by BTI 
Chair, Lawrence McRystal in a newspaper article entitled, 
"Industry must be restructured before tariffs are 
lowered".7 After this last ditch stand, McRystal resigned 
in August 19 91 and the BTI was emasculated by the BTI 
Amendment Bill of 1992.
Thus, after apparently.occupying centre stage in 
industrial policy for much of the 20th century, the BTI 
was renamed the Trade and Industry Advisory Board in 
1992, and its functions were curtailed to advising the 
Trade and Industry Minister on tariffs and dumping 
duties.8 Even so, in 199 3, it is the IDC that appears to 
be providing the basis for South Africa's tariff position 
at the GATT negotiations.
In the 1990s, with the demise of the BTI, the IDC 
administers the only significant pro-active industrial 
policy, namely the promotion of an industrial trajectory 
around the MEC, supporting large-scale mega-projects 
including Sasol's expansions, aluminium smelting, 
stainless steel and potash. The only difference is that 
the process is now driven by private sector interests.
Discretion still remains at the heart of decision 
making as in the selection of projects qualifying for 
Section 37E tax incentives, the subject of opposition by 
senior officials of the Finance Department.^ Section 37E 
incentives initially, in 1991, covered projects
7 Business Day 17-7-91.
8 Business Day 3-3-92. Previously, the BTI made recommendations directly to the Finance Department, 
bypassing the Trade and Industry Minister.
9 Business Day 2-8-91.
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beneficiating locally sourced minerals. It susceptibility 
to the powerful coalition of private sector interests 
around the MEC is evident in its extension, in 1992, to 
projects beneficiating imported material, in particular 
the Alusaf project, which did not previously qualify 
because it utilised imported alumina.
But of more interest, however, are the exceptions 
that the IDC (1990) brought to the fore. Apart from 
acknowledging that some sectors will adjust to tariff 
reduction with greater difficulty than others according, 
for example, to the level of previously sunk capital, and 
acknowledging the case for inward industrialisation, the 
report also emphasised the need for, what might be 
correctly termed, industrial policy for capital goods, 
p . 25:
The active promotion of capital goods manufacture is 
therefore a desirable direction for development in 
the long term ... in a modified trade policy, new 
development, including capital goods manufacturing, 
must be actively promoted but with less reliance on 
protection alone and greater use of pragmatic and 
innovative development schemes.
Like many previous recommendations for 
diversification out of the MEC core, such "active 
promotion" has never been carried through even if clarity 
has yet to emerge on what is meant by being "pragmatic 
and innovative". Given the orientation of the IDC and the 
strength of private sector interests around the MEC core, 
it is unlikely that any sectors falling outside the core 
will be "actively promoted".
The most recent official policy document, the 
Normative Economic Model, Keys (1993), confirms this. It 
represents a synthesis of a model developed by CEAS
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(1993).18 CEAS firstly adopts an incorrect and 
essentially false framework to conceptualise productive 
economic sectors. The model bases its analysis on a 
traditional conception of the economy, dividing it into 
primary (mining and agriculture), secondary 
(manufacturing, construction and electricity) and 
tertiary sectors (transport and communication, financial 
services and social services). The sectors are 
essentially treated as independent entities, with the 
policy objective being to shift, according to the 
aggregated international developed market economy norm, 
away from the primary sector. There is no recognition of 
interlinkages and interdependence within the MEC core 
sectors (Chapters one and two) and, furthermore, the 
model incorrectly interprets industrial development as 
having followed a path of ISI (see critique of ISI 
below), p .301:
The development of the manufacturing sector in South 
Africa during the 1960s and 1970s is typical of a 
country that has adopted an import replacement 
strategy. This strategy implies a progression from 
non-durable to durable consumer goods and then to 
highly sophisticated intermediate products and 
capital goods. Measured against the objectives of 
such a strategy, the results achieved cannot be 
considered a clear success.
Secondly, the model considers only a narrow range of 
factors which have contributed to the pattern of 
industrialisation. The problems of the economy are 
interpreted in terms of capital- versus labour-intensity 
at a level so highly aggregated as to render the analysis 
meaningless, p.42:
^  The Ineffective role of the BTT, the successor of the BTI, is evident in Its apparent lack of 
participation in developing the synthesis document.
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The capital or labour-intensity of the economy is 
dependent, inter alia, on the country's production 
structure, on the one hand, and the production and 
management techniques as determined by the stance of 
the technology, on the other. The production 
structure is, in the first instance, a function of 
the composition of the demand for South African 
goods and services, which in its turn, is subject to 
changes in the pattern of income distribution.
These are inappropriate analytical tools to 
interpret causality in the process of industrialisation. 
The economy's high capital-intensity is attributed to 
inappropriate state-led investment in strategic projects, 
p.44, as well as low nominal interest rates in the 1970s, 
p.14. Although the model only considers industrial 
development after the 197 3 gold and energy price rise, 
figure 1.6 shows the capital-intensive pattern to have 
been evident from the inter-war period. Alternatively, 
the CEAS argues, in an apparent tautology, that economic 
stagnation was due to low levels of investment in the 
1980s, p.25, which fell because growth fell, p.27. This 
led state sectors to cut capital expenditure in a regime 
of stricter fiscal discipline after 1980, p.28. Clearly 
this is descriptive rather than analytical.
Thirdly, the conduct of past policy is only 
superficially examined. Its failure to be cohesive, the 
problems of poor monitoring and its determination by 
social and political factors is ignored, p.289:
in the past, the manufacturing sector in South 
Africa was stimulated by means of large-scale 
investment in capital-intensive, import-replacing 
and export-oriented industries. Another 
characteristic was the high level of protection that 
was granted to specific industries producing mainly 
for the domestic market.
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The proposed CEAS corrective policies are defined at 
a highly aggregated macroeconomic level. It identifies 
two problems which policy has to overcome, first, the 
failure to specialise in specific exported manufactured 
products and, second, declining factor productivity, 
which the model only measures at an aggregate level.
Without any substantiation of its differing impact 
at the sectoral level, the model assumes that an outward- 
oriented policy will automatically lead to improved 
productivity ratios and increased exports simply because 
of the resulting increase in competition. The net impact 
of such an approach is the reduction of tariff protection 
and the abandonment of the sector concerned to market 
forces.
Keys (1993, p.15) further develops the criterion for 
selectivity, subordinating them to more abstract 
macroeconomic ideological objectives.
The extent to which selective assistance to 
particular industries will be needed, depends 
largely on the tempo at which policies such as the 
phasing out of exchange control, the lowering of 
tariff protection, cooperation in wage bargaining, 
price competition and fiscal and monetary discipline 
in general are realised. Progress in these areas 
would reduce and possibly even eliminate the need 
for selective assistance to industries with proven 
competitive advantage, such as in agriculture, 
mining and minerals beneficiation. The instruments 
to be used over a broadly defined spectrum of more 
advanced industries, probably mostly category 3 and 
4 products of the GEIS, and should meet the criteria 
of investment, employment and efficiency in their 
impact on development.
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While Keys expects a free-trade regime to benefit 
the primary and processed commodity sectors, its impact 
on the rest of the economy is unquantified, (even in CEAS
(1993)). Those that do survive the shocks of 
liberalisation may or may not be supported, depending on 
some discretionary judgement at that time.
To conclude, little has changed in the problems 
hampering manufacturing industry growth that were 
identified back in the 1960s. These then included skills, 
training and research development deficiencies and the 
need to target beneficiation and exports:
(South Africa) must step up and step up rapidly 
its secondary and university training and 
adjust and direct it more towards the 
exploitation of the economic potential of the 
country. In particular the country should train 
scientists and engineers to a considerably 
greater extent and with much more 
deliberateness than has been the case up to the 
present. The country's engineering facilities 
should be strengthened and the State should 
make available substantial funds for attracting 
deserving students to such training. Norval 
(1962, p.25)
It is imperative, too, that the country's 
research programme should be stepped up and 
that it should be more purposefully directed 
towards the development and exploitation of 
such resources in the country in respect of 
which it has the greatest potential and 
comparative advantage for taking advantage of 
foreign markets. Norval (1962, p.27)
The country needs to become far more outgoing 
in search of foreign markets and more 
aggressive in its salesmanship in the
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development of such markets than has been the 
case hitherto. Orders much be fetched, they do 
not come to the timid. Norval (1962, p. 28)
Three decades later, the same warnings and 
recommendations by Norval are being dusted down and 
recommended in Keys (1993) and CEAS (1993). Yet the 
obvious question of why these warnings were not heeded 
thirty years ago has rarely been addressed. The reality 
is that such general prognostications serve to veil a 
continuing lack of coherence and commitment in industrial 
policy and, more sinisterly, the desire to retain the 
ability to respond with discretion to shifting, uneven 
and fragmented economic and political imperatives.
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2. PERCEPTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
There have long been fierce debates over the 
successes and failures of South Africa's 
industrialisation. These have evolved and exhibited a 
rhythym corresponding to the perceived performance of the 
economy itself, although protagonists within South Africa 
have often picked up and run with the analytical batons 
passed on by those following the fashions of externally 
determined theory. The shifting marriage forged between 
internal empirical developments and external theory has 
given the debate a dynamic that has apparently endowed it 
with a progressive evolution. This is dramatically 
illustrated by the Pandora's Box of analyses that have 
been opened up by the prospects of a post-apartheid 
economy. Drawing upon a range of experiences and 
strategies from other countries and their corresponding 
intellectual baggage, an astonishing variety of 
industrial strategies has been proposed. This stands in 
sharp contrast to the previous, now supposedly sterile, 
debate over whether apartheid had been functional or not 
to South Africa's economic development and, subsequently, 
why had it proved incapable of sustaining itself.
Despite these swings in the content and the terms of 
the debates, the intention here is more to stress what 
they have had in common. Unfortunately, the apparent 
sensitivity to the most immediate empirical developments 
has been misleading in so far as the deep-rooted 
realities of the economy have, paradoxically, been 
overlooked. This is, in part, because of a lack of 
attention to detail in terms of what has actually 
constituted industrialisation in the South African 
context. And it is also due to the failure to acknowledge 
the underlying economic forces that have driven 
industrial policy.
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These deficiencies have been reinforced by 
dependence upon external theory. For, beginning with 
Rostowian notions of industrial transition, South 
Africa's performance was judged on the basis of a 
programmatic sequence, the notion that manufacturing 
would ultimately be self-sustaining. Although such 
determinism has long since been discarded,*1 some of its 
nostrums have persisted within the continuing debate. In 
particular, the idea has persisted that industrialisation 
will take the form of backward integration from consumer 
goods with a declining role for the primary sectors of 
the economy, made up predominantly of agriculture and 
mining. The issue of industrialisation has continued to 
be very much one of how far this process has or has not 
gone and why.
The perspective from which we assess this literature 
is diametrically opposite. First and foremost, the South 
African system of accumulation has been dominated by the 
core activities of mining and energy but increasingly 
incorporating other directly integrated manufacturing 
such as processed minerals and chemicals. Secondly, the 
extent of the MEC across the economy has been more or 
less limitless since, in corporate structure, it has been 
highly concentrated around mining houses, each of which 
has owned its own finance house, and these have been 
engaged in acquisition and mergers. In addition, private 
corporate capital has been heavily integrated with 
parastatals.
Third, the broad categorisation of the economy into 
sectors such as primary and manufacturing has been 
extremely misleading since much of the latter, from an 
analytical point of view, does not correspond to 
industrialisation in the sense discussed above (backward
Ti
Although this still essentially applies to Government thinking in its reports on industrial 
pol icy and performance, see section one of this chapter.
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integration from consumer goods). Rather, 
industrialisation has primarily been based upon forward 
integration from the core activities of the MEC. 
Consequently, industrialisation should be debated in 
terms of the reasons why this has not proceeded further. 
As a corollary, the notion that South Africa has failed 
to make the step from ISI to international 
competitiveness is equally misguided. For the greatest 
part of industrialisation that has been achieved has been 
related to core MEC activities that have served both 
domestic and foreign markets, whether directly or 
indirectly.
2.2 ROSTOWIAN DETERMINISM
Many analysts were blinded by the spectacular growth 
of the aggregated manufacturing sector, relative to 
mining and agriculture, in the 1950s and 1960s, (figure 
1.1). Falling growth after the 1970s was initially seen 
in cyclical, rather than structural, terms. Houghton 
(1973, pp.130-136) writing before the crisis in the South 
African economy became fully exposed, was optimistic over 
the prospects for industrialisation. In Rostowian 
fashion, he regarded "take-off into self-sustained 
growth" as having been achieved between 19 3 3 and 1945, 
with the economy engaged in "a drive to maturity" ever 
since.
According to Rostow, economic maturity is 
reached some sixty years after the take-off 
begins. If this holds true in South Africa's 
case the national economy should be reaching 
maturity about the year 1990! Houghton (197 3,
p.18)
By the early 1980s, flagging growth was attributed 
to low productivity, poor economic management and ISI 
trade policies, preventing a shift to an export
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orientation in the 1960s. Yet, Viljoen (1983, p.33) still 
maintained that "South Africa is clearly approaching the 
stage of industrial maturity".
On the whole South African manufacturers were 
more interested in exploiting the protected and 
rapidly expanding local market than in 
competing in the highly competitive overseas 
markets. They were also penalised by the 
internal location of the main centre of 
industrial activity. Viljoen (1983, p.47)
He observed the "remarkable fact" that growth was 
based on the combined use of more factors of production 
rather than on increased output for the same inputs, 
attributing this failure to "the quality of management" 
Viljoen (1983, p.42). Such problems were expected to be 
overcome over time by the formation of the Productivity 
Advisory Council and the National Productivity Institute 
in 1967, "experience has been that improvements in 
productivity is a long-term problem of many dimensions 
that can be solved only over a considerable period of 
time." Viljoen (1983, p.48)
Rostowian positions did not go much beyond this in 
explaining why industrialisation, itself perceived in 
highly aggregated terms, had not been more efficient nor 
penetrated deeper. Although Viljoen recognised the 
disproportionate weight of steel and chemicals in the 
economy with the future potential to develop downstream 
linkages, there was no explanation of why this had not 
occurred. In the case of the motor industry, its low 
productivity was not attributed to poor management, but 
to its fragmentation, which impeded the achievement of 
scale economies.
Viljoen (1983, p.51) simultaneously pointed to the 
high and growing concentration in ownership of the
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manufacturing sector, but drew few conclusions about its 
impact on the pattern and process of industrialisation 
except that it "naturally raised serious issues in regard 
to the maintenance of competition and, ultimately, of the 
free enterprise economy." Here conglomeration was viewed 
as a potential impediment to industrial growth, rather 
than as result of a particular form of industrialisation.
2.3 LIBERALISM CHALLENGED
In the face of flagging industrial performance 
during the 1980s, Rostowian optimism began to give way to 
a view that attributed industrial failure to the 
impediments imposed by apartheid. For Kaplan (1977), the 
second world war promoted manufacturing, especially in 
textiles, metal processing and engineering, and gave rise 
to a bimodal structure in the size of manufacturing 
firms; the large-scale open to a degree of foreign 
control and dependence, the small-scale particularly 
dependent upon protection. But, in his view, economic 
policy was primarily concerned to promote the interests 
of mining and agriculture (as a compromise between 
English and Afrikaner interests).
This is a judgement that is difficult to sustain on 
balance without a detailed study across different sectors 
of the economy. Even then, there is the problem of 
whether the distinction between the identified fractions 
of capital can be so sharply demarcated. Just as there is 
a necessary relation between state corporations and the 
mining sector, so the latter increasingly incorporates 
manufacturing. Cartwright (1964, p.221), for example, 
highlights one consequence of the development of the new 
goldfields in the Orange Free State after the war:
The chairman and directors of African Explosives and
Chemical Industries ... were quick to grasp what was
happening. The steps they took in those days were
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eventually to increase the issued capital of the 
company to no less than £29,000,000 and to make it 
the biggest manufacturing enterprise in the country.
It merely needs to be added that AECI had long been 
substantially under the control of Anglo-American; Ernest 
Oppenheimer chaired it almost to the day of his death in 
1957. Subsequently, it necessarily occupied an integral 
part in the development of the heavy chemicals in 
conjunction with Sasol. Cartwright's narrow conception of 
manufacturing ignored the far larger capital investment 
of £41m in state-owned Sasol by the end of the 1950s.
For liberals, poor industrial performance reflected 
the intensified constraints imposed by apartheid upon 
market forces and, for Marxist-revisionists,12 the crisis 
of the apartheid system that was previously functional 
for capitalist profitability. A compromise position is 
possibly to be found in the stance of Nattrass (1988).
She sees state intervention from 1924 onwards as having 
shifted the economy "to develop in its own right and on a 
broader basis than that of the mining industry alone" to 
become "something more than a peripheral area in the 
British Commonwealth", p.2 32. However, it also entrenched 
white privilege so that the positive impact on 
industrialisation had to be set against the economic 
inefficiencies and injustices associated with apartheid. 
In short, Afrikanerdom is seen as essential to break out 
of underdeveloped dependence on foreign capital, but its 
associated state intervention, especially in the labour 
market, had become increasingly dysfunctional to economic 
performance.1^
By a range of criteria, Moll (1991), inherently 
rejecting Rostowian determinism, has argued that the 
South African economy did not perform well in the
_
I" See for example, Wolpe (1972) and Johnstone (1976).
See also Nattrass and Ardington (eds) (1990).
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post-war period, even before the 1970s, so that the 
economy might be better considered to have been in a 
prolonged slump. His attention focuses on growth rates, 
relative both to other countries and to South Africa's 
own past experience, productivity growth and the 
contribution of exports.14 Whatever the merits of his 
empirical account, it still leaves open the issue of why 
the economy should have failed. For example, the 
following offers more of a description than an 
explanation, p.283:
Manufacturers were protected from some 
import-competition by a variety of direct controls 
and tariffs, and had access to cheap capital good 
imports. Not being encouraged to compete 
internationally via exports, they settled down to 
enjoy internal markets and in some cases returns to 
scale could not be achieved. Many "infant" 
industries seem never to have grown up and required 
tariffs and protection decades after being started. 
The "easy" stage of import-substitution in light 
final and intermediate goods industries ended in the 
early 1960s, but possible shifts towards exporting 
light manufactures and the efficient production and 
export of capital goods (for example mining 
equipment) did not take place. Meanwhile, there is 
abundant evidence that many state industrialisation 
initiatives were inefficient (for example Sasol) or 
misguided (the industrial decentralisation policy).
Essentially, the argument is that the tempering of 
market forces and the inadequacy of state intervention 
were at fault. But why should protection not lead to 
take-off? Indeed, limited domestic markets and access to 
imports might imply intense competition rather than 
featherbedding. And, given extensive state economic
14
See also Nattrass (1989a and b) and (1990) for an account of the falling South African economy 
based on falling profitability from the 1960s. Some doubts are cast on these calculations In view 
of (profit In the form of) capital flight, Kahn (1991), Rustomjee (1991) and Smit and Mocke (1991)
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intervention, why should it not have been more conducive 
to growth?
In his thesis, Moll (1990) ultimately offers a 
number of explanations without claiming to be 
comprehensive. These divide into two sorts. First, there 
is appeal to restrictions in the labour market, created 
by the commitment to apartheid, whether it be in the 
(geographical, sectoral and occupational) immobility of 
black labour or its limited access to informal 
(self)-employment and to state-provided education and 
training. Second, there is the argument of inappropriate 
economic policy within the confines of the apartheid 
labour system. In particular, devaluation of the rand 
would have proved more favourable to export of 
manufactures. He points to the separation between trade 
and industrial policy as well as the separation between 
each and the conduct of balance of payments and exchange 
rate policy, p.142:15
Balance of payments and exchange rate policy was 
seen as the preserve of the South African Reserve 
Bank, its aim being to deal with monetary flows ... 
Industrial policy was dealt with by the Board of 
Trade and industries, largely using tariff and 
decentralisation policy. The linkages between trade 
and industrialisation seem never to have been 
explicitly considered on either side.
Moll suggests that the reason for this 
compartmentalisation of policy is to be found in the 
short-term relationship between the exchange rate and the 
distribution of income and the favour to be bestowed on 
underlying economic interests. In short, devaluation 
would have enhanced the position of black workers since 
they were disproportionately employed within the traded
15
Moll (1990) quotes an Interview with Simon Brand, "Dr. M.H. de Kock, Governor of the Reserve 
Bank, would have been horrified if the Board of Trade and Industries had come to him In the 1950s 
and asked him to devalue to encourage industrialisation".
260
sector, as opposed to the whites predominantly within 
non-traded, particularly state, employment.
Such a view is problematical. Firstly, it ignores 
the role played by the IDC, attributing credit for 
industrialisation almost solely to tariffs administered 
by the BTI. Secondly, it presumes that the separation 
between arenas of policymaking and the content of policy 
is primarily determined by the distributional interests 
of different fractions of workers. It also sets aside the 
other factors determining the distribution of income and 
levels of wages and employment. Should export promotion 
have proved so favourable to black workers, the evidence 
is that compensating adjustments could well have been 
adopted by the apartheid state to support white workers. 
More generally, the problem with Moll's counterfactual 
arguments is that they are almost inevitably dependent 
upon very heavy ceteris paribus assumptions. The economy 
would have performed better with more skilled and less 
fettered black workers, and with exchange rate policy 
more favourable to exports. But the economic and 
political conditions to allow such policies to be put in 
place would not have allowed such ceteris paribus 
assumptions to hold. The skill composition of the 
workforce and the structure and content of policymaking 
were themselves products of the underlying balance of 
economic and political forces.
Similarly McCarthy (1988, p.21) finds it easier to 
identify than to explain South Africa's economic malaise:
It would appear that South African industrial 
development has reached an impasse. 
Import-substituting development has taken the 
manufacturing sector a long way up the ladder of 
development but has not lowered the average import 
propensity of the economy. In order for this to 
happen large-scale replacement of intermediary and
261
capital goods will be required, a development which 
is accepted to be difficult and costly in the 
comparatively small market.
Here, we find a number of commonly cited factors for 
South Africa's difficulty in promoting further growth in 
manufacturing; a structural obstacle to further 
industrialisation, which has exhausted the scope for 
import-substitution, continuing import dependence 
especially as a consequence of weak capability in capital 
and intermediary goods, and the constraints imposed by 
the level of domestic demand.1  ^As such, it leaves 
unanswered a number of questions, not least why the 
industrialisation that has taken place should not have 
gathered its own momentum, whether through spin-offs into 
other linked sectors or through the attainment of 
international competitiveness and export growth 
(especially given dependence upon limited domestic 
markets). As South Africa's export performance has been 
dramatically poor in manufacturing, with export growth 
limited to processed minerals and chemical sectors, the 
notion of insufficient demand cannot legitimately be 
isolated from consideration of export markets. Why could 
these have not be sought out and captured?
2.4 SCHUMPETERIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF INDUSTRIALISATION 
Poor economic performance is also reflected in 
perceptions of technological underdevelopment, based on 
Schumpeterian paradigms (for example see Fransman and 
King ed.(1986) and Rosenberg (1976)). Kaplan (1987 and 
1990) points to the weakness of the capital goods sector, 
drawing upon the sub-sectors of machine tools and 
telecommunications. For the former, he argues that 
traditional explanations of failure based on limited 
markets and insufficient R&D are inadequate by 
themselves. He points in addition to the failure to 
develop indigenous design capability, insufficient
See also Archer (1987), Black and Stanwix (1987), Kaplan (1987).
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protection and commitment to export markets and their 
ineffectiveness in view of exchange rate movements and 
the lag in the South African business cycle compared to 
other countries.
Meth (1990) takes a very different view. He 
emphasises the extreme diversity of the capital goods 
sector and argues that, given the structure of the South 
African economy, it is quite appropriate for it to import 
a large variety of capital goods and foreign technology, 
especially since these are used profitably in production 
for protected domestic markets, p.308:17
South Africa has a competent engineering (capital 
goods) industry which is as large as one could 
reasonably expect. Given the size and diversity of 
the manufacturing sector, it is unrealistic to 
believe that a local capital goods industry could 
produce anything more than a narrow selection of the 
core machines required.
But why should those sub-sectors in which competence
does emerge not also lead to international
competitiveness and exports? And what determines which
sub-sectors should benefit from competence? The two
sectors - capital goods and telecommunciations -
highlighted by Kaplan, for example, are very different
from one another, quite apart from their own internal
heterogeneity. Capital goods have in part had a close and
longstanding connection with the core activities of the
mining, minerals processing, chemicals and energy
industries; the determinants of developments in
telecommunciations have been very different, with much
stronger links to foreign capital and technology and
greater scope for diversification into new technology___
Meth Is also concerned to quest Ion the notion of "appropriate technology", suggesting that this 
Is only meaningful In the context of a more fundamental transformation of the economy, p.308: "A 
major restructuring of the pattern of demand (which is distorted by gross Income Inequality and 
South Africa's natural resource endowments) Is required before the potential for a larger more 
"appropriate" capital goods sector can be realized."
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around electronics. Such considerations raise the issue 
of how general an explanation for industrial success or 
failure, given the wide diversity of the sub-sectors 
concerned can be.
In the context of industrial development and 
industrial policy, it is more useful to avoid a narrow 
focus on capital goods and to consider the broad 
engineering industry as a set of heterogeneous and 
closely linked sub-sectors whose role it is to deliver 
capital goods, repairs and other services essential to 
the efficient functioning, reproduction and further 
development of core productive sectors. In the specific 
South African context, the engineering industry and, 
consequently, the capacity to produce capital goods, has 
failed to develop as a productive sector in its own 
right. This is not solely because of the reasons advanced 
by Kaplan or Meth. It is also associated with 
concentrated conglomerate ownership of the engineering 
and other sectors. These have tended to confine 
engineering's linkages to dependence upon mining, mineral 
processing, chemicals and energy industries. For those 
have historically absorbed a significant proportion of 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment.18
2.5 MONOPOLY CAPITAL INTERPRETATIONS OF INDUSTRIALISATION
As with Schumpeterian perspectives, the trajectory 
of South African industrialisation has only been 
partially explained by those operating within the 
monopoly capital paradigm, which has also used and 
reinforced the dichotomy between "mining" and 
"manufacturing" which, we have argued, is misleading.
In rejecting both the liberal arguments of apartheid 
constraining industrial development and the Marxist-
18 For a review of the engineering sector, see Rustomjee (1993) and Chapter six.
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revisionist, view of apartheid being functional to the 
growth of all industrial sectors, Innes (1984, p.170) was 
less glowing in interpreting the achievements in 
industrialisation. He regarded it as being "relatively 
backward" for, even in the early 1950s, apartheid 
encouraged:
a particular form of industrialisation based 
largely on labour-intensive methods of 
production. The immediate result was the 
expansion of the labour-intensive light 
industries rather than the more mechanised 
capital goods sector. For instance, during the 
early 1950s it was industries like food, 
beverages, paper and textiles that expanded 
(together with the more labour-intensive 
mineral processing group of industries), while 
in the late 1950s, when there was little 
growth, the trend to labour-intensity became 
more marked.
According to the model, diversification out of 
mining became possible through development of financial 
institutions, capital markets and a burgeoning credit 
system particularly after the late 1950s, Innes (1984,
p. 182):19
What the growth of the local money market 
represented in particular was the clearest form 
yet of the merging together of bank capital and 
productive capital - that is, of the emergence 
of the phase of finance capital.
Thus, for Innes (1984, p.191) industrial expansion of a 
capital-intensive nature could only take place in the 
1960s.
19 As mentioned earlier, Innes has borrowed the concept of finance capital from the analysis of 
advanced capitalism, however much valid for that purpose.
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As with ISI assumptions, the sequencing of events in 
reality does not fit the monopoly capital model. 
Investment in certain highly capital-intensive 
manufacturing industries has been a feature of industrial 
development since the late 1920s. By 1960, 35% of fixed 
assets in manufacturing were concentrated in just three 
MEC sectors, namely, steel, non-metallic mineral products 
and chemicals, (figure 4.3).
In summary, the monopoly capital paradigm, while 
describing the centralisation and concentration of the 
economy through the group structure of conglomerates with 
their historical roots in mining, offered a false 
explanation for the pattern of industrialisation and only 
partial reasons for poor industrial performance. Why, for 
example, did centralisation and concentration not lead to 
greater economies of scale and outward orientation and 
why did the economy stagnate in the 1980s, after "finance 
capital" had achieved even greater concentration and 
dominance?
2.6 REGULATION SCHOOL THEORY AND RACIST FORDISM
Poor industrial performance has been interpreted by 
Gelb (1987), through appeal to a variant of Regulation 
School theory.2  ^ His marriage of the external theory with 
internal empirical evidence adopts the seductively 
attractive terminology of "racist Fordism".
Theoretically, the regulation school provides for the 
economy to sustain accumulation systemically until it 
enters a "structural crisis". The apartheid system gives 
the South African economy its peculiarly distorted form 
of Fordism, the predominant structure of accumulation for
20 See also Gelb (1991) In which the racist Fordism approach serves as an uneasy, possibly 
reluctantly adopted, framework for the separate contributions. Most significant, In the rush to 
post-apartheld economic policymaking, the approach has sunk without trace, not least In Gelb's own 
work!
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the post-war boom. Essentially, then, South African 
Fordism as the unity of mass production and mass 
consumption is doomed to run its course but only upon the 
restricted basis of mass consumption for privileged 
whites. Consequently, apart from relying upon a 
stereotyped version of Fordism as a system of 
accumulation, there is ultimately reliance upon 
underconsumptionism even if this is reinforced by appeal 
to the poverty wage's of blacks. The theoretical and 
empirical underpinnings of the regulation school have 
already been extensively criticised for such leanings.21 
From our perspective, the notion of the South African 
economy as a restricted or distorted form of Fordism 
necessarily suffers from a reductionism of the apartheid 
system to the limited consumption of the majority (even 
if this is in turn related to the failure to sustain 
Fordist production) with, as in other contributions 
covered here, a neglect of the "Fordist" 
industrialisation that was in fact typical of production 
around the MEC core sectors.
21 See Brenner and Glick (1991) and Mavroudeas (1990). The obvious question to address to the 
putative crisis of the racist Fordism regime of accumulation is why it should prove incapable of 
serving continuing expansion in privileged, white, domestic markets (especially given high Import 
propensities and protection for domestic production of consumption goods) and/or serve export 
markets. It is worth observing that regulation theory has Increasingly become eclectic and "middie- 
range" In which, for the latter, stylised empirical observations are Interpreted as analytical 
structures which, not surprisingly, are more than capable of explaining the empirical evidence 
(from which they have been derived).
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3. THE THEMES OP DEBATE
Debates have covered two trajectories. The first 
concerns the interpretation of the conduct of industrial 
policy. The second traverses the observed pattern of 
industrialisation and its associated performance.
3.1 INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONDUCT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
T-he literature that is widely available on the 
formulation and conduct of industrial policy is limited, 
being partly if, as here, only literature in the English 
language is covered. This itself reflects a deeper 
problem, though one that is less relevant today. The 
economic disjuncture between English and Afrikaner 
capital has had a counterpart in academic debates over 
the content of industrial policy. South African 
industrial policy formulation and conduct has, until very 
recently, been the preserve of a handful of Afrikaner 
bureaucrats, academics and industrialists. Brand (1976, 
p.166) highlights this in passing:
...it is widely accepted that high growth rates of 
manufacturing output will continue to be essential. 
This assumption has occupied a central place in such 
forums for the formulation of government policy with 
regard to economic development as the Viljoen 
Commission (1958) and the Reynders Commission 
(1972), as well as in the spelling out of 
development targets in the successive Economic 
Development Programmes issued since 1963. It also 
features prominently in the writings of economists 
outside the official sector. Most recently, e.g. in 
T. Bell (1975).
The context of debate has thus been one where 
"unofficial" academics (our emphasis added) based at 
English-speaking institutions have usually criticised the
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conduct of industrial policy from the sidelines relying 
upon the findings of numerous Commissions of Inquiry and 
parliamentary bills (from the preparation of which they 
have been excluded). Key milestones in this chronology 
include the Holloway Commission (19 36), BTI Report No.282 
(1945), Viljoen Commission (1958), Reynders Commission 
(1972), Kleu Report (1982), White Paper (1985), BTI 
Report No. 2614 (1988), IDC (1990) and the Normative 
Economic Model of 199 3, Keys (199 3) and CEAS (1993). As 
argued above, the analytical tools used have often 
followed the fashions of externally determined theory.
The issues concerning the conduct of industrial 
policy contained in the official literature across the 
post-war period have been outlined above. Essentially, 
three main industrial policy instruments were used in the 
post-war period. The first instrument, of creating state 
corporations and joint ventures with private capital, 
provided a major impetus to targeted core MEC sectors, 
thereby shifting the trajectory of the economy by the 
sheer weight of investment involved. The second 
instrument of tariffs was unfocused, reactive to various 
fractions of capital and poorly monitored and managed. 
There were no clear criteria for selectivity, nor the 
forging of complementary backward or forward linkages 
with the MEC core. Thus, tariff policy was uncoordinated 
with the first instrument, and often subordinated to 
protecting the balance of payments. Neither of these 
instruments was accompanied by additional supportive 
policies to overcome specific problems, such as skills 
constraints, technology access and appropriate research, 
identified as problems by various official investigations 
throughout the post-war period. The third instrument, 
industrial decentralisation, was poorly funded, 
uncoordinated with other instruments and doomed to 
failure given poor infrastructure and corresponding poor 
performance in the traditional centres of industry. 
Moreover, it was subordinated to the political
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imperatives of apartheid, rather than being part of a 
coherent national industrial strategy, which in any case 
did not exist. It is against this background that the 
detail of industrial performance debates are examined.
3.2 INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PATTERN AND PERFORMANCE OF 
INDUSTRIALISATION
Three specific but overlapping issues have dominated 
debates on industrial performance in the past. The first 
has already been discussed and concerned the liberal 
perspective - that industrial performance has been 
constrained by apartheid. The more recent debates on 
post-apartheid industrial policy have essentially 
discarded this issue. A second set of issues weighed up 
the balance between inward and outward orientation of 
industry and the selectivity of sub-sectors in industrial 
strategy. A third issue has been the extent of state- 
versus market-orientation of the economy.
3.2.1 INWARD VERSUS OUTWARD INDUSTRIAL ORIENTATION
Debates on inward and outward orientation have 
pivoted around the widely accepted proposition that South 
Africa followed an import-substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) path. Observers and policymakers hold that, after 
exhausting the "easy" industrial activities by the early 
1960s, the "growth path" of ISI became progressively 
difficult in the 1970s and contributed to the crisis and 
stagnation of the 1980s.22
Houghton (197 3, p.18) points out that the need to 
shift away from ISI and to develop an export orientation, 
was recognised and advocated in a number of successive 
government reports, beginning with the Third Interim 
Report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements
__
See, for example, Moll (1991, p.283)
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Commission (1941). He identified several of the more 
common reasons for the failure to diversify out of 
mining, including the low productivity of production, 
partly linked to the small domestic market and poor 
economies of scale and the inward mentality of South 
African industrialists.
It is generally accepted that South Africa had 
completed the first stage of industrialisation, domestic 
production of consumption goods, during the 1950s. As 
Scheepers (1982, p.20) claims in retrospect:23
The studies of both T.A. du Plessis and the author 
during the sixties proved that this country entered 
the second phase of the import-substitution process 
during the fifties.
For him, this should have led to the increasing 
domestic production of intermediate and capital goods. It 
was certainly anticipated to be the prospect at the time 
and also during the following years. Such was the case 
for Marais (1960) who recognised, as others have done 
subsequently, that import-substitution does not 
necessarily reduce the propensity to import, thereby 
easing pressure on the balance of payments, since import 
dependence shifts from consumption goods to their input 
requirements. Similarly, Lumby (1983, p.227) notes that:
Although South Africa became nearly self-sufficient 
in the production of many consumer goods and certain 
equipment for mining, agriculture, construction and 
transport, industries which produced consumer goods 
continued to import a large percentage of their raw 
material requirements ... The contribution of 
manufacturing to the Gross Domestic Product may have
_
Zarenda (1975) quotes from the Scheepers' study to the effect that only 16% of growth was 
accounted for by Import-substitution between 1956/7 and 1963/4, as compared to 52% between 1926/7 
and 1956/7. Zarenda suggests that Industry (and exports) should be promoted rather than protected, 
opening the way in principle to a variety of policies and not Just price support.
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outstripped the combined contribution of agriculture 
and mining for the first time in 1965, but that 
industrial growth which was possible was not 
self-supporting or independent.
Lachman (1974), also accepting that the early stage 
of easy import-substitution had been completed, sought 
greater export orientation and must have been one of the 
first commentators to suggest South Korea as a potential 
model of export-orientation from which lessons could be 
learnt - however correctly that model was understood. For 
Reynders and van Zyl (1973), there is a recognition that 
there had been more than enough import policy (especially 
protection) but an absence of export policy - on the 
grounds that "gold sells itself". One of these authors, 
Reynders, had just completed chairing the commission 
examining export policy.
Some, however, did not agree that inward policies 
were exhausted but pointed to the issue of the selection 
of sectors to benefit under import-substitution 
protection. For Marais (1960, p.67) blanket ISI had run 
out of steam by 1960 and required targeting:
It therefore does not seem necessary to protect 
and stimulate a whole range of industries, but 
to concentrate on a few industries only, such 
as, for example, the production of rayon, 
synthetic rubber, and motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories.
Bell (1975), in response to the Reynders Report 
(1972) on the export trade, argued in favour of more 
import-substitution into intermediate and capital goods 
in order to accrue dynamic economies rather than seeking 
larger potential markets, as the report recommended, 
through blanket exports. But Bell went further, 
recognising that the international climate had, after the
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197 3 gold and energy price rise, grown more hostile to 
developing country exports.
A synthesis of or, more exactly, a compromise 
between these competing views is to be found in Brand's 
(1976, p.172) contribution. He argues that proponents of 
both inward and outward strategies base their respective 
arguments:
on the basis of very much the same evidence about 
the country's past patterns of development, and very 
similar perceptions of the present structure of its 
economy.
We will argue below that this basis is falsely 
conceived. However, Bell also raised the issue of 
selectivity, that there should not be a general 
disposition either towards protection for 
import-substitution or for export promotion, but rather 
the decision should be based on their potential to 
fulfill the objectives of economic policy, whether these 
be employment creation, easing balance of payment 
constraints, protection of infant industries or short­
term considerations such as anti-dumping. Moreover, Bell 
(1975, p.17 3) recognised the unscientific basis on which 
debates had been conducted and selectivity had been 
exercised in the past, pointing to the lack of "intensive 
micro-economic study of individual sectors and products" 
concerned. In Chapter four, we have argued that decisions 
around selectivity were bound up with the patronage that 
the state offered to Afrikaner capital during much of the 
post-war period.
Another objection raised to policies shifting to an
export orientation related to the perceived structure of
the economy. Ratcliffe (1975, p.80) warned that Reynders
had underestimated the extent of internal structural
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change that would be required to shift to an export 
orientation:
...the essentially one-sided approach of the 
Commission to the expansion of exports causes 
it to underestimate the extent of the internal 
transformation of the South African economy 
which is required for exports to lead growth.
Again and again the Commission tentatively 
considers various aspects of the matter, 
notably in the chapters dealing with production 
costs, fiscal measures, finance, and transport. 
Nevertheless it does not fully accept the 
proposition that domestic economic changes are 
the essential precondition for increased 
exports and for sustained growth.
In response, Reynders (1975, p.123) argued that it 
would be the implementation of export incentives that 
would lead to the structural changes, not the reverse:
...my fundamental hypothesis is that the newly 
introduced export incentives have in fact 
introduced a structural change in the whole of 
South Africa's export environment. However, 
since this is a very recent change; since the 
package of incentives is not yet complete; and 
since the understanding and acceptance of the 
new package has not yet worked its way through 
to all exporters and potential exporters, it is 
rather premature to look for a statistical 
quantification of the extent of the change 
which I am hypothesizing.
As discussed in Chapters one and four, the 
industrial policies that were actually implemented in the 
decade of the 1970s greatly strengthened the role of the 
MEC core within South Africa's economic structure. The
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results are also evident in figure 1.6. In this sense, 
Ratcliffe, and many others engaged in this debate, have 
based their observations on a false perception of the 
pattern of industrialisation - on backward linkages from 
consumption goods. Similarly, the political factors that 
influenced decisions around industrialisation have only 
been partially appreciated and these go some way towards 
explaining why effective policies were not taken despite 
the recognition of the same manufacturing sector 
weaknesses time and time again in the post-war period. 
Ratcliffe (1975, p.75):24
Fifteen years ago the report of the Viljoen 
Commission into the South African commercial policy 
was criticized for repetitiveness; the inclusion of 
superfluous details, incoherence, incompleteness and 
partiality in the presentation of economic 
arguments; and excessive concern with immediate 
decisions on the implementation of policy whose 
general direction had already been determined, 
instead of a scientific and reasoned analysis of 
alternative policies. These defects are also to be 
found in the report of the Reynders Commission.
Clearly, the terrain of debate has focused narrowly 
on the perceived exhaustion of ISI. It is our contention, 
however, that as a methodology used to interpret the 
specific form that industrialisation has taken in South 
Africa, the ISI concept is far too blunt. First, ISI's 
presumed path and chronology does not match the pattern 
of industrialisation in South Africa. Second, the 
descriptive categories of light (consumer) and heavy 
(producer) goods, used to sub-divide industries conceal 
other important sectoral linkages around the mining, 
mineral processing, chemicals and energy sectors which, 
in South Africa, have imparted a greater impulse to
2*4
The reference Is to Samuels (1959) who is less overt In his criticism than Is suggested but does 
raise the issue of how selectivity Is to be determined.
275
industrialisation than has blanket ISI protection. 
Thirdly, contrary to ISI logic, South African industry 
has long demonstrated a considerable capability in 
capital goods manufacture.
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3.2.2 IMPORT-SUBSTITUTING INDUSTRIALISATION (ISI) - AN 
INAPPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY FOR EXPLAINING 
INDUSTRIALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
First then, the empirical evidence reveals flaws in 
the presumed path and chronology of ISI in South Africa. 
Figure 5.1 shows that, even at the most aggregated level, 
"import-substitution" had largely taken place before 
1945. After this until 1970, imports ran at about 40% of 
gross manufacturing output falling to 30% thereafter.
Important sub-sectoral trends are revealed in 
figures 5.2a and 5.2b which show the real division 
between light (mainly consumer goods) and heavy (mainly 
intermediate goods, industrial consumables and producer 
durables) manufacturing activities. From 19 32, heavy 
activity output grew at a faster rate and caught up with 
consumer good production by the end of WWII.
Thus, the idea that imports of "easy" consumer goods 
were substituted for first and that this "stage" was 
exhausted by the 1960s is inaccurate.25 Figure 5.3 
reveals that the ratio of imports to value added for 
"easy" consumer good sectors fell from 270% in 1924 to 
75% in 1945 while the "difficult", capital-intensive 
sectors (mostly associated with the MEC) fell from 335% 
to 50% over the same period. While a greater proportion 
of consumer goods were wholly manufactured domestically, 
considerable in-roads into local manufacture of 
difficult, capital-intensive goods were also being made. 
Data are not available for the period between 1958 and 
1970, but figure 5.3 shows that only a slight decrease in 
import/value added ratio for both "easy" and "hard" 
sectors was achieved.
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FIGURE 5.2a - GROSS MANUFACTURING OUTPUT BY SECTOR
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FIGURE 5.2b - GROSS MANUFACTURING OUTPUT BY SECTOR
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FIGURE 5.3 - SECTORAL IMPORTS AS % SECTORAL VALUE ADDED
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"Easy" ISI sectors include : Food, Beverages,
Tobacco, Textiles, Clothing, Leather and Rubber Products.
"Difficult" ISI sectors include : Basic Metal Industries, 
Chemicals, Fabricated Metal Products, Non-Electrical 
Machinery, Electrical Machinery, Paper and Publishing.
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This is not to deny that imports declined with the 
flourishing of local production behind tariff barriers. 
However, the pattern of industrialisation in South Africa 
cannot be reduced to an ISI model which, in any case, 
grew out of studies based on patterns of Latin American
O f.
industrialisation, ° and interpreting industrialisation 
in South Africa as ISI is misleading for two reasons.
First, by aggregating specific sectors, the dynamic 
potential of linkages between economic activities are not 
recognised. ISI analysis has been based on a conceptual 
divide between industries which manufacture consumer and 
producer goods. Other linkages within the economy, for 
example between mining and manufacturing or between 
manufacturing sub-sectors, have usually been ignored.
Yet, linkages around a Minerals-Energy Complex were 
emerging even as early as the turn of the century when 
the largest dynamite factory in the world was constructed 
at Modderfontein and was subsequently to impart a 
propulsive effect on the chemicals sector. The impact of 
the primary steel industry which began production in 19 3 3 
is clearly evident in figure 5.2b and led to 
industrialisation across a wide range of sectors.
\
Secondly, ISI analysis has tended to reduce the 
political factors that have influenced the pattern of 
industrialisation to the strength and ability of 
indigenous capital to impose protection. But, for South 
Africa, inter-war diversification in industrialisation 
was constrained by the disjuncture between the political 
and economic power of Afrikaner as opposed to mining 
capital. So, the heavy capital-intensive industries were 
developed early on relative to the pattern for 
conventional ISI, reflecting an uneasy compromise between 
serving the MEC and promoting national capital.
2 6 The origins of these concepts are usually attributed to the work of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) In the 1950s and 1960s.
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The creation of Iscor is a case in point. The
development of the steel industry went some way in
stimulating other sectors but industrial policies could
not be cohesive enough to carry industrialisation
extensively downstream, out of the MEC core, in Chapter
3. In Korea, by way of contrast, heavy capital-intensive
industries have been fostered within a more clearly
defined industrial strategy that could be carried through
by the state, because political and social factors did
not pose a disjuncture and an obstacle to state planning
9  7and coordination.
27 See Fine (1992) among others for a discussion of this.
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3.2.3 STATE VERSUS MARKET IN INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE
The debate over state versus market has been and
continues to be largely sterile, of limited scope and
based on a false conception of the realities of state-
capital relations in South African industrial 
2 ftdevelopment. ° In more recent debates, attacks on any 
active role for the state has become a component of a 
range of contemporary policy studies (see below).
Two issues have dominated the debate on the role of 
the state in industrial performance. The first has 
already been discussed above, being the liberal assault 
on state intervention in labour markets which is held to 
have impeded industrial performance, Moll (1990). The 
second has been around the creation of state-owned 
industries. The use of this policy instrument has often 
been counterposed by positions which place greater 
reliance upon static comparative advantages in mineral 
exports.
Others, such as Black and Stanwix (1987) have seen 
state corporations in a broader economic context.
They recognise that state-created industries were among a 
number of factors which historically drove 
industrialisation. Others included tariff protection, 
state repression of labour, the demand from mining 
activities, diversification using mining surpluses and 
South Africa's relatively open economy stimulated from 
time-to-time by events in the rest of the world. The 
pattern of industrialisation that resulted from these 
factors is seen as having led to structural constraints 
to growth which emerged in the 1980s. These included: 
inadequate demand from a limited domestic market; 
exhaustion of easy consumer good import-substitution at 
the cost of raising capital good import dependency; an 
2 8 These are fulty discussed In Chapter four but, essentially, economic and productive linkages and 
the degree of Interpenetration of state and private capital have, In most cases, not been 
recognised.
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anti-export bias through overvalued exchange rates; 
uncompetitive industries featherbedded by protection; the 
promotion of capital-intensive investment; the 
concentration of ownership, coupled with capital strike 
and flight.
However, such a perspective tends to overlook the 
more obvious political and economic linkages forged by 
state-owned industries. The actual process of 
industrialisation in South Africa involved a symbiotic 
relationship between the state corporations and private 
capital around the MEC. Central to the process of post­
war industrialisation has been the erosion of the 
disjuncture between English capital's economic power and 
Afrikaner capital's political power. The creation of 
state-owned corporations should be viewed in the context 
of this process which involved the creation of 
large-scale Afrikaner capital around the MEC core, its 
interpenetration with English capital and, ultimately, 
their combined collaboration and coordination through the 
state. The first phase, centred in the 1950s, witnessed 
the state's successful encouragement of the development 
of large-scale Afrikaner capital. The second phase around 
the 1960s witnessed the interpenetration of large-scale 
Afrikaner capital into mining, with the active 
collaboration of both the state and mining capital 
itself. As a result, by the 1970s, there was no longer a 
political obstacle within the capitalist class to the 
adoption of a concerted economic strategy on the part of 
the state, Chapter four.
Indeed, one was adopted. But economic conditions had 
changed, both through the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, and the associated rise in the price of gold, and 
through the oil shock which similarly enhanced all energy 
prices. Consequently, the state and private capital drew 
upon policies to strengthen the MEC in its core 
activities. Thus, the third phase, emerging in the 1970s,
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consolidated the collaboration between MEC capital and 
the state with extensive, if not comprehensive, polices 
for the economy emerging for the first time in South 
Africa's history. They were directed at the MEC, through 
the expansion of public and private investment to promote 
mineral, heavy chemical and energy production, both for 
domestic and foreign markets. In addition, a highly 
coordinated strategy to produce armaments was also 
implemented. By the 1980s, even as the boost to core MEC 
activities was eroded, the apartheid system as a whole 
was in crisis. With increasing sanctions, disinvestment 
and labour and social unrest, it is hardly surprising 
that a coherent more widely-based industrial strategy 
continued to remain off the agenda. These adverse 
conditions might be considered sufficient reason but they 
were reinforced by the mode of operation of the economy, 
particularly of its previously developed financial 
system. For this had been more geared to speculation and 
acquisition than to long-term provision of investment 
finance to industry. And the policy priority of the 
financial system has been oriented around macroeconomic 
objectives rather than those of industrial development as 
in the disastrous liberalisation of the financial system 
in the early 1980s. This is dealt with in the next 
section.
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3.2.4 INDUSTRIAL FINANCING AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE
Industrial performance has also been associated with 
developments in the financial sector, and debates on the 
impact of industrial finance on industrial performance 
have been dominated by the conventional market-based neo­
classical perspective which holds that industrial 
development proceeds smoothly along a well-worn path, 
lubricated:
...institutions canalizing savings - including 
mutual funds - and the functions of the new issues 
market ... together with the position of the stock 
exchange as the facilitating mechanism through which 
the burden of waiting and risk bearing was shifted 
to those most able to bear it, and which facilitated 
the transfer of capital from those who possessed it 
to those who could employ it more profitably.
Dickman (1973, p.373)
The absence of capital markets is held to have 
resulted in (relatively) labour-intensive
industrialisation. Until WWII, Norval (1962, p.97) argued 
that industrialisation was constrained because industries 
had:
...to rely on what they could scrape together 
themselves or obtain from friends, legal firms, 
boards of executors and trust companies, one of 
whose main functions was to administer estates of 
deceased persons and invest the savings of their 
clientele.
For Norval (1962), the inter-war period was marked 
by the development of labour-intensive industries like 
clothing, tanning (coarse leather not requiring capital 
equipment), canning, confectionery, cigarettes using 
primitive machines, foundries and engineering repair
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shops. From our perspective, this is misleading for a 
significant proportion of labour-intensive industrial 
activity resulted from capital-intensive investment in 
the steel industry, through the creation of state-owned 
Iscor and an ensuing range of downstream joint venture 
metal industries with private capital, Chapter 3.
Martial control of production during WWII 
interrupted the "normal" process of industrialisation, 
according to conventional thinking, and state 
intervention spurred industrialisation for war 
production. For Norval (1962, p.53), WWII and not 1925-39 
was the turning point. "The country went from a labour- 
intensive to a capital-intensive basis of its 
manufacturing industries." This occurrence was attributed 
equally to a speculative bubble in industrial financing, 
Norval (1962, p.53):
No efforts were spared, nor funds for the equipment 
of industries. In many cases it could be no more 
than improvising. The remarkable phenomenon was that 
there was no lack of capital. Capital was 
forthcoming like rabbits from a hat. With the most 
favourable prospects of profits and dividends the 
general public had no hesitation in placing their 
savings at the disposal of industry by taking up 
shares based on nothing more than the optimistic 
assurances of industrialists of whose credentials 
very little was known and still less regarding the 
basis of the security offered. It was a real bubble 
and many came out the poorer, but the wiser, from 
these speculations.
Dickman (1973, p.373) also refers to constrained 
industrialisation in the 1950s due to the fact that:
...disillusionment with the stock exchange was rife 
following the 1948 debacle on the share market, when
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the hesitation that was to continue characterizing 
the investment scene for many years to come had as 
its counterpart the fact that the capital market 
mechanism remained relatively dormant and 
underdeveloped, and profit re-investment continued 
to be a major source of industrial finance.
In contrast to the financial constraints to 
industrialisation that typified the 1950s, the boom in 
aggregate manufacturing sector activity in the 1960s is 
attributed to the freeing up of impediments in financial 
markets. For Viljoen (1983, p.50):
A large number of new financial institutions have 
appeared on the scene, such as merchant banks, 
general banks and investment houses, and, in the 
late ’fifties, an increased interest began to be 
displayed by pension funds'and insurance companies 
in investment in industrial equities. This was a 
major element in permitting the market to fulfil its 
role of efficiently transforming the savings of the 
community into capital formation. The result has 
been the broadening of share ownership and 
marketability, and the increased ability of 
companies to look to the market for their capital 
needs.
Yet, despite these conducive institutional 
conditions, even Dickman (1973, p.375) acknowledged that 
finance did not flow as smoothly into expanding 
manufacturing activity in the 1960s. Long-term insurers, 
pension and provident funds almost doubled the proportion 
of assets invested in equity between 1961 and 1965, yet:
Just how much of the new capital that flowed from 
the public and the institutions in the two major new 
issue booms of 1963/65 (when a net R371 million was 
raised from the public) and 1968/9 (when a net R719
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million was raised) was destined actually to finance 
new fixed investment or fund existing borrowings is 
another matter ... And even if, as it will be 
argued, the majority of issues was designed either 
to attract savings for further but diversified 
investment in existing securities (as in the case of 
investment trusts) or to enable local entrepreneurs 
or foreign investors to reap the benefit for a 
successful profit record in their personal or 
foreign corporate capacity and yet retain effective 
control (as in the case of offers for sale, 
techniques similar to this but classed as new 
issues, and pyramid companies), one should not 
complain.
Dickman thus draws attention to the simultaneous 
emergence of the speculative nature of financial markets 
in South Africa and their overlapping with growing 
ownership concentration, facilitated by the very 
financial institutions whose purpose, according to 
theory, was to mobilise and allocate savings according to 
market-determined investment needs.
His failure to connect the two occurrences is partly 
noted by Viljoen for, while developed financial markets 
supposedly enhanced industrial performance during the 
1960s, it apparently also contributed to growing market 
defects, particularly through rising ownership 
concentration. Viljoen (1983, p.51), in noting the spate 
of mergers and acquisitions in the 1970s, suggests that 
the latter partly contributed to subsequent poor 
manufacturing performance:
The Commission of Inquiry into the Regulation of 
Monopolistic Conditions Act found that according to 
the 1971-72 census ... that virtually every industry 
investigated by it could be considered as either 
monopolistic, duopolistic or oligopolistic in
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structure ... The measure of concentration in South 
African industry naturally raises serious issues in 
regard to the maintenance of competition and, 
ultimately, of the free enterprise economy.
More recently, see below, neo-liberal positions have 
extended this to argue that economic stagnation was 
caused, firstly, by the concentration of state, rather 
than private, ownership in the productive sector which 
prevented the financial sector from efficiently deploying 
resources and, secondly, that the financial sector itself 
was constrained by a variety of regulations, such as 
foreign exchange control and prescribed assets.
A number of positions rooted in neo-classical 
theory, have drawn different conclusions from rising 
ownership concentration and evolving financial markets. 
According to the theory of monopoly capital, Innes 
(1983), industrial financing did receive a boost in the 
late 1950s as mining houses redirected profits from 
mining into manufacturing through new financial 
institutions, but this was seen as a consequence of the 
attainment of the stage of finance capital. However, it 
is not clear why either the achievement of monopoly 
capital or the emergence of capital markets did not lead 
to a dynamic and self-sustaining manufacturing sector 
after the 1960s.
Black and Stanwix (1987, p.52) on the other hand, 
view the rising concentration as an "organic" response of 
capital:
The mergers and takeovers which were the hallmark of 
the process of centralisation of capital during the 
1970s were spurred by recession as financially 
strong groups sought to expand their market share by 
buying companies weakened by adverse economic 
circumstances.
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A curious feature of debates on industrial finance 
is the way state and private sector finance and 
investment have been compartmentalised. Although many 
acknowledge the existence of the IDC in providing finance 
for industry, its activities are hardly referred to by 
Dickman (1973), for example, even though its investments 
while sectorally focused within the MEC core, constituted 
more than 50% of manufacturing sector fixed investment. 
Instead, the financing of state-sector industries have 
often been portrayed as the creation of monopolies, 
rather than as sectors with extensive upstream and 
downstream linkages with the private sector, imparting a 
propulsive effect on a broader industrial trajectory.2  ^
For Viljoen (1983, p.51):
... the state has played an important role in 
further enhancing the already undue measure of 
concentration. This has been effected through the 
Public Corporations and certain State departments, 
which dominate or monopolize the basic iron and 
steel and chemical industries, the supply of 
electricity, and the provision of rail, air and 
postal services.
Others, for example Levy (1981), cited in Black and 
Stanwix (1987), view state-owned industries as "capital- 
intensive" as opposed to private sector investment which, 
presumably because they were more responsive to factor 
markets, have been more "labour-intensive". More recently 
(see below), debates on the impact of industrial 
financing on industrial performance have focused on the 
reasons for the capital-intensive nature of South African 
manufacturing industry, with the neo-liberal position 
being that capital-intensity is the result of state 
"interference".
29 Significantly, against all its previous recent credo, even the World Bank has recognised the role 
of crowding-In of the private sector by pibllc sector Investment In the South African context.
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From our perspective, the issues around financing 
and industrial performance have been discussed using too 
narrow a conception of the financial and manufacturing 
sectors. Firstly, industrial performance cannot be 
explained solely by the extent of financial market 
development since considerable industrialisation took 
place before these emerged in their present form and, 
furthermore, financial market liberalisation in the 1980s 
did not enhance industrial performance.
Secondly, it is our contention that past and present 
debates have been based on a false conceptual division 
between mining and manufacturing. The bulk of industrial 
finance in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and late 1980s, has 
been concentrated in the core sectors of the MEC and 
continues to be so into the 1990s, (figure 4.3). Thirdly, 
the debates on industrial finance have largely ignored 
the role of state corporations and their symbiotic 
relationship with private capital in industrialisation, 
and simultaneously, have not recognised the resonance 
between the pattern of industrialisation and its 
financing and the evolving and peculiar form of 
conglomerate ownership which incorporates the financial 
sector.
In terms of the MEC, the growing power of large- 
scale capital has taken place in the context of the 
erosion of the disjuncture between English and Afrikaner 
capital from the inter-war period. The particular 
conglomerate form that has evolved in the post-war 
period, enveloping the financial sector in the process, 
is to be seen as a whole, rather than as separate and 
distorted "markets".
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3.3 CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON INDUSTRIALISATION
Recently, a more sophisticated understanding of the 
workings of the economy has emerged, focusing especially 
on the poor performance of the manufacturing sector, Lall 
(1993), Fallon et al (1993), Kaplinsky (1992) and Levy 
(1992). Whilst manufacturing is perceived to have been 
successful in the narrow sense of having increased its 
share of the economy at the expense of mining and 
agriculture, its overall performance over the past two 
decades is considered inadequate by a number of criteria, 
including many of those identified in past debates such 
as low productivity and ISI limitations.^
The consequences of adopting this false conceptual 
divide between mining and manufacturing has already been 
demonstrated, and it applies equally to agriculture, 
although in practice, linkages between agriculture and 
manufacturing are not as strong as those of core MEC 
activities. Apart from this, these analyses also adopt 
ahistorical approaches, ignoring the roles of the 
financial sector and the evolving corporate form in 
shaping and reproducing the pattern of industrialisation.
An example of the former is Fallon et al (1993), who 
argue that, had the state not intervened in creating and 
financing steel, chemical and mineral processing 
industries, scarce capital resources might have better 
been utilised to other purposes, for example, to create 
more jobs, export-oriented industries, etc, many of which 
would have realised greater returns to capital employed. 
Such an appraisal is reminiscent of Moll's ceteris 
paribus arguments discussed above. Levy (1992) implicitly 
accepts this, attributing heavy investment in steel, 
chemical and related industries to policies of state
30 Indeed, memories, and scholarship, seem to be short with the unacknowledged rediscovery of 
economic deficiencies (and remedying policies) that had already been Identified In the past.
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intervention which resulted in a manufacturing sector 
suffering "distortion" from some ideal "norm".
In addition, Levy (1992) notes that, whilst 
investment in the Sasol process might not be economically 
and financially justified ex ante, once undertaken it 
may, ex post, support a market-driven rolling programme 
of high capital investments in downstream activities such 
as plastics, particularly since ownership has largely 
passed into private hands. In fact, chemical sector 
investments have not proceeded downstream but have 
remained locked into the capital and energy-intensive 
MEC.
From our perspective, Levy self-admittedly fails to 
explain why investments have taken the direction that 
they have, and understands industrial policy on too 
limited a canvas,^ and forcibly disconnects 
manufacturing from the MEC as if, for example, the 
fortunes of the textile and clothing sectors have more in 
common with chemicals and steel than the latter do with 
mining and energy. His assessment of the past and of 
future prospects relies more or less completely on a 
theory of comparative advantage derived from 
(labour-intensive) factor endowments.
Kaplinsky (1992) and Lall (1993), however, while 
noting the distortion, do not argue, as the others seem 
to do, that state intervention is inherently and normally 
misplaced. Instead it is argued that selectivity of 
state-led investment in South Africa's case was 
misplaced. Although such judgements are made on economic 
bases, there is an absence of consideration of the 
political contexts in which the investments were made.
3 1 By way of digression, note that he also observes that "a producer that currently supplles 
one-third of local refrigerators estimated that production could be d a b  led with the addition of no 
more than 400 workers", p.8 - suggesting a considerable degree of excess capacity for this durable 
at least.
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Whilst many consider the creation of state 
corporations in South Africa to have been ill-judged and 
the consequence either of (unexplained) policy mistakes 
or of commitment to self-reliance in the face of 
potential sanctions, it is important to recognise that, 
the direction and content of such policies are thereby 
not predetermined. They reflect continuing capabilities 
and the response to economic and political interests as 
well as becoming institutionalised in particular ways. * 
Our approach suggests that these observations have to be 
situated in relation to the MEC.
The apparent consensus of contemporary debates on 
the triumph of outward over inward oriented policies in 
the late 1980s is premature and also a repetition of a 
debate which has been conducted on very narrow terrain 
for much of this century between the interventionist and 
more liberal factions of orthodox theory. Levy (1992, 
p.17) reports from the IDC that seven investigations into 
trade by government committees between 1958 and 1988 drew 
the conclusion that greater emphasis had to be given to 
exports at the expense of inward orientation by shifting 
the balance of incentives. Previously, it was 
demonstrated that the concept of ISI was inadequate to 
explain the pattern of industrialisation. Similarly, the 
supposed shift to an export orientation is inadequate as 
a methodology to understand the recent process of 
industrialisation in South Africa.
Firstly, export orientation has not shifted 
industrialisation away from the MEC. Most new 
manufacturing sector investment is taking place in large- 
scale mega-projects within the established MEC core, 
which, as a whole, has historically been export oriented.
To See, for example, the discussion of South African nuclear power In Christianson (1990). He argues 
that whatever its rationale within South Africa, It Is necessarily associated with an undemocratic 
and Informationally closed process of decisionmaking, one which we would argue is open to 
manipulation by entrenched Interests, most obviously the military but also the associated 
manufacturers. For a similar view of the British nuclear Industry, see Fine and Harris (1985).
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The MEC then is the subject of considerable intervention 
from the present government through tax (37E) subsidies 
and guarantees from potential future governing parties. 
Export incentives (GEIS) provide additional profits and 
guarantees to the close-knit conglomerates that are 
involved in such cast-iron investments. As Trade Monitor 
(1993, p.6) observes:
GEIS provides a premium to companies that would 
have exported in any case. It is a bonus hand­
out to large companies such as Iscor, Sappi,
Mondi, Armscor, Sentrachem and AECI.
Correspondingly, very little effective 
encouragement is given to potential first-time 
exporters in order to entice them into 
producing for the export market.
GEIS alone has had little impact in shifting export 
dependence away from the MEC, and its impact in future 
will be undermined when the heavy investments under 37E 
incentives begin production. Table 5.2 indicates a 
dramatic fall in primary exports, mainly gold. This has 
partly raised the relative percentage of non-primary 
exports. In addition some of the real rise in exports of 
Stage 4 Manufactured Products is unsustainable. A 
considerable proportion of 1990 and 1991 exports 
consisted of one-off exports from dying shipbuilding and 
railway equipment industries and from the armament 
industry. In the latter case, the product concerned is an 
artillery system that achieved an internationally 
competitive edge because it could be developed and tested 
in the Angolan war by the Defence Force. In the absence 
of continuing regional conflict in which similar systems 
can be developed and improved, it is unlikely that arms 
exports can be sustained.33
3 3 See Rustomjee (1993) for a more comprehensive account of the armament Industries.
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TABLE 5.2 - RECENT EXPORT 
EXPORTS
TRENDS, % OF TOTAL INDUSTRIAL
1988 1989 1990 1991
Primary Products 76.7 74.7 71. 8 67.9
Beneficiated Products 8.7 9.6 9.2 11.0
Material-intensive Prods. 10 .4 10 . 7 12.5 13 .1
Manufactured Products 4 .1 5.0 6.5 8.0
Source: Trade Monitor (1993).
Secondly, those looking to export orientation as the 
stimulus to renewed industrialisation have not noticed 
that industrial policy, other than for MEC sectors, has 
been increasingly divorced from the main policy making 
institutions like the IDC. In the past, non-MEC industry 
was in part promoted by the now defunct Board of Trade 
and Industry (BTI), which administered uncoordinated 
tariff policies.34 Today, these sectors seem to have been 
abandoned to negotiate their respective fates in various 
negotiating "forums" involving labour, capital and the 
state, while the latter unilaterally reduces tariffs. 
There is, in effect, no industrial policy for them.
These assertions are supported by the inadequacy of 
policy management, even at the level of basic industry 
monitoring. In its investigation into the level and 
structure of export development assistance for industry, 
the BTI (1988, p.44) stated that:
the nature of the present system of export 
assistance is such that sufficient information 
to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the system adequately is not forthcoming.
3 4 After a battle for Institutional sipremacy between the IDC and the BTI, the latter was abolished 
In 1992. Whilst the conventional wisdom Is that increased trade liberalisation has been a response 
to external pressure and fashions, we would emphasise the weakening representation of non-MEC 
manufactur ing Interests.
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Since the policy making role of the BTI has now been 
downgraded, it is difficult to imagine any improvement in 
this sorry state of affairs.
To conclude, perceptions of industrial performance 
have ranged across ideological divides, have often been 
based on a narrow range of factors and have usually 
utilsed highly aggregated analytical categories. Most 
importantly, though, they have failed to provide an 
adequate explanation of the pattern of post-war 
industrialisation. As argued above, within the South 
African economy, there lies a Minerals-Energy Complex 
core. Only by unravelling its mode of operation and its 
intimate relations to the state and finance is it 
possible to address the issue of the nature of the 
weakness of manufacturing, which other analyses take as 
their unproblematic starting point.
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CONCLUSIONS
The presence of a Minerals-Energy Complex core and 
its operation as a system of accumulation has been 
outlined in previous chapters. In terms of the conduct of 
industrial policy then, three industrial policy 
instruments were used in the post-war period. The first 
instrument, of creating state corporations and joint 
ventures with private capital, provided a major impetus 
to targeted core MEC sectors, thereby shifting the 
trajectory of the economy by the sheer weight of 
investment involved. The second instrument of tariffs was 
unfocused, reactive to various fractions of capital and 
poorly monitored and managed. There were no clear 
criterion for selectivity on the basis of forging 
complementary backward or forward linkages with the MEC 
core, so tariff policy was uncoordinated with the first 
instrument, often subordinated to protecting the balance 
of payments. Neither of these instruments was accompanied 
by additional supportive policies to overcome specific 
problems, such as skills constraints, technology access 
and appropriate research, identified by various official 
investigations throughout the post-war period. The third 
instrument, decentralisation, has not been dealt with in 
detail here. It was poorly funded, uncoordinated with 
other instruments and doomed to failure given poor 
infrastructure and corresponding poor performance in the 
traditional centres of industry. Moreover, it was 
subordinated to the political imperatives of apartheid, 
rather than being part of a cohesive national industrial 
strategy which, in any case, did not exist.
Compared to the pro-active thrust of IDC-led 
industrialisation initiatives around the MEC, the impact 
of the BTI-controlled tariff policy has been relatively 
ineffective in altering the pattern of industrial 
development in South Africa since the inter-war period. 
Its recent demise fully reflects the ascendance of large-
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scale capital finding resonance with the state 
institution, the IDC, which historically supported that 
climb. Present industrial policy, although seemingly 
oblivious of the existence of the MEC, is more supportive 
of the MEC core sectors than ever. Any selectivity in 
industrial policy, other than on the grounds of 
comparative advantage, is being firmly subordinated to 
balance of payment, fiscal and monetary policy 
imperatives.
From our perspective, this can only result in the 
widening of the cleavage between the MEC core and the 
rest of manufacturing industry and, unless addressed in 
the near future, can only lead to the de­
industrialisation of South Africa and the erosion of the 
capacity of industry, in its widest sense, to reduce its 
dependence on the MEC core. Moreover, those proposals 
with a genuine commitment to the use of more wide-ranging 
instruments to achieve a more wide-ranging outcome across 
manufacturing are doomed to failure unless they 
acknowledge the history and continuing dynamic of 
industrialisation and the overwhelming economic and 
political role that has been assumed by the MEC as the 
foremost axis of capital accumulation.
Our discussion has drawn predominantly upon 
empirical evidence and the arguments to be found in 
government reports. The latter, however, has also been 
accompanied by a parallel academic literature dealing 
with South Africa's industrialisation.
While periodisation of ideas is difficult, given 
their resurgence from time to time as well as the 
fundamental differences in economic paradigms, it is a 
useful starting point. By the 1970s, Rostowian 
determinism and optimism prevalent within liberal 
thinking was challenged by the, perhaps equally 
deterministic, Marxist-Revisionist school. The perceived
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cul-de-sac that industrialisation took was almost 
universally accepted and termed "import-substituting 
industrialisation" (ISI). Much of this work lacked 
empirical detail. However, other work during the mid- 
1970s, in particular that carried out within a 
Schumpetarian paradigm around capital goods and more 
complex manufacturing processes went beyond simple 
aggregates. In the 1970s also, another intellectual path 
within the Monopoly Capital school focused on the impact 
of concentrated ownership and power on industrialisation.
Most of these debates occurred before declining 
growth in the 1980s took on a pronounced structural, 
rather than an apparently cyclical character. Subsequent 
attempts to explain this have bifurcated between the 
resurgence of the neo-liberal paradigm, on the one hand, 
and a variety of more sophisticated and radical analyses, 
on the other.
Despite the literature's differences with, and 
putative critique of, the official posturing, the two 
share many themes in common. Firstly, both of these 
suffer equally from a distorted understanding of what 
industrialisation has occurred and why. They view South 
African manufacturing in terms of a pattern of more or 
less successful ISI and the need for It to give way at 
some point, whether past, present of future, to greater 
export orientation. It is reckoned that ISI proceeds from 
protected consumer goods to international competitiveness 
and backward linkages. From our perspective, this removes 
analysis away from the realities of the South African 
economy. It has grown on the basis of MEC industries that 
have failed to create forward linkages rather than on the 
basis of protected consumer goods.
In terms of the MEC, as a system of accumulation, 
the continuing gap in domestic capability - filled by 
imports - between the exports of primary products and the
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domestic manufacture of consumption goods has, firstly, 
been falsely conceived and, secondly, is to be explained 
by the failure to develop an industrial strategy to carry 
production through from one stage to the next, to accrue 
economies of scale, diversification and scope rather than 
to subordinate industrial strategy and policy to other 
objectives and to render it subject to piecemeal 
interventions. The argument is not that South Africa 
could or should have produced everything from primary 
products through to final consumption goods, but that 
such vertical integration out of the MEC was scarcely 
adopted on a selective basis, with positive consequences 
for forward linkages and horizontal spin-offs.
Moreover, the discussion of industrialisation on 
such false premises has been reinforced by the failure to 
acknowledge the central role of the MEC. In place of 
focus upon its shifting influence, the academic debate 
and historiography of industrial development in South 
Africa has drawn its momentum from theories of 
industrialisation and development, in general. But the 
application of many of the latest intellectual fashions 
from abroad has proved unsustainable, for most of these 
approaches have adopted a narrow view of "manufacturing 
industry", divorcing it from other economic sectors. 
Often, a very high degree of aggregation has been used 
which has concealed, for example, the existence and role 
of the MEC core.
Some approaches that have disaggregated by sector 
have uncritically used methodologies of imported 
theories. For example, the commonly held assumption, that 
a Latin American type ISI path was followed in South 
Africa, conceals more than it reveals. Similarly, recent 
analyses, preoccupied with the perceived shift from an 
inward to an outward, export oriented focus, have 
overlooked the fact that such policies are currently 
incoherent, poorly monitored, and that the main
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beneficiaries are, in fact, MEC industries, which were 
nurtured in previous decades.
Overlooked too has been the lack of cohesion between 
the three main policy instruments used to shape 
industrialisation, namely creating and supporting state 
corporations, trade or tariff policy and industrial 
decentralisation. Much of the historiography has focused 
on individual policy components, or on the (false) 
dichotomy between mining and manufacturing, but never 
have the components been considered together in the 
context of the MEC.
Such considerations are not purely of academic 
interest, designed merely to offer a historical account 
of how large-scale capital and the state ultimately 
collaborated with one another. For, the process by which 
this became possible, the peculiar creation and 
incorporation of Afrikaner capital, has profoundly 
affected the economic policies and outcomes realised over 
the post-war period. In particular, it led to a neglect 
of industrial policy, reinforcing the weaknesses of the 
inter-war period, and has left the economy particularly 
exposed in the 1980s once the gold/energy price boom had 
more than run its course, quite apart from the political 
crisis of the apartheid system itself.
As an interpretation of the thirties and the 
present, and the passage between them, this thesis is 
ambitious in drawing upon existing scholarship and 
insights whilst reformulating them in the light of the 
central place occupied by the MEC. It (im)poses a 
historiography in which economic and political 
developments need to be situated relative to the central 
themes that have been suggested - even where there may 
not be a direct connection with the MEC. Even in 
considering non-MEC sectors, such as agriculture or 
clothing, the policies adopted towards them and their
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apparent separation from the MEC will have been 
influenced by the latter's dynamic. For the MEC has been 
the main determinant of the power of agencies within the 
economy and, consequently, of the economic linkages that 
are or are not forged.
On the other hand, the extent to which these 
hypotheses can be justified is severely confined by the 
limited research available upon which to draw so that the 
issues addressed have been selective rather than 
comprehensive. There is much more to be done, on labour 
markets for example, and the political processes involved 
more generally. Nor can it be presumed that the 
historical development of these broadly defined changes 
has been even across the economy - for, as shown for the 
inter-war period (if not earlier) as their uneven 
starting point, they have been subject to various 
balances and structures of economic and political forces. 
We hope, however, to have made a start in unravelling the 




THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX AND THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA
INTRODUCTION - THE EVOLUTION OF THE MINERALS-ENERGY 
COMPLEX
The existence of integral linkages between mining 
and certain manufacturing sectors has been outlined in 
Chapter one, revealing a Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) 
whose core sectors consist of the mining and electricity 
sectors as well as a number of key sub-sectors of 
manufacturing, including iron and steel, chemicals, non- 
ferrous metal and non-metallic mineral products. The 
presence of this complex has been overlooked, and the 
degree of South Africa's industrialisation exaggerated, 
by the way in which industrial statistics have been 
constructed. The extent of industrial development has 
essentially been, exaggerated since, in 1989 , about 37% of 
activities within manufacturing were merely immediate 
downstream activities of the mining and energy sectors, 
as in metal-processing for example.1 The role of the MEC 
is thus shown to be far more important economically than 
usually acknowledged, particularly when its contribution 
to exports, imports and employment are taken into 
account. It encompasses a number of core economic sectors 
which continue to impart a determining influence on the 
pattern of industrialisation and economic performance.
The MEC, while central to the economy, has supported 
a range of upstream and downstream industries. Of these, 
the engineering industries have had the closest and 
longest historical links with the MEC, providing it with 
intermediate inputs and absorbing significant proportions 
of its outputs. Consequently, the failure of numerous 
past efforts to diversify out of the MEC is best
1 Based on 1989 value added, Chapter 1.
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understood by an examination of the development of the 
South African engineering industry. This paper explores 
this relationship between the MEC and the engineering 
sub-sectors of manufacturing, which produce what are 
usually termed "capital goods". Some empirical 
relationships are established between the expansion of 
MEC core sectors and engineering industries. These are 
traced historically, beginning with the inter-war period. 
Growth and decline in the engineering sectors are shown 
to have corresponded with fluctuations in MEC investment 
patterns.
At the aggregate level, engineering industries and 
capital goods have never acquired a dynamic that has been 
independent of the MEC. Although a handful of industries 
at sub-sectoral level have managed to forge independent 
paths, as evidenced by their export success, these should 
be regarded, firstly, as exceptions to the rule and, 
secondly, as indications of the latent potential of South 
African engineering which has never been cohesively 
supported by past industrial policies.
Yet, rather than a set of economic sub-sectors with 
input-output linkages, it is important to interpret the 
MEC as a system of accumulation, one that has varied in 
its nature over time. Its development has been mediated 
by relationships between English and Afrikaner fractions 
of capital through the state, giving rise to a 
conglomerate form of private and public corporate 
structure, straddling the mining, manufacturing, energy 
and financial sectors.
In Section one, it is argued that, in the inter-war 
period, the central impediment to diversification out of 
the MEC core and into engineering activities lay in the 
historical disjuncture between economic power wielded by
2 The MEC's historical origins, through the inter-war and post-war periods are respectively traced 
in Chapters 3 and 4.
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English capital and the political power of Afrikaner 
capital, Chapter 3. Industrialisation was largely 
confined to the MEC and failed to penetrate further. 
Industrial policy consisted of protection, other forms of 
subsidy and the creation of a state sector around steel 
production, rather than being linked to a strategy of 
diversification out of the mining base.
The impact of the disjuncture sector-by-sector and 
policy-by-policy was diverse, depending upon the balance 
and structure of economic and political forces, since the 
state depended upon the sources of revenue that could be 
generated by the MEC. However, a crucial consequence of 
the disjuncture between economic and political power was 
to preclude a strategy for industrialisation based on 
diversification out of the economic strengths (technical, 
financial, managerial and economies of scale and scope) 
to be found in mining. Mining capital itself was short of 
a guarantee that collaboration with the state would not 
lead eventually to policy penalties from a hostile 
government. Government could not secure its re-election 
if revealed to be pursuing policies overtly collaborative 
and supportive of mining capital. Thus, private capital 
was insufficiently secure politically to eschew a 
strategy of importing inputs and exporting profits. Nor 
could the state appropriate sufficient resources for 
industrialisation without prompting a flight of capital, 
thereby endangering access to the surplus that mining was 
able to make available.
Despite this, the sheer scale and continuity of 
investment concentrated in the MEC core has led to an 
engineering sector capable of producing a considerably 
diverse range of capital goods. Engineering sector 
developments were determined largely by the joint 
ventures formed by Iscor with private capital. Mining 
capital was less inclined to invest in ancillary 
activities given booming gold prices in the 1930s, but
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the onset of WWII led to considerable state coordination 
of national engineering industry activity for war 
production.
With the election of the National Party in 1948, 
efforts at diversification were hampered by the prior 
objective of creating large-scale Afrikaner capital which 
subsequently was to overcome the disjuncture between 
Afrikaner political and English economic power. The 
erosion of the disjuncture, while varying in rhythm and 
extent across sectors, was evident in the relations of 
conflict and compromise between English capital, on the 
one hand, and Afrikaner capital and state institutions on 
the other. In the 1940s and 1950s, the latter grew in 
strength, by the promotion of Afrikaner interests in 
general but, particularly, through the promotion of 
Afrikaner capital and its deployment in productive 
activities which, in the inter-war period, were largely 
the preserve of English capital.
The process of accumulation around the MEC in the 
1950s included the expansion of gold mining, electricity, 
coal and chemical sectors and the financing of these 
activities. In the financial sector, compromise with 
mining capital was evident in the creation of a long-term 
capital market, necessitated by the collective demands of 
productive activities within the MEC. Conflict resulted 
from state patronage of Afrikaner financial interests and 
similar dichotomies emerged within the electricity, coal 
and chemical industries. By 1960, activity within the MEC 
core sectors had increased considerably (a process that 
was to continue subsequently). GDP contributions from 
these sectors rose from 18% in 1953 to 21.5% by 1960, 
while non-MEC manufacturing remained static, fluctuating 
between 14-15%, (figure 1.6).
Section two covers the period between 1945 and 1960. 
Engineering activity was driven by a number of factors,
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all of which were related to massive expenditure on 
expanding MEC core sectors. Whereas mining and railway 
equipment requirements had dominated engineering demand 
in the inter-war period, specific sub-sectors of 
engineering, such as electrical machinery, grew through 
the development of electricity generation capacity in the 
1950s. Large-scale capital projects, particularly within 
the steel and chemicals sectors, also placed increasing 
demands on engineering capacity.
As a system of accumulation, the MEC represented the 
means by which Afrikaner fractions of capital sought to 
involve themselves in mainstream economic activity. While 
the 1950s saw Afrikaner capital consolidate its position 
within the financial sector and gain footholds in the 
coal mining, fuel and chemical sectors as a junior 
partner, the 1960s witnessed its much wider sectoral 
penetration of the economy, mainly within the core MEC 
sectors, and with an increasing interaction between 
itself and English capital.
The erosion of the disjuncture between English and 
Afrikaner capital was spurred on by foreign capital 
withdrawal after the Sharpeville massacre in 1961. It 
resulted in the interpenetration, firstly, of English and 
Afrikaner capital and, secondly, of different fractions 
of Afrikaner capital. However, the erosion was 
insufficient to support significant industrial 
diversification out of the MEC, which dominated economic 
activity and continued to determine the pattern of 
industrial development. The share of Afrikaner ownership 
of the mining sector increased significantly in the 
1960s. Initially, these were served by coal contracts 
from the growing state electricity giant, Escom. The 
acquisition in 1964 of General Mining by Federale Mynbou, 
with the help of the Anglo American Corporation, 
signalled a conscious accommodation of Afrikaner by 
English capital, of compromise in the face of conflict.
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This was accompanied by increasing state-led investment 
in the MEC, around energy, chemicals, processed minerals 
and armaments.
These divergent influences continued to have an 
impact on engineering in the decade of the 1960s, as 
shown in section three. The creation of a domestic 
telecommunications industry in the 1960s provided some 
diversification in engineering sector activity but did 
not significantly affect it in aggregate. The major 
impetus came from the creation of private sector basic 
iron and steel industries and their integration with 
newly acquired engineering companies, in the wake of 
foreign capital withdrawal after the Sharpeville massacre 
in 1961. These, together with large-scale chemical and 
mineral processing projects in the late 1960s, further 
boosted engineering output.
By the early 1970s, the erosion of the disjuncture 
between English and Afrikaner capital allowed the state, 
for the first time since the 1950s, to adopt coordinated 
industrial policies (discussed in chapters 4 and 5).
These revolved primarily around the MEC, following the 
gold and energy price rises in the early 1970s but 
coordination was uneven, varying across sub-sectors. In 
contrast to previous periods, a significantly greater 
degree of co-operation was evident between private 
capital as a whole and the state.
A far greater degree of both competition and
interpenetration between large-scale English and 
Afrikaner capital was evident which strengthened private 
capital as a whole. The emergence of six corporate "axes"
of private capital by the early 1980s, signalled the
metamorphosis of the historical disjuncture. Each "axis" 
consists of a conglomerate with extensive but varying 
interests in the mining, manufacturing and the financial 
sectors. Each sector is oligopolised by the conglomerates
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and that dominance is reproduced through simultaneous 
control of the financial sector.
In the 1970s, MEC industries benefited from both 
booming commodity prices and stable and conducive 
relations governing the profitability of internal 
markets. Non-MEC industries, while playing a supportive 
role to MEC mega-projects, either as suppliers of inputs 
and capital goods or as consumers of intermediate goods 
produced by the MEC core, were partly boosted by military 
demand during the Angolan war in the 1970s, and partly 
cushioned by conglomerate ownership and by tariff 
protection. This expanding MEC base, together with rising 
mechanisation of mining, also affected the engineering 
sector and is discussed in section four.
State industrial coordination during the 1970s, 
however, has been uneven across sectors and was short­
lived. As MEC projects such as mineral processing and 
Sasol were completed in the early 1980s, export commodity 
prices declined. Since there was no structural nor 
institutional basis laid down to diversify into non-MEC 
sectors, the latter declined according to the fortunes of 
the MEC (except for some sub-sectors driven by military 
and mega-project expenditure, whose buoyancy was 
prolonged until the late 1980s)
There is little empirical evidence of 
diversification out of the MEC core. Investment in these 
sectors declined relatively in the 1980s. Non-MEC 
manufacturing's contribution actually fell from 18% in 
1980 to 15% in 1985 but rose slightly to 16% by 1990 due 
partly to increased engineering sector activity during 
the construction of the Mossgas project.
A confluence of factors in the 1980s contributed to 
impeding any diversification out of the MEC, The 
orientation of the corporate sector and the nature and
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structure of the financial sector, together with policies 
of deregulation in the latter were not conducive to 
encouraging diversification. With most major mining and 
manufacturing assets having been acquired by 
conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s, a flurry of 
financial sector acquisitions followed deregulation in 
the 1980s, consolidating conglomerate power at the level 
of the financial sector. This is reflected in financial 
service contributions to GDP rising from 11% in 1980 to 
almost 15% in 1990, (figure 1.6).
Consequently, the industrial structure and 
institutional impetus that is based on the MEC has 
continued to guide South Africa's industrial trajectory 
into the 1990s. The process is increasingly being driven 
by private and parastatal industries towards further 
expanding the MEC core. Furthermore, orientation of state 
policy makers in the 1990s is increasingly hostile to any 
active industrial policy to diversify away from the MEC.
The prolonged stagnation of the economy that set in 
during the 1980s has led to a contraction and 
restructuring of major sections of the engineering 
industry within the conglomerate structure that 
simultaneously straddles the mining, manufacturing and 
the financial sectors. Thus, the processes by which 
segments of the engineering industry developed have 
varied. Some sub-sectors developed as articulations of an 
expanding MEC core (ISIC 381), while others grew upon 
demand for engineered goods (ISIC 382-384). Others 
developed as part of tightly coordinated state 
strategies, either directly (ISIC 383 telecommunications) 
or indirectly (ISIC 381-384 armaments). However, despite 
these varied achievements, there is little evidence of 
diversification out of dependence on the MEC. Instead, in 
the 1990s, the pattern of investment seems to be 
replicating that of the 1970s, focused on the MEC core,
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with engineering sectors playing a continuing and 
subservient role.
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TABLE 6.1 - ENGINEERING INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION
IS IC/( IDC) (1) ISIC/( I D Q C1)
CATEGORY CATEGORY
371 IRON & STEEL BASIC INDUSTRIES 383_ _ _ _ _ _ _ MACHINERY, ELECTRICAL
(3710) Iron & Steel (3831) Electrical Motors
(3710) Steel Pipe and Tube Mills (3831) Generators
(3831) Switchgear
372 NON-FERROUS METAL BASIC INDUSTRIES (3831) Switchboard Apparatus (Electromechanical)
(3720) Smelting, Blending,Refinlng (3831) Elect.Transmission & Distribution Equlpnt
(3720) Erection (3831) Electrical Control Instruments
(3720) Casting, Pressing,Corrugating (3831) Insulated Wire and Cables
(3720) Drawing (3831) Lamps and Tubes
(3831) Fittings and Lamp Connections
381 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS (3831) Conduits
(3811) Cutlery, Hand Tools, General Hardware (3831) Insulators
(3812) Metal Furniture, Fixtures of Metal (3832) Radio, Television & Communication
(3813) Builders' Hardware, Structural Steel (3833) Electrical Appliances
(3813) Prefabricated Steel Buildings (3833) Household Electrical Goods
(3813) Sheet Metal Goods (3839) Dry-Cell Batteries
(3819) Tin Goods (3839) Electric Globes
(3819) Cables (3839) Fluorescent Tubes
(3819) Wire and Wire Products (3839) Electrical Goods not classified elsewhere
(3819) Gates
(3819) Springs
(3819) Bolts and Nuts 384 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT (1)
(3819) Engineering Workshops (3840) Motor Vehicles
(3819) Welding, Fitting, Turning (3840) Caravans and Trallers
(3819) Electroplating, Anodislng (3840) Vehicle Bodies
(3819) Tinning, Galvanising (3840) Parts and Accessories
(3819) Enamelling, Spray Painting (3851) Shlpbuiidlng(ShIps,Freighters, Boats)
(3819) Plastic Coating (3851) Marine Engines
(3819) Sand Blasting of Metal Products (3851) Ship's Components
(3819) Foundry Industry (3851) Ship Conversion, Alteration and Scrapping
(3819) Steel Tanks & Containers (3852) RaiIway Locomotives
(3852) Railway Passenger Coaches
382 MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL (3852) RalIway Goods Trucks
(3821) Engines, Turbines (3852) Railway Equipment Components
(3822) Agricultural Machinery (3855) Aircraft Manufacture and Repair
(3823) Metal & Woodworking Machinery (3854-9) Motorcyc,Scootrs,BI eye,Animal Drawn Vehch
(3824) Special Industrial Machinery
(3825) Offlce&Computing(Mech)& Machinery 385 PROFESS 10NAL&SCI ENT IFIC EQUIPMENT(1)
(3829) Refrig..Washing Machines, Stoves,Ovens (386..) Laboratory and Scientific Equipment
(3829) Agricultural Tractors Measuring and Control Equipment
(3829) Air Conditioners, Refrigeration Plant Photographic and Optica! Goods
(3829) Vent III at Ion Machinery Watches and Clocks
(3829) Other Machinery
S o u r c e :  I D C  ( 1 9 9 2 ) .
( 1 )  I D C  s t a t i s t i c s ,  s h o w n  I n  b r a c k e t s  ( . . )  a r e  b a s e d  o n  
C S S  m o d i f i e d  I S I C  c a t e g o r i e s .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e i r  n u m b e r i n g  
f o r  S h i p b u i l d i n g ,  R a i l w a y  E q u i p m e n t  a n d  P r o f e s s i o n a l  &  
S c i e n t i f i c  E q u i p m e n t ,  s h o w n  a s  " 3 8 5 2 "  c a n  b e  m i s l e a d i n g  
I f  c o m p a r e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I S I C  c a t e g o r i e s  
w h i c h  d e f i n e  s i m i l a r  c a t e g o r i e s  u n d e r  I S I C  3 8 4 .
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1. THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY AND THE MEC - INTER-WAR 
FEATURES
This study considers the "engineering industry" to 
include those activities identified under International 
Standard Industrial Classification, ISIC 3800. The main 
sub-sectors include ISIC 381, Fabricated Metal Products; 
ISIC 382, Non-Electrical Machinery; ISIC 383, Electrical 
Machinery, ISIC 3 84, Transport Equipment and ISIC 3 85,
o
Professional and Scientific Equipment. Engineering also 
includes certain activities classified under ISIC 371 (in 
particular Steel Pipe and Tube Mills) and ISIC 372 
(Casting, Pressing and Corrugating), (table 6.I).4 In 
this study, ISIC 371 and 372 have sometimes been taken 
together with ISIC 3800 statistics both to emphasise 
linkages and because disaggregated data have not been 
readily available.
In the early part of the century, engineering 
activity in South Africa was largely dependent on the 
gold and diamond mining industries and, to a lesser 
extent, on South African Railways (SAR). Engineering 
workshops manufactured simple spare parts and repaired 
equipment.
The creation of Iscor in the mid-1920s, signalled 
the expansion of the MEC core out of mining to encompass 
mineral processing. Iscor also provided a great impetus 
to South Africa's engineering industry. Yet despite the 
establishment of a steel industry in the early 19 30s 
which rapidly encroached on downstream metal-intensive 
activities, the South African engineering industry never 
developed into a sector of importance in its own right. 
This is particularly significant, given that Iscor's
3 • ISIC 385 is relatively small and Is excluded from the rest of this study.
^ These sub-sectors also include the production of consumer goods, for example, stoves, electrical 
appliances and motor vehicles. Statistics are not detailed enough for disaggregation. However, as 
wl11 be shown, the forces shaping sectoral development were more related to the MEC than to 
consumer demand.
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output has grown continuously since 19 30, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, including a range of 
speciality steels and alloys, which it was forced to 
produce during WWII.
The reasons for the failure of engineering to 
develop further have varied over time but are rooted in 
the disjucture between economic and political power which 
shaped business strategies in and around the MEC. Mining 
capitals had preferred that a domestic primary steel 
industry be built through the expansion of one of their 
subsidiaries, the Union Steel Corporation (Usco), rather 
than on the expansion of Pretoria Iron Mines (PIM). They 
were driven by the desire to lower their input costs of 
steel as well as to appropriate the benefits of state 
protection and finance for primary steel production.
Afrikaner capital, in this instance represented by 
the coalition of interests around PIM, used its access to 
political power to force a limited diversification out of 
a dependence on mining, as epitomised by the process 
which saw PIM expand into Iscor, Chapter 3. Mining or 
English capital refused to subscribe to Iscor shares and, 
subsequently, paid more attention to expanding the mining 
industry after the abandonment of the gold standard in 
1932. iscor was able to expand to meet growing domestic 
demand at a relatively low cost since provision had been 
made for expansion in the original design.5 However, 
following the great depression, the international steel 
cartel had reorganised in the early 1930s and began 
dumping steel on the South African market through a steel 
marketing system which was controlled by their 
subsidiaries.
5 Iscor's early success was largely due to the favourable timing of the project. Meyer (1952, p.106) 
points out that "the original works at Pretoria, built during the depression years, cost, on 
average per unit of machinery, less than half the VanderbIjI Park works which have been built 
during the current period (early 1950s) of high prices." The Pretoria plant had also been built 
with provision in Its utility systems and site layout for expansion. It was thus able to double 
capacity between 1934 and 1939 at less than one third the original capital cost.
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Iscor soon found itself caught between the scissors 
of its main domestic client, the mining industry, and its 
international competitors. It was hit by dumping in 19 34, 
particularly from Belgium, whose steel industry was 
geared for export. Given the hostility of mining capital, 
Iscor was forced to accommodate the cartel in 1934 by 
signing an agreement for five years up to 1940. Iscor 
Chair, van der Bijl, and the Commissioner for Customs and 
Excise concluded this in 1936, which reserved for 
domestic producers, including Iscor, Union Steel,
Dunswart and George Stott, a capacity of 350,000 
tons/annum of rolled steel products and allocated sales 
quotas for the balance of the market by country of origin 
according to percentages of actual imports during 1934. 
Imported prices would be fixed by mutual agreement but 
would not exceed British home consumption prices plus 
cif. It should be noted that British producers were, at 
the time, among the least efficient. This arrangement 
benefited all parties except steel users and stunted the 
emergence of successful and competitive industries 
utilising steel. 'The advantages of the cartel arrangement 
cushioned Iscor's profits, raised state revenues and, 
were accommodated by mining users because of the rise in 
the gold price.
It is in this context that Iscor created several 
engineering industries in the 1930s, downstream of 
primary steel production with the objective of creating 
markets for its bulk steel. The marketing of Iscor's 
planned production of some 100,000t/a, nearly one quarter 
of the domestic market before 1933, (table 6.2), became a 
priority in the inter-war period. In 19 30, a controlling 
interest in Union Steel was obtained, providing Iscor 
with a complete marketing network.
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TABLE 6.2 - INTER-WAR STEEL MARKET, (’000)LONG TONS
1926 1929 1931 1933 1936 1937
Imports 427 553 337 340 544 599
Domestic Pig Iron Production 30 16 9 26 199 272
Domestic Primary & Semis Production(l) 41 51 56 - 291 310
Steel Imports as % tot.imports 11 11 9 10 10 11
Source: Richards (1940, p.265) compiled from Statistics 
of the Iron and Steel Industries.
(1) Produced using imports and pig iron as inputs.
A series of major downstream engineering industries 
were set up subsequently with (mainly) British 
engineering firms. In 1933, after an arrangement fell 
through with one of Britain's leading sheet works 
manufacturers, Lysaghts and Baldwins, Iscor decided to go 
ahead and build a rolling, pickling, galvanising and 
corrugating plant itself. Construction had already begun 
by the time protests were raised in Parliament that Iscor 
was now moving into secondary product manufacture. Iscor 
claimed that they would only make 30,000 of the 70,000 
tons of products then imported. A joint marketing company 
for sheets was then created with the import agents called 
Iscor, Baldwins, Lysaghts Sheet Sales Co. A further 
20,000t per annum was routed, via Union Steel, to a pipe 
making plant. South Africa's first local pipe manufacture 
had begun in Vereeniging in 19 25 to supply the mining 
industry. The English subsidiary, Stewarts and Lloyds, 
imported a second-hand seamless tube mill from Scotland. 
Square billet was sourced from adjacent Union Steel. In 
1928 a second mill was installed and, later, a third.
By 19 34, primary steel production had begun, (table
6.2), and was absorbed by a booming economy largely 
through gold mine expenditure. Union Steel's Vereeniging 
site became Iscor's vehicle for downstream steel 
processing. Union Steel entered into technical agreements
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with GKN to estabish a bolt and nut factory and with 
Mckinnon Chain Company of Ontario to build a chain 
factory, both at Vereeniging. The African Cables factory 
was established in 19 35 at Vereeniging. In this way,
Iscor bore the main financial risks with the private 
sector companies providing technical expertise under 
favourable conditions, and this constituted a pattern of 
state-led industrialisation that, subsequently, has 
continued. By 1937, Union Steel production had risen to 
70,OOOt from 20,000t in 1930, Clark (1987, p.114). 
Downstream industries around Pretoria were also set up 
such as the Pretoria Steel Construction Company in 1935, 
a joint venture between Iscor and Hubert Davies to make 
steel components, mainly for Iscor's own use.
While Iscor formed joint downstream ventures with 
domestic subsidiaries of foreign capital, it also entered 
into an accommodation with domestic English capital in 
ventures that were sited in the MEC mining core. In 1937, 
Iscor created the forerunner of the ferroalloys industry, 
the African Metals Corporation (Amcor), initially to mine 
iron ore on Iscor-owned properties. Although Iscor and 
Union Steel-owned 50% of the joint venture, other 
participants included Stewarts and Lloyds, Baldwins, 
Dorman Long and Lewis and Mark's African and European 
Investment Company (which also jointly owned union Steel) 
and Anglo American Corporation (AAC), Clark (1987, 
p.114) .
Joint ventures with English mining capital also 
extended to Iscor's coal mining activities. Clark (1987, 
p.115) reports that this was driven by cost 
considerations and by Iscor's desire not to be seen to be 
encroaching on what was traditionally the preserve of 
English capital;
the Corporation moved to expand its control
over all phases of production, One of its first
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allied enterprises concerned the supply of 
coal, necessary to produce coke for the blast 
furnaces. The Corporation held coal-bearing 
property near Witbank and, fearing being left 
"entirely at the mercy of coal owners", 
proceeded to investigate the possibilities of 
coking these deposits. Finding the coal 
satisfactory, the Corporation leased its 
properties to the Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Company (JCI), one of the major gold 
mining houses, which undertook to supply Iscor 
with the coal mined from the property. The two 
companies - Iscor and JCI - then proceeded to 
establish a third company, the Phoenix 
Colliery, for the purpose of carrying on the 
mining. Owning the major assets of the Phoenix 
Colliery, Iscor in effect controlled the 
company and the Corporation's supply of coal 
without incurring production costs or appearing 
to be expanding into a vertical monopoly.
Thus, the disjuncture encouraged a particular form 
of engineering activity that expanded in scope to serve 
the MEC but, at the same time, was impeded from acquiring 
an independence from the MEC. Iscor was forced to create 
downstream engineering industries for its main product, 
because mining capital was not willing to invest in such 
activity. Yet mining was the main market for 
engineering's output. Such relations served to constrain 
diversification and to contain economic activity to the 
MEC core, impeding the adoption of a cohesive 
industrialisation strategy until conflict was overridden 
by the demand for armaments during WWII. Then, a martial 
organisation of industry and production boosted the 
engineering sector, but its impact was dissipated after 
1945.
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But there were other initiatives which did 
contribute to the expansion of the engineering industry. 
These included expansions driven by the global operations 
of multinational corparations and investments driven by 
domestic non-mining capital. Metal Box and Anglo 
Transvaal Consolidated Investments are two examples.
In 19 33, Metal Box set up a tin box plant in South 
Africa, a decision driven by global marketing factors and 
the fear that competitors might establish themselves 
first. The world tin box market was then dominated by two 
US corporations, Continental and American Can, who also 
controlled the can making machinery market. Inter-war 
British import policies of Imperial Preference thus 
induced such corporations to set up operations in the 
Colonies. In 19 30, Metal Box had entered into a 
technological and market restricting agreement with the 
vastly larger Continental, following a battle for the 
English market with American Can. The latter, in 1933, 
was seeking to extend its influence in the Empire through 
possibly setting up a plant in South Africa.6
In order not to jeopardise its U.K. operation, only 
assembly was undertaken locally and Metal Box imported 
its tinplate inputs, forging linkages with the domestic 
primary steel industry much later. In addition, a 
domestic monopoly was established through a joint venture 
involving Metal Box(77%), Maythams1(a local family-owned 
canmaker)(16%) and Continental Can(ll%). In the post-war 
period, delays in machinery deliveries from England 
prompted Metal Box to build a precision workshop in 
Epping in 1951.
For a small domestic corporation like Anglo 
Transvaal Consolidated Investments (Anglovaal), having a 
foothold in mining was essential in the inter-war period. 
However, it required large capital investments which the
6 Reader (1976, p.105).
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company did not have. Instead, Anglovaal adopted a 
strategy of diversification in order both to accumulate 
sufficient funds to enter the mining industry and also to 
dampen cyclical cash flows associated with mineral 
markets. Even so, Anglovaal's diversification was 
initially confined to industries within the MEC core like 
cement and bricks, Chapter 3.
The potential for industrial diversification based 
on domestic steel manufacture was not fuly exploited 
prior to WWII, partly because of a lack of commitment of 
English/mining capital. It did not support the 
establishment of a domestic steel producer based on 
Pretoria Iron Mines and did not buy into Iscor when given 
the opportunity, leaving it to the state to take up a 
majority ownership. The expansion of Iscor in the 19 30s 
was financed by the state, there being little private 
sector response to take up Iscor debentures. At the time, 
most private capital investment was routed into the 
mining industry.
Seifsa (1966, p.12) lamented that, during most of 
the inter-war period, the Chamber of Mines refused to 
assist the Transvaal engineering employers organisation 
by encouraging local manufacture through increasing 
domestic purchase.
The Chamber... did not associate industrial 
development in South Africa with the necessary 
suppression of costs which was essential to 
maintain its profit earning basis.
Engineering employers, represented by the Federated 
Chamber of Industries, were divided according to region 
in their support for Iscor. Coastal industries feared 
higher costs of steel from an inland plant whose products 
would be subject to high rail tariffs, while inland 
engineering works welcomed the possibility of cheap steel
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inputs which they were previously denied by imports 
subjected to high rail tariffs and by higher cost private 
sector producers like Union Steel, for example, who had 
obtained protection for their industries.
Despite the lack of support, engineering, together 
with iscor, expanded rapidly in the 19 30s to meet booming 
demand from mining following the abandonment of the gold 
standard. Iscor capacity was doubled almost immediately 
after production began in 1933 to 334,000t/a by 1938, 
about one third of national demand of 950,000 in 19 37.
The enormous capital requirements for expansion were met 
through parliamentary allocations, after private 
investors showed no interest in taking up debentures; 
£1.0m plus a further £1.5m was raised in this way between 
19 3 3 and 19 38.
Mining houses, on the whole, focused attention 
preferentially on expanding mining. One exception was the 
development of diamond drilling equipment by De Beers, 
but this "diversification" was integrally linked to the 
MEC. Firstly, it was driven by the need to sell surplus 
industrial diamond "boart" or low grade industrial 
diamonds which were in excess supply in the 1930s.
Secondly, diamond production was at the heart of the 
economic and political disjuncture in the 1930s. De 
Beers, by then, had gained control over the global supply 
of diamonds and had stabilised the market during the 
depression by drastically reducing output. In 1932, as an 
indication of the power of mining capital over the South 
African economy, De Beers ordered the closure of all 
diamond mines in South Africa. De Beers' Diamond 
(marketing) Corporation simultaneously reduced diamond 
offtakes from suppliers outside South Africa.7 Financing 
the diamond stockpile valued at £15,lm in 1932 was costly
7 Innes (1984, p .106).
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and one of the solutions was to find new applications for 
lower grade stones.
A major use was in drill crowns in gold mining. In 
early days, these were made manually by the "drill- 
runner" on the drilling site by drilling holes into soft 
steel bit blanks and hammering 3 carat diamonds into the 
holes. Costs of such diamonds was £27/carat whereas 
stockpiles of boart were available, mainly from the 
Congo, at 1/2 crown/carat. The round boart soon replaced 
the more expensive material following research work done 
from about 19 34 by De Beers.
Boart Products South Africa was founded in 1936 by 
Ernest Oppenheimer to utilise low grade industrial 
diamonds. By 1938, Boart had developed a powder press 
diamond crown which used lower grade, smaller and less 
uniform diamond "cleavage" whose dimensions did not 
facilitate hand setting. The powder press also replaced 
the time consuming manual setting of stones. War 
production after 19 39 raised the demand for industrial 
diamond products such as abrasive powder for machining 
hard armament steels and diamond die making for drawing 
fine electric copper wire for use in radar electronics 
and materials like tungsten carbide.
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Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years (1960).
(1) Transport Equipment is shown but is misleading 
because it included the activities of garage workshops, 
spares dealers, panel beaters and spray painters until 
1956, when these were removed and measured under other 
non-manufacturing categories.
(2) The International Standard Industrial Classification 
system was adopted after 1950, which resulted in 
considerable reallocation of activities from Basic Metal 
Industries (ISIC 3700) to Fabricated Metal Products (ISIC 
381) and Non-Electrical Machinery (ISIC 382).
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In terms of industrial policy, the disjuncture 
between economic and political power precluded the 
adoption of cohesive strategies for further developing 
the engineering sectors for most of the 1930s. But with 
the demands of war production, this vacuum gave way to a 
highly centralised, planned and coordinated programme 
which considerably raised engineering output, (figure 
6 .1 ).
About £lm worth of special purpose machine tools 
were imported and war production was tightly co-ordinated 
by different state agencies including the Directorate of 
Supplies, Directorate of War Supplies, the Controller of 
Machine Tools and the Controller of Ship Repair. Labour 
shortages prompted the appointment of a Controller of 
Industrial Manpower and stringent price control was 
levied on ferrous and non-ferrous material. Factory 
capacity was appropriated for arms production.
Wartime production also required Iscor to raise 
output and produce several special grades of steel 
despite the shortage of equipment. These included armour 
plated steel and alloy steel for forged gun barrels for 
howitzers and anti-tank guns. Ship repair requirements 
drove the construction of the Vanderbijlpark works, with 
the construction between 1941-1943 of a plate mill. 
Imported components included electrical equipment and 
roller tables, Seifsa (1966, p.21). In 1945, Iscor 
production was 520,000t/a rising to 575,000t/a by 1947.
Most of the efforts of the engineering industry were 
directed to armaments production during the war for 
bombs, armoured cars, mortars, hand grenades, military 
spares and ship repair. Seifsa (1966, p.21) estimates 
that between 36-56% of Iscor's output during WWII was 
utilised in armament production for this purpose, (table
6.3). Most of this output was measured under "Basic Metal 
Industries" category, (figure 6.1).
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TABLE 6.3 - ARMS INDUSTRY STEEL CONSUMPTION
Number Tons(1)
Armoured fighting vehicles 57000 570000
Military Motor Vehicles 35000 70000
Ships repaired (1939-1945) 12000 60000
Helmets 1500000 750
Shells & shell cases 50000
Mortar bombs, grenades, land mines 28000
Small arms & ammunition 20000
Bombs 70000
Aircraft hangers & bridges 60000
Total Steel Consumption 928750
Annual Average Consumption 1940-1944 185750
% of Iscor 1939 capacity 56%
% of Iscor 1945 capacity 36%
Source: Seifsa (1966, p.16).
(1) Assume fighting vehicles are 10 tons and military 
vehicles 2 tons each. Assume 5 tons steel used per ship. 
Assume 2000 helmets/ton.
The joint venture corporation, Amcor, began making 
ferrochrome for armaments production and the Vanderbijl 
Engineering Corporation (Vecor) was set up in 19 38 to 
supply heavy castings as components for heavy engineering 
goods, particularly for the mining and electricity 
industries, Christie (1984, p.122). The Chair of Iscor 
and Escom, van der Bijl, was made Director General of War 
Supplies and chose to continue the relationship Iscor had 
previously forged with private capital, iscor 
concentrated on making bulk billets and supplying these 
to its private sector partners for further processing.
The private engineering companies that had close 
relationships with Iscor were the main beneficiaries of 
contracts for wartime production of guns, cannon and 
ammunition. The South African government had undertaken 
to supply the allies with £lm/month of ammunition. By 
1942, van der Bijl had installed £3m of equipment in 
various engineering company workshops. A further £3m was
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spent on SAR workshops, the Central Ordinance Factory in 
Johannesburg and at the South African Mint.
Dorman Long received most of Iscor's armour plate 
and made military vehicles, bridges and aircraft hangars. 
Stewarts and Lloyds received massive equipment 
expenditure and became the country's main shell factory. 
Usco made bombs in its foundry and bolts, nuts and copper 
wire. Iscor entered into agreement with about 40 private 
engineering firms, who added most of the value and made 
the greater profits, even though Iscor might have been 
capable of similar activity. In addition, Iscor's 
production of special steels and alloys raised its costs. 
Usco profits rose by 30% during the war and Stewarts and 
Lloyds paid dividends of 20%. Conversely, those 
engineering firms not associated with Iscor did not 
receive major defence contracts and their profitabilty 
suffered including Dunswarts, George Stott and Scaw.
Clearly then, the engineering sector prior to WWII 
had expanded to meet the changing requirements of the 
MEC, which itself was diversifying out of gold and 
diamond mining. The demands of war production further 
expanded the scope of engineering activities but 
contraction immediately followed the dismantling of the 
martial system of coordinating war output.
329
2. THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY AND THE MEC - 1945-1960
After the war, the cohesion around war production 
dissipated and most of the machine tools used were sold 
to private and joint venture companies in which they were 
installed. This consolidated their position in the 
domestic market at a time when imported equipment was in 
short supply given the reconstruction needs of Europe. 
Thus Iscor continued its coordinating role and the 
expected post-war recession for engineering did not 
materialise. Instead the engineering industry expanded on 
growing demand from the mining industry, particularly the 
Orange Free State gold field (FSG) development, from 
uranium production facilities and from secondary 
industries.
In the post-war period, Afrikaner capital 
concentrated on the pooling of finance, in the first 
instance, and, secondly, in directing it increasingly at 
large-scale investment projects, particularly around coal 
mining and chemicals. English capital, on the other hand,' 
focused on developing the FSG. The industrial policies of 
the National Party (NP) government, after its election in 
1948, were mediated by the need to support the 
empowerment of Afrikaner capital, on the one hand, and to 
respond to minting capital's demands for railway and 
electricity infrastructure, on the other.
The provision of the latter in turn raised demand 
for engineered equipment as did demand from mining 
capital's development of the FSG and other expanding MEC 
industries in the 1950s, including uranium extraction, 
coal mining, electricity generation, railway 
infrastructure and rolling stock, oil refining and 
chemicals production. One component of state industrial 
policy, namely the creation of state corporations around 
the MEC, continued into the 1950s with the creation of
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the Sasol fuel-from-coal plant, which itself placed 
demands on domestic engineering industries.
Thus, while engineering industries flourished, there 
were no coordinated or cohesdve industrial policies which 
were designed to ensure its continuation independently of 
the MEC. In the 1950s, then, a considerable expansion of 
the engineering sector took place. Value added more than 
doubled in the decade, from £70m to £160m. The bulk of 
activity was in ISIC 371 (Iron and Steel Basic 
Industries), ISIC 372 (Non-ferrous Metal Basic 
Industries) and ISIC 381 (Fabricated Metal Products). But 
growth in ISIC 382 (Non-Electrical Machinery), ISIC 383 
(Electrical Machinery) was considerable, with value added 
rising from £22m to £55m. ISIC 384 (Transport Equipment) 
data prior to 1956 included a range of trading activities 
like motor spares dealers and was misleading in 
indicating manufacturing activity.
In this policy vacuum, Iscor, through its control of 
bulk steel, exercised considerable influence on the 
structure of the engineering sector. It did this in two 
ways. Firstly, the expansion of Iscor provided a major 
boost to post-war engineering sector growth. In 1945, 
Iscor production was 520,000t/a rising to 575,000t/a by 
1947, recorded under Basic Metal Industries, (figure 
6.1). Anticipated demand after WWII led to the expansion 
of Vanderbijlpark by more than 360,000t/a. This was 
subsequently raised and by 1952, 1.2mt of ingots were 
being produced at both works, representing about 850,000t 
of finished products.
While this matched consumption, Meyer (1952, p.104) 
points out that "throughout the post war period, there 
has been much unsatisfied demand for steel", and Falkena 
(1980, p.18) points out that steel prices were controlled 
and constant between 1952 and 1970 in order to stimulate 
downstream usage. This also had the effect of lowering
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Iscor profitablity, leading to the need for Iscor to 
raise capital on local and foreign markets to fund 
deficits. Meyer (1952, p.105) refers to the
...widely credited fallacy that the South 
African Iron and Steel Industry enjoys great 
natural protection in the South African market 
... capital charges are greatly inflated by the 
cost of importing most of the plant and 
equipment ... the capital cost per unit of 
machinery of Iscor ranges from 50 per cent to 
100 per cent more than that of leading American 
steel firms and approximately similar 
differences would appear to exist between South 
African and British cost ... this difference 
must be attributed to that costs of importing 
(insurance, freight, customs duties, landing 
charges, etc., and the cost of administering 
the importations).
Secondly, Iscor continued to set up joint downstream 
engineering sector ventures in the years following WWII. 
Iscor used the fact that steel was in short supply 
internationally to change its terms of trade with 
customers. Clark (1987) records that Iscor subsidiaries 
Usco, Amcor and Vecor were assured of supply, but their 
competitors were not and had to rely on high priced 
imports, if available. At the time, 80% of local orders 
were filled by Iscor with 20% imported. Iscor1s long time 
partners, Stewarts and Lloyds and Dorman Long, received 
preferential treatment. The mines received most of 
Iscor’s sheet steel output and half of Iscor's rail 
output, the SAR receiving the balance of rail and pig 
iron output.
In 1947, private (and unprivileged) engineering 
firms, Dunswart (owned by Anglovaal), Scaw Alloys (owned 
by several mining houses) and Wire Industries (owned by
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Fedvolks) threatened to set up their own steel works, 
iscor responded by doubling pig iron allocations to Scaw, 
who then sold processed billets to Dunswart. Wire 
Industries proposed setting up wire manufacture in 
competition to Iscor's planned wireworks, which would 
meet total national demand. In 1950, Iscor and Fedvolks 
agreed to a joint venture to rationalise the industry.
Thus, though the forward linkages forged by Iscor's 
joint ventures with private capital engineering activity 
within the Fabricated Metal Product sub-sector (ISIC 381) 
grew considerably, (figure 6.1). When the ISIC standard 
was adopted in 1950, more than half of what was 
previously measured under the Basic Metal Industries was 
reallocated to ISIC 381. Table 6.1 indicates the type of 
activity associated with ISIC 381, namely a mixture of 
simple to complex metal working sub-sectors.
One of the more important generic industries within 
ISIC 381 is the foundry industry, which has forged 
further linkages with other sub-sectors within 
engineering. Webster (1985, p.56) records both internal 
changes and increased output from the foundry industry in 
the post-war period. Quoting Thomson (1946, p.114):
Before the war the majority of South African 
foundries were engaged mainly in jobbing work and it 
was the general practice for moulding to be carried 
out by hand. The repetition work involved in the 
execution of large orders for the Director General 
of War Supplies has stimulated the use of foundry 
machinery.
While Webster is concerned with the impact this had 
on craft unions which organised foundry labour, the post­
war period up until 1960 did not witness any significant 
changes in the organisation of the foundry industry, 
which exhibited a bimodal ownership structure. A number
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of large foundries dominated a considerable proportion of 
output, while the balance was made up by many small 
jobbing foundries. The main markets served in the 1950s 
were the expanding mining industry and the increased 
expenditure on railway and power generation capacity.
Scaw metals, for example, diversified in the 1950s. 
In 1949 a steel foundry was erected and a ball forge 
commissioned in 1951 to provide grinding media for the 
expanding mining industry. A technical agreement was 
concluded with General Steel Industries of USA and UK 
Steel Castings Corporation in 1956 for technology to cast 
steel bogies and other components for the expanding 
railway system. Simultaneously, a technical agreement 
with Abex Corporation (USA) facilitated the manufacture 
of freight car wheels and later earth moving and heat 
resistant steel castings, Innes (1984, p.197)
Engineering expansion, then, was directly related to 
the MEC and most of the sub-sectors that emerged were 
also limited by a dependence on the MEC continuing into 
the 1990s. One exception to this was the example of De 
Beers subsidiary Boart.8 Unlike many other domestic 
engineering industries, Boart's motivation was 
historically driven by factors around the global diamond 
market, immediately after WWII Boart began acquiring 
companies operating mainly in the USA and Canadian 
markets which utilised diamonds/boart in advanced 
technological applications. They began with the takeover 
of the cast set-drilling crown factory in Johannesburg of 
Boyles Brothers of Salt Lake City. Boyles had just been 
taken over by the Barlows group at the time.
Subsequently, a direct share in the Salt Lake City 
company was acquired by Boart.
An association was formed with Christensen Diamond 
Products of Salt Lake City in 1953. Christensen was a
® Most data are sourced from Boart (1986) and various edIt lens of Boart International News.
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buyer of Boart's diamonds and were experts in diamond 
tool manufacture for oilfield drilling. This gave Boart 
access to Christensen's growing international network and 
later led to closer relationship with Longyear, which was 
subsequently acquired by Boart. At the same time Boart 
Hard Metals bought Gardiner Steel of Noranda Quebec and 
Canadian Rock to access the Canadian mining industry 
market. In 1960, Boart set up a plant in Southern 
Rhodesia and also in Zambia in 1963 after breakup of the 
federation to make diamond crowns, hand hard metal tools 
and provide contract drilling.
Contract drilling has been a major part of Boart*s 
activities. Anglo American's development of the Free 
State Goldfields in the 1950s provided Boart the 
opportunity to build its contract drilling service 
division. The service was later extended to other mining 
houses. In 1951, Boart pioneered a contract sales system 
for long term stability of tungsten carbide and diamond 
tipped products, selling drill steel by footage drilled 
rather than on an individual basis. By 1955, their Crown 
Mines factory was making 8,000 drill crowns/month and the 
Springs plant, 60,000 drill stems/month. In subsequent 
years contract drilling became a central part of Boart's 
global expansion.
In 1947 Boart began making diamond saws (for cutting 
sandstone) and wheels at a new factory in a joint venture 
with Impregnated Diamond Products of Gloucester. An 
association was also formed in 1960 with the Wendt 
Company of Germany, which made diamond impregnated 
grinding wheels and grinding machines. The Hard Metals 
Company, formed in 1949, marked Boart's diversification 
into tungsten carbide tipped mining tools. It began with 
an unsuccessful approach to Swedish tungsten carbide 
technology leaders. Boart subsequently formed an 
association with UK's Murex Ltd. Hard Metals became the 
largest manufacturer of cemented tungsten carbide
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products in the Southern Hemisphere and the core of an 
important part of Boart's operations.
Initial products were chisel rods for rock drills. 
Boart had already developed experience during the war 
years of tungsten carbide applications in armour piercing 
shell, metal forming dies, synthetic diamond 
manufacturing components and machine tool inserts. 
Tungsten carbide still remained a small part of Boart's 
operations. In 1951, 75% of profits still came from sales 
and processing of industrial diamonds.
In terms of the engineering industry as a whole, 
Boart's apparent "success" in becoming an international 
engineering company is clearly an exception, due to its 
ownership links and because of the monopoly control that 
De Beers had held over the global diamond market. While 
Boart itself globalised its operations from an early 
date, it did not play any significant role in advancing 
South African engineering output beyond the production of 
drill steel and drill bits for local consumption. In the 
1960s, it transferred considerable manufacturing 
operations to Shannon and, in the 1990s, has also shifted 
research operations to Ireland.
However, engineering activity also extended to more 
complex goods from an early stage. Prior to WWII, the 
only Electrical Machinery activity (ISIC 383) of note was 
in armature winding and repairs. The scope of activities 
expanded during WWII with the production of batteries, 
electric motors, transformers, cables, motor-starters, 
cranes and searchlight generators. Most of these plants 
were set up by subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations.
After the war, even before the introduction of 
import tariffs and controls, the English Electric Company 
decided to set up local manufacturing facilities,
336
inviting Roger Price, son of Bernard Price head of the 
power utility, VFTPC, to establish the factory. English 
Electric initially made small electric motors at their 
Benoni factory. By 1958, it was manufacturing radio 
transmitters and components, mine pumps, mine winders, 
locally designed radar sets, power station switchgear, 
Marconi communications equipment, industrial closed 
circuit television, 400kva transformers and large 
electric motors, Christie (1984, p.158). The local 
subsidiary of British GEC expanded its plant after the 
war to make railway signal gear, X-ray machines and gold 
mine air compressors. Philips began light bulb 
manufacture in 1947 and by 1958 had established a local 
electronics research laboratory. Siemens, who had 
established a local import agency in 1923, was 
manufacturing electrical switchgear by 1957 and opened 
its Waltloo telephone factory in 1961. By 1960, output 
from the Electrical Machinery sub-sector had grown 
considerably, (figures 1 and 2).
From the mid-1950s up until the early 1980s, South 
Africa was one of the world's most important markets for 
railway equipment, ISIC 384. In 1957, Union Carriage of 
Australia, set up a subsidiary in South Africa to 
manufacture locomotives, coaches and wagons with 
production beginning in 1959. Railway equipment 
production, recorded under ISIC 384, (table 6.1), 
involves a number of interlinked activities across the 
engineering sector. A considerable proportion of railway 
equipment components would be sourced from ISIC 381 
where, for example, wagon wheels, bogies and other items 
would be cast in the foundry sector. ISIC 381 would also 
produce bolts, nuts, springs and sheet metal goods and 
might also provide suitable treatment of finished 
components by, for example, anodising, galvanising, 
electroplating, sand blasting or spray painting assembled 
components. Thus the expansion of the Fabricated Metal 
Products sector in the 1950s should be attributed to the
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forging of downstream links from the MEC core as well as 
expanding to support other engineering industries in ISIC 
382, 383 and 384.
2.1 FINANCING THE ENGINEERING SECTORS
Up to the 1950s, the major sources of domestic 
capital were internally generated through mining profits 
centralised within the mining finance houses, 
particularly within Anglo American. Major capital 
expenditure was locked up in developing the Free State 
Goldfields for much of the 1950s, Christie (1984, p.160). 
While conventional wisdom holds that it was the 
availability of finance that constrained the development 
of manufacturing, generally, this is based on a 
conceptual divide between financing mining in preference 
to "manufacturing".9 In fact, it has been the MEC core 
which has always been accorded priority in financing, in 
turn, driving other sectors through linkages of 
ownership, inputs and outputs.
Meyer (1952, p.106), in partial recognition of this, 
illustrates the crucial trade offs that were being made 
at the time over capital allocations, that these largely 
concerned capital-intensive core sectors of the MEC;
The Union appears to have been in a better 
position recently as far as investment capital 
is concerned than it has been in the past few 
years, but the supply is not unlimited and 
there are many claims to be satisfied including 
those from the Gold Mines, the oil from Coal 
Industry, etc. Recent events have shown that, 
to name but two, the South African Railways and 
Harbours and the Electricity Supply Commission, 
require considerable sums for capital 
development. Both these organisations supply
^ For example, see Dlckman (1973).
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essential services to the Steel Industry and 
there is no doubt that the very considerable 
demand which the Steel Industry makes on them 
adds substantially to the severe burden on 
their resources. Were Iscor, irrespective of 
other needs, to enter the capital market for 
the £25,000,000 to £30,000,000 which would be 
required for a new steel making unit, the 
capital available to these and other service 
organisations would be reduced while, by the 
same token, the demands made upon them would be 
considerably increased. This is but an 
illustration of the consideration which must be 
given to preserving balance in the growth of 
our industrial economy.
As has been shown, a large portion of the 
engineering industry was financed by an articulation of 
Iscor's steelmaking activity. Many of these industries 
were joint ventures with, either, domestic or foreign 
capital. Other engineering industries were established by 
non-mining capital, usually subsidiaries of British, US 
and German multinational corporations, Christie (1984, 
p.158) to take advantage of burgeoning expenditure around 
the MEC. However, the divisions have been shown to be 
blurred, considering the interlinkages within engineering 
sub-sectors.
Where direct MEC activities were involved, even 
mining capital was not averse to developing engineering 
sectors, as the Scaw and Boart examples show. 
International capital also did not miss the opportunity 
of growing markets within the expanding MEC. In the early 
1950s a consortium of nine US banks put up a $20m loan to 
the Union in anticipation of big orders for US mining 
machinery, Innes (1984) quotes Henry (1963, p.288). Thus 
the financing of engineering industries should be viewed 
broadly as a combination of state, domestic and
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transnational activity, which was largely sustained by 
domestic profits. Norval (1962, p.96) argued that most 
foreign subsidiaries within the manufacturing sector were 
funded from internally generated funds.
In conclusion then, considerable expansion of 
engineering activity took place between 1945 and 1960. 
However, in the context of the overall economy, 
diversification out of the MEC and further into 
engineering was constrained, as in the inter-war period. 
This was despite developments in drilling and cutting 
technology, the ability to manufacture a wide range of 
speciality steels and to engineer them into a range of 
military equipment and civilian activities such as ship 
repair and the capacity to manufacture a considerable 
range of mining and electrical equipment. The potential 
of this sector was evident during WWII when policies of 
coordination and the pooling of resources demonstrated an 
enormous capacity to expand and innovate.
One of the reasons for the failure to build on these 
achievements lies in the disjuncture between economic and 
political power, identified in Chapter 3, which is shown 
above, for example, to have given birth to Iscor and 
simultaneously limited the scope of its diversification. 
After WWI, Afrikaner capital strengthened itself by 
pooling finance in the first instance and, secondly, 
directing it at large-scale investment projects, 
particularly mining. English capital's attention was 
occupied by the FSG development until the mid-1950s.
After this, investments in downstream industries 
increased, largely through acquisition following post- 
Sharpeville disinvestment and through major investment in 
the MEC core.
Although local manufacture was encouraged, the 
mechanisms varied with different approaches for certain 
sectors, iscor continued to coordinate a large part of
340
the engineering sector through joint ventures. In 
strategic sectors such as fuels and chemicals, 
intervention was more direct, with the creation of Sasol 
in the mid-1950s. For telecommunication equipment, the 
industry was started under a long-term state-TNC 
agreement for local manufacture, which subsequently 
involved Afrikaner capital. Beyond using its purchasing 
power for telecommunication equipment, few other 
supportive policies were pursued - even sub-sectoral 
monitoring of productivity, evaluation of the impact of 
policy on sector development, etc. were never carried 
out. So, by the record of the policy implementing 
agencies of the state themselves, industrial policy was 
poorly managed, Chapter 5.
Tariff protection is often advanced as a motivating 
factor for the establishment of domestic manufacturing, 
particularly the production of easily substitutable 
consumer goods. In the case of the engineering sector, 
the main motivator in the 1950s was, in fact, the 
expansion of MEC activity through the FSG gold field 
development, the expansion of supporting electricity and 
railway infrastructure and increasing capital and energy 
intensive manufacturing industries. The achievements in 
engineering should also be viewed in the context that 
capital goods have historically been exempt from tariffs
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3. THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY AND THE MEC - 1960-1970
The decade between 1960 and 1970 is acknowledged as 
one of high manufacturing sector growth. Elsewhere, it 
has been argued that much of this growth was associated 
with the expansion of core MEC sectors, Chapter 4. Some 
segments of the engineering industry grew faster than 
others during that period but, in the main, none of the 
engineering sectors acquired a momentum independent from 
the MEC.
During the 1960s, engineering sector growth varied 
across sub-sector according to different influences, 
(figure 6.2). Disinvestment after the Sharpeville 
massacre in 1961 was absorbed by both English and 
Afrikaner capital who acquired footholds in a large 
number of manufacturing sub-sectors. Here the ownership 
component of the MEC came to the fore. As conglomeration 
and concentration of ownership increased across all 
sectors of the economy, it partly facilitated increased 
capital-intensive industrial activities and production 
methods, such as mechanised mining and these, in turn, 
stimulated the engineering sectors.
Major investments were made in the 1960s in the 
Basic Iron and Steel sector by private, mainly English 
capital. These integrated steel works were extensions of 
their mining operations and, as Iscor had done in 
previous decades, these were vertically integrated with 
existing downstream operations and new acquisitions in 







FIGURE 6.2 - ENGINEERING SECTOR VALUE ADDED 1961-1970
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Source: South African Statistics (1990).












Investments in mining, mineral processing, chemicals 
and infrastructural expenditure on railways to support 
the MEC continued. These placed demands across all 
engineering sectors, particularly ISIC 381 and 382. 
Electrical equipment, ISIC 383, was most affected by two 
main activities namely, electricity generation expansion 
and the state's industrial strategy for telecommunication 
self-sufficiency. However, the strategy was limited in 
scope and failed to achieve a dynamic of its own by the 
end of the decade when local manufacture was outmoded by 
new technologies.
The growth of the automotive industry (ISIC 3 84) 
also took place in the 1960s and placed increasing 
demands on the engineering sectors, particularly ISIC 
381. The local content programme is acknowledged to have 
failed because of its fragmentation and this, not only in 
the motor industry but in all supporting engineering sub­
sectors, precluded the achievement of economies of scale 
and undermined the prospect of the automotive industry 
leading a sustainable diversification out of the MEC 
core.
3.1 GROWTH IN ISIC 371, BASIC STEEL OUTPUT
Major investements were made in the Basic Iron and 
Steel industries in the 1960s which had cascading effects 
on the engineering sector, (figure 4.4). Firstly, Iscor 
made significant and continuous investments in their 
existing plants. Secondly, private capital entered the 
primary steel sectors and simultaneously began to 
integrate this with upstream and downstream operations.
The Anglo American Corporation established the 
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation in 1961. It was
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their largest industrial undertaking in the 1960s with 
capital expenditure of R127m around 1963. The plant was 
designed by Davy United of Sheffield with technology 
licenced by Newmont Chemical of the USA, Innes (1984, 
p.195). The plant was integrated with AAC's upstream iron 
and coal mining operations, with iron ore being railed in 
from the Mapochs mine 160km away at Roossenekal.
Highveld's capacity at the time was 360,000t/a of pig 
iron which was used to produce 300,000t/a of rolled steel 
sections and 18,000t/a of vanadium pentoxide (V205) slag.
Integration also took place with downstream 
industries owned by AAC. In the 1960s, the engineering 
sectors were affected by the general spate of mergers and 
acquisitions. The Anglo American Corporation, for 
example, bought downstream users of steel like Scaw 
Metals, Union Carriage and Wagon, Stewarts and Lloyds and 
Hall and Longmore, Innes (1984, p.195). Scaw was taken 
over in 19 64 by Amic. At the time it was a major producer 
of steel parts and grinding media for the mining industry 
and AAC's move essentially mirrored Iscor's actions in 
the 1930s when it created downstream industries in order 
to find a market for its increasing production. In 1966, 
Scaw expanded by RIOm.
A second boost to the engineering industry came from 
Rand Mines' subsidiary RMB Alloys who began producing 
ferrochrome in 1962 and expanded this capacity at 
Middleburg in 1964. In 1965, an R80m stainless steel 
plant, Southern Cross Steel, also known as Middelburg 
Steel and Alloys (MS&A), was built on the ferrochrome 
plant site.
Ferrochrome was first manufactured in South Africa 
by Iscor's joint venture, African Metals Corporation, 
during WWII for armament production. The modern 
ferrochromium industry began in 1960 when Amcor bought 
Ferrometals, Witbank which was producing high carbon
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alloy for use in stainless steel production. At the time 
the stainless steel refining process required a high 
chrome (65-70%) low carbon(0.5%) ferrochrome but new 
technology in the Argon-Oxygen-Decarburisation (AOD) 
steelmaking process allowed the more abundant low 
chromium (52-55%) high carbon (6-9%) alloy to be used 
(charge chrome). Amcor expanded the Witbank plant to 
produce this. Other competitors followed and by 1979, six 
smelters were in operation with national capacity of 
940kt.
3.2 MINING MECHANISATION - COAL MACHINERY AND MATERIALS 
HANDLING EQUIPMENT
The mechanisation of mining processes increased in 
the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s. The greatest 
developments took place in coal mining, inititally, with 
underground mechanisation and, subsequently, through 
open-cast mining operations each of which required 
different equipment, (figure 4.8). Coal production has 
been an integral component of the MEC, involving 
considerable coordination by the state through Escom's 
purchasing policies and direct and indirect state control 
of exports, Chapters 4 and 5. However, the scope of such 
coordination was never extended to the engineering 
sectors producing mining equipment, although the latter 
demonstrated a considerable capacity to produce complex 
machinery.
Various coal mining methods require specific types 
of equipment, (table 6.4). Essentially, underground 
mining consists of a series of unit operations involving 
cutting, blasting, loading and conveying coal out of the 
mine. In addition, most South African coal has a high ash 
content making it unsuitable for export unless upgraded 
through a subsequent crushing, sizing and/or washing 
process. Open-cast mining requires a different set of
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equipment; excavators and draglines to expose the coal 
seam and trucks to remove the coal from the site.
TABLE 6 . 4 -  COAL MINING EQUIPMENT PER MINING METHOD
Bord & Bord & Longwall Open Strip






Gathering Arm Loader *
LHD' s *
Shuttle Cars * * *
Roof Bolters * * *
Fans * * *
Feeder Breakers *






Front end Loaders * *
Source: Mostert (1982).
* represents the use of equipment in the particular 
process.
Christie (1984, pp.20-21) has identified labour 
resistance and periodic shortages of labour as major 
determinants in the mechanisation of coal cutting 
activity, the most labour-intensive activity of coal 
mining. While hand cutting of thin coal seams was 
cheaper, many colieries used hand cutting methods and 
electric chain coal-cutting machines simultaneously to 
ensure a steady output of coal during periods of labour 
shortage. Coal cutting was almost completely mechanised 
by 1930, less so in Natal where seams were narrower and 
more suited to hand cutting than in the Transvaal, (table 
6.5).
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TABLE 6.5 - COAL CUTTING MECHANISATION
TRANSVAAL NATAL







Due to the combustibility of coal, special 
explosives are used for blasting. Coal removal originally 
took place by hand loading, by horse and by shuttle car. 
While mechanical loading had replaced hand loading in the 
USA by 1930, most South African coal mines used labour- 
intensive methods until the 1950s, when coal output rose 
in accordance with electricity demand. By 1960, self- 
loading shuttle cars were in common use, carrying a 
maximum of 22 tons up to a conveyor belt.
Major changes took place in the coal industry from 
the early 1970s as output increased dramatically, (figure 
4.8). Growing interpenetration of large-scale capital by 
the 1970s allowed the state, English and Afrikaner 
capital to focus jointly on achieving economies of scale 
in coal production to serve electricity generation, 
synthetic fuels and export markets. A shift to continuous 
mining took place in the early 1970s, replacing the 
cutting/blasting/loading cycle, which also coincided with 
rising labour resistance and rising labour costs.
These changes provided impetus to developments in 
the engineering industries. Although the extent of 
domestic production of mining machinery varied according 
to equipment type, a variety of complex machinery has 
been produced from an early period. The argument here is 
that, firstly, engineering capability was inextricably
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linked to the MEC and that, secondly, the commonly 
accepted chronology of import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) beginning with the "easy" 
consumer good stages and ending with "difficult" capital 
goods production was not followed in South Africa. 
Thirdly, the potential to develop engineering sectors on 
the basis of MEC demand was never encouraged by 
coordinated industrial stategies.
Boart’s foray into coal mining machinery began in 
1963 with the acquisition of 50% of Bereg Engineering, 
makers of coal cutters and coal loader chains. Bereg, 
jointly owned by the General Mining and Finance 
Corporation, became Boart Mining Chains, and later became 
knows as Coalequip. However, in keeping with its 
international orientation, in the mid-1960s, Boart also 
expanded its Shannon factory with a carbide sintering and 
carburising plant to make carbide tipped mining tools and 
extension steels for the European and US markets.
Even before the 1960s, the Joy Manufacturing 
Company, was manufacturing complex, continuous coal 
mining machinery locally. Its origins were as the local 
agent for the Sullivan Machine Company, established in 
1929 as the agent for mining machinery, mainly scraper 
winches. Local manufacturing of scraper winches and 
diamond set crowns for the coal and gold industries began 
in 1936, partly as a response to import controls. Imports 
were restricted by import permits and coal mining was not 
considered an essential industry at the time.
Joy Manufacturing Company of the USA bought Sullivan 
in 19 45. At the time, Sullivan offered the only 
mechanical cutter available locally, and this allowed Joy 
to offer completely mechanised coal mining systems. By 
1950, two domestic coal mines were completely mechanised. 
The first locally manufactured loader was made in 1956. 
Shuttle cars and cutters were made locally by 1958 and
349
the first continuous miner was imported in the 1960s. The 
demand for continuous miners grew as coal mining 
mechanisation increased. Between 1980 and 1984, 28 units 
were imported. In 1979, the first continuous miner was 
made with 65% local content by value.1*1 By 1982, Joy had 
become the biggest supplier of underground trackless coal 
equipment. Today the local content is 98% by value with 
exports projected at 10-15% of turnover. Included among 
the in-house operations are electric motor manufacture, 
electronic equipment, gears, hydraulic systems, cutting, 
machining and assembly, straddling ISIC 381-383.
However, the lack of industrial policy coordination 
around this sector is evident when one considers that of 
the 400 continuous miners with replacement value 
estimated at R1200m supplied by Joy by 1991, only a small 
proportion have been made locally, despite the capability 
outlined above. Between 1984 and 1989, only 32 units were 
locally manufactured.11
The lost opportunities to develop sectors, such as 
continuous coal mining machinery sector, on the basis of 
large anticipated demands from MEC core sectors is 
duplicated across a number of other engineering 
industries. Some 42% of coal is currently produced by 
open cast methods compared to 26% by continuous 
underground mining and the former techniques have driven 
a different segment of the engineering industry, (table 
6.6, see earthmoving equipment section below). Although 
apparent at an early time, these trends in mining 
technique did not prompt the adoption of coherent 
policies to exploit the potential benefits.
10 South African Mining and Engineering Journal, Johannesburg, 11/82.
11 Engineering Week 21-7-89
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Source: Joy Manufacturing Interview (1991).
3.3 AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY CREATION
In 1960 the Minister of Economic Affairs initiated a 
BTI study into the motor industry. The industry had few 
local inputs and was essentially an assembler of 
completely knocked-down kits (CKDs).
For some time the metal industries had supplied 
limited components to motor assembly plants but 
not to any large extent, only a few firms 
engaging extensively in this type of 
manufacture. Seifsa (1966, p.27)
Subsquent tariff assistance led to the formation of 
more than 300 component manufacturers by 1967. This 
targeted industrial strategy was the second major 
industrial strategy involving the downstream use of 
steel, the first having been Iscor's creation of 
downstream joint ventures. However, coordination of this 
strategy was left to the private sector to organise and, 
as a result, the strategy was incomplete. One result was 
a fragmented components industry, particularly a 
fragmented foundry industry, see below. Although, the 
process of mergers and acquisitions accelerated in the 
1960s, particularly around the steel and engineering 
sectors, it was both insufficient in extent and not 
accompanied by a range of additional policies to 
encourage greater productive efficiencies so that
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engineering industries would be able to follow a path 
independent of the MEC.
In the case of the motor industry, many commentators 
have cited the local content programme, initiated in the 
early 1960s, as providing a boost to engineering
1 O
industries and the manufacturing sector. The evidence, 
presented in figure 4.7, indicates that the impact has 
perhaps been exaggerated, in relation to the MEC. Apart 
from the direct growth in GDP contribution of about 1.8%, 
the motor industry would have stimulated growth in the 
Fabricated Metal Product sector and in the Non-Electrical 
Machinery sector. While the latter two grew, 
respectively, to 2.2% and 1.6% of GDP, they are equally 
likely to have been stimulated by the impact of large- 
scale MEC projects during this period, Chapter 4.
Efforts made to diversify out of the MEC were not 
effective. Between 1960 and 1970, the GDP contribution of 
non-MEC manufacturing sectors rose from 15% to 17.5% and 
then fell below 16% in 1972. Only part of the 2.5% non- 
MEC growth can be attributed to the motor industry (0.6% 
GDP directly), the other significant contributor being 
the textile industry (0.4% GDP).
In the case of textiles, growth during the 1950s was 
partly encouraged by, now discredited, apartheid 
decentralisation policies.11 By the early 1960s, the 
lessons of this experience were abundantly clear to the 
IDC, the creator of the industry in the 1950s.14 However, 
the linkage effects created by the new SANS nylon plant 
in 1964, itself part of the MEC chemicals sector, 
provided a boost to the downstream textile industry,
(figure 4.7).
12 The IDC provided direct support by forming Wlspeco, a Joint venture with Australian Repco, to 
manufacture motor components.
13 See Clark (1987, p.335).
14 See van Eck cited by Gerber (1973, p.113).
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3.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
In the 1960s, a second strategy was implemented 
which had an impact on the Electrical Equipment sub­
sector of engineering, ISIC 383. A major influence on 
ISIC 383 has always been the electrical generation and 
distribution sector, with demand for such items as 
generators, switchgear, transmission and distribution 
equipment, (table 6.1).
This strategy concerned telecommunication equipment, 
in particular, electromechanical switchboard equipment, 
(table 6.1). It was initiated by a military committee and 
subsequent sectoral growth was driven and governed by the 
South African Posts and Telecommunications Department 
(SAPT) who formed a long-term joint venture with 
transnational telecommunication equipment suppliers, 
Kaplan (1990, pp.28-45). The specific form taken by the 
joint venture was a 10 year contract from 1959 to supply 
all domestic market requirements, through the SAPT, at 
prices which guaranteed the private companies a fixed 
profit margin.
In terms of the first Manufacture and Supply 
Agreement, SAPT guaranteed minimum purchases were 
about R30 million per annum, divided between four 
companied - ATE, AEI Henley, STC and Siemens SA ... 
AEI Henley (later to be taken over by the General 
Electric Company) and ATE (later to be taken over by 
Plessey) entered into a 50/50 joint venture, and in 
1958 established Telephone Manufacturers of South 
Africa (TM) to locally manufacture telephone 
instruments and electromechanical exchange 
equipment. In 1960, STC began to manufacture 
transmission equipment and PABXs in Boksburg 
employing a staff of 200. Siemens opened a factory 
at Koedoespoort in 1961 which made telephone and
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telegraph exchanges, magneto telephones and later, 
teleprinters. Plessey, at its factory in Cape Town, 
began producing items such as cords and manual 
switchboards for SAPT, Kaplan (1990, p. 31)
During the 1960s, output grew and in 1964, for 
example, constituted about 20% of activity in ISIC 383, 
Electrical Machinery.15 The objectives of the first 
agreement were limited to meeting a local content of 70% 
and to raise (preferably) white employment. However, 
local content targets were not met because "local 
industries were not able to provide some of the key 
inputs", Kaplan (1990, p.33) although white skill 
shortages were overcome by employing Indian and Coloured 
workers. As with the motor industry strategy, no 
additional supportive strategies were adopted to assist 
other sectors to build capacity to raise local content. 
Furthermore, the agreement focused on the internal market 
only, and therefore precluded the achievement of 
economies of scale. In 1969, the agreement was 
renegotiated on the basis of new digital technology which 
then undermined as outmoded, the achievements made thus 
far .
The state did attempt to use its purchasing power 
pro-actively to favour the local engineering industries 
in the early 1960s. The State Tender Board was instructed 
by the Minister of Economic Affairs that Government 
Departments should give priority to the purchase of 
products of the South African metal industries group. The 
Minister of Transport instructed the Railways to do the 
same. The Department of Commerce and Industry set up a 
Capital Goods Advisory Committee on which Seifsa was 
represented to investigate possibilities of local 
manufacture, Seifsa (1966, p.20). However, these were
15 Based on Kaplan's figure of R30m per annum and ISIC 381's gross output of R153m In 1964, South 
African Statistics, (1990).
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largely confined to ISIC 381 and, in any case, the state 
was not the main purchase of output from ISIC 3800.
In summary, the decade of the 1960s was 
characterised by rising investment in MEC core sectors, 
the increasing interpenetration between English and 
Afrikaner capital and an increasing concentration of 
ownership of most sub-sectors of manufacturing including 
the engineering industry. The influence of Iscor 
decisions on ISIC 381 diminished as private capital 
vertically integrated out of its new primary steel 
production with other downstream acquisitions. But ISIC 
381 and other engineering sub-sectors remained tied to 
the fortunes of the MEC as before. While the state 
attempted to diversify out of the MEC, particularly by 
fostering the automotive industry, policies were not 
cohesive and coherent enough for that sector or for its 
supporting sub-sectors within engineering.
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4. THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY AND THE MEC - 1972-199016
The rise in gold and energy prices after 197 3 led to 
the expansion of the MEC core sectors together with 
increasing coordination of activities within it. This 
concerned, in particular, coordination around energy, 
coal and chemicals and was accompanied by growing 
conglomerate control of the economy. These events around
the expansion of the MEC core in the 1970s led to
corresponding growth and change in the engineering 
sectors. Engineering output rose from R28b to R40b 
between 1972 and 1981, a most intensive period of mega­
project investment, (figure 6.3). But output contracted 
in the early 1980s as GDFI fell, resulting in 
considerable employment loss, and illustrates the 
dependence of engineering on MEC expenditure. Engineering 
employed 307,000 of the 1.4m employees in the 
manufacturing sector in 1990. The Mossgas mega-project 
boosted engineering in the late 1980s and the recent 
commitment to Alusaf, Columbus and chemical sector mega­
projects will further raise this.







FIGURE 6.3 - ENGINEERING SECTOR OUTPUT 1970-1990
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4.1 TRENDS IN ENGINEERING SECTOR'S TRADE BALANCE17
The South African engineering sector has developed 
in the shadow of the MEC. The changing nature of MEC core 
sectors has also altered the characteristics of the 
engineering sectors, both in terms of output range, 
quantity and quality as well as institutionally, for 
example, in regard to ownership.
Historically, the sectoral trade balance has 
fluctuated according to three factors. First, GDFI 
expenditure has been the primary drive behind imports 
into the engineering sector, (figure 6.3). This is due to 
the particular lumpy pattern of investments, namely the 
commitment of massive amounts of capital to mineral 
processing, petrochemical and energy (Escom, Sasol and 
Mossgas) mega-projects. A large proportion of national 
investment was allocated to the Escom expansions between 
1970-1985, to Sasol II and III between 1976-1982 and to 
Mossgas between 1988-1991. On ^average in 1990, the 
import/output ratio of the manufacturing sector was 0.37. 
The engineering sector's average was 0.56. Mining, in 
contrast, has a much lower import propensity, estimated 
to be about 0.05, Chapter 1. Engineering is a conduit for 
many imports destined for the sites of such projects. 
Turbines, compressors, vessels, pumps, machinery, 
components, are all required to be assembled and 
engineered into the projects. Thus the high import 
propensity of engineering is partly symptomatic of the 
fact that investments have focused on the Minerals-Energy 
Complex, which have required inputs which are import­
intensive .
Given that present Government and some extra- 
parliamentary planners have favoured a continuation of 
MEC investment to the exclusion of other strategies, the
Unlike  idc (1992), CEAS (1992) trade data excludes BLS and Namibia and has been used as such 
throughout this study except where Indicated.
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outlook for the engineering trade balance is bleak. The 
evidence below tends to negate the argument in the 
Nedbank Review, May 1992 which held that;
..in 1984 when capital formation relative to
GDP was high at 25%, ...only 18.6% of all
imports are used directly in fixed capital 
] ftformation ..{and therefore)... although an 
increase in fixed investment expenditure will 
result in an increase in imports, the impact 
may possibly not be as severe as anticipated.
The year 1984 was atypical in that no mega-project 
was in progress, the economy was sliding into recession, 
Escom was cutting back on expenditure and engineering 
lobbies were besieging the Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs to approve one of the several import 
replacement synthetic fuel projects that were supposed to 
follow Sasol II. ^  Gencor had proposed a coal 
liquefaction plant, Caltex and Anglovaal put forward a 
methanol plant, AECI submitted a coal based methanol-to- 
fuel project, Sentrachem had proposed producing ethanol 
from biomass, and Sasol had proposed Sasol IV. The result 
was Mossgas, much to the disappointment of the 
conglomerate parents of the engineering groups.
The trade balance has also fluctuated with the 
business cycle, lagging by approximately one year or 
less, with upturns and growth tending to suck in imports, 
and downturns having the opposite effect. This, of 
course, has serious balance of payment implications for 
any future periods of growth.
The exchange rate, the third influencing factor, 
appears not to have had an impact on engineering imports
18 Of the balance of 81.4%, 56.1% of Imports were used In "intermediate demand". The Nedbank Review, 
July 1993, wrongly assumes that none of this finds its way into fixed investment, whereas the 
evidence of this study proves otherwise.
Financial Mai I 6-4-84.
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as much as other factors discussed above. The Rand was 
acknowledged to be overvalued, between 1972 and 19 82 and, 
while this may have discouraged the export of engineering 
outputs, the evidence below is that most engineering sub­
sectors were operating at close to capacity and producing 
for the mega-projects of the time. Depreciation of the 
Rand after 1985 did not dampen imports into the 
engineering sector but exports have increased, (figure 
6.4). However, other factors, such as the General Export 
Incentive Scheme (GEIS), the two-tier exchange rate 
mechanism (see Shipbuilding below) and the need to export 
or die in declining domestic markets (See Railway 
Equipment below) have also contributed.
There is considerable variation between sub-sectoral 
Import/Output (I/O) ratios, (figure 6.5). As expected, 
the sectors involving machinery manufacture are the most 
import-intensive, having ratios well above the 
manufacturing I/O average of 0.37. The trade balances of 
individual sub-sectors have varied over time and are 
discussed individually below.
A similar diversity exists in Export/Output (E/0) 
ratios within engineering, (figure 6.6). The average for 
engineering is 0.11 and 0.51 for manufacturing as a 
whole. In 1990, the engineering sub-sectors with the 
highest E/0 ratios were Metal and Woodworking Machinery, 
Railway Equipment, Other Transport Equipment and 
Shipbuilding. There is at present no clear evidence of 
sustainability in these export achievements, Rustomjee 
(1993). Many industries appear to be feeling their way 
into export markets, cushioned by GEIS and other 
incentives. Furthermore, exports are from such a low 
base, that swings in E/O ratios from year to year are 
significant enough to make the ratio meaningless. For 
example, while Metal and Woodworking Machinery production 
was R245m in 1990, imports were worth R1159m with exports 
of Rl40m.
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Rising exports have been accompanied by significant 
ownership concentration, capital intensity, changes in 
production organisation and rising productivity. The 
causes and effects are blurred, varying across sub­
sectors, but although GEIS and a declining rand exchange 
rate have assisted, they do not appear to be determining.
While it is true that the capital goods produced 
from engineering sectors in South Africa exhibit lower 
export propensities compared to several NICs, this is but 
one basis of comparison. The simple comparison of export 
propensities is descriptive, and does not analyse reasons 
for the path that engineering has followed or why it 
failed to go beyond import replacement.
One of the consequences of the pattern of 
engineering growth is that its overall trade balance has 
been consistently negative, (figure 6.4). Portrayed in 
this way, the statistics conceal an important determinant 
in the trajectory of the engineering sector's 
development, which is that a considerable proportion of 
engineering sector imports are required for MEC 
investments, particularly the capital-intensive mega­
projects. This reveals the engineering industry to be 
both a site of value-adding activity as well as a conduit 
for goods required for investments made in the MEC core. 
This situation is more accurately reflected in the ratio 
of imports/value added. The impact of MEC expansion in 
the 1970s and the Mossgas project of the late 1980s are 
clearly reflected in rising ratios, (figure 6.7), 
although the previous trend was downward. Given that the 
economy is committed to further massive investments in 
the MEC, it is likely that the engineering industry trade 






FIGURE 6.4 - ENGINEERING SECTOR TRADE BALANCE
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FIGURE 6.5 - ENGINEERING SECTOR IMPORT PROPENSITY
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FIGURE 6.6 - ENGINEERING SECTOR EXPORT PROPENSITY
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FIGURE 6.7 - ENGINEERING SECTOR IMPORTS/VALUE ADDED 1972- 
1990
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FIGURE 6.8 - ENGINEERING SECTOR LINKS WITH OTHER SECTORS, 
1988
ENGINEERING
SECTOR ■ ■ |
V








Source: Inout-Qutout Tables. (1988).
(1) Engineering sector includes ISIC 381-384 but excludes 
the motor industry.
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4.2 ENGINEERING SECTOR ECONOMY-WIDE LINKAGES, INPUT- 
OUTPUT ANALYSIS
There are three important interlinkages around 
engineering activities. Firstly, the engineering sector 
forms the link between bulk material products such as 
steel, aluminium and chemicals, on the one hand, and more 
complex manufactures and final demand, on the other. The 
present role of engineering in relation to the MEC is 
illustrated in figure 6.8 which shows that about 50% of 
engineering output was routed to the MEC (including 
inter-engineering transfers), while 79% of engineering 
inputs were sourced from the engineering sectors and the 
MEC. Some 35% of engineering inputs (excluding labour) 
are sourced from the mineral processing sectors 3600 and 
3700, like Iron and Steel Basic Industries and from Non- 
Ferrous Metal Basic Industries.
Inter-engineering transfers, for example, includes 
castings output from the foundry industry (ISIC 381) 
being routed to the earthmoving equipment industry (ISIC 
384), which might also receive electrical equipment 
inputs from ISIC 383. The capacity of an economy to 
produce a capital item such as a bulldozer, for example, 
should therefore be viewed as a systemic process, one 
which encompasses several distinct manufacturing sub­
sectors each producing diverse capital goods and/or 
components.
Secondly, a considerable proportion of engineering 
output (25%) is drawn directly into sectors "absorbing" 
GDFI, mainly those sectors around the minerals-energy 
complex. In 1988, 45% of engineering inputs were sourced 
from the MEC. In other years, GDFI expenditure in 
mineral processing, chemical and energy projects might 
have been more important whereas, in 1988, output was 
particularly dependent on the mining industry. Mining was
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the most important direct single source of demand from 
outside the engineering sector. This linkage is important 
when estimating the cascading effects of the mine 
closures.
Third, strong intra-sectoral linkages exist within 
and between the various engineering sub-sectors (Eg. 
foundry output becoming railway/earthmoving equipment 
input). Inputs to engineering from various engineering 
sub-sectors amount to 35% of total material inputs, while 
25% of engineering output is routed back to other 
engineering sub-sectors. Thus, contraction of final 
demand from mining, leads to several multiple contracting 
"loops" within engineering. During the contraction of the 
1980s, this has resulted in huge retrenchments outlined 
in figure 6.3.
The main implication is that unless other markets 
are found to replace falling mining, mineral processing 
and energy sector demand, the outlook for the engineering 
sector is rather bleak. Conversely, should final demand 
rise as a result of new or expanding markets, the strong 
intra-sectoral linkages within engineering could lead to 
rapid multiplying "loops" of growth.
TABLE 6.7 - ENGINEERING SECTOR OUTPUT DESTINATION, 1990
FABRICATED NON­ NON-MOTOR ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING
METAL ELECTRICAL ELECTRICAL TRANSPORT AVERAGE AVERAGE
PRODUCTS MACHINERY MACHINERY EQUIPMENT
ISIC 381 ISIC 382 ISIC 383 ISIC 384
INTERMEDIATE OUTPUTS 64 31 47 13 44 52
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 1 4 6 8 4 23
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 3 7 7 47 8 4
INVESTMENT OUTPUTS 27 53 37 22 39 11
EXPORTS 5 5 3 10 5 10
Source: IDC (1992).
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In the 1970s and 1980s, the engineering sector has 
been shown to be demand driven and heavily dependent on 
GDFI in and around the MEC. However some engineering sub­
sectors are more dependent on intermediate consumption, 
others on government consumption. On average, the 
engineering sector's output is split between intermediate 
goods(43%) and investment goods(40%), (table 6.7). The 
bulk of output from Fabricated Metal Products(64%) is of 
an intermediate nature, such as structural steel, wire 
ropes and foundry castings destined for use in mining 
equipment or motor industry sub-assemblies. This 
highlights the generic nature of some sectors of 
engineering. The high proportion (53%) of Non-Electrical 
Machinery sectors' output was recorded as being 
Investment Outputs in 1990. This was probably partly 
related to the Mossgas project.
4.3 ENGINEERING AND THE BASIC METAL INDUSTRIES
The strength of the specific linkages between the 
Basic Metal Industries and downstream engineering 
sectors, reinforces the more general linkages shown 
above, and is reflected in table 6.8. While the relative 
shares consumed in downstream industries may vary from 
year to year, a significant 42% of Basic Iron and Steel 
output is directly utilised in the engineering sectors. 
This is likely to be higher if indirect supply via steel 
merchants, for example, is included. Of the balance, 3 2% 
of steel output was exported.
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FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS - OTHER 1,553 13
IRON & STEEL BASIC INDUSTRIES (PIPES & TUBES) 1,466 12
STRUCTURAL METAL PRODUCTS 909 7
CIVIL ENGINEERING AND OTHER CONSTRUCTION 788 6
MOTOR VEHICLES 518 4
MOTOR VEHICLES PARTS & ACCESSORIES 504 4
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION 487 4
OTHER MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL 412 3
SPECIAL INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 393 3
ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS 303 2
OTHER ELECTRICAL APPARATUS AND SUPPLIES 125 1
CUTLERY, HANDTOOLS AND GENERAL HARDWARE 91 1
FURNITURE AND FIXTURES PRIMARILY OF METAL 84 1
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE 82 1
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND STEAM 64 1









Source: Input-Output Tables, (1988).
Between 1972 and 1990, there was no significant 
growth in any individual sub-sector, except in the Basic 
Metal Industry (ISIC 371 and 372) sectors, (figure 6.9). 
Other than expansion and consolidation around steel 
production, there were a number of components that made 
up this growth including ferrochrome, aluminium, heavy 
mineral sands and platinum.
Basic Metal Industries value added doubled from 
R3.4b to R7.6b between 1972 and 1990. For the engineering 
sectors, ISIC 381-384, value added rose to peak in 1981 
and fell subsequently with declining MEC investment.
There has been considerable variation in value added 
across engineering sectors and the sections below explore 
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Source: IDC (1992).
(1) Basic Metal Industries covers Basic Iron and Steel 
(ISIC 371) and Non-Ferrous Metal Products (ISIC 372), 
which includes include iron, steel, ferrochrome, 
aluminium, heavy mineral sands refining and platinum.
(2) Transport equipment shown above (ISIC 384) excludes 
the motor industry
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A considerable portion of growth can be allocated to 
the expansion of Iscor's capacity in Newcastle. Iscor 
expenditure between 1973 and 1976, figure 4.4 was largely 
concentrated in expanding the Newcastle Works, which was 
built partially to support the state's industrial 
decentralisation plan. It was sited in the Tugela Basin, 
far from available sources of coking coal and iron ore 
and far from export ports or steel consuming industries. 
The decision was taken in 1969 and the first steel poured 
in 1974. The original population of 10,000 in 1969 was 
supplemented by 13,000 Iscor workers, and the population 
rose to 46,000 by 1980. The Newcastle plant's 45,000 
tons/month liquid steel production in 1975 rose to 
180,000 tons/month by 1980.
Figure 4.4 excludes the estimated expenditure
between 197 3-76 of R650m on the large MEC Sishen-Saldhana
railway project in the 1970s, of which RIOOm was for mine 
o n
expansion. ^ This together with other Iscor capital 
expenditure would have increased demands on other 
engineering sectors.
Several other industries within ISIC 371 and 372 
grew in the 1970s including aluminium, titanium and 
platinum smelting. Alusaf's capacity was doubled in 1974 
and a further expansion was carried out in 198 3 by 
importing an entire mothballed Japanese smelting plant. 
The titanium smelting operation at Richards Bay was 
initiated in 1972, as a joint venture between the IDC, 
Genmin, SA Mutual and QIT of Canada (a subsidiary of 
mining conglomerate RTZ).
However, the bulk of production was exported and no 
cohesive industrial strategy emerged to foster downstream 
engineering use of such output. Instead, existing 
downstream industries became further integrated
^  Construction in South Africa, September 1977 estimates of carrying out the Sishen-Saldhana Bay 
Railway Construction Act of 1973.
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vertically into existing primary producers, without 
diversification out of dependency on the MEC.
4.4 INDUSTRY INTEGRATION AROUND BASIC METAL INDUSTRIES
In the late 1960s, the slump in the steel market led 
Iscor and Highveld to form a joint venture called 
International Pipe and Steel Investments (IPSA) in 1971. 
By 1973, IPSA had rationalised three of the largest steel 
consuming companies in South Africa, including Stewarts 
and Lloyds, Vecor and Dorman Long into Dorbyl.21
By the 1970s, Afrikaner capital was also confidently 
reorganising other important sections of the mining and 
manufacturing industry, although not without favourable 
assistance from state institutions. Acquisitions of 
fragmented chrome mines in the early 1970s were 
consolidated and recapitalised leading to the development 
of the ferrochrome and ferromanganese industry on a large 
scale. After embarking on a joint venture with Union 
Carbide, which led to the construction of the Tubatse 
Ferrochrome smelter, Genmin took control of its main 
rival Samancor in 1984 in controversial circumstances. 
Samancor, formed by a merger between SA Manganese and 
Amcor in 1975, was controlled by Iscor(39.6%) with AAC as 
the largest private shareholder and Gencor as a smaller 
partner (7%). In 1977, both AAC and Genmin bid for 
Iscor*s 40% share but each was blocked by the state. In
1983, Genmin instituted a R120m court case against Iscor 
on a coal supply contract at the tied Hlobane colliery 
where Iscor was demanding reductions in supply. To 
resolve this, in June 1983, Iscor exchanged 50.25% of 
AMCOR (which controlled its share of Samancor) for 
Hlobane and 70% control of Dunswart Steel despite the 
fact that AAC would have paid more for the stake. In June
1984, Samancor bought the remainder of Iscor*s share.
21 Innes (1984, p.208).
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Highveld Steel, owned by AAC, only began to pay out 
dividends in 197 3. The company’s growth after its initial 
investment in 1968 was through acquisition. In 1975 it 
set up the Ferroveld electrode paste plant jointly with 
Samancor. A ferromanganese operation was bought from 
Avesta of Sweden in 1976. Rand Carbide's ferrosilicon and 
electrodes (paste) operation was purchased in 1978 and 
steel drum and pailmaker, Rheem, was acquired in 1985.
The largest acquisition, that of rival Middleburg Steel 
and Alloys (MS&A), came in 1991 and was done jointly with 
Samancor. A significant round of capital expenditure came 
in 1980, A RllOm expansion between 1980-1983 raised 
production from 850,000 tons/annum to 1.1m tons/annum. 
R60m was invested in a steckel hot-roll mill in 1982. At 
the time, Iscor was the only domestic producer of hot 
strip steel and had excess capacity. Air pollution 
equipment also cost R45m in 1982. Scaw Metals, also owned 
by AAC, spent R30m in 1983 on a rolling mill and its next 
round of capital expenditure was in 1988, involving a 
R72m pelletising plant, a R25m rotary kiln for its Vantra 
operation, R60m for a 5th sillicomanganese furnace at 
Transalloy and an Rllm ferrosilicon plant upgrade at Rand 
Carbide.
In 1971, increasing ownership concentration in the 
economy led to Thomas Barlow and Sons acquiring Rand 
Mines, owner of stainless steel and ferrochrome producer 
MS&A. Expansion followed in 1972 with an Argon-Oxygen- 
Decarburising (AOD) plant, submerged arc furnaces in 1976 
and 1977 and a briquetting plant for chromite fines in 
the same year. Between 1980 and 1982, a R150m expansion 
was commissioned including a continuous slab caster, a 
hot Steckel mill and ancilliary equipment, a cold rolling 
mill, processing lines and a new melt shop. In 1989, some 
R260m was spent on a chrome direct reduction plant (CDR) 
at Middelburg.^
22 Davis Borkum Hare (1991).
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In the early 1980s, South African steelmakers began 
to introduce direct reduction (DR) sponge iron plants due 
to a shortage of scrap. DR also obviates the need for 
coking coal, which is limited in South Africa. Instead, 
the plants used industrial gas produced from Sasol's 
synthetic fuel/chemicals complex. The plants used German 
technology and some equipment was imported including the 
plasma arc heaters and rectifiers. The balance of 
equipment including transformers were made locally. Union 
Steel Corporation's (Usco) 250,000 ton/annum DR plant 
cost R25-30m, compared with Iscor's 600,000 ton plant 
costing R150m and Scaw's 80,000 ton plant valued at R3 3m.
In the late 1980s, rationalisation of steel 
producers continued. Usco got into difficulties after its 
R20m vanadium plant was delayed, incurring an additional 
R20m penalty from its vanadium flake supplier, Rhovan. 
Steel and vanadium prices fell and the domestic market 
was stagnant. In 1991, Usco sold its steel division 
including DR units to Iscor for R50m, its steel trading 
operation was sold to Macsteel for R5m and the vanadium 
venture was sold to Rhovan for a nominal R 1 .
Most significantly, Iscor was privatised in 1989 
and, by 1993, the largest shareholders included IDC 
(16.1%), SA Mutual (10.1%) and AAC (13.2% through 
Standard Bank Nominees). This event was followed in 1991 
by Barlow Rand disposing of its holding in stainless 
steel maker, MS&A, to the AAC/Gencor Columbus joint 
venture.
The increasing ownership concentration of steel, 
speciality (stainless) steel, ferroalloys and aluminium, 
in the hands of AAC and Gencor has implications for the 
engineering industry in the 1990s, for these constitute 
major inputs to engineering. One important issue here 
relates to the pricing of intermediate commodities. In a
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recent study, Rustomjee (1993), several engineering firms 
cited the price and quality of steel as an impediment to 
their competitiveness with imported finished engineered 
products. It appears that considerable discretion is 
exercised in the pricing of intermediate materials. Some 
purchasers in downstream industries have been able to 
extract export parity prices. The power to do this seems 
related both to market power through volume purchases and 
to transfer pricing within vertically integrated 
industries under conglomerate ownership. Several 
exporters had special pricing arrangements with Transnet, 
overcoming another impediment to competitiveness.
4.5 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, ISIC 381
This sub-sector has been closely associated with the 
Basic Metals sectors. This historical association has 
been fused through ownership linkages from the 1930s, in 
the case of Iscor vertically integrating downstream, to 
recent times by increasing dominance of two domestic 
conglomerates. Consequently, the sector has the lowest 
import propensity within engineering, (figure 6.5). Value 
added in ISIC 381 grew from R3.7b to R5b between 1972 and 
1981 and then fell to R4.2b by 1990, (figure 6.9). This 
sector is explored by reference to the foundry industry 
and the vessel fabrication industry.
There are close input-output linkages between Basic 
Metal Industries, ISIC 371 and 372, and the foundry 
industry. These have overlapped with linkages of common 
ownership. Metal and energy inputs constitute the bulk of 
foundry material input costs. As discussed above, the 
process by which primary steel producers Iscor and 
Highveld integrated vertically downstream, also 
consolidated ownership of large foundries. The number of 
operating foundries has declined from 450 in 1981 to 200 
in 1988, Huyl (1988). In addition, concentration of
376
ownership has increased since the downturn after 1981.
The South African Foundry Association, formed in the 
early 1980s, represents 60 major foundries who produce 
70% of industry's output while 20 foundries produced 80% 
of all exports.23 In the recession of the 1980s, the 
process of consolidation has accelerated. In 1991, Scaw 
acquired the Lennings foundry group. The foundry industry 
today is dominated by four foundry groups, namely Murray 
and Roberts Foundries (Gencor), Scaw Metals (AAC), Dorbyl 
(Iscor and AAC) and independently-owned Unihold. It 
should be noted that after Iscor's privatisation, Gencor 
and AAC together control all the main material inputs for 
foundries.
The foundry industry has been driven, at different 
times, by demand from various segments of the MEC. Figure 
6.10 illustrates the growth in demand for ferrous 
castings in the 1970s and its subsequent decline. Ferrous 
foundry activity was associated directly with the SATS 
railway infrastructure expansion and, indirectly, with 
infrastructural and capital-intensive mineral and mineral 
processing projects. The expansion around export coal 
through Richards Bay increased requirements for coal 
mining equipment, cast products for the railways and the 
coal loading terminal. Increased demand for castings came 
through the Escom power station building programme, Sasol 
II and III and associated water (mainly pump casings and 
pipe fittings) projects. The GDFI expenditure decline in 
the early 1980s is mirrored in a tapering off of demand 
for ferrous castings from 667,000t in 1979 to 189,000t in 
1991.








































Source: Huyl (1988, p.9).
The foundry industry plays an important generic role 
linking basic metal production with the rest of the 
engineering industry, whereby 7 3% of foundry output is 
routed to other segments of engineering within ISIC 3800, 
(table 6.9). The industry is segmented between ferrous 
and non-ferrous products. Firms in the latter segment 
tend to be smaller and more specialised. The ferrous 
sector has the largest output in tonnage and value terms 
and is the largest employer. Non-ferrous sectors tend to 
be smaller and more specialised. Ferrous foundries are 
split mainly between heavy and light categories. Trends 
have differed for each segment and motivating factors 
have been fairly specific, related largely to changes in 
the markets for specific foundry products.
While the weight of ferrous casting output declined, 
the total value of foundry output rose from R690m in 1986 
to Rib in 1989.24 This has been due to a shift to higher 
value castings of lower weight. Huyl (1988, p.17) shows 
that the producer price index for castings between 1980 
and 1988 lagged behind the indices for base metals, 
fabricated metal products and transport equipment and,
24 Huyl (1988).
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therefore, rising values and falling tonnages of castings 
were not simply due to rising casting prices.
As a whole, the foundry industry's expansion in the 
1970s and its subsequent decline and consolidation took 
place in the absence of any industry specific strategy, 
except where related to arms production. Thus, the 
opportunities to build and learn on the basis of demand 
from MEC expenditure have been wasted. In the absence of 
cohesive industrial policy, the foundry sector's 
restructuring and contraction has been driven by pure 
market considerations without regard to preserving and 
enhancing areas of dynamic comparative advantage.
The heavy ferrous foundry segment expanded during 
the major infrastructure projects of the 1970s and has 
declined significantly since then. The closure and 
dispersion of unique productive facilities like Dorbyl's 
Vanderbijlpark heavy jobbing foundry in 1993 best 
illustrates the decline of this segment, with all the 
ensuing consequences should infrastructural development 
of major parts of South and Southern Africa take place in 
the future. Changes in ownership structure, capital 
intensity and technology utilised by the industry, 
however, mean that even if infrastructure expenditure 
meets previous peaks, employment levels will never reach 
corresponding past levels. In hindsight, it was perhaps 
inevitable that with domestic heavy MEC infrastructure 
completed, the need for heavy casting capacity would 
decline. Had there been a strategy for this sector, such 
a trend might have been anticipated and instead of 
prolonging the death of the facility, the dissipated 
skills and expertise might have been more constructively 
retrained and rechannelled into one of the growth areas 
of the foundry sector. The lighter ferrous foundry 
segments have been adversely affected, firstly, by the 
decline in infrastructure projects since the early 1980s 
and more recently, by the decline in mining capital
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expenditure and by Phase VI legislation around the 
automotive industry, its main current market.
The mining industry contraction has severely 
affected the ferrous foundry industry, though coal mining 
equipment (largely related to dragline and earthmoving 
machinery wear parts) demand on foundries have increased. 
This is a result of the massive increase in capital 
intensity in coal mining in the 1970s and 1980s, 
particularly towards open cast methods. The demand for 
replacement equipment wear parts will continue to keep 
sections of the foundry industry buoyant. The non-ferrous 
foundry sector has, in contrast, grown. Motivating 
factors include technological trends within foundries and 
trends in the use of lighter materials, mainly aluminium, 
particularly in the automotive industry.
Significant investments have been made in the 
aluminium foundry sub-sector, most notable of which is 
the Murray and Roberts RIOOm investment in the Cosmar and 
Gemtec plants in Port Elizabeth. Murray and Roberts are 
licensed by Cosworth, UK to use the casting process to 
produce aluminium cylinder heads. The castings will be 
machined by Gemtec, another Murray and Roberts company 
using state-of-art technology. Murray and Roberts see 
their operation as niche-based, having more flexibility 
in that they can competitively tender for smaller batches 
that would be ignored by larger overseas competitors.
It is unclear how vulnerable new automotive foundry 
activity is, linked with the export rebate scheme offered 
to the motor industry under Phase VI. When the scheme 
expires in 1996, or earlier if recent evidence of fraud 
is confirmed, will the bubble collapse as global vehicle 
manufacturers source their components from countries 
offering greater financial incentives?
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In contrast, an industrial strategy was present for
the armaments and atomic energy industries, and a number
of specialist foundries developed around the associated 
large and stable demand. These include Telcast, the 
Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), Metallurgical Processes 
(Metpro) and Castco.25 Significant capability in 
producing castings from exotic materials exists in 
institutions such as the AEC.
The benefits of these achievements have not been
utilised to propel the industries concerned to 
international competitiveness or to diffuse technology to 
commercial applications. In 1990, the coordination around 
arms production was summarily scrapped as the state 
switched to market-oriented policies. The expertise, 
built up at considerable cost, is presently dissipating 
through the competitive pressures of a stagnant domestic 
market, inward orientation and lack of experience in 
exports and the static competitive disadvantage that 
exists, in some cases, in competing at international 
prices. In the absence of an industry strategy, the most 
likely scenario is that the state-owned facilities or 
equipment will, in piecemeal fashion, be scrapped or sold 
to the private sector and associated skills dispersed.
The Mossgas project provided a testing ground for 
several foundries for petrochemical plant work, which has 
continued with the Sasol and oil refinery expansions 
planned between 1991-1994. Metpro, located near the AEC 
in Magaliesberg, is a leading specialist manufacturer of 
nickel magnesium alloys and centricast stainless steel 
tubes. It is one of two South African foundries capable 
of centrifugally casting stainless steel. The other is 
Rely Precision Castings, part of the Unihold group.26 The 
stainless steel specialist foundry market was estimated 
at R60-80m in 1990, supplied by only 3-4 specialist
^  For more detail see Rustomjee (1993).
26 Engineering News 12-4-90.
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foundries. Metpro itself is a subsidiary of Genmin's 
Impala Platinum Holdings and is effectively a domestic 
outlet for nickel from the Springs refinery.
Centricast technology is licensed from Post-Marre 
Edelstahlwerk of Dusseldorf and a lot of Metpro's work 
has been sourced from the licensor. In 1989, Lurgi placed 
an emergency order for 200 reformer tube sections for a 
Shanghai petrochemical plant through licensor PME, which 
had no capacity at the time. 30 reformer tubes have been 
made subsequently for Kynoch Fertilisers, Cape Town, 
(R0.5m) and the biggest contract to date was for 684 tube 
assemblies and 40 spares for the Mossgas reformers,
(Rllm). A subsequent R4m export order was obtained for 
tube ends for 4800 small diameter tubes for an East Asian 
ethylene plant. Clearly, there is a dependency on the 
licensor in this particular niche market, but it is 
important in indicating that requisite quality and price 
competitiveness is possible in a highly specialised 
niche. 1990 turnover was about R60m and, flushed with 
Mossgas success, the company plans to become a world 
leader in centricast tubes.
The higher value added end of the industry, known as 
’investment" casting of small net shaped castings, is 
still rather small. In 1991 there were 8 such foundries 
in South Africa compared with 200 in Taiwan, which 
produced 1.2 million tons of castings in 1990, up from 
422,OOOt in 1982.
The strategies adopted by this new "group" type of 
foundry ownership profess to raise quality through 
capital equipment upgrading, labour training and export 
targeting. While there is certainly evidence of rising 
capital intensity and exports, this has been accompanied
^  Engineering Week 31-8-90, Steloy Managing Director Danle Slabbert.
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by a fall in employment between 1989 and 199 3 from 40,000 
to 26,200.28
A corresponding commitment to raising skills does 
not appear to be forthcoming. While most of the major 
foundries are in the process of obtaining the (South 
African Bureau of Standards) SABS 0157 listing, some 
doubts have been cast on the effectiveness of raising 
quality. Anthony Harris, Chair of SAFA and Managing 
Director of Scaw Metals said "...quality assurance 
systems seem to generate an enormous amount of paper and 
provide employment for a new breed of quality assurance 
engineers. Whether this has made a significant 
contribution or not I have my doubts..."2^
In contrast to their overseas counterparts, South 
African foundries were, in 1990, regarded as largely 
labour-intensive, with consequent lower productivity and 
lower quality capabilities.88 Constraints cited include a 
shortage of technical and managerial skills and 
inadequate training facilities, both within the industry 
and at technikon level.81
The South African Institute of Foundrymen (SAIF), a 
technical organisation promoting technology advancement 
of casting as a science, appears to be the major 
protagonists of foundry technology training. Their 1992 
focus was on foundry technology and education which is 
seen as the key to international competitivity. However, 
most current training is done on a piecemeal basis within 
a few companies. In 1990, only 50 moulding apprentices 
and 80 patternmakers were in training in the entire 
industry of about 40,000 workers.
28 Engineering News 12-4-90 and Industrial Council Interview.
^  Engineering News 12-4-1991. Several repeated requests for an Interview with Scaw's Managing 
Director were dec 11ned.
30 Murray and Roberts Foundries Managing Director, Gordon Scott, Interviewed by Engineering News 12- 
4-90.
31 Engineering News 12-4-90.
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4.5.1 VESSEL FABRICATION INDUSTRY
The tank and pressure vessel engineering sub-sector 
has had a long direct association with the MEC, 
particularly the mining and chemical sectors. A 
considerable portion of domestic requirements of chemical 
sector mega-projects were met by local engineering 
fabricators. Major linkages exist between the production 
of bulk steel and aluminium and these downstream 
activities. For example, of the 3,000t of stainless steel 
produced in 1992, 300t was consumed directly by container 
tank manufacturers.
But as with foundries, the potential to build on the 
enormous demand generated by the MEC core since the 19 60s 
was not realised because of the lack of an industrial 
strategy for this sub-sector. During the construction of 
the domestic oil and synthetic fuel industry mega­
projects, many fabricators began domestic manufacture but 
little long term benefit was realised for, once the 
projects were completed, many of the fabricators simply 
closed down.
MEC projects tended to source equipment from the 
home countries of German or UK contractors. Often, this 
was conditional on the export credit form of industrial 
financing commonly used. However, some vessel fabricators 
have been successful domestically. CBI constructors 
received a Badger order to make 2 vertical coke drums for 
Sasol's R320m anode and needle coke complex. CBI also 
received a major portion of the Genref FCCU contract 
including design, fabrication and erection of a 
reactor/stripper, regenerator, reactor riser, spent and 
regenerated catalyst line and it is involved in 
mechanical package of Caltex refinery octane project and 
has export contracts of 9,000t including a West African 
project. It recently relocated its Port Elizabeth plant
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to Secunda, which is reported to have the largest rolls 
in the southern hemisphere.32
Another fabricator, DB Thermal, a subsidiary of 
Deutche Babcock, was awarded some pressure vessel 
contracts for Sasol's R300m ammonia plant and Genref’s 
R450m upgrade. Design work was done at the Parktown head 
office and fabrication at the Nigel workshop. This 
followed a 40 metre distillation tower/column for Mossgas 
in 1990. Industrial Research and Development of 
Boksburg, a subsidiary of Afrox/BOC was exporting 40% of 
production as early as 1980 indicating a degree of 
competence and competitiveness within South African 
engineering of fabricated metal products involving a 
significant amount of welding.
While most of the above are subsidiaries of 
transnational corporations and therefore more able to 
access export markets, some indigeneous engineering firms 
have been successful in producing for the world market. 
This indicates the possibilites open to domestic 
engineering. Figure 6.11 shows the rapid growth in 
exports of container and tank containers. Two companies, 
Consani(tank containers) and Trencor(containers) are the 
major manufacturers having raised production on the basis 
of exports. Export value of tank containers is 60% of the 
total exports of beneficiated stainless steel and 20% of 
the world's tank containers are made in South Africa, of 
which 30% are owned by individual South African 
investors.34 35
These isolated examples in the context of the 
broader failure of this sub-sector to develop an 
independence from the MEC can largely be attributed to
Engineering News 18-10-91. Refers to the size of plate that the mill is capable of rolling.
33 Engineering News 18-10-91.
34 Engineering Week 19-2-93.
35 Tank container leasing came under scrutiny In a 15 month Reserve Bank investigation Into a R60m 
fraud allegedly perpetrated by Multistar Container Transport owner, David Jenkins. The Attorney- 
General ultimately declined to prosecute. The Citizen, 27-2-93.
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the lack of industrial strategies to take advantage of 
the large capital-intensive projects of the 1970s. 
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4.6 NON-ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, ISIC 382
ISIC 382 has been driven mainly by capital 
expenditure on mining, mineral processing, petro-chemical 
and energy mega-projects within the MEC but past decades 
of expenditure have not resulted in a sustainable and 
internationally competitive non-electrical machinery 
sector. The fall in GDFI expenditure after 1981 caused 
output to contract from R12b to R7.8b by 1985, with 
employment down from 100,000 to 87,000, (figure 6.12).
There are six main sub-sectors within ISIC 382 
producing a sectorally diverse range of machinery. The 
two largest, in terms of employment, output and imports 
are, Special Industrial Machinery (ISIC 3824) and "Other" 
Machinery (ISIC 3829). Both sectors have been driven by 
MEC expenditure with ISIC 3829 more influenced by arms 
production.
Special Industrial Machinery includes the 
manufacture, alteration and repair of food, textile, 
paper, printing, chemical, oil refining, cement making, 
clay working, earthmoving, crushing and mineral refining 
equipment. Other Machinery includes the manufacture and 
repair of pumps, air and gas compressors, blowers, air- 
conditioning and ventillation equipment, fire sprinklers, 
industrial refrigerators and washing machines, mechanical 
power transmission equipment, cranes, elevators, 
escalators, industrial trucks, trailers, tractors, 
agricultural tractors, stackers, sewing machines, small 
arms, heavy ordinance and artillery assembly, rockets and 
missile assembly, furnaces, vending machines, industrial 
dry cleaners, stoves, ovens, ball and roller bearings, 
piston rings and valves.
Massive MEC capital expenditure after the 1970s 
contributed to the growth of sectoral output and 
employment between 1972 and 1982, (figure 6.12). This was
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particularly associated with increased mechanisation of 
coal mining with this and other open cast operations 
using earthmoving equipment including off-road dump 
trucks. The rapid growth in employment(+11,000), 
output(+R2b) and capital stock within Other Machinery 
between 1978 and 1982 is also likely to have been 
associated with the Sasol project.
A second factor that supported 1970s activity was 
growth in military expenditure linked to the invasion of 
Angola. Unlike almost all other manufacturing sub­
sectors, military expenditure sustained output and 
employment in ISIC 3829 up until 1990. A similar pattern 
is noted in the Aircraft section below. In contrast, 
Special Industrial Machinery, ISIC 3824, output collapsed 
from R6b in 1982 to R2.8b in 1987 with a similar decline 
in imports and the loss of 10,000 jobs. Four other sub­
sectors include Engines and Turbines, Agricultural 
Machinery, Metal and Woodworking Machinery and Office and 
Accounting Machinery.
Of note is the decline in Agricultural Machinery 
imports and production as a result of drought in the 
1980s as well as increasing concentration of already 
capital-intensive agricultural production. The growth of 
Office Machinery imports (consisting largely of computing 
and data processing equipment) including automated 
telling machines is due to rising bank automation. This 
followed the liberalisation of the financial sector 
between 1980 and 1983, which led to greater competition 
on the basis of (imported) machinery.^
ISIC 382 has one of the highest import propensities 
within manufacturing, with output of R8.4 billion matched 
by direct imports of components and finished products of 
Rll billion. (Total domestic demand of R19.4 billion)
More than half of engineering sector imports of R19.8b
36 For more details of the liberalisation Instruments, see Erosa (1987).
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were sucked through ISIC 382, (figure 6.13). Imports have 
been most significant via the two largest sub-sectors, 
ISIC 3824 and ISIC 3829, respectively accounting for 
R3.9b and R3.1b out of ISIC 382's Rllb in 1990.
With the exception of armament production, there has 
been no significant industrial policy targeting the 
industrial machinery sector. The "total strategy" adopted 
by the Botha regime resulted in segments of the arms 
industry being internationally competitive at great cost 
with few spin-offs to civil industries (discussed 
separately below). The greatest spin-off was in sub­
contracting work, which raised capacity utilisation in 
several private sector engineering works. This is partly 
reflected in the buoyant statistics for "Other"
Machinery. Sectoral trends are illustrated by reference 
to the arms industry and earthmoving equipment which 
includes bulldozers (ISIC 3824), front-end loaders (ISIC 
3824) and dump trucks (ISIC 3829).
4.6.1 EARTHMOVING EQUIPMENT
The bulk of the earthmoving sector's material inputs 
are sourced from other engineering sectors or are 
imported. For example, about 400 vendors supply equipment 
to Bell, one of the three main domestic manufacturers. 
Locally made components include cast axles from Scaw 
(AAC), brakes from the Southern Brake Co., hydraulic 
cylinders (made on site) and cast gears, hub reductions, 
differentials and drive shafts from Paramount engineers. 
Cast wheel rims are supplied from Guestro Wheels (Dorbyl 
subsidiary), tapered roller bearings locally manufactured 
by Timken and steel plate is supplied from Iscor through 
Stewarts and Lloyds (Dorbyl). Some 15,000t were used in 
1988. In 1991, usage had risen to 1,500t/month. The 
backward linkages with other segments of the engineering 
sector, such as foundries, are clearly illustrated here.
393
TABLE 6.10 - 1992 EARTHMOVING SALES BY EQUIPMENT TYPE
NEW WHOLE MACHINES (GENERAL EQUIPMENT) Rm
SMALL EXCAVATORS 





COAL MINING SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT
LARGE HYDRAULIC EXCAVATORS 50-100






EST. CONSTRUCTION MINING GOVT. 
SALES 
R (1990 )
1970 R6b 60 10 30
1992 R2-3b 25 70 5
Sources: Interviews with various earthmoving 
manufacturers, Engineering Week, Engineering News 
reports. No official market statistics are available for 
this sector and industries interviewed were very 
reluctant to release detailed market shares.
Earthmoving equipment itself is quite diverse,
(table 6.10). Of the R8b production and Rllb imports of 
ISIC 382 in 1990, new earthmoving equipment accounted for 
an estimated R1.5b production. In addition, an estimated 
R1.5b was spent on spare parts by end users.
Earthmoving markets have declined from R6b in 1970 
to R3b in 1992. In 1970, heavy infrastructural
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expenditure accounted for about 60% of the market but the 
mechanisation of mining, particularly coal, has made the 
mining market the most important one in 1992, accounting 
for 70% of sales. A drag line, for example, would cost 
about RIOOm in 1990 and there are currently 28 in service 
in South Africa, reflecting a replacement value of R2.8b. 
These forward linkages with mining are significant.
Annual expenditure of R2.1b on earthmoving equipment 
represents about 27% of GDFI in mining (R7.4b in 1990) 
and 3.7% of 1990 total national GDFI, which is 
significant for an economy in deep recession, with low 
levels of capital investment.
The import content of equipment has varied 
according to type and period. The Barlow Equipment 
Company <BEM) produces motor graders, wheel loaders, 
scrapers, off-highway trucks, tractors, coal haulers, 
water tankers, bulldozers and attachments like blades and 
rippers. For motor graders, the local content is about 
7 0% by value with engines, transmissions, axles and the 
hydraulic pump being imported. For wheel loaders, local 
content is about 60% and even lower for bulldozers. The 
actual impact on the balance of payments is higher, since 
half of total market sales consist of spare parts and 
most moving equipment items are imported. Local content 
has risen over time. In 1981, estimates were that only 
25% of total BEM sales by value were locally 
manufactured. In 1981, the BEM Managing Director said 
that it was not cost effective to make many components as 
this involved tremendous engineering and capital costs. 
They had not asked for tariff protection because of 
this.37 Local component production included buckets and 
hydraulic cylinders.
37 Financial Mai I 13-2-81.
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Declining markets in the 1980s led to the closure of 
BEM's Nigel plant and consolidation at Boksburg.®® In 
addition, subcontracting increased to 50% by value and 
75% of individual parts by 1993, raising local content.®^ 
An estimated 3-4 sub-contracting jobs exist for every 
Barlow Equipment employee.
In contrast, the local content of Bell's different 
range of equipment is about 72-7 8% depending on type of 
equipment. Imported components include ZF transmissions, 
ZF transfer gearboxes, Allison transmissions and 
Vickers(USA) hydraulic pumps.40 The policy is to 
standardise on world class component suppliers to 
facilitate quick response, reliability and security for 
overseas purchasers.
As with other engineering sectors, increasing 
ownership concentration within the earthmoving sector has 
occurred. There are two major domestic manufacturers of 
general earthmoving machinery, reflecting international 
competition. Komdresco, (AAC) is a joint venture between 
Anglo American's Amquip subsidiary, holding the Komatsu 
franchise for South Africa and Dresser Industries, USA 
and competes with the Barlow Equipment Company who have 
had the Caterpillar franchise in South Africa since 1927 
with local manufacture since 1951. BEM is controlled by 
conglomerate Barlow Rand, itself part of the SA Mutual 
empire. Komdresco 1991 sales are estimated at R500m with 
Barlows at R600m, each holding about 30% of the estimated 
total equipment market.41 Neither company would disclose 
sales figures in interviews.
38 SALES Rm SOURCE
1980 291 (Financial Mail 13-2-81)
1988 103 (Engineering News 26-8-88)
1989 145 (Engineering News 26-8-88)
39 Source: interview 9 March 1993. Other sources, Engineering News 26-8-88.
43 Bell now make an axial piston type hydraulic motor, previously Imported from Sweden.
Engineering Week 8-2-91.
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Some companies concentrate on certain equipment 
niches. Bell Equipment Company (family-owned) have been 
very successful in both the domestic and export market 
for articulated dump trucks, logging and cane loading 
equipment. Specialist equipment is made by several other 
companies. The Joy Manufacturing Company (discussed 
above) make continuous coal mining machinery. Eimco and 
Bateman manufacture in a variety of market segments. A 
number of large international manufacturers such as 
Harnischfeger, Mannesman Demag, Orenstein and Kopple have 
local subsidiaries assembling, rather than manufacturing 
rope excavators and hydraulic shovels. The trend is to 
import whole machines, with only the buckets and heavy 
metal fabrication being manufactured domestically. The 
companies argue that quality is the main impediment to 
increasing local content.
Many engineering companies who manufacture under 
licence, including Komdresco and BEM, are geographically 
limited to domestic markets and are unable to achieve 
economies of scale by exporting part of their production. 
Such constraints are negotiable and can be subject to 
national industrial strategies, particularly given that 
there is considerable global competition between 
transnational engineering companies such as Komatsu and 
Caterpillar.
However, no such industrial strategy has existed in 
South Africa to develop the earthmoving sector and the 
magnitude of past markets represent a lost opportunity. 
The success of the Bell Equipment Company underlines the 
capability of domestic engineering sectors, as an 
interlinked whole, to design, develop, market and support 
a piece of complex machinery in both domestic and 
international markets. Furthermore, it has done this 
independently of the domestic conglomerate structure.
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Bell is a family-owned and -controlled business with 
Senbank having 10% stake. Having started as a cane- 
loading equipment company in 1954, it has diversified, 
achieving phenomenal growth in producing and exporting 
complex mining and construction earthmoving machinery, 
(figure 6.14). If its exports are classified under ISIC 
3 82 and not under Transport Equipment, Bell alone 
accounted for R175m of ISIC 382's Rib exports in 1990.
4.6.2 ARMS PRODUCTION AND THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY
Unlike most other industrial, particularly 
engineering sectors, military and ideological factors 
around apartheid fashioned a very effective industrial 
strategy to produce and support the production of 
armaments. This was achieved at an enormous cost of about 
1.5-2% of GDP over a period of 20 years. Nuclear power 
and uranium enrichment was also part of this strategy.
The benefits of this strategy are embodied in Denel, 
a diversified conglomerate with R3 billion turnover, of 
which an estimated R 1 .1 billion relates to mechanical 
engineering activities. A few internationally competitive 
weapon systems have emerged within engineering.
Commercial spin-offs from military production appear to 
be limited, niche based and small in value terms. There 
appear to be few benefits to the internationally 
uncompetitive enrichment facilities of the Atomic Energy 
Corporation and the low value of existing and potential 
spin-offs cannot be justified on the basis of past 
expenditure. A number of issues pertain to the future 
though.
A significant proportion of defence equipment 
production has been sub-contracted to the private sector. 
Spin-offs from defence expenditure should theoretically 
have diffused into non-military applications through the 
firms concerned. There are, however, few examples of
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private sector companies that have succeeded in 
maintaining employment and redeploying efforts in 
developing such spin-offs from their defence contracts. 
Instead, reduction in defence purchases have had a 
significant impact on employment. For every Rib less that 
is spent on defence equipment, an estimated 20,000 jobs 
in the engineering sector have been lost, Rustomjee 
(1993). Significant losses have taken place already.
Commercialisation has reduced any cohesion between 
Denel, AEC and other state institutions who are under 
pressure to show short-term paper profits. In the present 
industrial policy vacuum and ideological and political 
attacks on the state sector, sales of assets to achieve 
short term profitability is the most likely route that 
will be followed. This might not be the optimal use of 
such facilities in the medium to long term.
Alternatively, state-owned engineering industries are 
entering markets today as competitors rather than as the 
rich customers they were in the past. While this might 
raise competition, it is also likely to have a severe and 
possibly short-term destructive impact on those sectors.



















Source: Rustomjee (1993) based on a Denel interview.
(1)R3,000m turnover includes Denel's intergroup sales of 
about R500m. Total assets are R2,900m while fixed assets 
are Rl,900m.
(2)Denel "engineering" includes Simera, LIW, Somchem 
pipemaking, Gerotek, Advena and Gennan.
(3)Figures are Denel estimates for 1993.
(4)1993 GDP estimated at R336b.
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Armscor co-ordinated defence force purchases as well 
as the production of armaments. In 1992 these activities 
were split, with the latter under Denel. Denel represents 
a large and diversified conglomerate with significant 
activity in the engineering sector and some penetration 
of non-military markets. Denel engineering activities are 
significant, contributing about 0.2% of GDP. About 3 7% of 
total Denel production lies within the engineering 
sectors, (table 6.11). The balance, which is spread 
between more traditional weapons production and 
electronic systems, involves a smaller mechanical 
engineering content. Of the identified engineering 
divisions, a significant proportion of activity is 
associated with aircraft manufacture/repair, small arms, 
transport equipment and the G5 and G6 artillery systems 
with a smaller proportion consisting of support 
activities and non-military sales.
Denel's growth can be attributed to coordinated 
policies around research, development and production 
together with the commitment of considerable resources in 
direct investment. Fixed assets grew in real terms since 
Armscor was created in 1968 with fixed assets of 
R (1990)205m. This rose to R (1990)2,118m in 1977 and 
R (1990)2,37 3m in 1988. The bulk of fixed investment thus 
took place in the early and mid-1970s, corresponding to 
capital stock growth within ISIC 3829, for example. An 
estimated 1.5-2% of GDP over a period of 15-20 years, was 
been spent on purchases of arms, contributing to building 
up the South African arms industry.42 Guaranteed and 
coordinated purchases also facilitated investments by 
private sub-contractors. No other sector of South African 
manufacturing has received such massive and sustained 
support, except perhaps the electronics and 
telecommunications sectors, sections of which were 
themselves developed to support military applications.42
Based on defence budget spending since 1968. 
See Kaplan (1990).
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Imports of items used in Denel's 1993 production is 
about R300m or 10% of output, significantly lower than 
the manufacturing sector's 37%. However, the import 
propensity of national armament requirements is 
significantly higher because the R300m excludes items 
which are imported directly for use by Armscor, which do 
not pass through Denel factories. Secondly, the turndown 
in the defence budget has, for 1993, cancelled or delayed 
production of some systems which have higher import 
contents, such as aircraft for example. About 46% of 
total exports emanate from Denel’s mechanical engineering 
related sectors, mainly G5 and G6 artillery systems. Most 
exports realise GEIS Category 4 rebates but the company 
regards itself as internationally competitive without 
GEIS.
A significant engineering capability exists within 
the AEC. In the 1970s, the development of the pilot 
enrichment plant was carried out in secrecy at enormous 
and, as yet, unquantified cost. It was found that 
domestic industry did not have the engineering capability 
to manufacture and test to the high tolerances required 
for uranium enrichment equipment. Workshops were thus set 
up at considerable expense at Pelindaba and Valindaba to 
service the enrichment facility. The AEC received a state 
subsidy of R685m in 1992 to produce R140m of enriched 
uranium. The present glut of cut price enriched uranium 
from the USA and eastern Europe, its availability to 
South Africa following signature to the Non Proliferation 
Treaty in 1992 and Escom's commitment to cutting real 
electricity costs by 20% over 5 years has jeopardised the 
future of the enrichment facilities. It was recently 
disclosed that while AEC sells Escom enriched uranium 
under long term contract at $200/Separative Work Unit, 
Russia can supply at $68/SWU, resulting in a saving to 
Escom of R80m/annum.44 The decision taken in 1993 to
44 Sunday Times, 21-2-93.
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close down the enrichment facilities has led the AEC to 
diversify (like Denel) into engineering services and 











|---- 1 ELECTRICT.GAS,WATER % OF TOTAL CAP EX
Source; South African Statistics (1990)
(1) Although the statistics are cited as Electricity, Gas 
and Water, the bulk of this expenditure after the 1970s 























ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, ISIC 383
PRODUCTION R(1990)m
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Source: CEAS(1992)















ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, ISIC 383
IMPORTS R( 1990)m
1
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Source: CEAS(1992)
ELECT.INDUSTRLMACH CZ3 RADIO.TV.COMMUNICAT G S ELECTRIC.APPUANCES m  OTHER ELECTRICAL
Source: CEAS (1992)
406
4.7 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, ISIC 383
As with other engineering subsectors, ISIC 383 has 
also been dependent on investments within the MEC core 
sectors. This section is not as developed as others since 
it was not covered in the Rustomjee (1993) study for the 
ISP project. Electrically operated coal mining machinery, 
for example, would be produced within this sector. 
However, Escom's capital expenditure has had the greatest 
impact.
Major spending programs began in 1974 (R1.5b) and 
ran through to a peak of R5.2b in 1984, falling steadily 
to 1990's R2b, (figure 6.15). The latter fall is the 
result of lower than expected growth in electricity 
consumption which has prompted Escom to curtail its 
capital expenditure programme drastically and to mothball 
older power stations which would also have incurred high 
maintenance costs to keep running.
There are four main sub-sectors within ISIC 383. The 
Domestic Electrical Appliance sector is dwarfed by the 
weight of activities, (figure 6.16), and imports, (figure 
6.17), in Electrical Industrial Machinery; Radio, TV and 
Communication Equipment (mainly South African Post and 
Telecommunications expenditure) and Other Electrical 
sectors.
4.8 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT, ISIC 384
Transport equipment exhibits the same 
characteristics evidenced in studies of other engineering 
sectors, namely, dependence on the MEC for inputs and 
concentrated ownership. Lack of cohesive industrial 
strategies have led to high import propensities across 
all transport equipment sub-sectors. The motor industry 
has been excluded from this study, firstly, because it is
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driven less directly by the MEC and more by global 
factors governing global motor production, even though 
there are important linkages with other engineering sub­
sectors, particularly through the foundry industry. 
Secondly, it is more researched than other engineering 
sectors.
Of the four sub-sectors of ISIC 384, Shipbuilding 
and Railway Equipment have been most influenced by the 
MEC. Railway Equipment production and associated imports 
declined drastically in the 1980s on completion of major 
infrastructure, particularly the upgraded coal export 
line to Richards Bay. This has accounted for most of the 
contraction in the sectors' production, (figure 6.18).
The Shipbuilding sector is a major market for MEC output. 
It includes ship repair and activity has been fairly 
static since the 1970s.
Domestic production of Aircraft and Spares has been 
associated largely with military aircraft. The import 
propensity for the sector has been high, (figure 6.5). 
South African Airways' (SAA) purchases of jumbo jets and 
South African Air Force (SAAF) requirements in the mid- 
1970s resulted in ISIC 384's import bill peaking at R7b 






FIGURE 6.18 - ISIC 384 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT - PRODUCTION
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FIGURE 6.19 - ISIC 384 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT -IMPORTS
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4.8.1 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIP REPAIR
Shipbuilding is closely linked to the Basic Metal 
Industries, the source of 21.4% of shipbuilding's 
material inputs. The chemical industry, part of the MEC, 
contributes another 10.1% while a further 19.9% of inputs 
come from within ISIC 3800, (table 6.12).
TABLE 6.12 - SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIR - LINKAGES
ISIC INPUTS TO SHIPBUILDING FROM %
3310 Wood 2.3
3521 Paint, varnish, Lacquor 2.8
3529 Other Chemical Products 4 . 8
351/354 Other Basic Chemicals,Fuel 2.5
3710 Iron St Steel 17 . 2
3720 Non-Ferrous Metals 4.2
3819 Other Fabricated Metal Products 5 . 6
3821 Engines & Turbines 3.4
3831 Electrical Industrial Machinery 3.2
3851 Shipbuilding & Repairs 7.7
4100 Electricity 1.9
61/62 Wholesale, Retail, Motor Trade 4 . 9
7100 Transport St Storage 2.0
81/82 Financial St Insurance Services 3.2
8310 Real Estate 3 .1
8320 Business Services 2.5
9900 Other Goods St Services 15.5
Other 13.1
Total Inputs 100 .0
Source: Input-Output Tables, (1988).
Given South Africa's location on world shipping 
lanes, ship repair and, to a lesser extent, ship 
building, has been carried out for many years, having 
been boosted during WWII. Shipbuilding and Repair passed 
through a major cycle of activity from the early 1970s. 
Closure of the Suez canal led to increasing traffic 
around the Cape and corresponding repair and maintenance 
work. Armadah Shipyards exported six oil rigs from the
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mid-1970s up to 1983 but failed to secure further orders. 
The demand for naval vessels during this period, built 
mostly at the Sandock-Austral yard in Durban also 
contributed to employment, capital stock and production 
peaks between 1976 and 1978 which declined thereafter 
until 1985. After 1985, increased activity was due to the 
construction of Mossgas offshore modules and with 
shipping lines, including South Africa's largest, 
Safmarine, increasing the overhaul of their fleets in 
South African ports. This was probably related to the 
collapse in the value of the rand.
Shipbuilding and Repair's trade balance has 
consistently been negative. This is partly due to the 
imports of complete vessels. In converting to container 
trade, Safmarine spent R350m between 1977 and 1980 on 
importing five 50,000t cellular container ships.45 In the 
same period, Dorbyl launched two cellular container ships 
for Unicorn Lines which, at the time, was the local 
yard's biggest customer. Local content of recently built 
vessels was 75% with the main imported items consisting 
of engines, ancillary equipment, deck cranes and marine 
electronics. An estimated 70% of components used in ship 
repair are imported and local manufacture of these items 
is unlikely in the absence of a viable shipbuilding 
industry.
Ownership of building and repair operations, as with 
other engineering sectors, has been vertically integrated 
with primary steel makers and has, in the 1970s and 1980s 
undergone increased concentration. Dorman Long 
established a shipyard in Durban in 1962 based initially 
on naval contracts. In 1968, it began ship repairs in 
Cape Town, merging with Swan Hunter. In 197 3, Dorman Long 
merged with Vecor to become Dorbyl. Between 1970 and 
1982, Dorbyl Marine launched 57 vessels including tugs, 
trawlers, supply/service vessels, two oil separator
^  Sunday Times 7-6-81.
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platforms and South Africa's first oil drilling rig. With 
stagnant demand, Dorbyl's workforce fell from 2,500 in 
1983 to 150 in 1985. Withdrawal of subsidies for 
shipbuilding relegated Dorbyl activities to small vessels 
for the local market. Dorbyl Marine's survival during 
those difficult times can also be attributed to the 
strength of its diversified parent. Dorbyl is owned by 
International Pipe and Steel Investments SA (52.6%), IPSI 
in turn owned by AAC 40% and Meteor 60%, while Meteor is 
owned by Rembrandt 50% and Iscor 26.5%.
By the early 1980s, Dorbyl and Sandock- 
Austral(Gencor) (naval vessels) were the largest 
shipbuilders followed by Dorman Long-Swan Hunter.
Activity in shipyards declined by 30% between 1981 and 
1983, a period of domestic recession and low world demand 
for shipping. Dorbyl also acquired Sandock-Austral's 
shipyard in Durban in 1987.
Dorbyl's next most important domestic competitor, 
EMSO, is part of the Murray and Roberts group (Sanlam).
In the 1970s and 1980s EMSO jointly controlled Amardah 
Shipyards in Durban with Darling and Hodgson, 
manufacturing oil rigs for export. After 1983, Armadah 
Shipyards sustained heavy losses and Darling and Hodgson 
sold out to Murray and Roberts. In the late 1980s EMSO 
completed the Mossgas jacket and several Mossgas modules.
Conglomerate ownership extends to the ship repair 
industry. By 1981 the main repair companies were Globe 
Engineering (Anglovaal), Elgin Engineering (Murray and 
Roberts) and Dorman Long-Swan Hunter (Dorbyl).
Merchant shipping, also exhibits concentrated 
ownership. Safmarine was set up by the IDC in the late 
1940s with the objective of creating an indigenous 
merchant marine. Its growth was supported by parastatal 
contracts such as Iscor's control of Amcor's pig iron
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exports to Yawata Iron and Steel in the 1960s, the Iscor 
Saldhana bulk contract in the 1970s and various fruit 
export contracts.46 In 1984, following the sale of IDC 
shares in Safmarine, control passed to SA Mutual which 
proceeded to rationalise its freight operations, 
Safmarine, Freight Services and Rennies into Safren.47
Unicorn, South Africa's second biggest line, was 
formed in 1966 by the merger of three lines and is 
jointly owned by Safmarine (40%) and Grindrod (60%), the 
latter owned by Gencor 49% and the Grindrod family 51%.
It would appear that some agreement exists to rationalise 
the market. The Financial Mail, 3-6-83:19 reported that 
"Safmarine and Unicorn have carved up the globe so that 
there is no over-lapping of routes".
The domestic deep-sea fishing fleet is controlled by 
Anglovaal but ownership of the inshore fleet, with the 
exception of Oceana (Barlow Rand), is fragmented but in 
need of replacement. It is likely to be a large potential 
market if standardised patterns were adopted. In 1992, 
Dorbyl estimated that replacing the 2-300 vessel fleet 
over the next ten years would cost between Rib and R6b.
Industrial policy did support shipbuilding in the 
past but did not go far enough, support being limited to 
raising the consumption of steel rather than developing 
greater integration with other sub-sectors within and 
outside engineering. Between 1969 and 1985, shipbuilding 
was supported by state incentives of a 10% cash subsidy 
of the contract price for smaller vessels and 25% cash 
subsidy for larger vessels. In addition a range of export 
incentives and IDC purchase loans were offered. Local 
shipbuilders argued that their competitors overseas 
received far higher subsidies of up to 40% from their 
governments.46 In 1985, following a BTI investigation
46 By 1970, Safmarine had diversified into air transport.
4^ Business Day 24-6-85.
48 Financial Mall 17-7-81.
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into the feasibility of more incentives to stimulate 
shipbuilding and repairs, the government withdrew the 
cash subsidies to the shipbuilding industry. This was 
partly driven by the crisis following the debt 
moratorium. On the other hand, shipbuilders themselves 
have not made any significant new capital investment 
since 1976, an indication of the extent of comfort 
offered by the above incentives.
Another component of policy towards shipbuilding has 
been notably absent. South African merchant shipping, 
despite having been started as a state enterprise, has 
not been encouraged to support domestic shipbuilding. The 
fact that the merchant fleet is small, disguises another 
related problem. For Unicorn and Safmarine, South 
Africa's biggest shipping lines, have failed to dominate 
South African freight business, transporting only 14% or 
11.4mt of the llOmt handled by Portnet in 1989. (80mt was
of a bulk product nature, mainly coal, mined and 
processed by one or other sister company of Unicorn or 
Safmarine) The total value of the national sea freight 
bill was R8.4b in 1989, excluding oil and other 
classified products. South African shippers captured only 
14-17% of the foreign freight bill, reflected as the net 
payments for freight and merchandise insurance of R2.6b 
(excess of payments over receipts)in 1989.49 This was a 
significant portion of invisible current account item 
"Service and Transfer payments" of RIO.9b in 1989. Had a 
greater share of national freight business been obtained, 
the larger purchasing power of domestic shipping lines 
might have provided greater support to shipbuilding, as 
was the case in Japan and Korea.50
In the past, Unicorn have purchased ships locally 
while Safmarine have not, partly because the required 
vessels were too large for local slipways. Recently, five
49 Financial Mail 24-5-91.
50 For a comprehensive account see Antsden (1989).
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new vessels have been ordered from eastern European 
yards.51 Domestic shipping lines argue that high 
subsidies provided to these yards, which were expected to 
be phased out in the near future, made local shipbuilders 
uncompetitive.5  ^ Furthermore, no local facilities and 
expertise exist to build the larger vessels.
Of course, developing domestic shipbuilding is not 
an objective of domestic shipping lines, who are 
following global shipping market trends and towards 
integrated transport services, going beyond port-port 
transfer and paperless shipping through advances in 
documentation technology. In 1991, Safmarine purchased 
49% of the largest shipping container line in Belgium, 
Compagnie Maritime Beige Transport (CMBT) for $25m. CMBT 
controls 24 liners, moved 400,000 containers in 1990, 
(East and west African coasts and controls the AMI 
forwarding and distribution agency in Africa) and has a 
large trucking business in Belgium and a freight agency. 
Unicorn Shipping Holdings has also expanded its presence 
in European shipping trade routes. Having created two 
Geneva based companies in May 1991,56 it sold two 
container ships (built by Dorbyl in the 1980s) to 
Carrybox Lines, Switzerland and then bought 80% of 
Carrybox in a R30m deal and one way of bypassing exchange 
control. This gives it access to routes between the UK, 
Europe and Portugal.54
Poor coordination and improvement of state-owned 
dry-dock and repair facilities have also acted against 
the shipbuilding industry. Some attempts to address this 
were rejected by the private sector in 1980, when SATS 
(now Portnet) offered to sell or lease its dry-docks to 
the marine engineering industry on condition that SATS 
vessels would get repair priority. They were refused and
51 Sunday Times 5-4-92.
52 Financial Mall 24-5-91.
53 Financial Mail 24-5-91.
54 Business Day 17-5-91.
416
no significant investment has been made in facilities 
since then.
The main constraints to increasing repair work is 
that ship repair facilities require expansion to cope 
with increasing traffic and larger vessels. Only one 
repair wharf in Cape Town was reported to be equipped 
with a crane, electric power and other facilities. Many 
wharves do not have power or fresh water.55 The 250,000t
oil tanker, Alborz, spent R1.5m on temporary repairs in
May 1991 before sailing to Singapore as no local drydock 
could accommodate the vessel for essential and lucrative 
repairs. The world's largest ship, 567,793t Norwegian 
tanker Jahre Viking, built in Japan in 1979 for Chinese 
tycoon CY Tung was rehabilitated after Iran/Iraq war 
damage at a cost of $38m in Singapore. The Cape Town 
drydock, one of the world's largest, is 25m too narrow to 
take the ship and no domestic harbour is capable of 
accommodating wide berth VLCCs. With the present 
commercialisation pressure on Portnet, and, in the 
absence of any cohesive industrial policy from the
present government, it is unlikely that further
investment in repair facilities will be forthcoming.
Overall, freight trends have shifted from general 
cargo to containerised and to specialised cargos through 
dedicated private sector leased facilities, eg. Durban's 
granite terminal, Rennies bulk terminal, SA Sugar 
terminal, citrus terminal, bulk facilities for molasses, 
soda ash and coal. It is likely that, given that there 
are only two major national ships repairers, such trends 
might extend to dedicated drydock and repair facilities. 
The possibility of the sale of Portnet facilities raises 
policy questions around ownership.
In 1990, despite these problems, Dorbyl Marine was 
awarded a R300m contract for three 10,000dwt container
55 Financial Mail 17-11-89.
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ships for Cyprus based Columbia Shipping. A measure of 
Dorbyl Marine's dominance of this sector is its 1990 
turnover of R299m, 83% of the sector's overall production 
of some R3 60m. The Columbia contract was secured by 
innovative financial engineering which utilised the 
financial rand. Essentially Columbia invested in local 
securities under the financial rand and used the 
dividends to pay Dorbyl. In addition, Dorbyl received 
GEIS export incentives of 19.5%.56 In 1992 the Reserve 
Bank refused to allow Columbia to finance two more ships 
under such a scheme on the grounds that "SA resources 
were paying for the ships...(and it)...reviews each 
proposed scheme on its merits and it tries to be 
scrupulously fair between economic sectors. Similar 
schemes have been rejected from other sectors", although 
it had allowed a certain number of such schemes following 
the debt moratorium in 1985.57
The financial rand issue highlights a potential 
problem of conflicting policy instruments. While the 
state's industrial policy had explicitly withdrawn 
subsidies to shipbuilding, the sector was able to use the 
exchange control mechanism to increase its international 
competitiveness artificially. Similar independent 
operation of the Reserve Bank might in future undermine 
industrial policy.
56 Th® Financial Mai I, 17-11-89, reported that variations of this mechanism was practiced by other 
firms. It was reported, for example, that a local shipping line was being Investigated for exchange 
control contravention after It used an Intermediary to buy Pifolic Investment Commissioner 
controlled foreign debt at the prevailing 30% discount. The intermediary then lent the same 
shipping company domestic funds against the debt.
^  Statements by Reserve Bank exchange control assistant General Manager, Alick Bruce-Band, reported 






























From the mid-1950s up to the early 1980s, South 
Africa was one of the world's most important markets for 
railway equipment. The purchasing patterns of South 
African Railways, now Transnet, shaped the railway 
equipment manufacturing industry. Transnet capital 
expenditure mirrors the production profile for railway 
equipment, (figure 6.20). Approximately 20-35% of the 
total Transnet budget was spent on equipment between 197 2 
and 1990. Much of this was associated with MEC 
requirements, such as the Richards Bay line and Sishen- 
Saldhana line in the 1970s.
Declining expenditure after the completion of major 
rail infrastructure cascaded onto the equipment 
suppliers, resulting in the present low levels of 
activity. Imports of equipment and components also 
fluctuated in accordance with Transnet expenditure. For 
the first time in 1990, exports have exceeded imports. On 
a national basis, import propensity has fluctuated 
between 21-45% of production value since 1972 and is 
currently running at about 25%. Employment peaked at 
11500 in 1982 and has declined since then to 5,200 in 
1990, the bulk of which is in Transnet maintainance 
departments. The largest locomotive and coach 
manufacturer, Union Carriage employed about 700 people in 
1990 .
The railway equipment sector developed through an 
unfocused industrial policy to maximise backward 
industrial linkages using Transnet's purchasing power 
during a three decade period of infrastructure 
development (1950-80). Infrastructure completion led to 
the sector's output shrinking between 1982 and 1990 from 
R1.2b to R300m.
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Conglomerate ownership of this sector only emerged 
in the 1980s. Until the mid-1970s Union Carriage and GEC 
Alsthom had a virtual monopoly on the supply of electric 
locomotives to Transnet, with GEC supplying the 
electrical equipment. In the 1960s, 50% of GEC UK's 
traction output was destined for South Africa. The volume 
of business justified a dedicated GEC traction equipment 
factory, manufacturing under licence, which was closed in 
1984 as demand fell. At the time, import content of 
electrical equipment was between 5-10% by value.
Union Carriage was established as an Australian 
subsidiary in 1957, with production beginning in 1959. 
Since establishment, it has supplied 13,000 locomotives, 
coaches and wagons to SAR. In the mid-1980s, political 
pressure by the labour movement within Australia forced 
gradual disinvestment, the shares being taken up by 
Sanlam and Anglo American. In 1993, Union Carriage is a 
subsidiary of Standard Engineering which is in turn 
jointly owned by Malbak and Murray and Roberts. AAC holds 
a 28.5% share through AMIC.
With the growth of new technologies using AC 
traction, GEC have lost market share, from almost 100% 
between 1950-70 to 40-50% between 1970-90. General Motors 
(GM) used to supply diesel-electric locomotives from Port 
Elizabeth until disinvestment in 1986.^® They were highly 
competitive, building on their mass production base in 
the US, and were able to import complete traction motors 
for less than the cost of GEC's unassembled materials 
domestically. More recently, Union Carriage have been 
making dual carriages, which are primarily electrically 
driven but have a diesel-electric capability.
Dorbyl Railway Products are the only other domestic 
manufacturer. They are considerably smaller than Union
^  Diesel-Electric means that a diesel engine turns an alternator which supplies current to a 
traction motor. Such units are used on unelectrified lines.
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Carriage, having supplied far fewer units of rolling 
stock since inception, compared to the former's 13,000. 
Previously, Dorbyl used to supply bogies to Union 
Carriage but secured an order from Transnet in 1984 for 
rolling stock, in an association with Hitachi. Transnet, 
at the time of shrinking markets, sought to support the 
creation of a second competitor. It appears that, like 
Escom's power station program, Transnet overestimated 
their equipment requirements, which led to sharp decline 
in orders in the late 1980s and a contraction of, for 
example, foundry output.
Part of the problem with the industrial strategy 
adopted was that access to the buoyant domestic market 
was only conditional on achieving a degree of local 
content. Instead, some conditionality should have been 
imposed regarding export markets. Today, like the motor 
industry, global sourcing patterns are followed in 
railway equipment manufacture. Thus, there is potential 
for railway component manufacturers to target the markets 
for bogies, gears, couplings and other components, many 
of which are ultimately sourced from the foundry 
industry. Australian National Industries bought EEC 
company, Aurora, and now export wheels and axles which 
are direct products from foundries. There is considerable 
potential for South Africa here since EEC foundries are 
closing down due to environmental considerations.
4.8.3 AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE AND REPAIR
The Aircraft sector is split between commercial and 
military applications. The commercial activities are 
dominated by the national carrier South African Airways, 
whose purchases of whole aircraft and spares and 
maintenance activities are largely delinked from the 
domestic economy. The bulk of domestic aircraft
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production relates to the assembly of military aircraft 
by the state-owned Atlas Aircraft Corporation.
Security considerations in the face of sanctions led 
the national carrier to purchase rather than lease its 
fleet and this had enormous balance of payment 
implications. Imports of R5.6b (1990 Rand) peaked in 
1976, and again in 1989, reflecting both the purchase of 
several Boeing and Airbus jets as well as building 
military stocks, (figure 6.19). The entry of Flitestar, 
Comair and other competitors to SAA have had a lower 
impact since they have chosen to lease rather than 
purchase aircraft.
In addition to imports of whole aircraft, the 
country was reported to have used R240m of aircraft 
spares in 1989 of which 75% was imported. SAA's 199 3 
spares inventory stands at R720m in value, due largely to 
sanctions and none of these components are manufactured 
locally. Large corresponding investments were made in a 
very broad maintenance capability for the fleet at Jan 
Smuts Airport, raising overhead costs. For a relatively 
small airline in international comparison, SAA Technical 
Department's scope of maintenance activity under one roof 
is one of the most extensive in the world. About R130m of 
the technical department's R520-570m turnover in 1993 is 
for, mainly routine, third party work for other airlines 
calling at Jan Smuts. A smaller maintainance capacity for 
smaller aircraft exists in four other companies; Safair, 
Comair, Field Aviation and NAC.
Atlas assembly operations cycled according to South 
African Air Force (SAAF) orders for a series of aircraft. 
Between its establishment in 1964 and 1991, Atlas 
manufactured/assembled Italian designed Impala Mkl and 
MKII jet fighters, Kudu and Bosbok light reconnaissance 
aircraft, Mirage jets, and Puma and Alouette helicopters. 
About 100 Impala jets and more than 100 helicopters were
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built between 1983 and 1991. Each Impala, for example, 
was valued at about R7m and peak production was 12 planes 
per annum.
The import propensity of military aircraft is very 
high. While exact data are unavailable, all assembly was 
carried out under licence to foreign corporations (mainly 
French and Italian). It is known that Snecma (France) 
supplied engines for Mirage and Cheetahs which were made 
under licence to Dassault (France). Puma, Alouette and 
Super Frelon helicopters were licensed by Aerospatiale 
(France) with Turbomeca supplying turboshaft engines.5  ^
Numerous arms smuggling cases in Europe and the US, 
involving aircraft and aerospace components, indicate the 
extent of import dependence. While production may have 
peaked in 1975 at around R660m, in the same year R5.6b 
(1990 rand) of aircraft and components were imported. In 
that year SAA purchased six Boeing 747SP and two Boeing 
747-200B Combi aircraft valued then at R233m or Rl,435m 
in 1990. Thus approximately R4b of military equipment, 
probably in component and kit form, were imported in that 
year.
Despite the import dependence, a significant 
domestic design and manufacturing capacity has been 
developed, although much of this is still shrouded in 
secrecy. Apart from avionics, which falls outside this 
study, capability appears to exist in engine and aircraft 
design and production. This capability grew out of a 
targeted industrial strategy, involving the commitment of 
significant resources to research and development, co­
ordinated by the military within the martial "total 
strategy" of the Botha regime.
Aircraft design, assembly and manufacturing capacity 
has been sustained by (now shrinking) defence 
expenditure. During the "total onslaught" framework of
^  Business Day 25-6-91.
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the Botha regime, this sector flourished under a tightly 
directed and well supported and co-ordinated industrial 
policy that focused major research and academic 
institutions around developing a design capability, 
capacity to reverse engineer, to develop advanced avionic 
systems and to make significant gains in materials 
technology, notably in the production and use of 
composite materials. Since 1990, the aircraft 
assembly/manufacturing segment has been abandoned to 
free-market forces. While the maintainance of the 
shrinking SAAF fleet is likely to provide a small 
constant baseload, the potential to build on past (and 
expensive) gains is rapidly diffusing.
There were at least four targeted developments in 
the 19 80s that went beyond simple assembly, which form 
the nucleus of a potential aerospace industry today.
These included helicopter design and manufacture; the 
capacity to reverse engineer, upgrading the ageing Mirage 
fleet with new radar, radar and mission performance 
accessories; a capability to design and produce jet 
turbine components such as blades in high precision 
foundry operations using single crystal vacuum furnace 
technology; and the capacity to design and develop the 
Ovid trainer and the Hummingbird observer aircraft made 
of composite materials.
The slashing of the defence budget in 1991 was the 
main factor in curtailing further development of the 
above projects. The fact that the projects incurred high 
costs and were uncompetitive was secondary, since 
projects of this nature take years to break even. In 
addition, airforce rationalisation has reduced the SAAF 
fleet from 775 to 390 aircraft and five of the twelve air 
bases have been closed,thus reducing the maintenance 
baseload on Atlas' activities.
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As the state has embraced free-market policies, the 
co-ordinated and targeted "total strategy" around this 
sector has dissipated. Armscor reorganisation has split 
military and (mostly potential) civilian activities 
between Atlas Aircraft Corporation and Simera. Military 
sub-contractors involved in aircraft manufacture have 
attempted to organise themselves around the Aerospace 
Industry Representative Association of South Africa 
(Airasa). However, the considerable accumulated expertise 
in this industry is being allowed, in the absence of any 
coordination, to diffuse.
The SAAF's (originally) R220m replacement programme 
for one hundred ageing Harvard trainers was contested by 
an industry consortium who proposed the Ovid aircraft. 
However, in December 1992, the Cabinet awarded Pilatus of 
Switzerland the R520m contract for 60 PL-7 trainers. Even 
though the Pilatus PL-7 cost more, R5.5m/plane compared 
to R 5 .3m for the Ovid,60 the reasons cited for this 
decision were that the Ovid was not fully developed and 
has yet to undergo the problems of tooling up and 
airworthiness certification. Pilatus, on the other hand, 
is in use by 22 airforces in the world and can be 
delivered immediately with established maintenance and 
simulation packages. Although Pilatus have offered a 
large amount (up to 55%) of offset work to Simera, it is 
anticipated that this will take the form of countertrade 
rather than be the site of the development of engineering 
equipment.
This issue has become quite controversial but 
whatever the merits of the various arguments, the lack of 
co-ordination between institutions involved is apparent, 
between Armscor as the sole military purchasing 
institution, SAAF as the user of the aircraft and the 
various parties within the industry association or 
consortium, who are attempting to institutionalise
60 Sunday Times 3-5-92.
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themselves as the Aerospace industry. In the absence of a 
national industrial policy that covers this sector, the 
net result is likely to be the loss of one of the most 
technologically advanced segments of the engineering 
industry.
4.9 TRENDS IN FIRM SIZE AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
The interdependence of different engineering sectors 
and their overall dependence on the MEC core has been 
illustrated above. In parallel with this, conglomerate 
control of the MEC core has been complemented by 
vertically and horizontally integrated control of all 
engineering sub-sectors.
Table 6.13 shows the extent to which the engineering 
sector is dominated by large firms and firm groups. This 
is particularly surprising for a sector like Fabricated 
Metal Products which is traditionally associated with 
smaller, often family-owned, workshops. Yet in 1985, 148 
of the 2,865 firms active in the sector employed 49% of 
workers and produced 65% of output. Trends in rising 
ownership concentration are not reflected because the 
definition of "firms" above are based on productive units 
rather than plants with common ownership. No data were 
available after 1985, a period acknowledged as one when 
significant increases in ownership concentration took 
place and confirmed in several case studies in Rustomjee 
(1993), where concentration is shown to be even greater 
than indicated in certain sub-sectors.
Many individual firms have been acquired and grouped 
within the six conglomerates that dominate the South 
African economy. Concentration is confirmed by firm level 
analysis, (table 6.14), showing the bulk of engineering
^  For IS 1C 371 see Hall Longmore case study; for ISIC 381 see Foundry Industry; for ISIC 382 see 
Earthmoving Equipment, Drilling Equipment; for ISIC 384 see Railway Equipment and Shipbuilding case 
studies.
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activity carried out by publicly listed subsidiaries of 
the six conglomerates that dominate the economy, which, 
collectively account for more than 70% of engineering
C o
sector output and fixed assets.
TABLE 6 . 1 3  -  EMPLOYMENT, 
FIRMS
OUTPUT AND ASSETS OF TOP 5% OF
No. of % of % of X of
Firms Total Total Total
(1) Employ Gross Assets
-ment Output
ISIC SECTOR
371 IRON & STEEL (1979) 8 75 78 88
371 IRON & STEEL (1982) 11 72 78 92
371 IRON & STEEL (1985) 10 71 77 88
Total Firms (1985) 192
372 NON-FERROUS METAL (1979) 6 44 65 74
372 NON-FERROUS METAL (1982) 6 44 61 68
372 NON-FERROUS METAL (1985) 5 41 63 77
Total Firms (1985) 104
381 FABRICATED METAL PRODS.(1979) 132 49 67 65
381 FABRICATED METAL PRODS.(1982) 148 51 64 66
381 FABRICATED METAL PRODS.(1985) 148 49 65 62
Total Firms (1985) 2,865
382 MACHINERY (NON-ELECT.) (1979) 71 47 56 51
382 MACHINERY (NON-ELECT.) (1982) 88 54 62 68
382 MACHINERY (NON-ELECT.) (1985) 93 53 60 72
Total Firms (1985) 1,856
384 TRANSPORT EQUIP.(NON M0T0R)(1979) 9 70 80 92
384 TRANSPORT EQUIP.(NON M0T0R)(1982) 11 69 74 69
384 TRANSPORT EQUIP.(NON MOTOR)(1985) 11 67 73 69
Total Firms (1985) 226
Source: Census on Manufacturing, (1982) and (1985).
(1) Defined as "a legal entity consisting of one or more 
establishment... Premises under the same ownership or 
management in which one type of manufacturing activity is 
carried on is regarded as an establishment."
62 This comparison of ISIC aggregates with published corporate data should be taken as Indicative 
only. Firstly, some of the activities of the above corporations might lie outside the paper's 
definition of "engineering". Secondly, the valuation of fixed assets differs from company to 
company and may not have been depreciated at the same rate as used In ISIC calculations.
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Powertech (6) Venter/Altron 1,157 145
AI tech (6) Venter/Altron 397 60
Telemetrix (6) Venter/Altron 72 11
Voltex Elcentre 1,075 271
Grlntek Anglovaal 1,031 37
DeIta DeIta PLC/AAC/SA MutuaI ? 40
TOTAL 25,742 5,940
ENGINEERING SECTOR, ISIC ESTIMATE 36,142 7,656
% of Total 71% 78%
Source: McGregor (1993)
(1)AMIC Annual Report, 1990, Contribution of "engineering” subsidiaries estimated at 25% of group 
turnover and 20% group fixed assets.
(2)Barlow Rand Annual Report, 1990, "engineering" contribution to turnover and assets Includes the 
following divisions; Electronics and electrical engineering (50%), Earthmovlng equipment (100%), 
building materials (50%) and steel (100%). Barlow listed subsidiaries African Cables, Persetech and 
Reunert are Included In holding company data and are not shown separately.
(3)Anglovaal Annual Report, 1990, Contribution of "engineering" subsidiaries estimated at 20% of 
group turnover and 20% group fixed assets.
(4)RustomJee (1993). Turnover is likely to have been higher than Indicated above In 1990.
(5)Murray and Roberts Engineering Annual Report, 1990. Murray and Roberts Engineering data are shown 
only.
(6)Holdlng companies Altron and Ventron are not shown. It is assumed that 50% of Altech activity 
relates to electrical (ISIC 383) and 50% to electronics (ISIC 385).





Ma Ibak/Gencor/AAC 1,254 279
Government 1,108 228
San Iam 817 340
Dlrectors/SA Mutual 785 88
San Iam/MaIbak/Gencor 691 119
Directors 589 32












It is no coincidence that tariff protection policies 
tended to favour large-scale, vertically integrated 
capital. High effective levels of protection (ie on both 
inputs and outputs) have partly been driven by increasing 
conglomerate control of both upstream and downstream 
industries. In 1989, IDC estimates for Fabricated Metal 
Products, Electrical and Non-Electrical Machinery sectors 
were 17.1% protection on inputs, 18.2% on outputs and an 
effective protection level of 20.3%.®3 This has raised 
barriers to entry for independently-owned firms. 
Independent metal fabricators, for example, are 
disadvantaged in having to buy inputs from conglomerate- 
owned steel companies or steel merchants at high prices 
and then compete with another subsidiary of the same 
conglomerate in shrinking markets.
For domestic production, consumers of steel with 
ownership links through conglomerates or by being partly 
owned by Iscor (Eg. Dorbyl) are in the best position.
They are followed by larger consumers of steel who, by 
virtue of size, have some muscle to negotiate favourable 
prices directly with the steel producers. Many smaller 
independent engineering firms are forced to buy steel 
through steel merchants, who handle about 40% of all 
steel sold domestically. Like many other sectors, 
merchant trade is dominated by three groups, Macsteel, 
Trident and Baldwins Steel(which is actually controlled 
by Dorbyl). Evidence is that the steel merchant price 
index has been consistently and significantly higher 
than, for example, the Iscor works price index. This is 
to be expected since merchants have to finance 
stockholdings and other off-cut wastage costs. However, 
there have been periodic complaints of price fixing among 
steel merchants with a call for investigation by the 
Competition Board.®4 One of the reasons cited by the
63 IDC (1990).
64 Sunday Times 22-9-91.
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Competition Board in blocking the Haggie/NFM merger in 
1993, was that it would lead to a monopoly in domestic 
copper scrap supply.
On the one hand, concentrated ownership is 
potentially beneficial in that it facilitates further 
concentrated investment and the achievement of economies 
of scale and scope. However, the evidence is that this 
has not been achieved, although the impact is mixed 
across sectors. Conglomerates have continued to focus on 
the MEC core as the main source of revenue and have not 
diversfied their engineering holdings out of a dependence 
on the MEC. Mergers and acquisitions by Sanlam, Old 
Mutual, AAC, Rembrandt and Anglovaal subsidiaries took 
place in the 1970s and 1980s without any clear sectoral 
or strategic focus. Fierce competition in a declining 
economy led to the wiping out of many small and 
independently-owned engineering firms. Some of these 
acquisitions are still being digested.
There is little evidence of any major improvement in 
the engineering arms of the conglomerates in the 1980s. 
Sectoral studies in Rustomjee (199 3) show uncompetitive 
production in sector after sector until the late 1980s. 
Instead, a general contraction set in whereby 
conglomerate muscle was used to lobby for higher tariffs 
to make domestic sales more profitable. Most of the 
industry associations in existence today were formed in 
the early 1980s. Furthermore, the 1980s were 
characterised by greater interpenetration of 
conglomerates at holding company level, making focus more 
difficult.
The combination of conglomerate control and import 
parity pricing has contributed to stifling independent 
engineering sector activity. Several independent 
engineering companies have raised productivity and 
competitiveness after conglomerates were forced by GEIS
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incentives to provide intermediate inputs at export 
parity prices. However, barriers to entry still 
disadvantage new players. They can only enter the market 
if they export, yet many of the export markets are 
dominated by conglomerate subsidiaries who export at 
marginal cost and who are in a better position to sustain 
a price war.
Despite this, some examples of success have been 
noted. However, their subsequent activity is to diversify 
into conglomerates themselves. This is illustrated by a 
recent move by Trencor. This independent engineering 
company which so successfully overcame such barriers to 
entry, chose to use its significant cash reserves, not to 
strengthen its engineering core or to shift focus within 
engineering, but to buy a small relatively independent 
conglomerate, W&A in February 1993.
Had there been an industrial strategy for the 
engineering sector, the obvious point in time to switch 
to an outward focus would have been in 19 81 when unit 
costs of production were at their lowest, capacity 
utilisation was high and engineering skills, though 
limited, were in place. Here the studies of Bell and 
Trencor are instructive, for during that declining 
period, they focused outward'whereas the increasing 
conglomerate control of engineering sectors focused 
inward, it being easier and more lucrative to engage in 
mergers and acquisitions in the shrinking domestic 
market.
The two main sources of revenue for conglomerates 
declined simultaneously in the late 1980s. The fall in 
mining revenue and state-led GDFI led parent companies to 
force a degree of focus on to several of the engineering 
conglomerate groups. The greatest impact has probably
^  This was despite the precedence of Boart, an internationally oriented drilling equipment 
subsidiary of AAC/De Beers since the 1960s.
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been made by the restructuring of Sanlam's messy 
collection of engineering assets.®6 Murray and Roberts 
and Malbak have taken over and rationalised many of the 
engineering interests of Sankorp, the holding company of 
Sanlam's industrial interests, most of which were held by 
Federale Volksbeleggings. Major Murray and Roberts 
acquisitions have included Darling and Hodgeson, 38% of 
Standard Engineering (the balance held by Gencor's Malbak 
- also part of Sanlam) and Blue Circle Cement. Murray and 
Roberts's investment policy is described in its Annual 
Report, 1991, as "to acquire or establish businesses 
which have related technology or markets and which add 
value to Murray and Roberts's activities". Murray and 
Roberts has done this and reduced gearing between 1990 
and 1992 from 22% to 14% through several sales of non­
related activities. Capital intensity has risen over the 
same period from R705m to R1271m. Similar consolidation 
and refocus is taking place within AAC, Iscor and 
Rembrandt-owned Dorbyl.
In summary, unbundling and refocus has been underway 
even before 199 3 budget proposals to encourage this 
process by taxing holding company dividends. Business 
analysts argue that in 1993, many engineering firms have 
become lean and are well placed to meet a period of 
growth. Excess capacity is very high. This means that, 
future growth may be met without any significant increase 
in capital expenditure. More importantly, should there be 
a need to increase capital investment in the engineering 
sectors, this might be facilitated by the peculiar form 
that South African conglomerates have taken, straddling 
mining, manufacturing and financial sectors.
However, the process described above has benefited 
conglomerates. The losers have been retrenched workers 
and a lost opportunity to enhance national development by 
preventing the destruction of engineering capacity after
66 Financial Mail 6-3-92.
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1981 and diversifying out of this into engineering 
activites independent of the MEC. The danger exists that, 
in the 1990s, the conglomerate-controlled engineering 
sector will continue narrowly to serve conglomerate-owned 
core MEC interests, thereby perpetuating the pattern of 
industrial history.
CONCLUSIONS
The MEC, while central to the economy, has been 
shown to have, firstly, driven developments in the 
engineering sectors and, secondly, to have been supported 
by such developments. Even so, the processes by which 
segments of the engineering industry developed have 
varied. Some sub-sectors, mainly Fabricated Metal 
Products (ISIC 382), developed as articulations of an 
expanding MEC core. Others, including industries within 
Non-Electrical Machinery (ISIC 383), Electrical Machinery 
(ISIC 383) and Transport Equipment (ISIC 385) grew upon 
demand for engineered goods. Yet others developed as part 
of tightly coordinated state strategies, either directly, 
for example, telecommunications within ISIC 383 or 
indirectly, in the case of armaments which stimulated a 
range of industries across ISIC 3800. However, in all 
cases, the driving force was linked to demands placed by 
core MEC sectors, either directly or indirectly. With few 
exceptions, the engineering sectors have not been able to 
develop an independence from the MEC.
Increasing conglomerate control of the South African 
economy is a characteristic of the MEC as a system of 
accumulation. It is prevalent across and between all 
major sub-sectors including mining, manufacturing and 
finance. In engineering, the particular form through 
which ownership evolved has been shown to have varied 
across the different engineering sectors. As with the 
development of MEC core sectors, the development of
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engineering has involved both conflicting and 
complementary relations between state- and privately- 
owned corporations. Ownership has had a significant 
impact on engineering sector development.
Ownership concentration grew out of increasing 
vertical integration, particularly around the Basic Metal 
Industries. This was driven in the inter-war period by 
state-owned Iscor. The disjuncture between English and 
Afrikaner capital shaped the expansion of engineering 
activity and also impeded it from developing an 
independence from the MEC. The ownership pattern of 
engineering, namely vertical and horizontal integration 
is shown to have originated in this period. Iscor 
developed a number of vertically integrated joint 
ventures with foreign and domestic capital. But the 
disjuncture precluded the adoption of any more cohesive 
industrial policies for engineering until the sector was 
placed under martial control for war production, during 
which many engineering industries made enormous progress 
in scale and scope.
In the post-war period, although there were enormous 
gains in engineering output and widening diversity, the 
disjuncture still constrained diversification. English 
capital concentrated on developing the Free State 
Goldfields until the mid-1950s, while Afrikaner capital 
was involved in pooling finance and concentrating it in 
large-scale investments mainly in the MEC core sectors of 
mining and chemicals. In the absence of industrial policy 
for engineering, engineering sector development was 
shaped by traditional demands from mining and increasing 
demands from the broadening MEC core, namely from 
electricity, railway, oil and chemical industries. Iscor 
also continued to be influential in shaping engineering 
through its vertically integrated operations.
435
In the 1960s, with the increasing erosion of the 
disjuncture between English and Afrikaner capital, the 
former entered the Basic Metal Industries sector and 
vertically integrated operations with acquisitions made 
during the outflow of foreign capital in 1961. Even 
though some policy attempts were made to diversify out of 
the MEC, through the creation of the motor and 
telecommunications industries, for example, these 
policies were not cohesive enough and their success was 
precluded by the disjuncture and by changing and 
increasing demands from an expanding MEC core.
The rise in gold and energy prices in the early 
1970s reversed attention back to the MEC core. Cohesive 
and extensive polices were adopted to considerably expand 
the core. Correspondingly, engineering activity grew in 
scale across all sub-sectors but there was no 
corresponding expansion of scope. So for example, the 
bulk of increased production from the Basic Metal 
Industries was exported and no cohesive industrial 
strategy emerged to foster downstream engineering use of 
such output. Instead, existing downstream industries 
became further integrated vertically into existing 
primary producers, without diversification out of 
dependency on the MEC.
Consequently, the slump that followed the exhaustion 
of the boom in the early 1980s led to drastic contraction 
across the entire engineering industry. This was 
accompanied by increasing mergers and acquisitions within 
conglomerate structures. Such concentration did not lead 
to rationalisation, increased investment and the seeking 
out of new export markets. Instead contraction continued 
according to MEC demand. Although there is considerable 
diversity across the engineering industry, an extensive 
interlinkage within the engineering industry has been 
demonstrated above, both in terms of material inputs and
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outputs as well as in relations of ownership and 
industrial organisation.
The engineering sector then, needs to be viewed as a 
systemic whole within which the capacity of industry to 
produce complex machinery, or capital goods, is 
ultimately bound up. Thus, for policy purposes, a 
targeted sectoral policy for the automotive industry is 
unlikely to succeed unless it considers the capability of 
casting, forging and pressing support industries as well 
as the industries producing materials that flow through 
these plants and the capacity of the industry to 
maintain, modify and produce the machinery that is used.
Some significant but isolated developments in the 
engineering sectors have occurred despite the lack of any 
cohesive and supporting industrial policy. The examples 
of Trencor, Consani and Bell suggest that, were cohesive 
policies to be instituted, there is enormous potential to 
increase the output from engineering sectors.
Although present policy makers proffer support for 
capital goods production, the policies being implemented 
are no more cohesive than they have been in the past, 
given the lack of supporting infrastructure and 
institutions to allow such sectors to survive proposed 
policies of deregulation and protective tariff 
reductions. The prospects for the engineering sector to 
become the focal point for diversification out of the MEC 
in the 1990s is, therefore, very bleak indeed.
In the 1990s, history appears to be repeating 
itself. Increasing investments are flowing into the MEC 
core in anticipation of a revival in international 
commodity prices. Most conglomerates have rationalised 
their engineering sector holdings and are poised to 
benefit internally from increased domestic demand. There 
is, however, little evidence that the engineering
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industry will go any way towards diversifying out of a 
dependence on the MEC core. As in the early 1970s, there 




This thesis has ambitiously attempted to weave 
together a political economy of seventy years of 
industrialisation. This tapestry, though far from 
complete, offers an original (re)interpretation of the 
paths and processes through which industrialisation is 
understood to have traversed.
Both the conduct of policy, as reflected in numerous 
government department reports and Commissions of Inquiry, 
and the accompanying debates over industrialisation share 
a distorted understanding of what industrialisation has 
occurred and why. By drawing a false dichotomy between 
mining and manufacturing activities, the evolution of the 
MEC that straddles both has been overlooked. It has been 
too readily accepted that industrialisation has 
floundered on an ISI path that initially proceeded from 
protected consumer goods but failed to achieve 
international competitiveness and backward linkages. In 
contrast, this thesis argues that economic Igrowth was 
based on expanding MEC core industries through the 
creation of forward linkages, but that this was not 
carried through to its full potential for the following 
reasons.
Firstly, secure industrialisation, while large in 
aggregate terms, is shown to has been confined to a 
number of core sectors around the Minerals-Energy 
Complex. Secondly, as a system of accumulation, the MEC 
has represented a complex and shifting relationship 
between English and Afrikaner fractions of capital, 
mediated through the state. The empowerment of Afrikaner 
capital and its interpenetration with English capital is 
shown to have underpinned the MEC as a system of 
accumulation. This had the effect of limiting industrial
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policy to three relatively uncoordinated, and even 
incoherent, components, namely, the creation of state 
corporations, mainly around the MEC, the application of 
trade policy through tariff protection and, thirdly, 
policies of industrial decentralisation. While these 
policies have varied over time and across sectors, they 
were poorly monitored and never actively sought to 
diversify out of the MEC on a long term basis. The 
reasons for this include the failure to develop an 
industrial strategy based on the realities of the MEC 
and, even where coherent policy did emerge, it was 
subordinated to other objectives.
Thirdly, the existence of concentrated ownership of 
industry in South Africa is well-known. But the thesis 
has gone further than before in bringing out its 
implications. It shows that, while the relationship and 
outcomes have differed across sectors, the MEC has both 
contributed to, and been influenced by, the particular 
large-scale and conglomerated form into which capital has 
evolved and through which it wields power and influence 
in the South African economy.
State regulation of capital in general has been seen 
to have empowered large-scale capital. For example, 
although enacted in 1955, anti-monopoly legislation has 
never been used against the interests of large-scale 
capital. Instead, it was often employed to transform some 
of the conflictual relationships between English and 
Afrikaner fractions of capital into collusive ones, as in 
coal mining.
The state's direct investments in industry, while 
small in comparison to private sector holdings, have been 
concentrated over different periods of time in MEC core 
sectors such as steel and chemicals. These interventions 
have been shown to have been simultaneously the sites of 
the expansion of the MEC core, of the interpenetration of
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English and Afrikaner capital and of the fostering of the 
development of large-scale capital.
The MEC, then, demonstrates a capability to carry 
through a significant industrial transformation of parts 
of the South African economy. But it has only done so on 
a piecemeal basis, exceptions that prove the rule as it 
were, for there has been an accompanying failure to 
diversify industrialisation away from MEC core sectors. 
This, in turn, exposes weaknesses in a number of 
generally accepted hypotheses. The argument that post-war 
industrialisation has conformed to a pattern of Import- 
Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) is shown to be 
misconstrued, differing from the industrial trajectory 
actually followed. In South Africa's case, industries 
which are supposedly "difficult" to substitute are shown 
to have expanded almost as fast as the industries which, 
according to ISI sequencing, come first because they are 
"easy" to substitute. This suggests that ISI may not be a 
useful methodology for analysing other developing 
economies. In any case, it is too descriptive, providing 
little analysis of why a particular pattern of 
industrialisation might or might not have evolved.
In addition, the buoyant hypothesis held by many 
observers in the 1970s and earlier, that South Africa had 
reached a stage of industrial "maturity" in Rostowian 
terms, is shown to be based on a recognition of gains 
made in and around the MEC. While Rostow's adherents 
expected these gains to be built upon by the forging of 
backward and forward linkages, the MEC hypothesis 
explains why differing circumstances prevented such an 
industrial policy from being carried through.
Thus, the prevailing hypotheses which downplay the 
capacity of a "peripheral" economy like South Africa to 
develop a domestic capital goods industry are shown to be 
false. Detailed study of the engineering industry has
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revealed both its dependence on MEC core sectors and the 
existence of considerable capacity to produce a wide 
range of simple to complex capital goods, together with 
examples of some highly competitive exporters.
This indicates that both the process and extent of 
industrialisation in South Africa has been misunderstood. 
From the perspective of the MEC, this enormous capability 
to meet a wide range of needs of the MEC core, as 
evidenced by a number of successful exporters of complex 
capital equipment, is an indication of the latent 
potential of industry, even if it has remained dependent 
on the MEC core. The fact that it failed to develop a 
dynamic of its own is attributed to the political, 
economic and institutional aspects governing the MEC as 
it evolved over time.
Yet, instead of acknowledging the central role of 
the MEC, the academic discourse in South Africa is shown 
to have been impelled by the application of various 
theories of industrialisation and development in general, 
some of which have been less useful in interpreting 
causality in the process of industrialisation, as has 
been shown in the case of ISI theory for example. In 
addition past debates over industrialisation are shown to 
have been based on a partial and even false recognition 
of how industrial policy has been adopted and implemented 
in practice. For example, the lack of cohesion between 
the three main policy instruments used to shape 
industrialisation, namely creating and supporting state 
corporations, trade or tariff policy and industrial 
decentralisation has been overlooked. Much of the 
historiography has focused on individual policy 
components, or on the false dichotomy between mining and 
manufacturing, but never have the components been 
considered together in the context of the MEC.
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This leads, finally, to the range of current debates 
which seek to proffer solutions to South Africa's 
supposedly weak manufacturing capability. The evidence in 
this thesis both questions the definition of 
"manufacturing" and reveals manufacturing sector 
"weakness" to be mixed across sectors and over time. 
Further, while weaknesses in manufacturing can be 
described at a particular point, they cannot be analysed 
without a comprehensive and historical understanding of 
linkages between the various sub-sectors of manufacturing 
and other sectors of the economy as well as the processes 
by which these have changed.
The challenges facing South African society, then, 
as it moves into a democratic era in the future are 
indeed as enormous as the achievements of the MEC in the 
past. Here, of crucial importance, will be the relative 
emphasis placed between either further developing the MEC 
core or attempting, once again, to diversify industry out 
of the strengths of MEC core sectors. Historically, it 
has been shown that several attempts were made by 
policymakers to achieve the latter, but these floundered 
for a variety of reasons; the disjuncture between 
economic power held by English capital and political 
power wielded by Afrikaner capital in the inter-war 
period, the focus on the development of Afrikaner capital 
and the Free State Goldfields in the 1950s; the 
interpenetration of English and Afrikaner capital in the 
1960s around the MEC core which facilitated cohesive 
policies to expand MEC sectors following the gold and 
energy price rises in 197 3; and, ultimately the end of 
this boom in the early 1980s when the apartheid system 
itself became increasingly susceptible to political 
challenges by disenfrachised South Africans and 
increasingly incapable of implementing coherent and co­
ordinated industrial policies.
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In the post-apartheid 1990s, there is no doubt that 
the power and influence of the MEC, through the 
conglomerates, will continue, as in the past, to make the 
greatest impact on the future trajectory of 
industrialisation in South Africa. A possible scenario is 
that, given the increasingly external orientation of the 
powerful conglomerates as well as the industrial policies 
favouring further MEC development, the South African 
economy could well revert to a dependence on primary 
commodities and primary processed commodity exports, 
facilitating conglomerate expansion externally. If the 
current policies of tariff reductions on non-MEC 
industries are carried through in the absence of any 
coherent industrial policy, de-industrialisation will 
take place with all the associated consequences. The 
economy will increasingly be subject to deteriorating 
terms of trade necessitating, as has been the case 
recently, corresponding exchange rate devaluations to 
bolster the profitability of MEC core sectors. More 
important, the nature of the large-scale and capital 
intensive industrialisation path means that formal sector 
employment will not grow significantly. Indeed, it is 
likely to decline with the contraction of non-MEC 
industries, as will the prospects for meeting the basic 
needs of South Africans.
On the other hand, there is an alternative scenario 
which presupposes that post-apartheid policymakers will 
recognise the cleavage at the sectoral level between the 
MEC core and non-MEC industries, and secondly, that their 
evolution is bound up with the particular form exhibited 
by large-scale capital through its interaction with 
various state-owned industries and state institutions.
The enormous achievements of the MEC as a system of 
accumulation, in creating and expanding the MEC core, 
have been accompanied by a dependent but diversified set 
of non-MEC industries with considerable, but as yet
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unrealised, potential as in the engineering sector for 
example.
The realisation of this potential will depend on the 
industrial policies adopted. Recognition of the cleavage 
based on the MEC will lead to at least three policy 
thrusts; one towards the MEC core sectors, one towards 
the non-MEC industries and an overarching set of policies 
to nurture the linkages between the two. Of necessity, 
this will require a mixture of incentives and coercion 
directed at the conglomerates, which by their 
concentrated, centralised and integrated form, are 
capable of, though unwilling to, carry through a 
diversification out of the MEC core.
Although large-scale private capital is not averse 
to accepting state support and guarantees for capital- 
intensive projects, in the present period of transition 
and in the global and domestic climate of deregulation 
and privatisation, it presents a collectively 
antagonistic front to any idea of coordinated state 
industrial policies. This does not mean that large-scale 
capital is opposed to coordination, but that the form 
taken will be unacceptable, should coordination usurp 
what are regarded as capital's prerogatives. Conglomerate 
behaviour thus continues to be a mixture of investment in 
export-oriented MEC core sectors through acquisition of 
privatised state-owned industries and some new investment 
whose profitablity is effectively underwritten by tax 
concessions and by the sheer magnitude of the capital 
committed. Capital flight continues to finance the off­
shore expansion of several conglomerates.
Policymakers will thus have to challenge the power 
of corporate capital without undermining the capability 
of its organisational form to carry through an 
industrialisation that genuinely diversifies out of the
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strengths of the MEC core and begins to meet the needs of 
those most affected by the legacy of apartheid.
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